Implementation Evaluation of Operation Phakisa

Final Report

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National Evaluation Plan Report

planning, monitoring and evaluation

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Abbreviation in Full
ANC	African National Congress
AsgiSA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South
BFR	Big Fast Results
CEF	Central Energy Fund
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CMT	Coastal and Marine Tourism
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DAFF	Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DDM	District Development Model
DEA	Department of Environmental Affairs
DG	Director General
DFFE	Department of Forestry, Fisheries, and the Environment[1]
DHET	Department of Higher Education and Training
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DMR	Department of Mineral Resources
DoE	Department of Energy
DoL	Department of Labour
DoT	Department of Transport
DPE Department	Department of Public Enterprises
DPME	DPME Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
DPME	Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (2010-2014)
DPSA	Department of Public Service and Administration
DPW	Department of Public Works
DRDLR	Department of Rural Development and Land Reform
DST	Department of Science and Technology
DTF	Delivery task force
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
DU	Delivery Unit
DWS	Department of Water and Sanitation
EBPM	Evidence-based policy making
EDD	Department of Economic Development
ETP	Economic Transformation Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution

[1] A number of government departments changed their name following the presidential election and cabinet reshuffle in 2019.

GNI	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
GTP	Government Transformation Programme
HDI	Human Development Index
ICRM	Ideal Clinic Realisation and Maintenance Programme
ICT	Information and communication technology
IMC	Inter-Ministerial Committee
IOPC	International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
ISU	Intervention Support Unit
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LCC	Lab Coordinating Committee
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCA	Malaysian Chinese Association
MKPI	Ministerial Key Performance Indicator
MPG	Marine Protection and Governance
MS	Multi-stakeholder
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MTM	Marine Transport and Manufacturing
MTSF	Medium Term Strategic Framework
NDP	National Development Plan (South Africa)
NEM	New Economic Model
NGP	New Growth Path
NKEA	National Key Economic Area
NKPI	National Key Performance Indicator
NKRA	National Key Result Area
NPAI	National Public Administration Initiative
NPM	New Public Management
NRF	National Research Foundation
NT	National Treasury
NTP	National Transformation Programme
O&G	O&G Oil and Gas
OPASA	Offshore Petroleum Association of South Africa
OPMS	Operation Phakisa Monitoring System
OPOCT	Operation Phakisa Occupational Coordinating Team
OPSMC	Operational Phakisa Sector Ministerial Committee
PASA	Petroleum Agency of South Africa
PCAS	Policy Coordination and Advisory Service
PDI	Previously Disadvantaged Individual
PDIA	Problem driven, iterative adaptation
PE	Public Entrepreneurs
PEMANDU	Performance Management and Delivery Unit
PetroSA	Petroleum South Africa
PIA	Phakisa Implementing Agent
PIRC	Presidential Issue Resolution Committee
PMDU	Performance Management and Delivery Unit

POA	Programme of Action
PSCBC	Public Sector Coordinating Bargaining Council
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACP	South African Communist Party
SEA	Strategic Environmental Assessment
SRI	Strategic Reform Initiative
TNPA	Transnet National Ports Authority
UCT	University of Cape Town
WDR	World Development Report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings of an implementation evaluation of Operation Phakisa conducted by Citofield who were commissioned by the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) and the Operation Phakisa Intervention Support Unit (ISU). The evaluation process commenced in May 2021 and ended in September 2022.

Operation Phakisa was identified by the South African government as a planning and implementation methodology whose key features include acceleration of service delivery. It brings a range of key stakeholders together for intensive and detailed practical planning and solution finding and is aimed at fast tracking the delivery of collaborative projects. While modelled around the Malaysia's "Big Fast Results" (BFR), this delivery mechanism was adapted to the South African context and reflected the government's commitment to deliver on priorities outlined in the National Development Plan of 2030 (NDP) in a faster, more efficient, and effective way. This results-oriented mechanism was seen as an opportunity to elevate planning for results in implementation plans based on agreed solutions that have clear timelines and targets. The guiding principle became that of "enhanced competitiveness' often compressed into the strategic aim of getting the private sector, the government, and other key stakeholders to work collaboratively to accelerate service delivery in key national priority areas. There was also a strong emphasis on the need for political buy-in to unblock government processes that were slowing down delivery and to set up delivery mechanisms that would function as conduits for solving matters of national priority with urgency.

The implementation evaluation was undertaken to meet the following two objectives:



Evaluation approach

To meet the learning objective for this evaluation, the evaluation team undertook a Utilisation-Focused Evaluation (UFE) approach pioneered by Michael Quinn Patton in 1978, whereby the work was engaged extensively with all the relevant stakeholders with the intention of utilising the results.

Complementing the UFE, the evaluation team undertook a theory-based approach (Chen and Rossi, 1980) as it set out to do the following:

- Describe and test the theory of change for the Operation Phakisa.
- Validate the connections and assumptions across each level of the underlying results chain; and
- Identify a set of indicators which can be used to monitor the performance of the programme against its theoretical framework.

In essence, the intention of the evaluation was also to develop an Operation Phakisa conceptual framework and a programme-implementation theory, to inform the programme development in this evaluation, as well in other similar studies in the future.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The terms of reference states that this evaluation should provide information and evidence to DPME, project partners and other stakeholders on; the programme results achieved in each of the seven (7) Labs, what has been working or not working, and lessons learnt in terms of the resources allocated over the past seven years of implementation. In summary the main objective of this implementation evaluation has been to assess the progress of the project's implementation to date and to identify lessons and/or remedial actions needed to achieve the desired results.

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team conducted an implementation evaluation where a mixed methods design (using quantitative and qualitative research techniques) was employed, and both primary and secondary data was collected. The evaluation team used disaggregated data (race, gender, age, location) to meet the accountability objective for this evaluation, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the Operation Phakisa delivery mechanism and to understand whether the intervention represented Value for Money.

The value of a mixed methods design is that it encourages simultaneous adoption of multiple paradigms, methods and methodologies that provide a holistic view by incorporating the perspectives and experiences of different stakeholder views and interests. The evaluation design of this evaluation is multi-stage, multi-strand, multi-method, and based on triangulation as indicated below:

- *Quantitative data* was derived from a survey questionnaire that was completed by the Operation Phakisa stakeholders.
- *Qualitative* data was derived from key informant interviews and a focus group discussion with the conceptualisers of the Operation Phakisa methodology, Delivery Unit Heads, members of Lab Coordinating Committees, Department representatives, the Private Sector, Academia, as well as DPME outcome facilitators and ISU officials.
- *Quantitative and qualitative secondary data* was derived from Operation Phakisa programme document which included reports and PowerPoint presentations
- *Academic and grey literature* were used to inform the introduction and contextualising the evaluation.

Following this introductory chapter on the programme description, social context, the history of the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) and the Intervention Support Unit (ISU), the remainder of the implementation evaluation report presents; the process of the evaluation, a brief description of the methodology, limitations and the evaluative activities carried out during the evaluation, the evaluation findings which are presented around the core evaluation questions. The conclusion is then presented using the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and emerging impact. Individual sections address different aspects of each criterion and include a detailed presentation of the findings, including stakeholder perceptions and findings emerging from the in-depth analysis of program documents and of implementers' responses. Appropriate conclusions and recommendations are presented in the final two sections.

1. PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION

1.1 Social Context

Since 1994, the government has delivered on many of the development commitments enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996, as amended, the Constitution) and more relevantly, the original Freedom Charter as declared in Kliptown, Soweto in 1955 (the Freedom Charter) and the National Development Plan (NDP, 2012, the Presidency, 2017). However, much work still needs to be done to eradicate the social and economic inequities created by South Africa's long history of segregation and apartheid. The 1994 democratic breakthrough, apart from triggering South Africa's re-distributive development agenda, also initiated concerted efforts through government interventions that were targeted at improving the lives of its citizens. The South African government positioned itself as "a capable and developmental state" based on the fundamental role that the state had played in East Asian industrialisation and development in the 1980s. The South African government's vision was that state intervention would be required to develop new capacities, products, technologies, and infrastructure, which would not arise from the normal workings of the markets. However, while South Africa underwent a successful and peaceful political transition in 1994, too many South Africans have remained excluded from participating in the economy, rendering the transition incomplete.

Despite its progressive development agenda, the South African government has struggled to implement many of its social and development interventions. Significant efforts have been made to develop policies, plans and strategies but the desired results have not always been achieved. While the Government has done much to address its most pressing development challenges, the triple challenge of high unemployment, poverty and inequality remain as pressing as ever. There is a major divide between political aspirations and rhetoric, and the robustness of public policies to improve the quality of the disadvantaged masses (Mouton, 2021). While politicians haggled over the terms of political settlement post-1994, a proverbial elephant lumbered around the room as South Africa entered its historic transition hauling along the bedraggled economy, unemployment, and inequitable distribution of resources (Marais, 2013). Whereas the world feted South Africa for its successful transition to democracy, other major conundrums stood unresolved. One was how to devise a set of policies that could potentially reconcile the country's insertion into global division of labour and equivalence, with the commitment to improve the quality of life of the majority. Bond

(2018) wrote that the dominant discourse in South Africa after 1994 orbited around improving the standard of living for South African citizens.

Many of the challenges facing the government are well known, but structurally difficult to address (Mathebula, 2015). This emanates from the fact that there are constrained resources, a narrow tax base that yields insufficient resources, and limited human capital that would enable the government to address its critical development challenges. At the time that government looked in 2013 at the Malaysian experiment with accelerated service delivery (Big Fast Results) the concerns around poor service delivery, cadre deployment, endemic corruption and weak governance and accountability mechanisms were growing, both within government and the private sector. Efforts to improve service delivery tend to come from the national government level, and many of the initiatives are potentially useful but the impact tends to decrease as they reach provincial and municipal levels. Under South Africa's devolved system of government, local government has been mandated to deliver quality sustainable services that communities require to maintain and improve their welfare, but it is at this level that service delivery failures have been most acutely experienced. The District Development Model (DDM) introduced by President Ramaphosa in 2020 is just one in a long line of government initiatives to strengthen the capacity of local governments and improve service delivery.

In 2012, the National Development Plan (NDP) recognised that the persistent and intransigent challenges of inadequate service delivery were a critical area of intervention for strengthening the capacity of the "developmental state" to deliver equitable services to all its citizens. As with many governments around the world, South Africa has struggled to pivot from traditional operating models to employ the agile, whole-of-government approach required for a modern interconnected, rapidly evolving development agenda. The main challenge has been unevenness in capacity that leads to uneven delivery performance in local, provincial, and national government. This is caused by a set of complex factors, including tensions in the political-administrative interface, instability of the administrative leadership, skills deficits, the erosion of accountability and authority, poor organisational design, and low staff morale. The weaknesses in capacity and performance are most serious in historically disadvantaged areas, where state intervention is most needed to improve the quality of people's lives. There have been many individual initiatives, but there is a tendency within the public sector to jump from one quick fix or policy initiative to the next – often a result of political pressure. These frequent changes have created instability in organisational structures and policy approaches that further strain limited capacity. The search for a quick fix has diverted attention from more fundamental national developmental priorities.

New initiatives have often been ad hoc, with responses to individual problems being implemented without adequate consideration being given to the cumulative longer-term consequences of poorly designed interventions and questionable stewardship of public resources. Inadequately formulated policy interventions often result in poorly prepared and equipped public servants who are expected to serve as government's delivery arm, but often become swamped by onerous systems and increased bureaucratic procedures. Based on its understanding of the "delivery unit" model that has been experimented in countries as diverse as the UK, Chile, Tanzania, and Malaysia, the government of South Africa at the time (2013) believed that this approach, translated into the domesticated "Operation Phakisa" could serve as the ideal mechanism for implementing key development priorities within the NDP by 2030. Its envisaged role was to serve as a fast-results delivery

mechanism involving the setting of clear plans and targets, monitoring of progress, and making results public.

1.2 About DPME

The DPME was established in January 2010, initially to introduce the outcomes approach to planning, and M&E of government's top priority outcomes approach and to facilitate, influence and support effective planning, monitoring and evaluation of government programmes aimed at improving service delivery, outcomes, and the impact on society (Goldman, 2013). The focus of the Department is on the implementation of the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 using the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) as an implementation and monitoring tool. The MTSF identifies the important actions required to implement the various aspects of the NDP for which the government is responsible over the medium to long term. Critical government programmes are periodically evaluated to determine the efficiency and effectiveness, as well as their impact, on society. Additionally, DPME has introduced several initiatives since its establishment, including a focus on the twelve (12) government priority outcomes; the assessment of the quality of management performance of national and provincial departments; a new system of monitoring front-line services; a national evaluation system; and a municipal performance assessment tool. These tools have contributed to a major increase in the availability of evidence for policy and decision making in South Africa.

1.2.1 The Intervention Support Unit

Since the inception of Operation Phakisa in 2013, the intervention has been closely monitored by DPME which has also been responsible for the overall management of the Operation Phakisa methodology and the coordination of the seven Labs. Through the Operation Phakisa Unit (OPU), later to become the Intervention Support Unit (ISU), DPME was also tasked with the performance monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of Operation Phakisa initiatives to ensure that the departments leading various Phakisa Labs reported regularly on progress made with regards to implementation.

The ISU established within DPME supports all the structures of Operation Phakisa in terms of establishing the necessary governance, communication and risk plans as well as developing and maintaining the reporting system. The Unit is ultimately responsible for the efficient and effective functioning of decision-making structures and the monitoring of delivery of Operation Phakisa activities, outputs, and outcomes (DPME, 2015b). The ISU supports the design, development, delivery, monitoring, and issue resolution related to the entire Operation Phakisa. Due to the custodianship of the Operation Phakisa delivery transmission mechanism residing in the DPME, the ISU is also responsible for the development and maintenance of the public reporting system and related infrastructure. In pursuit of fulfilling the monitoring mandate as part of the DPME, the ISU conducts independent monitoring of delivery in implementing agencies. The ISU was also tasked with knowledge management related to the work of the Labs.

1.3 Programme Background

Operation Phakisa was identified by the South African government as a planning and implementation methodology in 2014. Its attraction for the government were its key features that included accelerating service delivery of collaborative projects through bringing a range of key stakeholders together for intensive and detailed practical planning and solution finding. While modelled around the Malaysia's "Big Fast Results" (BFR) and the central role of a Delivery Unit called PEMANDU, this

delivery mechanism was domesticated to the South African context and reflected the government's commitment to deliver priorities in the NDP 2030 in a faster, more efficient, and effective way. Delivering the urgent citizen outcomes required in South Africa has always hinged on the implementation capability of the state. While there is no question that good policies have been necessary for achieving the country's development outcomes, the challenge is that there is an increasing recognition that they were insufficient for delivering on the strategic priorities of Vision 2030 as outlined in the NDP. Operation Phakisa, designed as a result-oriented delivery mechanism, was seen as an opportunity to elevate planning for results in implementation plans based on the agreed solutions that were evidence based and that had clear and measurable timelines and targets.

Stemming from a hybrid of corporate knowledge and strategies, mixed with the technical machinery and expertise of the government, Operation Phakisa was adopted to galvanise service delivery through collaboration, comprehensive planning, and a shared commitment to delivering development results. It brought together key sector stakeholders in one location and challenged them to take full ownership of the aspirations, decisions and initiatives generated during a full-time, "delivery Lab" of four to six weeks.

The appeal of the BFR Methodology to the Government of South Africa was that it was framed as a holistic and granular transformation approach designed to deliver a specific goal within a stipulated timeframe. It was premised on the notion of transformational leadership that could enable fundamental change. It also emphasised the powerful enabling role of the "centre of government" in driving transformational change through BFR. The intended aim was a comprehensive paradigm shift from business as usual to "business unusual", and an effort to embed accelerated delivery as the new normal for the public service. This "business unusual" mindset was regarded as adaptive to the different stages in the team's development throughout the transformation journey, where a more directive style was appropriate in the early planning stages, but which would evolve into a more empowering style as implementation geared up. Operation Phakisa was designed to be a cross-sector, multi-stakeholder programme where various stakeholders could engage with each other and pool complementary expertise to implement initiatives and develop concrete actions to address constraints to delivery in a prioritised focused area for public accountability and transparency. It also looked to improve cooperation between the government, organised businesses, civil society, and organised Labour. This included working on detailed problem analysis, priority setting, intervention planning, innovation, and delivery.

It is important to note that this methodology was not conceptualised as "an event", but rather as a continuous and deliberate government attempt of changing the delivery attitudes of civil servants to that of a nation in emergency, and to inculcate an urgency to delivering programmes that could address the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment, and inequality. The government of South Africa took the view that some of the potential benefits that could be obtained from Operation Phakisa would include:

- Fast-tracking of specific national development priorities as outlined in the NDP within the 2030-time horizon.
- Designing and implementing appropriate initiatives to achieve identified big and complex development outcomes.
- Facilitating co-operation and resourcing of initiatives by the public and private sectors; and

- Achieving quick and sustainable development results that could be measured and reported to the citizens of South Africa.

In the period 2013 to 2021 seven Operation Phakisa Labs (shown in Table 1 below) were undertaken with the one consistent objective of assisting the country to address and overcome the triple challenge of poverty, unemployment, and inequality.

Table 1: List of the seven Operation Phakisa Labs

Laboratory	Objectives
Ocean Economy	To examine and assess the economic opportunities of the oceans for South Africa as well as contribute up to R177 Billion to the GDP and create more than one million jobs by 2033.
Health (ICRM)	To find solutions that will address challenges in primary health Care facilities(clinics and community health centres): Service delivery, Waiting times, Infrastructure, Human resources for Health (HRH), Financial Management, Supply Chain Management, Institutional arrangements, Scale-up and sustainability.
Education(ICT in Education)	To provide solutions on how Information Communication Technology (ICT) can be integrated into all public schools to enhance teaching and learning
Mining	To galvanise growth, transformation, investment, and employment creation along the entire mining value chain, in relevant input sectors and in mining communities.
Biodiversity Economy	To develop and improve the bioprospecting industry to create a sustainable, inclusive, and commercially viable sector adding new jobs and contributing to GDP; and To have an inclusive, sustainable, and responsive wildlife economy that is growing, while providing a foundation for social well-being and maintaining the ecological resource base.
Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development	To ensure equitable access to land for economic development and agrarian transformation. To devise economic growth interventions for priority industries and commodities. To identify profitable markets and improve market access for commercial and small-scale producers. To address fragmented and low-impact support for producers. To improve sustainable productivity by balancing mechanization and job creation; and To reduce negative environmental impact of agricultural production through interventions.
Chemicals and Waste Economy	To grow the secondary resources economy by increasing local utilisation and beneficiation of waste resources by 50%-75% through creation of an enabling regulatory environment. To generate opportunities from chemical and waste resources for the creation of jobs/opportunities in new/existing markets specifically through enabling Small, Medium, and Micro-enterprises (SMMEs).

DPME (2018), states that all the Labs have had their own individual Lab aspirations, which have been collectively aimed at contributing to the targets set in the NDP, in terms of contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), job creation and transformation (inequality). Following the convening of

the first Operation Phakisa delivery Lab in July 2014 (the Oceans Economy), six more Labs were convened in rapid succession as demonstrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Operation Phakisa Lab Timelines



The original purpose of the Operation Phakisa was to fast track the implementation of priorities contained in the NDP 2030. The Operation Phakisa delivery transmission mechanism was intended to fast track the convening of delivery Labs[2], as well as accelerating the planning, implementation, monitoring, and reporting processes related to the plans developed by each Lab. This thinking was premised on both political and developmental imperatives to catalyse a service delivery paradigm shift towards doing "business unusual" to meet the commitments outlined in the ruling party's election manifesto as well as commitments made in the NDP.

Underpinning the purpose of this implementation evaluation is the concern that this fast-tracking approach has not been working optimally and that its perceived lack of impact has raised concerns within government about the cost and utility of the Operation Phakisa model. Findings from an evaluation of the Oceans Economy and observations by the Operation Phakisa Unit suggest that the speedy delivery which the Operation Phakisa envisages has often not been realised and, in most cases, this has been due to human and other factors (DPME, 2018). There is also a growing concern that there is no substantive evidence of the impact each of the delivery Labs had made so far. Government resources are increasingly scarce, and the current structure and format of these Labs is extremely expensive to convene and maintain. Additional concerns relate to the perception that the initial 'business unusual' approach has in fact transitioned into the routine administrative and operational functions of lead Operation Phakisa departments. As such, it is important that the overall

[2] A Lab is a forum in which a unit brings the key players together to develop a detailed implementation plan for a particular activity, including establishing their respective responsibilities

impact of the delivery Labs as fast-tracking delivery mechanisms is assessed to justify the financial and human resources used in them.

1.4 Legal and institutional frameworks governing the Operation Phakisa

The BFR as articulated in Malaysia was an approach to service delivery acceleration that was premised on the capacity of government sectors to change their delivery modalities by building a consensus for multisectoral, multi-stakeholder change, speeding up planning and implementation processes, creating efficiencies and cutting back on red tape. The ultimate goal was to change the attitude and mentality of public officials towards service delivery in a way that at the end they should embrace a "business unusual" approach to service delivery.

Conversely, governments have specific moral and legal responsibilities to intervene in society to direct and regulate socio-economic prosperity and political constancy. Such interventions might include facilitatory initiatives to establish an enabling socio-economic environment and developmental interventions such as the design of national policies and broad-based sector strategies and plans.

In South Africa, the NDP outlines a comprehensive broad-based vision for a capable state characterised by synergy, coordination, and cooperation between the spheres of government as it aims to eliminate poverty, lower unemployment, and reduce inequality by 2030. The NDP is seen as the guiding planning and development document for South Africa. It was released in 2011 and was positioned as a blueprint for tackling South Africa's multiple socio-economic challenges. It was structured around fourteen (14) priority outcomes: education, health, safety and security, economic growth and employment, skills development, infrastructure, rural development, human settlements, local government, environment, international relations, an effective public sector, social protection, nation-building and social cohesion. The NDP recognised, from the outset, that "Making the plan work will require a complex interplay of actors and actions, and progress in any one area is almost always dependent on progress in another. The plan will provide a common focus for action across all sectors and sections of South African society". This meant that for all government sectors accelerated delivery and quality of implementation would be required to meet the ambitious targets set out in the NDP. Efforts to harmonise the Operation Phakisa initiative with the NDP led to the identification a cluster of development priorities that could be addressed using the "accelerated service delivery transmission" approach. These components of the NDP would serve as the platform for launching the various design concepts that would be realised through the creation of the Labs:

- Chapter 3 focuses on Economy and Employment, detailing an unemployment rate fall from 24.9 percent in (June 2012) to 14 percent (2020) and to 6 percent (2030). Total employment rises from 13 million to 24 million.
- Chapter 4 focuses on Economic Infrastructure and includes a target where the proportion of people with access to the electricity grid should rise to at least 90 percent by 2030.
- Chapter 5 focuses on Environmental Sustainability and expands on economic infrastructure targets. This includes a set of indicators for natural resources to inform policy. A target for land and oceans under protection (presently about 7.9 million hectares of land, 848kms of coastline and 4 172 square kilometres of ocean are protected). At least 20 OOOMW of renewable energy should be contracted by 2030. Increased investment in new agricultural technologies, research, and the development of adaptation strategies for the protection of

rural livelihoods and expansion of commercial agriculture. Absolute reductions in the total volume of waste disposed to landfill each year.

- Chapter 9 focuses on expanding Science, Technology, and Innovation outputs by increasing research and development spending by government and through encouraging industry to do so.
- Chapter 10 focuses on the deployment of primary healthcare teams to provide care to families and communities. Recruit, train and deploy 700 000 community health workers to implement community-based primary health care. Increase average male and female life expectancy at birth to 70 years. Strengthen health systems at district level.

2. EVALUATION PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

This section discusses the purpose and the methodological approach that was employed in carrying out this evaluation. Further to this broad task, this section also provides a brief outline of the field work that was carried out by the evaluation team.

This evaluation utilises a pragmatic paradigm in which we argue that quantitative data alone cannot holistically tell us the impact of the Operation Phakisa methodology (Stern et al, 2012). The paradigm blends the interpretivism paradigm ***(there are as many realities as the number of individuals*** - ***each individual and or family have their own story to tell)*** and positivism paradigm (***we can quantify and generalise the impact to the rest of the population)*** philosophical underpinnings. The individual strengths of quantitative and qualitative methods have resulted in such a combination (Bamberger, 2012). In addition, Leeuw & Vaessen (2009) argue that a mix of methods, which is triangulating information from different approaches, is essential in assessing different facets of complex outcomes, yielding greater validity than from one method alone. The methodological approach was, therefore, mixed methods; where qualitative methods (sampling, data collection and analysis techniques) are applied together with the quantitative methods. The attractiveness of the mixed-method approach lies in the fact that it allows a combination of inductive and deductive thinking to respond to the evaluation questions while making use of various types of data.

The methods explained in this chapter present a portrait of intellectual inquiry processes that resemble an interlocking system of levers, typical of internal mechanisms in a clock, controlling the evaluation and finding justification. Consequently, each method was used to reveal the different facets under evaluation.

2.1 Evaluation Purpose

According to the South Africa's National Evaluation Policy Framework (2011), implementation evaluations aim to "evaluate whether an intervention'' operational mechanisms support the achievement of the objectives or not and understand why". Conversely, evaluation helps to provide evidence for continuing support for a programme and in determining whether a programme is appropriate for the target population, and to identify any challenges with its implementation. The focus of this evaluation is to use available evidence to present an in depth and comprehensive understanding of the quality-of-service delivery of the Operation Phakisa methodology.

The commissioned Citofield evaluation team comprehends that the overall purpose of this evaluation is to provide information to DPME, project partners and other stakeholders with evidence on the programme results achieved so far, as to what is working or not working, and what lessons have been learned in terms of the resources allocated over the past seven years of implementation. In essence, the main objective of this implementation evaluation is to assess the progress of the project's implementation to date and to identify lessons and/or corrections needed to achieve the desired results.

2.2 Key evaluation questions

The approach adopted in this evaluation is to use a set of questions to focus and structure program evaluations and program evaluation is fundamentally about answering these questions (Owen & Rogers, 1999). Thus, this evaluation is framed by a set of overarching evaluation questions that

should yield the kind of evidence that enable evaluators to make substantive recommendations. The overarching evaluation questions are as follows:

1. To what extent has the Operation Phakisa planning and implementation methodology been appropriately designed for the achievement of its objectives?
2. Three years after the convening of the seven Operation Phakisa delivery Labs, are the various Operation Phakisa Labs likely to achieve the intended outputs and outcomes?
3. To what extent has the Operation Phakisa delivery transmission mechanism inculcated the "business unusual" approach in government?
4. What lessons can be learned from the implementation of Operation Phakisa in South Africa?

2.3 Evaluation Design and Approach

The evaluation approach that was undertaken in this evaluation is the Utilisation Focused Approach (UTI) pioneered by Michael Quinn Patton in 2008, whereby the work was engaged extensively with all the relevant stakeholders with the intention of utilising the results. Complementing the UFE, the evaluation team undertook a theory-based approach as it sets out to describe and test the theory of change for the Operation Phakisa; to validate the connections and assumptions across each level of the underlying results chain; and to identify a set of indicators which can be used to monitor the performance of the programme against its theoretical framework.

As discussed before and to ensure a comprehensive evaluation, this report is based on methodologies that incorporate both quantitative and qualitative approaches as shown in Figure 2 below:

Figure 2: Mixed methodology design used in the evaluation



The qualitative approach included key informant interviews, focus groups, reflection sessions and secondary documents reviews while the quantitative approach included survey questionnaires, and secondary document reviews. Given the various advantages and disadvantages associated with pure quantitative or qualitative designs, recent practice in evaluation design favour mixed methods designs. It is also important to note that the proliferation of data and meanings contributes to

complex understanding and improves the validity of the program representations and findings and methodology that underpin the analysis presented in this report.

2.4 Evaluation criteria

Drawing on the OECD DAC[3] evaluation criteria, the purpose of the evaluation criteria is linked to the purpose of this evaluation. This criterion has been used to enable evaluators to determine the merit, worth and significance of the interventions implemented. Each criterion is a different lens and perspective through which the programme can be viewed. Together, the criteria provide a more comprehensive picture of the interventions, the process of implementation, and the results. It describes the desired attributes of interventions: all interventions should be relevant to the context, coherent with other interventions, achieve their objectives, deliver results in an efficient way, and have positive impacts that are sustainable. The evaluators have worked with this criterion to assess how the Operation Phakisa methodology could, based on the already achieved outcomes, be made more strategic and which technical areas of operation could be improved. This criterion facilitated the identification of evidence gaps and generated findings and recommendations that support more effective implementation of the NDP imperatives. Applying the OECD DAC evaluation criteria surfaced issues that help to indicate how Operation Phakisa can enhance learning about service delivery change and involve a range of stakeholders in participating in the evaluation. Figure 3 below summarises the criteria applied in this evaluation.

Figure 3: OECD DAC evaluation criteria



Source: OECD (2017)

The evaluation team is aware that the definitions of the criteria should be understood within the broader context of South Africa's public sector. The following principles have guided the use of the OECD DAC criteria in the Operation Phakisa implementation evaluation.

[3] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) - Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

Principle One: The criteria is applied thoughtfully to support high quality, and useful evaluation. The domains are understood in the context of the evaluation, the intervention being evaluated, and the stakeholders involved. The evaluation questions and what we intended to do with the responses have informed how the criteria domains were specifically interpreted and analysed.

Principle Two: The use of the criteria has not been applied mechanistically. Instead, they were covered according to the needs of the relevant stakeholders, the context of the evaluation and the aim of ensuring alignment with the utilisation focused approach principles. Data availability, resource constraints, timing, and methodological considerations have also influenced how (and whether) a particular criterion has been covered by the evaluation team.

2.5 Implementation of the evaluation

The evaluation was conducted over the course of six distinct phases, as shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Map of evaluation phases

Activities	Outputs
Phase 1 – Inception	
l Inception meeting l Literature Review and Document Analysis l Stakeholder Analysis l Submission of an inception report	**ü** Inception report
Phase 2 – Literature Review and Programme Documents analysis	
l Review literature and international benchmarking l Stakeholder Analysis	**ü** Stakeholder map **ü** Literature review
Phase 3 – Theory of Change and Evaluation Framework	
l Theory of change workshop with DPME and Steering Committee l Develop Evaluation Framework l Develop evaluation instruments Develop the Report Structure	**ü** Theory of change **ü** Evaluation framework **ü** Report structure **ü** Evaluation Instruments
Phase 4 – Field Work and Field Work Report	
l General key informant interviews l Survey l Focus group discussions	**ü** Field work report
Phase 5 – Analysis and Synthesis	
l Thematic Analysis and Summary of key findings l Qualitative and quantitative data analysis l Development of recommendations l Validation workshop	**ü** Validation workshop **ü** Value assessment
Phase 6 – Reporting and Close-Out	
l Draft evaluation report l Presentation to the Steering Committee and receive comments l Incorporate comments l Final report and presentation	**ü** Draft final report (full and 1/5/25) and PowerPoint **ü** Final report (full and 1/5/25) and PowerPoint Presentation

2.6 Data collection

2.6.1 Sampling Strategy

The evaluation embarked on a rigorous data collection process to capture the views of diverse stakeholders who are involved or who have been involved in Operation Phakisa.

Purposive sampling of the officials and different stakeholders involved in Operation Phakisa was used. This sampling was appropriate for the study as it targeted a particular group of people meaning those that hold the knowledge directly (Silverman, 2010). Purposive sampling was useful to provide

descriptive, interpretative, and in-depth analysis of the phenomenon, a cost effective and time effective approach that accommodated a very small population to work with (Wagner, 2012).

2.6.2 Key informant interviews

A total of seventy-four (74) key informant interviews were conducted online from November 2021 to March 2022. As shown in Figure 4 below, most of the respondents (26.10 %) are from Oceans Economy Lab, followed by a total of 21,74% from Chemical and Waste Lab. Unfortunately, despite numerous documented efforts, the evaluation team did not manage to find the desired number of respondents from the Biodiversity and Mining Labs.

Figure 4: Percentage of evaluation respondents per Lab n= 74



Table 3 provides a summary of the interviews conducted per stakeholder group:

Table 3: Number of evaluation respondents per stakeholder group n= 74

Organisation	No. Contacted
Conceptualisers of Operation Phakisa as a delivery mechanism.	7
Workgroup Chairs and Delivery Unit Heads	10
Lab Coordinators (Lab Coordinating Committees)	2
Implementing Agents	14
Department Representatives	12
DPME Outcome Facilitators	6
Facilitators of the Lab	5
DPME Intervention Support Unit	4
The Private Sector	4
The Academia	10
Total	**74**

2.6.3 Survey

Another component of the fieldwork was a survey. The rationale for including a survey was that it would allow the evaluation team to reach a broader group of stakeholders and generate quantitative data. After consideration and mutual agreement, the DPME sent out the ninety-three (93) email request in December 2022 and the link to the online survey to the database of individuals involved in the Operation Phakisa.

Survey responses were anonymised, and data collection was managed independently by Citofield. A total of 44 respondents responded to the survey, and the results from the survey have been incorporated into the findings outlined in ***Section 5***. The below graph (fig 5) gives an overview of the respondents of the survey:



Figure 5:Survey Respondents per lab

2.6.4 Focus group

One focus group discussion was conducted online with stakeholders from the mining lab on 14 January 2022. The focus group comprised of four (4) colleagues. Unfortunately, despite requests and reminders that were sent to the other stakeholders in the mining lab, they did not attend the focus group discussion.

2.7 Process of analysis

The collected data was analysed using both qualitative (through AtlasTI, qualitative software) and quantitative techniques (using MS Excel and SPSS). The process of analysing qualitative data began by confirming the collected data by means of ensuring that all the pre-selected participants were interviewed with all questions answered and verifying if the pre-identified documents were analysed as per the evaluation criteria. Once the data was confirmed, detailed notes were made to decide on the valuable pieces of information as they emanated leading to decoding themes, creating categories and sub-categories.

The final stage in this evaluation is interpretation based on the *front-end and reverse -process analysis*. The aim was to establish reliability, dependability, and credibility in a naturalistic sense through the analysis and integration of data yielded through using multiple methods. The front-end analysis involved data and time triangulation to link data and to integrate the key themes across the different sources of data gathered at different times across all stages in the evaluation. This was followed by a process of verification involving reverse-process analysis where themes identified in

the final analysis are related back to themes identified at previous stages in the analysis, and then back through previous stages of the evaluation design.

Based on the results of both front-end and reverse-process analyses, a conceptual framework encapsulating the core themes from the study was developed, a basis of judging the value of the Operation Phakisa program. This was then checked and further substantiated through interviews and presentation of findings. The logic of using multiple methods in analysis is that different methods increase validity and dependability. The Citofield evaluation team believes that the crystallised reality in this evaluation is credible in so far as those reading our data and analysis will be able to see the same emerging patterns, which adds to the trustworthiness of this evaluation.

2.8 Triangulation

To ensure the validity of the results obtained during the evaluation, a triangulation methodology was employed. Triangulation included the combination of different data sources and employed various techniques and methods in investigating the same phenomenon. The advantage of the triangulation method was that it provided for in-depth and richer data sets by integrating multiple data from various sources through collection, examination, comparison, and interpretation (Institute for Global Health, 2009). As a result, triangulation assisted in improving the validity of the results by reducing the risk of false interpretation of the collected information (Institute for Global Health, 2009).

Finally, we triangulated the results of the quantitative and qualitative approaches within and across both components of the evaluation. We did this by grouping all the results around key analytical categories and carrying out a thorough cross-cutting analysis. This allowed for a thorough understanding of the aggregate outcomes, as well as the mechanisms explaining these. The triangulation strategy was synergistically integrated throughout the whole evaluation process, including the evaluation design, instruments, data collection and results.

The evaluation team used quantitative data drawn from programme reports, departments datasets, the survey conducted for this evaluation, and information drawn from a literature review. Qualitative data was derived from programme documents, key informant interviews, focus group discussions with a range of different participants in different Labs or those with knowledge and experience of the Operation Phakisa delivery methodology. All these sources of information, combined with iterative reflections within the team, comprised the three points of the triangulation process.

2.9 Ethical Consideration

The implementation evaluation of the Operation Phakisa aimed to be transparent and accountable for the information provided by the respondents. At every key informant interview, respondents were briefed on the purpose of the evaluation and were asked to give consent as to whether to proceed with the interview or not without being coerced. This was done to ensure that consent is obtained from participants after an informed understanding of the scope of the evaluation. Clear agreements on the ground rules about attribution (e.g., whether they can be personally identified, and whether they can be directly quoted or paraphrased) was requested and granted in all the interviews conducted. In addition, the survey and focus group respondents were also requested to give their consent to be interviewed. A consent form was sent to them, with detailed explanation of how their confidentiality was going to be ensured and that their participation was voluntary.

2.10 Limitations

A number of limitations in this evaluation stem from the staged design of the assessment, which is based on a combination of discourse analysis and theory-driven content analysis of data from a panoply of sources. Triangulation is used within and across different stages of investigation and different data sources. Each of these stages in the evaluation is potentially subject to errors and bias in interpretation.

The reliance on primary online interviews for the key informant interviews meant that statements could not be evaluated with reference to actual observations, and that non-verbal cues could not be recorded or interpreted[4]. However, according to some evaluators, this also created a sense of safety and confidence to address questions that might otherwise have been embarrassing. Data collection strategies such as unobtrusive observation, building rapport with stakeholders (observing local customs and cultural norms), as well as all sorts of inductive inquiry (including in-situ snowball sampling of interviewees) were not possible. Table 4 below details some of the challenges the Citofield evaluation team encountered and how they dealt with them.

Table 4: Challenges faced during the evaluation and responses

Details of Challenges	How the Evaluation Team Dealt with the Challenges
Challenge: Hawthorne Effect	
This phenomenon was noted to some extent as some of the respondents have been used to reviewers / evaluators communicating with them and to some degree they are primed to provide standard responses. In some cases, this presented a challenge in terms of understanding some of the constraining factors. In addition, government officials who had extensive departmental commitments were difficult to maintain communication with. This was a challenge because: a) it took more time to secure interviews and b) the team had to extend the planned fieldwork period to accommodate late or slow responders.	The evaluation team continuously and systematically tracked all the information related to the fieldwork, including the names of people contacted, the stakeholder groups, the number of times people were contacted and progress of interviews. There were cases were DPME was requested to intervene.
Challenge: Government Protocol	
During the inception phase, it was agreed that Citofield would reach out to respondents via email and attach a letter signed by the DPME Director General (DG) stating that Citofield has been commissioned by DPME to undertake the evaluation. However, there were cases where government	Citofield and DPME remained in close contact regarding the interview process progress. This sense checking aided the team in prioritising necessary interview candidates. It also ensured that DPME was satisfied with the cohort of key informants – saving time and streamlining the effort in the long run.

[4] At the time of the interview process COVID-19 restrictions meant that most government officials were working remotely.

protocol required that there be internal senior level approval for officials to participate in the evaluation e.g., the mining Lab.	The evaluation team adapted to the unique needs / requirements of the various departments and Labs and worked closely with the key people in the departments to a) provide guidance on the process to follow and b) to assist Citofield in securing meetings with interviewees. The result of this approach was that Citofield managed to conduct interviews with some of these departments.
Challenge: Incorrect Contact Details	
There were cases where the contact details that were received from DPME were incorrect.	The evaluation team relied on their own knowledge from previous experiences with the various stakeholders, as well as additional inputs from DPME.
Challenge: Non-Responses	
The evaluation team sent emails to all the targeted key informants and some of these did not respond at all.	In cases of non-responses, Citofield sent follow-up emails, made phone calls, and asked DPME to assist where necessary. Some targeted respondents were contacted several times before setting up an interview time. These strategies worked in some cases and interviews were secured, but not in all cases.
Challenge: Refusal to Respond	
Some respondents refused to participate in the evaluation. The reasons varied. Other respondents felt like they had no value to add to the evaluation since they only participated in the Lab establishment and not in the actual implementation and the other respondents expressed that they do not in principle believe in the Operation Phakisa.	Citofield and / or DPME sent an email to encourage these stakeholders to respond. Ultimately, these stakeholders did not take part in the interview process.
Challenge: No-Shows to interviews	
Seven targeted respondents accepted the meeting request but did not join the meeting at the agreed time.	Additional follow-ups with these respondents were done as necessary.
Challenge: Receipt of Supporting Documentation	
Respondents often suggested sending the team additional information in documents; however, even after multiple follows ups few respondents sent these documents to the team.	The evaluation team conducted follow-up phone calls where necessary. The evaluation team also requested input and support from DPME.
Challenge: Accessing Performance Data	
Repeated requests were made to the DPME's ISU to provide consolidated performance data sets to the evaluation team to enable them to better assess the financial and implementation performance of the Labs.	The team utilised the fragmented data provided, but in some cases engaged directly with lead departments to source data.

3.KEY FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW and INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE.

The axiomatic point of departure in this section is to provide an overview of the data sources and literature that underpin the analysis presented in this report. Further to this broad task, this section provides a brief outline of the field work conducted by the evaluators. Secondly, we then introduce the different streams of evidence collected that inform this report. Lastly, evaluation questions have been addressed through an amalgamation of desk-top analysis and consultations with key stakeholders and presented using the components of the DAC.[1].

3.1 Review documents and collect data.

Over the eight (8) years of its programmatic work, Operation Phakisa has generated a substantial quantity of documentation, including quarterly reports, evaluation reports, M&E reports, programme related reports and other governance-related materials. In conducting the traditional literature review, the evaluation team built up a set of relevant resources that informed the literature review.

The second type of literature review was a meta-synthesis, which is the "non-statistical technique used to integrate, evaluate and interpret the findings of multiple qualitative research findings". This approach allowed the evaluation team to combine the findings of the studies and identify their common core elements and themes. In conducting the meta-synthesis, the evaluation team drew on desktop research, as well as requesting documents from relevant stakeholders in different departments who are implementing Operation Phakisa.

The only limitation on the literature review is that while the internet offers enormous possibilities for accessing documents (solicited and unsolicited), evaluators had to exercise critical reflexivity since many of the documents on the internet are produced by powerful political, cultural, and economic groups who want to ensure that particular images reach the public domain and wish to counter negative images with more favourable representation. Additionally, authors of documents inevitably decide to record and leave out information in accordance with their assumptions and their social, political, and economic environment.

In collecting information, the evaluation team consulted a variety of sources, including the publications of governmental and multilateral organisations, journals, books, and the publications of think tanks. The literature review process included papers from academic journals; research thesis; grey literature (including published government reports and publications from NGOS and internal Operation Phakisa publications). Publications tabularised below are not exhaustive and serve as artifacts of literature sources identified during the project inception phase that were used for the purposes of the evaluation. Historical documents are thus amenable to manipulation and selective influence, which is why it was pertinent for the evaluation team to consult a range of documents as shown in Table 5 below

Table 5: Category of documents reviewed for the evaluation

Category	Source	Usage
Operation Phakisa Background	✓ Operation Phakisa website ✓ Online ✓ Operation Phakisa Blueprint	This assisted the evaluators to have an acute understanding of the Operation Phakisa methodology and what it stands for.

Programme background and implementation	✓ Operation Phakisa Lab Concept notes ✓ The Operation Phakisa progress reports and slides ✓ Implementation Evaluation of the Oceans Economy	This was reviewed to understand the institutional, contextual, and other factors of the programme and comprehend the issues the programme is aiming to address.
Literature Review	✓ Google scholar search ✓ Operation Phakisa website ✓ Lab Reports	This assisted the evaluators to fully understand the intervention under study and informed the design of the evaluation

3.2 Findings from the Literature Review

Operation Phakisa was designed to be a cross-sector programme where various stakeholders could engage and collaborate to implement initiatives and concrete actions to address constraints to delivery in a prioritised focused area. It also committed participating government departments to the principles of public accountability and transparency. A key element of Operation Phakisa was to strengthen cooperation between government, organised business, civil society, and organised labour. This included working on detailed problem analysis, priority setting, intervention planning, innovation, and delivery. Furthermore, DPME (2020), acknowledges that the Operation Phakisa projects were envisaged to be impactful, fast tracked, characterised by the business unusual, hands-on approach that is results driven to ensure attainment of the projected outcomes.

According to Barber (2016), a delivery unit is supposed to lead to cultural change in government and throughout delivery chains such that institutional buzzwords become “ambitious, focus, clarity, urgency and irreversibility.” In simpler terms, Operation Phakisa was supposed to be a pledge-fulfilment tool that would help the government to address the bounded rationality problem of policy makers by proposing a simple plan with a set of clear goals, prioritization, tracking of key metrics and the delivery capacity to act quickly. In essence, the success of a Lab hinges on the ability to facilitate substantive engagement of citizens in defining goals and targets, as well as flexibility to change, rather than a vertical delivery pattern.

As mentioned above, one of the most important tools of the Operation Phakisa methodology is target setting – prioritized sets of measurable, ambitious, and time-bound goals and trajectories. A projected progression towards these goals creates a tight link between planned interventions and expected outcomes. According to Mouton (2021), setting targets and developing trajectories are a central component of the BFR approach. In the Malaysian context the view was that real transformation began with setting an ‘impossible’ target or what they called ‘the game of the impossible. As lead agents PEMANDU encouraged their BFR teams and clients to “shoot for the stars because even if they miss, they’ll at least land on the moon”[5]. Once the target is set, the next step is to plan a detailed action plan, prioritising the initiatives that would move the needle quickly. While

[5] PEMAMANDU and Associates. The Game of the Impossible at https://pemandu.org/pursuing-big-fast-results-in-climate-change/

nearly all public sector organizations set targets (most notably in the departmental APPs) many of these targets are imprecise or unmeasurable or they simply operate under unclear time horizons. The centrality of stringent target setting within the BFR approach is that it establishes the milestones for accelerated programme delivery.

According to DPME (2021), a total of seven (7) Labs have been undertaken so far, with varying degrees of success. Moreover, these seven Operation Phakisa Labs were undertaken with one consistent objective of assisting the country to address and overcome the triple challenge of poverty, unemployment, and inequality. All the Labs have had their own individual Lab aspirations, which have been collectively aimed at contributing to the targets set in the NDP, in terms of contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), job creation and transformation (inequality). Following the convening of the first Operation Phakisa delivery Lab in July 2014 (the Oceans Economy) six more Labs were convened in rapid succession. The below are key learnings from literature review:

3.2.1 Use of the 8-step methodology:

Based on the eight (8) step methodology (as described by the Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Senator Idris Jala (2014), Operation Phakisa developed a clear strategic direction and encouraged government departments to develop strategic and transformative initiatives that aligned with key priorities in the NDP. Detailed plans and reports from the seven delivery Labs that have to date been operationalised are testament to the level of effort that went into giving substance to the NDP 2030 and the MTSF 2014-2019 / 2019-2024.

The Labs brought together various stakeholders who undertook detailed problem analysis, priority setting, intervention planning, innovation, and delivery mechanisms. Though there is unevenness across the Labs on the breadth and depth to which issues of public engagement, roadmaps and measuring performance have been detailed in Steps 1-5, an extraordinary amount of work has been accomplished. All the Labs have, to varying extents, developed detailed plans for future actions and recommendations.

- Step 1: Strategic Direction: determine the strategic direction required
- Step 2: Labs: determine what needs to be done
- Step 3: Open Days: share the Lab findings with people and incorporate their feedback
- Step 4: Roadmap: inform citizens of plans of action
- Step 5: Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Targets: determine KPIs to measure progress

Many of the Lab reports are less clear when dealing with Steps 6 to 8:

- Step 6: Implementation of plans of action in communities, local, provincial, and national level.
- Step 7: External validation of results achieved.
- Step 8: Annual reporting and information sharing with the population on achievements.

The literature suggests that the lack of clarity on these 3 critical steps could potentially be an indication that challenges were experienced in the following areas:

- Big-budget planning could not be supported in the current fiscal climate.
- Weak capacity of provincial and local government to implement plans.

- Monitoring and performance expectation of long-term results in the short term.
- Stakeholder uncertainty and / or mistrust of the macro-planning.
- Inconsistent knowledge management across Labs.

3.2.2 Learning from international experience

The conceptualisation of Operation Phakisa was based on the earlier experiences of other countries around the world – including the United Kingdom, India, Tanzania, Australia, and Malaysia – in attempting to fast-track government service delivery performance. In most cases these initiatives were driven by leaders determined to short-circuit the bureaucratic inertia and bottlenecks that typified government processes and to leverage specialised "Delivery Units" to accelerate the achievement of key government priorities. The Malaysian version of the Delivery Unit (the Performance Management and Delivery Unit or PEMANDU) became the leading exponent of this approach through its adoption of the BFR methodology. The Malaysian initiative was driven by the Malaysian Prime Minister, who was and active, hands-on presence in the work of the delivery Labs.

The successes achieved by PEMANDU, through its application of the BFR approach attracted the attention of governments around the world and has become an increasingly common way to achieve this delivery by establishing "delivery units" (DUs) - small groups of highly skilled people working at the centre of government who help line ministries achieve outcomes for a number of initiatives that leadership deems "mission critical," or a top strategic priority. These DUs can operate at the state, local, or national level and address a range of issues, including large capital projects, election promises, popular citizen concerns, and classic objectives such as improved educational outcomes. Delivery units are an innovation with both technical and cultural components, bringing new sets of technical approaches to resolving the planning and implementation barriers to getting results. They are designed to instil a culture of data-led decision making and to support governments in keeping their focus on top development priorities. PEMANDU pioneered the use of Labs as an addition to traditional departmental planning processes. The Lab is a forum in which a unit brings the key players together to develop a detailed implementation plan for a particular activity, including establishing their respective responsibilities. This is particularly appropriate for issues that require multiple departments to contribute to implementation as it enables the relevant officials from different departments to sit together and develop a common plan for an issue requiring inter-departmental cooperation.

In summary, the literature suggests that Delivery Units are often not institutionalized in any way within government systems, and that this appears to be a common factor for the delivery management units with mandates by the highest political authority. In Lindquist (2006), the cases of Australia, Queensland and the United Kingdom were examined, and the conclusion was drawn that Delivery Units usually represent the personal initiative of a President or Prime Minister, and their permanence over time is hard to guarantee due to the way in which they have been conceived. The features that played to PEMANDU's strengths point to the following lessons and trade-offs for countries considering establishing a DU:

- ***Secure strong backing and involvement of the top leadership - PEMANDU's success depends critically on the Prime Minister's direct involvement in its routines***: PEMANDU not only tracks progress in implementation but is actively involved in clearing up bottlenecks between Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). These incentives work only with the regular involvement of the Prime Minister through routines, such as the performance

reviews. The trade-off is the potential politicization of the technical implementation process, which in turn requires a strong leader of the DU that can manage these issues.

- ***Create a focused and granular results platform linked to an overarching national results framework:*** It is impossible to discuss PEMANDU without discussing the National Transformation Program (NTP) – a results platform that PEMANDU helped create and whose implementation it drove. Just like PEMANDU did with the NTP, successful DUs generally focus on a limited number of well-defined and operationalized strategic priorities. At the same time, the selectivity of such focused platforms may create questions about the attribution of national outcomes to the narrow interventions facilitated by the DU. Building in ways to ascertain such contributions ex ante can assuage this concern.
- ***Combine top-down control with bottom-up voice***: As is typical of most DU approaches, PEMANDU is embedded within a top-down, command-and-control system. Yet through the Labs, the process of operationalizing the government's strategic priorities included the voice from the rank-and-file MDA staff who became the eventual implementers of the NTP. This process has also built in some responsiveness to align with MDA objectives, issues, and challenges.
- ***Create institutional interface between the DU and MDAs:*** The DU by itself does not implement the policy prerogatives – the MDAs do. The DU's role as a driver of MDAs performance is greatly facilitated if there is an institutional interface with MDAs, such as Delivery Management offices (DMOs) within MDAs, ministry-level DUs, or specialized M&E divisions. Because MDAs are the implementers of government's top priorities, the real action takes place on their turf, not at the Prime Minister's office. The DU strengthens the link through introducing the routine of reporting and regular problem-solving meetings where unresolved issues are progressively escalated.

3.2.3 A focused results platform linked to an overarching national results framework:

According to the Operation Phakisa draft blueprint, the Operation Phakisa delivery transmission mechanism should complement the South African government's five-year strategic planning, the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF). When targets emanating from the Operation Phakisa planning activities are crafted, attention should be paid to the Programme of Action (POA), which is the government's step-by-step outline of processes that should be followed in the reporting cycle. For a project to be undertaken using the Operation Phakisa methodology, its qualification should be based on its contribution to the NDP and the NDP Five Year Plan.

Just as the Malaysian model was linked to national development planning, Operation Phakisa has been clearly linked to the NDP 2030 and the MTSF. This is indicative of the Delivery Unit concept, which is generally used by heads of state to accelerate progress on key national development priorities and often to meet commitments made in their election manifestos. Each of the Operation Phakisa Labs have ensured that their delivery concepts have been fully aligned to these strategic imperatives of national government. Relevant legislation and policy frameworks have been referred to in each of the Labs, as well as recommendations for future targeted policy engagement and formulation that will sustain the longer-term implementation of Operation Phakisa.

The Table below demonstrates some of the similarities and the difference between Malaysia and South Africa regarding the way they implemented the delivery units. In Table 6 we also suggest the best practices that delivery units could follow:

Table 6: Comparison of BFR implementation in Malaysia and South Africa

Malaysia	South Africa	Recommended Best Practice
In the development context delivery units (and delivery unit-style programmes) are bound to encounter significant challenges when implementing large-scale changes in complex environments, due to similarities in fragmented institutional environments[6]. According to Jordan and Sabel, replicating a PEMANDU-like programme requires at least three conditions: ***first, a political consensus in favour of carrying out reform in public service (or at least a lack of possible political hindrances), second, a government that is responsive towards information in enacting changes and penalties, and thirdly, a minimal level of variation in the capabilities of government, firms, and agencies so that there is space for improvement[7].*** The World Bank warns that countries looking to learn from the Malaysian (PEMANDU) experience will have to carefully weigh the benefit in terms of cost associated with replicating the whole structure in its entirety. Among the Delivery Units around the globe, PEMANDU is the largest in size. This has cost implications, and few developing countries can afford a large DU or sustain it in the long-term. In addition, not all countries will be able to get exemptions from the civil-service salary structure that allowed PEMANDU to recruit talented staff from the private sector. Many contextual factors, such as a relatively developed institutional ecosystem and performance culture, also contributed to PEMANDU's ability to drive performance[8]. On the one hand despite the costs, the potential benefits of the PEMANDU model are significant. While PEMANDU's critics have pointed to the high costs of setting up and operating such a model, PEMANDU and its supporters consider these costs a reasonable investment, given the benefits to the Malaysian economy from their National Transformation Programme (NTP). A careful consideration of the country context and a cost-benefit analysis will therefore have to precede any decision to adopt a similar model. Because of the trade-offs inherent in its design features, PEMANDU's experience is instructive both for its successes and challenges. Finding the right balance is key. The features that played to PEMANDU's strengths point to the following lessons and trade-offs for countries considering establishing a DU[9]:		

Malaysia	South Africa	Recommended Best Practice
The BFR methodology is used to determine focus areas and	The operational methodology is used to develop detailed plans in specific thematic areas determined	**Data and sound economic rationale should be used to determine the economic focus areas –** Economic data and impartial technical analysis should be used to

[6] Narasimhan, A. and Pillai, A. A Paradigm Shift in Public Service Delivery: The Malaysian PEMANDU. Eruditio E-Journal of the World Academy of Art and Science Volume 2 Issue 5, December 2018.
[7] Sabel, C. and Jordan, L. "Doing, Learning, Being: Some Lessons Learned from Malaysia's National Transformation Program," January 2015.
[8] World Bank Group (Global Knowledge and Research Hub in Malaysia). 2017. Driving Performance from the Center Malaysia's Experience with PEMANDU at https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/318041492513503891/pdf/114270-WP-PUBLIC-13-4-2017-13-0-58-WorldBankReportPemanduFAFULLWeb.pdf
[9] Ibid.

indicators related to national key results areas (NKRAs).	by the Cabinet and in line with the NDP.	select the sectors for the BFR programme. These sectors should have the potential to make the strongest contribution to the achievement of national goals. This evidence-based analysis must also account for the prevailing global economic conditions and the scenarios that may emerge over the course of the programme's implementation.
Labs are used to assess the vitality of initiatives and to develop detailed plans.	Initiatives are partly pre-determined, and Labs are used to develop detailed priority and emerging plans. Similar to the BFR approach, the Operation Phakisa methodology is recursive and allows planning and implementation to be intertwined. This approach allows for continuous adaptation and incorporation of new information that may emerge during implementation.	**An iterative planning approach should be embedded into the culture of the state underpinned by simultaneous planning and implementation -** feedback loops should be established to ensure that any new information that emerges, which may alter the course of a project, is quickly used to revise assumptions, and adopt appropriate approaches to overcoming the problem. This is a problem driven and responsive iterative adaptation approach, where the adaptation should be based on the changing conditions at implementation.
Annual Labs for all initiatives as part of an iterative process of annual convenings.	Labs are only conducted at the beginning of the programme. It is then up to the Lab Secretariats and the lead department to ensure that implementation proceeds as determined in the plans.	It is clear that **Lab planning creates energy and synergy** as key stakeholders coalesce around critical development challenges. It becomes important to design a cost-effective mechanism that maintains this level of commitment,
It involves stakeholders from government and the private sector, but no clear evidence of multi-stakeholder governed processes.	Involves stakeholders from government and the private sector, but no multi-stakeholder governed processes.	**Participants of the Lab process should represent a diverse set of stakeholders -** This is so because selecting stakeholders that are largely similar carries the risk that they may not be able to engage each other critically. This could lead to them reverting to the status quo instead of coming up with innovative and novel solutions. There is a need for clear roles and responsibilities to ensure accountability. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders in the implementation process is important to create a shared vision and embed accountability at all levels of government. In addition, it helps to reduce ambiguity and ensures that the roles are complementary in design. Inter-ministerial coordination and planning is also crucial for the successful implementation of the BFR methodology especially in achieving budget alignment to meet the financial requirements of the initiatives.

Targets are reviewed and amended by mutual consent subject to high - level approval.	Targets are amended primarily to extend deadlines due to the inability of Lab programmes to unblock red tape and bottlenecks.	**KPIs and targets need to be transparent -** The delivery unit should introduce transparency to the Lab processes by publicly disseminating the outputs of the Lab sessions, including Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and relevant targets. This allows the public to scrutinise the outputs of the BFR and offer feedback. This also creates a mechanism to ensure that stakeholders are fulfilling their relevant duties. KPIs should not be set in stone and should be reviewed on a periodic basis. However, the review process should include multiple stakeholders to ensure accountability. While KPIs are a useful tool for tracking the progress of a project, they are only as good as the underlying assumptions. Weak assumptions can result in the value of KPIs being lost. Additionally, there is a need to ensure that a strong monitoring and evaluation component is embedded in the BFR model and is transparent such that all relevant stakeholders have access to the monitoring and evaluation outputs. Detailed monitoring of performance data by delivery staff is intended to support rigorous implementation and can often reveal new and important insights that had not previously been considered. This analysis can be used to inform future Lab iterations and course corrections for that sector.
PEMANDU and the National Key Results Areas (NKRAs) have a dedicated budget.	Outcomes of Operation Phakisa projects are funded from the annual budgets of departments as per National Treasury allocations.	**A performance management and delivery unit require institutional legitimacy to be effective -** Being able to mobilise resources for priority projects which can be achieved though improving cash flow by unlocking resources from capital intensive projects, improving the management of government spending, addressing revenue leakages, and exploring new revenue sources. This ensures that priority areas have adequate support for carrying out interventions.
DTF established for each NKRA are chaired by the Deputy Primary Minister.	DUs are led by senior government employees and are generally understaffed. There appears to have a lack of hands-on senior level leadership and support for the Labs.	
Transparent and open by design.	Transparent and open by design, however data is not easily accessible and the one on the website is limited.	**KPIs and targets need to be transparent -** The delivery unit should introduce transparency to the Lab processes by publicly disseminating the outputs of the Lab sessions, including KPIs and relevant targets. This allows the public to scrutinise the outputs of the BFR and offer feedback. This also creates a mechanism to ensure that stakeholders are fulfilling their relevant duties.
Prime Minister or the Deputy	Minister in the Presidency and lead Minister heads	**SA should** s**ecure strong backing and involvement of the top leadership -** The

Prime Minister Heads apex decision-making and conflict resolution structure - **PEMANDU's success depends critically on the Prime Minister's direct involvement in its routines**: PEMANDU not only tracks progress in implementation but is actively involved in clearing up bottlenecks between MDAs. These incentives work only with the regular involvement of the Prime Minister through routines, such as the performance reviews. The trade-off is the potential politicization of the technical implementation process, which in turn requires a strong leader of the DU that can manage these issues.	apex structure. No clear leader with uncontested authority. While the President at the time initiated the Operation Phakisa initiative, events appear to have deflected his interest and commitment to ensuring the viability of Operation Phakisa.	delivery unit should have the support of the most senior office in the country to be effective at delivering on its mandate. Large organisations are often reluctant to embrace change and the mandate of the delivery unit is to facilitate change within these organisations. Therefore, the delivery unit needs the support of senior officials to overcome challenges posed by individuals within the civil service. Moreover, the DU by itself does not implement the policy prerogatives – the MDAs do. The DU's role as a driver of MDAs' performance is greatly facilitated if there is an institutional interface with MDAs, such as DMOs within MDAs, ministry-level DUs, or specialized M&E divisions. Because MDAs are the implementers of government's top priorities, the real action takes place on their turf, not at the Prime Minister's office. The DU strengthens the link through introducing the routine of reporting and regular problem-solving meetings where unresolved issues are progressively escalated.

4. OPERATION PHAKISA THEORY OF CHANGE

Any evaluation of a programme like the Operation Phakisa needs to be informed by a theory of change (ToC). A ToC is a conceptual technique that demonstrates how an intervention contributes to the intended outcomes[10]. It is fundamental for the ToC to ensure that activities and their related outputs, are properly aligned to the desired outcomes of the programme and make as much contribution as possible to the desired impact. This has implications for the project selection process as one of the key elements in the logic chain, as project selection must promote effectiveness and efficiency. The Operation Phakisa methodology will benefit from using a ToC as the basis for testing the strategies (coherence and linking of strategies) to ensure that they are logically sound and, ultimately, to adjust strategies and activities for greater programmatic impact. In this case, the ToC has been developed around the activities and outputs that are outlined in the Operation Phakisa methodology. These outputs are then mapped to the higher-level objectives or outcomes of the project.

The theory of change workshop was held on 14 September 2021, which included other stakeholders from various departments and the members of the steering committee. The reason for convening for this workshop was to derive an in-depth understanding of all the Operation Phakisa interconnected issues and providing a solid platform for strategizing and initiating problem solving measures. This led to the design of the below theory of change **(Fig 6)** that maps the contribution of the Operation Phakisa methodology to the accelerated service delivery exemplified by the integration of the Big Fast Results methodology. The theory of change was based on the government's own thinking on how to improve and accelerate service delivery in critical priority areas, discussions from a stakeholder workshop and a review of international and local literature on the Big Fast Results. Figure 6 below demonstrates the proposed ToC for the Operation Phakisa methodology.

[10]. www. theoryofchange.org

Figure 6: Operation Phakisa Theory of Change



4.1 Theory of Change Narrative and Assumptions

The ToC for Operation Phakisa was designed to reflect the logic of this intervention as the application of an accelerated delivery mechanism to support the government in its developmental mandate of achieving its priorities as set out in the NDP 2030. Having recognised that sub-optimal nature of aggregate service delivery across all sectors the BFR methodology was seen as a delivery transmission mechanism – or a means to address the triple challenge of poverty, unemployment, and inequality. At the impact level Operation Phakisa seeks to bring about **increased capacity of the state to deliver equitable, effective, and accountable development outcomes that improve the livelihoods, quality of life and wellbeing of all South African citizens**. In other words, the delivery transmission mechanism itself (OP) becomes a means for government and its partners to achieve a better life for all South Africans and for other nationals living and working in South Africa.

To achieve this high-level, longer-term impact two medium term (or intermediate) outcomes need to be in place:

- Firstly, there needs to be **increased sustainability of the BFR Methodology across multi sector implementation**. In other words what starts off as an innovative "business unusual" approach transforms into a more effective and sustainable way of doing service delivery across all sectors.
    - To achieve this medium-term outcome two immediate outcomes are needed to facilitate this change – in the first-place **enhanced stakeholder alignment to the NDP and MTSF development agenda** and secondly **increased buy-in and commitment by all stakeholders to an accelerated and equitable service delivery approach**.
- Secondly, there needs to be a **strengthened sector response to key national development priorities** as outlined not only in the NDP and the MTSF, but also in all sectoral planning. In other words, there needs to be greater levels of harmonisation, alignment and intervention synergy between sector departments, state owned entities and private sector partners to drive collaborative and effective efforts to achieve key priorities.
    - To achieve this medium-term outcome two immediate outcomes are needed to facilitate this change – in the first place there must be **improved capacity for accelerated service delivery** and secondly there must be **improved adaptive management and evidence-based decision making**. These immediate level outcomes are critical elements of the BFR methodology which requires urgency, speed, and efficiency to achieve transformative change.

Each of the four immediate outcomes (or the changes that can be measured within a few years of implementation) require that certain outputs will have to be achieved if interventions are going to be sustainable.

- For the immediate outcome **enhanced stakeholder alignment to NDP & MTSF development agenda** to be achieved key activities will need to result in measurable outputs. Work will need to be done to develop comprehensive mapping of the processes and systems required to enable the Operation Phakisa intervention to function efficiently and effectively. This activity will result in the development of an **Operation Phakisa Framework**. Work will also need to be done to set up the governance structures that will ensure that all the necessary **validation and verification processes are in place**.
- For the immediate outcome **increased buy-in and commitment by all stakeholders to an accelerated and equitable service delivery approach** the custodians of the Operation Phakisa model will need to engage in intensive advocacy, information sharing, marketing,

and partnership mobilisation to raise awareness of the potential that the model has for driving accelerated service delivery. Using the BFR approach Operation Phakisa custodians will ensure that **Open Days are held** to demonstrate the capabilities of the model and to secure buy-in from partners. By informing and mobilising partners, it is expected that sectors will then design what they consider to be optimal accelerated delivery mechanisms so that highly focused **sector Labs are established**.

- For the immediate outcome **improved planning capacity for accelerated service delivery** to be achieved two key outputs need to be in place. In alignment with national development planning, sector Labs will convene in a facilitated process that will result in **priority intervention areas being defined (strategic direction)**. Having achieved agreement on priority intervention areas the Labs will then engage in an intensive planning process (of about six weeks) that will result in **detailed action plans (3-foot plans) being developed**.
- For the immediate outcome improved adaptive management and evidence-based decision making to be achieved, intensive work will have to be in the Labs to develop sector theories of change, implementation log frames and measurable performance targets and indicators. The Lab participants will therefore ensure that agreed key performance indicators (**KPI) targets are developed**. They will also need to work on developing measurement and knowledge management processes to ensure that each Lab has full capacity to report on implementation achievements and can generate new knowledge bases for future service delivery efficiencies. The Lab will therefore work on setting up management and reporting systems that will result in **M&E and knowledge management (KM) systems being in place**.

The methodology of the BFR model assumes that certain enabling factors are in place to facilitate the establishment of Labs and drive their implementation efforts. For Operation Phakisa to bring about the intended changes in the capacity of the South African developmental state to drive transformation the following critical inputs are in place:

- **Common understanding:** The success of the BFR methodology is dependent on a common understanding of what it is and what it sets out to achieve (based on experiences in countries such as Malaysia). It is imperative for the success of Operation Phakisa that there is a **common understanding of what constitutes business unusual**.
- **Government funding**: there must be high level government commitment (or **political will**) to the concept of accelerated service delivery, including the commitment of adequate resources to achieve the intended outcomes.
- **Cross-sectoral collaboration:** through the modalities of the Operation Phakisa concept, government will need to ensure that both sector departments and private sector **partners share the same objectives and are willing to cooperate** to achieve the agreed priorities. Such an approach will also demand **adequate levels of trust to be built up between stakeholders**.
- **Private sector investment:** In a resource-constrained environment of government austerity it will be critical that through Operation Phakisa government is able to convince key private sector partners, through the establishment of strategic public-private partnerships, to invest and co-fund critical interventions so that there is **sufficient and available funding** for activities.
- **Human resources and skills:** Operation Phakisa (using the BFR model) will be a high intensity and skills reliant approach to accelerating service delivery. The requirements of transformation and “business unusual” mean that government and private sector individuals

involved in the various Labs will need to have the kinds of **human skills, capacities and experience** that are suited to the demands of innovation, "blue sky thinking" and adaptation.

5.KEY EVALUATION FINDINGS

Operation Phakisa domesticated the Malaysian BFR eight (8) step methodology and attempted to integrate detailed sector diagnosis, meticulous planning, painstaking implementation as well as recursive problem-solving for improved implementation. The process of setting up the Labs was sequenced through the BFR eight steps and guided by the manual called the Operation Phakisa Framework. The intention was to create a high level of transparency, accountability, and collaboration in developing the so-called "three-foot plans" that would speed up implementation and achieve the intended outcomes that would meet key NDP priorities. The success of this approach to a large extent hinged on the understanding and acceptance by stakeholders of the methodology and their "buy-in" to the concept of "business unusual".

This section presents results from the analysis of data generated through the survey, focus group discussions, interviews, and document analysis. Given that an eclectic mix of methods was utilised, the analysis and presentation of the results is objectives based. An objective is taken as a subsection and then results from the different data sources are presented and discussed, triangulating to provide an answer to the evaluation question aligned to the objective.

Through engagement with Labs implementing teams and other stakeholders, the evaluation team took note of some of the contextual factors that have both facilitated and impeded implementation of the Operation Phakisa methodology and that will determine the long-term sustainability of the overall approach.

The findings are based on the qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods conducted with different Operation Phakisa stakeholders and the DPME staff. These findings were triangulated with the findings from the desktop review (of project documents and relevant secondary literature) conducted by the evaluation team. This was done to answer the evaluation questions regarding the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability of this programme. The discussion of the findings will be done in accordance with the following five-point rating scale described by the OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluations (Jobs Fund, 2021). The rating reflects the evaluation team's informed judgement, based on qualitatively or quantitatively captured indicators and data collected during the evaluation. The rating scale below gives an overview of the evaluation rankings at a glance.

Rating	**Definitely no**	**No**	**Undecided**	**Yes**	**Definitely yes**

This rating scale will be applied to the applicable sub-questions, and then an overall rating will be applied to each criterion. The ratings are corroborated and fully supported by the analysis of the evaluation as specific explanations and justifications of these assessments are provided. These criteria also provide a lens through which to assess the implementation framework, which highlights successes and challenges experienced by the programme in the process of implementing the Operation Phakisa initiatives. These definitions guide the usage of the rating scale when assessing the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of the programme. In addition, the findings of the evaluation are supported with networks, tables and with figures which will be embedded throughout relevant sections of the findings and analysis

5.1 To what extent has the Operation Phakisa planning and implementation methodology been appropriately designed?

The Government of South Africa introduced Operation Phakisa as framework intervention regarded as heuristically valuable for establishing seven delivery units (DUs) or Labs to tackle pressing implementation challenges, deliver on key political priorities, and better respond to citizen needs. Despite adopting the NDP, the government was facing implementation challenges in delivering critical outcomes. The outcomes that citizens expect from governments often have a long results chain: from defining policy priorities to policy formulation, policy implementation, and service delivery outcomes for citizens. Governments have recognized that enhancing public sector performance is key to achieving better citizen outcomes. International experiences with DUs have shown that under the right circumstances these mechanisms can help to strengthen the link between a given policy and citizen outcomes, and South Africa chose to adopt this approach. The expectation was that a transmission mechanism for faster service delivery could be leveraged to create strong performance incentives, driving the public sector in partnership with other stakeholders to produce high-quality outputs in an efficient and accountable manner. At the launch of Operation Phakisa in 2014, the then President Zuma stated that:

> "*Operation Phakisa is an adaptation of that Big Fast Results methodology that was first applied by the Malaysian Government very successfully in the delivery of its Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) and the Government Transformation Programme (GTP). We renamed the Malaysian Big Fast Results approach as Operation Phakisa, to highlight the urgency with which we want to deliver on some of the priorities encompassed in the National Development Plan 2030.*[11]*"*

One of the critical questions that this evaluation is attempting to answer is the extent to which South Africa's political context and institutional arrangements were ready for a model (BFR) that introduced a new public service delivery transmission mechanism, and whether the public service, its systems and processes were adequately prepared to engage with and implement this approach. The following sections document the varied perspectives elicited from respondents.

5.1.1 Level of Understanding of BFR

In the survey that was conducted, respondents were asked to reflect on the level of understanding that people had of the potential that the BFR methodology could bring to South Africa's service delivery environment. Most of the respondents had a common understanding that the adoption of the BFR methodology demonstrated the governments' commitment to deliver priorities set out in the NDP 2030 in a faster, more efficient, and more effective way by bringing a range of key stakeholders together for intensive and detailed practical planning to collaboratively translate solutions into detailed implementation plans. As shown in Figure 7 below, the response rate of 72%

[11] Address by President Jacob Zuma at the launch of Operation Phakisa Big Fast Results Implementation Methodology, Inkosi Albert Luthuli International Convention Centre, Durban at https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/speeches/address-president-jacob-zuma-launch-operation-phakisa-big-fast-results-implementation

(very much so / to some extent) suggests that from the outset of the initiative, there was a good understanding of the BFR methodology and the potential that it had for accelerating service delivery.

Figure 7: Level of understanding of the BFR methodology n= 44



Key informant interviews pointed to the fact that there was a broad understanding and acceptance of the methodology, and an acknowledgement that South Africa had an urgent need to address its service delivery challenges. One of the respondents mentioned that the public sector should move away from regarding Operation Phakisa as a programme or project and should rather look at it as a transformative public service innovation and a more effective way of doing business. Most respondents from the qualitative interviews, acknowledged, however, that for this methodology to work in the public sector it should not be an "add-on", but rather needed to be embedded within government processes and functions as standard practice. To achieve this level of integration there had to be a clear commitment from the political and executive principals to introduce and sustain the work of the Labs.

Some respondents from the interviews conducted indicated that they saw the BFR methodology as conceptually worthwhile in the context of South Africa's implementation challenges but pointed out several critical constraints -such as limited political will, constrained financial resources and bureaucratic red tape - that they felt ultimately hampered the success of the delivery mechanism. A strong sense was expressed that the current government systems and processes lack the flexibility and adaptability to integrate an innovation that demands a "business unusual" mindset.

5.1.2 Government Readiness

In the survey conducted, respondents were asked to reflect on whether they felt that in 2013/14 South Africa's political context and institutional arrangements were ready for a model such as the BFR that would initiate new delivery transmission mechanisms into government. A total of 71% of the respondents indicated that South Africa was either not very ready or not ready at all, which suggests a general feeling that both political and institutional conditions were not in a state of readiness for a bold and transformative model that BRF was intended to be.

Figure 8: State of government readiness for BFR n= 44



Several respondents mentioned that efforts to strengthen public institutions have in the past decade suffered setbacks because the political context has not been ready for change or conducive to transparency, accountability, and good governance issues. The sustainability of accelerated service delivery mechanisms was essentially at risk from the outset in this context. Efforts to improve service delivery in any country are embedded in the prevailing socio-economic and political context and the confluence of forces that exist at a given time, and for many respondents the prevailing circumstances in 2013 and subsequent years were not amenable to an intervention such as Operation Phakisa. A common thread of the main barriers identified was the lack of continuity of public policies and priorities from one government administration to the next, as well as the high rotation of middle management and technical staff that affects government institutions.

5.1.3 Political Will and Leadership

One of the consistent findings of this evaluation was the absence of political and executive will to ensure successful implementation of the Operation Phakisa methodology. Survey respondents were asked whether in their experiences, there was strong political will and a commitment from the senior officials (Director Generals). Some respondents mentioned that there was some level of political and executive buy-in at the inception of the methodology, as government structures were adjusted to enable fast tracking of service delivery. Unfortunately, at this juncture, there is no longer demonstrated political, and executive will to support the methodology as processes have gone back to the routine "business as usual" operations of the public service bureaucracy. The responses as indicated in Figure 9 below demonstrate that a total of 71% of the respondents felt that there has been a lack of political will in creating the optimal conditions for the implementation of Operation Phakisa and that there had also been a lack of leadership from the executive within departments to drive the various Lab implementation plans. A further 15% were unsure and only 14% felt that there had been an adequate level of leadership.



Figure 9: Level of political will and leadership n= 44

Given the hierarchical, rule-based nature of governments, the ability to drive the BFR approach was dependent on some level of charismatic leadership, strong political will, and executive determination to drive change and commitment to the concept of "business unusual". One of the respondents mentioned that:

> *'The delivery unit should be near the political head and led by respected, delivery oriented and results driven individual. Unfortunately, the pioneers of OP are no longer in political office. The political contexts and its institutional arrangements were perfect at that time. At that time when the labs were established – YES, because members of the executive that were involved at that time had common understanding and bought in the OP. Currently, those who have inherited it are being supportive, but the efforts are lower than those who experienced it when it firstly came to SA –* ***Respondent 37****.*

In the Malaysian context PEMANDU's success critically hinged on its access to the Prime Minister and his direct involvement in the routines and practices introduced by the unit. This does not appear to have happened in the Operation Phakisa case in South Africa. On the other hand, international literature points to the fact that many of the experiments in establishing tailored Delivery Units are associated with charismatic and visionary political leaders (either at the national or sub-national level). These leaders often have a specific stake (either reputational and/or electoral) in the manifest success of the Delivery Units and the achievement of development priorities. When these leaders are no longer in office the impetus is often lost and new leadership may not place the same value on the approach. In the case of Operation Phakisa such dynamics may be playing a role in the lagging performance of many of the Labs. In South Africa, when President Ramaphosa took office in February 2018, replacing President Zuma who had initiated the Operation Phakisa, there was a sense that he may not want to continue providing centre of government support for an initiative developed by his predecessor. While some of the Labs continued to operate post-Zuma, their impact appears to have been different – with evidence suggesting that still functioning Labs have been more focused on the way the civil service operates than its immediate delivery on key priorities using the BFR methodology. It is unclear within government circles whether Operation Phakisa is expected to be a short-term intervention linked to a particular administration or whether in some form or other it

becomes a permanent feature at the centre of government. What was obvious from most respondents was the feeling that Operation Phakisa had lost its impetus and was being overtaken by other strategic initiatives. One of respondents mentioned that:

> *'Each subsequent leader obsesses with his own legacy and doesn't seem to want to continue with a programme from his predecessor, which is the root of our implementation challenges. So, every time a new administration comes in, there is something new coming in even though the previous one that was agreed upon with the same ruling party hasn't been concluded.'* - ***Respondent 67.***

It appears that the current administration is placing less emphasis on Operation Phakisa and focusing its resources more on post-COVID recovery interventions and on the work of Operation Vhulindlela and Master Plans. Figure 10 below maps some of the views of the different stakeholders involved in Operation Phakisa regarding political will:

Figure 10: Perspective of key informants on Operation Phakisa n=74

5.1.4 Levels of Support and Investment by Government Departments

The avowed purpose of the Operation Phakisa methodology has been to induce the government to act differently and to engage in systems change. Part of the rationale for introducing the so-called

"Delivery Units" into government to speed up planning and implementation processes was the recognition that conventional ways of doing business in the public sector were overly slow and bureaucratic. A critical consideration from the outset was the extent to which individual government departments would buy into the BFR approach and commit themselves to integrating the approach into their planning and implementation processes. Survey respondents were asked to assess the extent to which government departments involved in Operation Phakisa Labs were fully committed to the BFR approach and the below results were obtained:

Figure 11: Level of Commitment of government departments to BFR n = 44



Figure 11 above shows that a total of 49% of the respondents indicated that they felt that several government departments had not fully invested themselves in the BFR approach, while a total of 40% felt that there had been an effort and commitment by government departments to align with the approach. The lack of commitment by some departments has also been exacerbated by the National Treasury's reluctance to commit financially to the methodology as indicated by the following respondent.

> *'Phakisa outcomes were idealistic enough and we were ready to implement, but to date very little earmarked resources have been provided for game changing interventions. Given that OP was not aligned with government planning processes, and it was not budgeted for and many of the accounting officers were not involved at planning stage, the implementation was business as usual approach. Government and lead departments are still using bureaucracy for delivery and reporting, which is against the spirit of Operation Phakisa. If we had a business unusual approach then a significant number of outcomes would have been achieved, impacting positively on growth, investment, and employment. Currently, we have regressed in these critical indicators.' –* ***Respondent 18***

The model of the Delivery Unit is generally based on the determination of a country's leader and close associates to overcome bureaucratic bottlenecks and fast-track service delivery processes. This requires a short-circuiting of the standard operating procedures of governments and a leadership motivated expert driven top-down approach to mobilising these Delivery Unit structures. The Labs

have been a top-down approach where high level thinkers, planners and practitioners have undertaken detailed problem analysis and priority setting. As per the model, community engagement has not been prioritized, which may be problematic in the long-term. The top-down approach does not fit the current approach of government and the NDP 2030 narrative of a social compact between government and the citizens, where citizens engage with government and place issues on the development agenda.

The emergence of Operation Phakisa as a "centre of government" transmission/delivery unit was driven by the political and reputational risks associated with the government struggling to deliver on its commitments, which promoted the initial shift towards a greater focus on implementation. Despite changes in administration, the NDP 2030 and MTSF remain key documents that set the government's agenda and determine key national development priorities. Changes of administration (Zuma to Ramaphosa) and perceived uncertainty within ruling party structures has led to a highly risk-averse environment and at departmental levels many processes and programmes have been put on hold. In the past few years, the struggling South African economy has seen government placing greater premium on the maintenance of basic services rather than the expansion of new, cost-heavy initiatives. The long shadow of the proceedings of the Commission into State Capture and the revelations of massive state corruption created ever higher levels of caution within government. The advent of COVID-19, the restrictions associated with, and the massive state resources used to fund Covid relief efforts, have served to hold back progress on and even stall ambitious socio-economic programmes such as those envisaged by the Operation Phakisa Labs.

5.1.5 Lab Planning Processes

The central purpose of the Operation Phakisa Labs was to develop detailed evidence-based implementation plans for priority sectors such as the oceans economy, mining, health, and education. Survey respondents were asked to rank key six components of the Lab processes on a scale from very effective to not effective at all. The responses indicate that the Labs were relatively effective in the design, strategic focus, and planning components of the Lab work, but much weaker on implementation arrangements. Responses regarding the effectiveness of the M&E and research elements of the Lab work were mixed as shown in Figure 12 below.

Figure 12: Perspectives on Operation Phakisa Lab planning processes n = 44



	Conceptual design of interventions	Strategic focus of the Labs	3-Foot planning processes	Implementation arrangements	Monitoring and evaluation	Use of research
Very effective	31,80%	31,10%	15,60%	13,30%	6,70%	17,80%
Somewhat effective	31,80%	42,20%	51,10%	17,80%	28,90%	31,10%
Unsure	15,90%	17,80%	17,80%	15,60%	20%	26,70%
Not very effective	18,20%	4,40%	11,10%	37,80%	33,30%	15,60%
not effective at all	2,30%	4,40%	4,40%	15,60%	11,20%	8,90%

The theory and practice of BFR demands that a transparent and robust monitoring and evaluation system is embedded in the methodology such that all relevant stakeholders have access to the monitoring and evaluation outputs. When asked about the effectiveness of the monitoring arrangements, most of the respondents (33,30% not very effective / 11,20% not effective at all) expressed concern about the inadequate state of the current monitoring arrangements. Comprehensive monitoring of performance data by implementing staff is meant to support rigorous implementation and reveal new and important insights that have not previously been considered. It was clear, however, that for many Labs the monitoring and evaluation challenges did not lie at departmental level, and some departments indicated that they had been rigorous in following the onerous reporting requirements demanded by the DPME's ISU. Many departments expressed concern that the data that they were providing was not well-managed, and a few of the respondents noted that the regular reporting that they were providing was "disappearing into a black hole".

Respondents were asked to assess the extent to which the Lab planning processes were strategically aligned with departmental medium term strategic and annual performance planning processes. Most of the respondents (44.5%) and as well triangulated with the qualitative analysis were of the view that the Lab planning process was not strategically aligned with most of the department's medium term strategic and annual performance planning. Two of the Labs that were interviewed noted that the activities associated with Operation Phakisa had been absorbed into routine APP processes and were no longer viewed through the lens of "business unusual".

Figure 13: Extent of BFR planning alignment with routine department planning n = 44



5.1.6 The Use of Research to Inform Planning

The public sector delivers a wide variety of outputs. Some of them are "downstream" as they affect citizens and firms directly; for example, public services such as health, education, sanitation, infrastructure management, and regulations. Others are less tangible but equally critical: these occur further "upstream" in the public sector delivery process and include research and evidence-based policy formulation and prioritization. Effective government planning relies on timely data and current research to inform conceptualisation, formulation, and decision-making. The inclusion of academia in the Operation Phakisa Labs as key stakeholders was intended to be a strategy for ensuring that planning processes would be evidence informed. Survey respondents were therefore asked whether in their experience in the Labs the design and planning processes were sufficiently informed by new and / or up-to-date research and data.

Figure 14: The extent to which research was used in Lab planning n = 44



Generally, both research and academia were key components of the Labs process. A total of 62% of the respondents felt that research had been a significant component in the design of the three-foot plans, whereas only 15% felt that research had not been a significant contributor to planning processes. A total of 45.5% of the respondents felt that academia had been brought on board during Lab planning, while a total of 36.4% felt that the academic community had not been adequately engaged. Below are some of the views brought forward regarding research:

> *Within tourism, the research work was completed 100% and all the research studies needed that time as a delivery unit were conducted. The only challenge is that as we know that research is ongoing, what we did wrong was to focus on what was happening at that time without focusing more on the future – this was going to assist more in scenario planning e.g., we could have also had research that focuses on the future trying to understand the impacts of climate change in the next ten years, pandemics etc, Futures Analysis type of assessments were not done –* ***Respondent 24***

In conclusion, within the context of the South Africa's economy, Operation Phakisa as a methodology responds to the underlying problems and commonly accepted challenges that impedes accelerated service delivery. Overall, the evaluation has found that the design of the Operation Phakisa is logical, and the outputs and outcomes are clearly defined. What emerged from the qualitative data was a strong sense that in theory the BFR approach had enormous potential and that where Operation Phakisa was implemented systematically and successfully using the tools of BFR, it became more relevant to the South African economic context, well-aligned with the government's overall economic growth, transformation, and supportive of job creation objectives. In practice and in most instances, the theory failed to become practice and most participating departments have reverted to "business as usual". This conclusion is summed up in the table below:

5.1 To what extent has the Operation Phakisa planning and implementation methodology been appropriately designed?					
Evaluation Questions	Definitely yes	Yes	Undecided	No	Definitely no
To what extent is the political context & institutional arrangements ready for a BFR model and new delivery transmission mechanisms?					
Is there demonstrated political will for the BFR model					
To what extent is the Operation Phakisa methodology relevant in achieving objectives?					
Is the methodology of Operation Phakisa consistent throughout all the Labs?					
Could deviations from methodology be justified?					
Were the Lab participants and Implementing Agents correctly chosen?					
Was the process transparent and appropriate?					
To what extent have resources been used in an efficient manner throughout the planning and delivery phase?					
Could there have been an improved manner in which resources were used?					
Was research and development (R&D) undertaken for Labs?					
Have the available skills development been optimally used?					
Has there been benefit in bringing skills and R&D under one Unit (DHET and DST)?					

5.2 Three years after the convening of the seven Operation Phakisa delivery Labs, are the various Operation Phakisa Labs likely to achieve the intended outputs and outcomes?

Among Operation Phakisa methodology most effective tools are targets – prioritized set of measurable, ambitious, and time-bound goals and trajectories, a projected progression towards these goals creates a tight link between the planned interventions and expected outcomes. According to Mouton (2021), setting targets and developing trajectories are part of the target between now and the targeted date of completion. While nearly all public sector organizations set targets, many of these targets are somewhat vague or immeasurable or they simply operate under unclear time horizons. Targets should be both ambitious and realistic. An unambitious target generates acceptance of incremental rather transformational change, and an unrealistic target will discourage those responsible for achieving it. This section looks at the achievability of the targets set in different Operation Phakisa initiatives and labs, and also gives a brief analysis of what worked well and what did not work well regarding implementation.

5.2.1 Achievability of Outcomes and Timelines

The initial link between Operation Phakisa and apex political power, suggested that the methodology came with the necessary authority, resources, flexibility and striving for provision of timely advice and quick turnaround to potentially cut through bureaucratic roadblocks. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with Operation Phakisa, as standard bureaucratic processes resumed just after the Labs were set up. Several respondents cited that Government and lead departments are still using bureaucracy for delivery and reporting, which is against the spirit of BFR. One of the respondents

mentioned that if Operation Phakisa had a business unusual approach, then a significant number of outcomes would have been achieved, impacting positively on growth, investment, and employment. The reality is that government has, over the years, established strict financial and administrative frameworks based on legislation such as the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and the Public Service Act (PSA) to ensure good governance of public money and recruitment transparency. Without amendments to legislation, it was always going to be a challenge for Labs to circumvent regulations to fast-track processes such as procurement and recruitment.

One of emerging issues arising from this review of the Operation Phakisa methodology is that the approach has experienced the same kind of slippage between planning and implementation that routine department delivery experiences. The BFR methodology was intended to deliver improved implementation of government goals through an understanding that goal setting cannot be separated from implementation, and that solutions to problems that arise amid implementation will often lead to important changes in goal setting. As such, a core part of the Lab planning process was to identify realistic outcome targets and timelines for implementation.

Figure 15: Perspectives of respondents on achievability of outcomes and timelines n = 44



Survey responses on this issue were quite mixed with a total of 37% of respondents noting that outcome targets and timelines were realistic, while a total of 51% felt that the outcome targets and timelines had not been realistic. The fact that less than 40% of respondents felt that the outcome targets and timelines set out in the Lab plans were realistic suggests that from the outset there was some level of scepticism about implementation capacity.

According to the Operation Phakisa blueprint, the BFR methodology encouraged ambitious target setting within tight timeframes. For many departments this runs counter to their routine approach of setting modest targets to avoid under-performance. This has been supported by the views of one of the respondents who stated the following:

"*Doing business unusual means working against almost impossible targets to reach. We encouraged high ambitions using stretched, seemingly impossible targets, but to do this we had to encourage everyone to conquer the fear of failure*" - ***Respondent 28.***

5.2.2 Overall Performance of the Operation Phakisa Labs

The concept of the Operation Phakisa Labs was drawn from the experiences of delivery units over the past twenty years in various countries. In Malaysia the effectiveness of the delivery mechanism (PEMANDU) stemmed from its design features and methodology, as well as the effectiveness of its working relationship with service delivery agencies and outside stakeholders. South Africa adopted the concept of "Labs" – a signature PEMANDU innovation – which was seen by South African officials as having the potential to broaden ownership of the NDP priority areas among a wide variety of stakeholders. The role of the Labs was to design ambitious plans that would strategically address critical development priorities and establish rigorous monitoring and reporting of key performance indicators (KPIs), thereby creating incentives to deliver results at all levels. South African officials had also seen how PEMANDU had attracted top talent from the private sector, a factor which had infused the public sector with innovation and drive and the wish to replicate this achievement.

Some respondents mentioned that the demands of regular reporting on KPIs meant that the Labs were required to establish important routines and promote evidence-based decision-making. At the same time, it created an additional reporting burden for the departments, which resulted in several of them not being more supportive of the methodology. The complex performance ecosystem of the South African government has tended to create a heavy reporting burden as well as coordination challenges. This burden was compounded especially where departments were already reporting on several indicators for existing plans and programmes.

The evaluation team triangulated both the primary and secondary data, as well as the qualitative and quantitative data. Interwoven with this analysis are perspectives by key informants, reference to data provided by the DPME, the respective implementing departments and presentation of findings from the literature that either lend weight to or contradict the survey findings. The overlap between the quantitative and qualitative dimensions is deliberate, allowing for the triangulation of data primarily from the three major sources – survey, statistical, and interviews – but also with information from secondary sources (reports, PowerPoint presentations, and academic literature). Where there are insufficient or potentially unreliable data upon which to base conclusions, this is indicated in the text. Recommendations are based on the available evidence with caveats about data quality where appropriate. According to the analysis conducted as part of this evaluation, several of the weaknesses in administrative implementation can be traced back to a lack of adequate funding, executive and political support.

Survey respondents were asked to assess the performance of the Labs on a range of performance criteria as shown in Figure 16 below:

Figure 16: Ratings of Lab performance n = 44



The DPME ISU was tasked with managing a set of centralised processes that can be described as a nested set of monitoring routines reinforcing accountability and optimum performance delivery. The plan was to commence with bi-weekly reports on the KPIs of each initiative. The ISU team was expected to liaise with the owners of each initiative to request updates, especially any change in the metrics being tracked, any significant events that have occurred, and an explanation of why the metrics had or had not changed. The current state of each metric was then supposed to be compared to the target for the period, and coded as completed, on-track, or falling behind. The metrics and salient information were then supposed to be compiled into a template that would feed into a common database that would be later updated on the Operation Phakisa website in form of a dashboard. Through their planning processes each Lab set itself a framework of timebound activities. Performance data was expected to be submitted to the ISU on a quarterly basis and then consolidated within a centralised data repository.

The following section of the report indicates performance per Operation Phakisa Lab where data was made available:

5.2.2.1 Biodiversity Lab

According to the Lab respondents the Biodiversity and Tourism Lab has different components. Biodiversity Economy is a Lab on its own while CMT is a mini-Lab for Oceans Economy. For cost efficiency, it was decided that the mini-Lab piggyback on the convening of the Biodiversity Economy Lab. So, the Biodiversity Economy Lab has two arms: Bioprospecting and Wildlife Coastal Marine Tourism, Bioprospecting and Wildlife whose objectives are aligned to the NDP and include achieving an average yearly GDP increase within the sector and creation of new jobs.

The Bioprospecting arm is responsible for collecting, harvesting, and extracting living or dead indigenous species or derivatives and genetic material thereof for commercial or industrial purposes whilst the Wildlife arm is centred on game and wildlife farming / ranching activities that relate to the stocking, trading, breeding, and hunting of game and all the services and goods required to support this value chain. The Coastal and Marine Tourism (CMT) mini lab of the Biodiversity Lab focused on recreational activities along the coastal zone and/or the marine environment. It was assumed that major infrastructural projects would have the potential to significantly contribute to the economic growth and job creation aspirations of the sector. The longer-term vision for this was a uniquely South African, world class coastal and marine experience where South Africa, ranked within the top 20 tourism destinations, would contribute to an inclusive and sustainable tourism economy. The nesting of mini labs within the broader Biodiversity Lab was seen as an exercise in cost management and efficiency.

The targets were that by 2020/21, there would be R1.915 billion revenue generated from the sector that would create 24 800 jobs. The wildlife businesses or operations would have 30% PDI ownership. The target of 24 800 jobs and R1.9 billion revenue were most definitely impacted by the COVID-19 lockdowns and the bans placed on international travel. The hectarage target was 2 million ha of wildlife under PDI ownership of use rights. Another important target that the Department had set was supporting 1 000 SMMEs to engage in the wildlife economy.

Given the salience of Covid-19 as a major economic disruptor in 2020 and into 2021, there was 0% achievement of the targeted number of jobs in the same period. Impressively, the Lab surpassed the number of entrepreneurs who were supposed to be trained in 2020-2021 as a total of 192 instead of 150 were trained. Figure 17 below gives an overview of the performance of this Lab regarding the envisaged set targets and the actual implemented.

Figure 17: Performance of the Biodiversity Lab 2016 to 2022



	Q1 (2016/17)	Q2 (2016/17)	Q3 (2016/17)	Q4 (2016/17)	Q1 (2017/18)	Q2 (2017/18)	Q3 (2017/18)	Q4 (2017/18)	Q1 (2018/19)	Q2 (2018/19)	Q3 (2018/19)	Q4 (2018/19)	Q1 (2019/20)	Q2 (2019/20)	Q3 (2019/20)	Q4 (2019/20)	Q1 (2020/21)	Q2 (2020/21)	Q3 (2020/21)	Q4 (2020/21)	Q1 (2021/22)	Q2 (2021/22)	Q3 (2021/22)	Q4 (2021/22)
	2016/17				2017/18				2018/19				2019/20				2020/21				2021/22			
Lab Activities Due	48	204	311	395	477	550	642	690	709	731	753	776	835	843	886	898	899	900	915	963	1014	1014	1018	1023
Lab Activities Completed	46	90	132	157	194	223	269	317	369	403	440	451	495	523	529	535	535	538	547	550	551	551	551	551

Source: DPME (2022)

One of the interview respondents commented as follows:

> *Phakisa – at least for the wildlife sector – did not deliver as expected in implementation. Government bureaucracy and ingrained business as usual approaches, especially in provinces, impeded implementation of innovative approaches identified in the Labs. In addition, although the private sector was willing and able to do their part, government could not deliver financially in terms of capacity and approaches in implementing the 3feet plans, or at least in the areas where I was involved. There are solutions but the current slow and tedious processes of government impede implementation and delivery"* – **Respondent 21**

The overriding impression is that the Lab performance was sub-optimal in most of the set performance areas that they were being assessed against from 2016 to 2021/22 (suggested by Figure 17). The gap existing between the activities due, and the activities completed is significant. Additionally, the sector is currently sustaining over 418,000 jobs nationwide with a target to add at least 100,000 more jobs by 2030. Table 9 below shows the progress made in 2020-2021 towards the realisation of the set outcomes as October 2021.

Table 7: Progress on the Biodiversity Lab implementation

Biodiversity Economy: Progress 2020-2021				
Indicator	**Indicator Definition**	**2020/212 Target**	**Progress made to date (Q1, Q2, Q3 & Q4)**	**% Achievement**
Jobs	No. of jobs created in the sector	4,000	No progress received form Sector (reasons related to COVID)	0%

Training	No. of entrepreneurs trained	150	Total: 192: Business management (20), Project management (25), Community leadership development programme (24), Rest: Wildlife training	128%
Support mechanisms coordinated	No. of hectares for indigenous species identified and cultivated	500ha	0 ha cultivated due to lockdown.	0%
	No. of biodiversity-based businesses supported	200	34 SMME supported through WG1	17%
	No. of game donated to emerging game farmers	0	No progress on Game donation due to COVID: Department of Defence approved donation of over 6000 game animals	0%
	No. of community beneficiation programmes implemented	5	2 draft co-management agreements in place	40%

Source: High level progress report on Biodiversity economy Phakisa (December 2021)

In 2021 alone, at least 2,262 work opportunities have been created, albeit that these are short term ones. At least 2000 beneficiaries were trained on various opportunities within the wildlife, bioprospecting, and ecotourism streams. On a positive note, performance in 2021/2 demonstrates improvement as the number of jobs created compared to the previous financial year recorded a 56,65% achievement and another achievement of 69.48% game donated to the emerging game farmers where there was 0% activity in the previous year.

Table 8: Biodiversity Lab progress on job creation, training and coordination

Biodiversity Economy: Progress 2021-2022				
Indicator	**Indicator Definition**	**2020/21 Target**	**Progress made to date (Q1, Q2, Q3 & Q4)**	**% Achievement**
Jobs	No. of jobs created in the sector	4000	Total: 2262 420 jobs created SANBI (37), Cape Nature 940, Emerging game farmers (379), PPYCP (1475 temporary jobs)	56.65%
Training	No. of entrepreneurs trained	400	Total: 137 Professional hunting (12), Game Farming (20), Eco-tourism (15), Business management (70), Capacity building for Bioprospecting/bio trade (20)	34.25%
Support mechanisms coordinated	No. of hectares for indigenous species identified and cultivated	500ha	TBC	
	No. of biodiversity-based businesses supported	400	0	0%

	No. of game donated to emerging game farmers	5000	3474 animals approved for donation by SANParks	69.48%
	No. of community beneficiation programmes implemented	9	2 Co-Management agreements facilitated: Loskop Nature Reserve Claimants; Ongeluksnek Reserve	22.22%

Source: High level progress report on Biodiversity Economy Phakisa (December 2021)

The Biodiversity Economy sector is presently contributing a total of 4% to the country's GDP. The Department of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries (DFFE) has invested about R2,2 billion infrastructure grant to support and motivate SMMEs, PDIs and communities to participate significantly in the Biodiversity Economy sector value chains. It is expected that with such a government investment, the private sector matches the investment. A good example is where the DFFE invested R10 million at Mfolozi big 5 reserves with the private sector investing R160 million in return. Similarly, with Emcakwini Game reserve where the department invested less than R50 million, where the private sector invested R500 million in return. Table 11 below exemplifies the investment amounts that the government has put into the sector.

Table 9: Investments made via the Biodiversity Lab

Government Intervention: Biodiversity Investments					
Focus area	No. of approved projects	Year of activation 20/21	Year of Activation 21/22	Year of Activation 22/23	Total budget
Biodiversity Economy	108	20	51	37	R1,185 billion
Ecotourism Projects in protected areas (People & Parks)	57	21	14	22	R1,059 billion
Work opportunities	**48,982**				**R2,2 billion**

Source: High level progress report on Biodiversity Economy Phakisa (December 2021)

There is insufficient data to look closely at the efficiency of expenditure and the outcomes of Biodiversity programmes. The view of the evaluators is that the allocation of expenditure and the accomplishments of this Lab are commensurate with the broad reach, complex logistics and levels of effort involved therein. A breakdown of provincial of expenditure per province (up to 2022) is shown in Figure 18 below:

Figure 18: Expenditure on the Biodiversity disaggregared by province, 2022

Province	Approved Projects	2021/21	2021/22 Activation	2022/2023 Activation	Budget
Eastern Cape	23	3	11	9	R244 000 000,00
Free State	3	1	2	0	R50 000 000,00
Gauteng	3	2	0	1	R18 000 000,00
KwaZulu Natal	13	2	6	5	R129 000 000,00
Limpopo	27	7	13	7	R296 000 000,00
Mpumalanga	6	2	4	0	R56 000 000,00
North - West	16	0	7	9	R138 000 000,00

Western Cape	3	0	3	0	R23 000 000,00
Total Projects	108	20	51	37	
Budget		R250 000 000.00	R547 000 000.00	R388 000 000.00	R1 185 000 000.00
Work Opportunities		**5 580**	**12 208**	**8 660**	**26 448**

Source: High level progress report on Biodiversity Economy Phakisa (December 2021)

5.2.2.2 Chemicals and Waste Lab

The Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) together with the DPME initiated a Chemicals and Waste Phakisa programme from 24 July to 24 August 2017 (DEA, 2018). The purpose of the Lab was to engage around opportunities that could lead to the reduction of the impact caused by chemicals and waste on the environment, while growing the GDP contribution and creating jobs. By reducing this impact, the Lab envisaged generating about R11.5 billion to the South Africa's Waste and Chemicals sector and creating about 127,000 jobs by 2023. The Lab also envisaged diverting 19.74 m tonnes of waste from landfills of which 13.55 m tonnes would be recycled. Furthermore, the coordination of SMME development across Phakisa initiatives was cited to have the potential to support the development of 4,300 SMMEs, which will result in the creation of about 41,000 jobs. The results and a summary of the total activities projected are summarized in Table 12 below:

Table 10: Summary of the total activities completed by the Chemicals and Waste Economy Lab

Workstream	Initiatives	Anticipated Impact
Chemicals	Establishing a refrigerant reclamation and reusable cylinder industry Mercury initiative was for addressing mercury contamination (land remediation) in the country Lead in paint initiative Asbestos initiative (Development of the National Asbestos Strategy)	Creation of 2,000 direct jobs and 5 new SMMEs created Environment: 22,5000 contaminated cylinders diverted from landfills, 114K GWP of ozone depleting gas venting abolished GDP: R700m
Product redesign and waste minimisation	Food waste - Food insecurity will be reduced by upskilling and educating stakeholders across the value chain Conducting focused research and developing capacity amongst agro stakeholders Launching a consumer awareness campaign to use and consume 'imperfect' food Packaging waste - Recycling of packaging will be increased by rethinking design and formalising the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) mechanisms. Compile/update packaging design guidelines and establishing a national grading scheme for packaging. Formalising Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) plans in the packaging industry. Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF) - Establishing a Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF) plant with the intention of building four more by 2023 Establish up to 5 Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF) plants across South Africa	Creation of 751 direct jobs and 2,305 indirect jobs Emission of ~114,000 tonnes of ozone depleting gas can be avoided GDP: ZAR 792m Environment: 19.75 tonnes diverted from landfills by end of 2023

Municipal waste	Increase E-waste recycling rate from 7% to 30% Grow to 50% the number of households in 8 Metros separating at source by 2023 Create 8,000 direct and indirect jobs through plastic recycling Produce building aggregates and construction inputs from rubble and glass	Creation of 16,000 direct jobs, 6,000 indirect jobs, 6 enterprises, 2,200 buy-back centres and 2,000 informal GDP: ZAR 4,49 bn Environment: 808,000 tonnes of waste diverted
Bulk industrial waste	➢ Increase beneficial use of ash and gypsum ➢ Zero sewage sludge to landfill by 2023 ➢ Zero meat production waste to landfill by 2023	Creation of 58500 direct jobs, 120000 indirect jobs, and 3500 SMMEs created Environment: 10,6 m tonnes of waste diverted from landfills

Source: DPME (2021)

According to officials the Lab is currently undergoing amendments of implementation plans and this performance is based on the plans which are being amended, which may slow down performance as consultation with industry is also being conducted. Table 13 below shows the achievement made so far for this Lab in terms of activities:

Table 11: Chemicals and Waste Economy activities due and completed

Summary of activities expected, due, and completed				
Year / Qtr.	**Lab Activities**	**Lab Activities Due**	**Lab Activities Completed**	**% Of Lab Activities Completed**
2017/18 Q1	2442	0	16	0,66%
2017/18 Q2	2442	27	19	0,78%
2017/18 Q3	2442	386	124	5,08%
2017/18 Q4	2442	831	274	11,22%
2018/19 Q1	2442	1242	376	15,40%
2018/19 Q2	2442	1490	396	16,22%
2018/19 Q3	2442	1700	414	16,95%
2018/19 Q4	2442	1809	436	17,85%
2019/20 Q1	2442	1917	444	18,18%
2019/20 Q2	2442	1999	463	18,96%
2019/20 Q3	2442	2059	463	18,96%
2019/20 Q4	2442	2108	463	18,96%
2020/21 Q1	2442	2135	463	18,96%
2020/21 Q2	2442	2151	463	18,96%
2020/21 Q3	2442	2171	463	18,96%
2020/21 Q4	2442	2189	463	18,96%
2021/22 Q1	2442	2203	463	18,96%
2021/22 Q2	2442	2211	463	18,96%
2021/22 Q3	2442	2220	463	18,96%
2021/22 Q4	2442	2252	463	18,96%

Source: (DPME, 2022)

Based on Table 13, several charts were developed to provide a graphic view of the performance. Figure 19 below presents a plot of Lab activities versus completed activities in a year. Percentage activities completed were also included to better explain the extent of performance.

Figure 19: Chemicals and Waste Economy Lab progress on activities 2017/18 to 2021/22



As shown in Figure 19 above, performance improved each year with an overall growth in activities completed from 18% to 76% from 2017 to 2021. These results indicate that the CWE Lab performance was low in 2017 and gradually improved to 66% in 2018, 75% in 2019, and 76% in both 2020 and 2021. The performance remained constant at its best between 2020 and 2021. The huge jump from 18% in 2017 to 66% in 2018 could be attributed to the fact that activities had just been introduced and the implementers and Lab staff had not yet grasped the art of performing the activities or their importance. But as years progressed, implementation gradually began to improve as well. There is a need, however, for further support regarding financial, technical, and human resources for the Lab to achieve 100% performance of these activities.

When it comes to quarterly performance, figure 20 below summarizes the analysis of activity performance. According to Figure 20, as expected percentage of completed activities gradually increased each quarter, starting from 0.7% in Q1 of 2017 to 19% in Q4 of 2021. A huge jump in performance was witnessed between Q2 2017 and Q3 2017, and between Q3 2017 and Q4 2017, from 0.7% to 5.1% and from 5.1% to 11.2%, respectively.

Figure 20: Analysis of Chemicals and Waste EconomyLab performance



Given that the target for each quarter was fixed at 2442, the department had a separate target of activities due by each quarter, which is indicated by the column **Lab Activities Due**. According to this column in Table 14 above, 0 activities were due in Q1 of 2017, whereas in Q3 of 2017 a total of 386 activities were due, etc. Therefore, Tables 14 and 15 summarize the total activities completed with respect to activities due on a yearly and quarterly basis, respectively.

Table 12: Biodiversity Lab total activities completed, annually 2017 to 2022

Year	Sum of Lab Activities Due	Sum of Lab Activities Completed	% of Yearly Completed vs Yearly Due
2017/18	1244	433	34,8%
2018/19	6241	1622	26,0%
2019/20	8083	1833	22,7%
2020/21	8646	1852	21,4%
2021/22	8886	1852	20,8%

Source (DPME, 2022)

Table 14 above indicates that for all years, the Lab underperformed because it failed to complete all the activities that were due by that year. The highest performance was observed in 2017, where the performance was 34.8%, followed by 2018 with 26%. Generally, the yearly completed activities versus the number of activities due that year decreased continually from 34.8% in 2017 to 20.8% in 2021.

Table 15 below indicates that for all quarters, the Lab underperformed because it failed to complete all activities that were due by that quarter. The highest performance was observed in Q1 of 2017, where the performance was 1600% because no activity was due in that quarter, but the Lab completed 16 activities. This was followed by Q2 of 2017 with 70.4% even though this was still below the expected number of activities that were due that quarter. Generally, the quarterly completed activities versus the number of activities due that quarter decreased continually from 1600% in Q1 2017 to 20.4% in Q4 of 2021. The grand total row at the bottom of Table 15 below indicates that overall, the lab did not perform as envisaged as the number of expected activities was 33100 when due by each quarter assignments were summed up, but the department managed to only complete 7592, which makes 22.9% completed assignments.

Table 13: Chemicals and Waste Economy Lab total activities completed, by quarter 2017 to 2022

Qtr	Sum of Lab Activities Due	Sum of Lab Activities Completed	% of Qtrly Completed vs Qtrly Due
2017/18 Q1	0	16	1600,0%
2017/18 Q2	27	19	70,4%
2017/18 Q3	386	124	32,1%
2017/18 Q4	831	274	33,0%
2018/19 Q1	1242	376	30,3%
2018/19 Q2	1490	396	26,6%
2018/19 Q3	1700	414	24,4%
2018/19 Q4	1809	436	24,1%
2019/20 Q1	1917	444	23,2%
2019/20 Q2	1999	463	23,2%
2019/20 Q3	2059	463	22,5%
2019/20 Q4	2108	463	22,0%
2020/21 Q1	2135	463	21,7%
2020/21 Q2	2151	463	21,5%
2020/21 Q3	2171	463	21,3%
2020/21 Q4	2189	463	21,2%
2021/22 Q1	2203	463	21,0%
2021/22 Q2	2211	463	20,9%
2021/22 Q3	2220	463	20,9%
2021/22 Q4	2252	463	20,6%
Grand Total	33100	7592	22,9%

Source (DPME, 2022)

In summary, there is still work to be done for the lab to realise their goals because the rate of activity completion is very low. Figure 21 tracks the performance picture of the Lab in relation to the projected activities.

Figure 21: Chemicals and Waste Economy Lab overall performance 2017 to 2022



	Q1 (2017/18)	Q2 (2017/18)	Q3 (2017/18)	Q4 (2017/18)	Q1 (2018/19)	Q2 (2018/19)	Q3 (2018/19)	Q4 (2018/19)	Q1 (2019/20)	Q2 (2019/20)	Q3 (2019/20)	Q4 (2019/20)	Q1 (2020/21)	Q2 (2020/21)	Q3 (2020/21)	Q4 (2020/21)	Q1 (2021/22)	Q2 (2021/22)	Q3 (2021/22)	Q4 (2021/22)
	2017/18				2018/19				2019/20				2020/21				2021/22			
Lab Activities Due	0	27	386	831	1242	1490	1700	1809	1917	1999	2059	2108	2135	2151	2171	2189	2203	2211	2220	2252
Lab Activities Completed	16	19	124	274	376	396	414	436	444	463	463	463	463	463	463	463	463	463	463	463

Source (DPME, 2022)

5.2.2.3 Oceans Economy

The Oceans Economy hub of Operation Phakisa focuses on delivering on a range of maritime and marine-related sector initiatives to support the objectives of the NDP 2030. Thus, South Africa's maritime road map envisages a future where *"South Africa is globally recognised as a maritime nation"* by 2030. Operation Phakisa focuses on unlocking the economic potential of South Africa's oceans economy, which could contribute up to R177 billion to the GDP by 2033 and between 800,000 and 1 million direct jobs. Investments is mainly in the list focus areas of Aquaculture, Coastal and Marine Tourism, Marine Protection Services and Ocean Governance, Marine Transport and Manufacturing, Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Small Harbours Development. However, to realise the ambitious high-level targets for the Oceans Economy the following is required:

- To realize a GDP contribution of R177 billion by 2033, South Africa will require a real growth rate of approximately 1.8% per annum from 2015; and
- To realize the creation of 1 million jobs by 2033 South Africa will require a real employment growth rate of approximately 4.9% per annum from 2015

Table 16 below demonstrates Operation Phakisa envisaged growth:

Table 14: Oceans Economy Lab sort, nedium and long term performance targets

Indicator	Short term - 2016	Medium term - 2019	Long term - 2033
Jobs	26,000 cumulative	77,100 jobs	1 million jobs
Economic Growth	GDP contribution of R7.5 billion	GDP contribution of R32 billion	GDP contribution of R129-R177 billion
Transformation Indicator	Monitoring of Maritime BEE Charter and application of BEE Codes in National Ports Act. (Min level 4 BEE and focus on Ownership and Operation) 15% transformation (Aquaculture) Opportunities for SMMEs	Monitoring of Maritime BEE Charter and application of BEE Codes in National Ports Act. (Min level 4 BEE and focus on Ownership and Operation) 26% transformation (Aquaculture) Opportunities for SMMEs	Monitoring of Maritime BEE Charter and application of BEE Codes in National Ports Act. (Min level 4 BEE and focus on Ownership and Operation) 50% transformation (Aquaculture) Opportunities for SMMEs

Source: Ocean Economy (LCC) Progress Report (November 2021)

Oceans Economy commenced with operational work after the October 2014 launch. Overall progress to date for directly funded Oceans Economy projects impacts includes a combined government and private sector investment of R 41 billion and a creation of 8,383 jobs in various sectors. A core function of Operation Phakisa Oceans Economy has been to create a coordinated interface with the private sector to unlock more funding and since its inception it has worked both to influence and to support the agenda for reformation in the public sector.

The approach of bringing stakeholders together to discuss and agree on issues was appreciated by all stakeholders interviewed. The methodology was viewed by the stakeholders as a catalyst that is revitalising the much-needed activities by institutions and stakeholders dealing with ocean governance and economy for effective and efficient service delivery. The evaluation set out to understand how Operation Phakisa-driven partnerships works at the strategic level, but also how it has manifested at the implementation level and how the relationships are perceived. Most respondents interviewed felt that the relationship between the Oceans Economy Lab and the private

sector was critical to the success of the methodology, and that to date it has been constructive and mutually beneficial. During the interviews respondents highlighted different aspects of this relationship:

> *Programmes implemented jointly by the Lab and the private sector generally work well because there are significant levels of financial, expertise and information exchange and efforts are made to align the Operation Phakisa programmes / interventions with government policies and initiatives-* ***Respondent 24.***

The partnership between the public sector and the private sector has resulted in significant investment from the private sector of approximately R16,9 billion. The private sector also recognises the challenges facing the government pertaining to skills and financial shortages. This reality provides a strong "business case" for the private sector to partner with government and provide targeted support, interventions, and development programmes to improve the quality-of-service delivery in South Africa. The Lab aspirations are to unlock about R177 billion by 2033 together with I million jobs. With the current pace of delivery and prevailing fiscal conditions, the evaluation team are of the view that more speed in implementation and resources are required if these Oceans Economy targets are to be realised. Table 17 and Table 18 below show the investments and jobs realised by the Operation Phakisa Oceans Economy Lab:

Table 15: Levels of public and private sector investment in the Oceans Economy

Delivery	Gov Investment	Pvt Sector Investment	DTI Incentives	Total Investment	Jobs
Marine Transport and Manufacturing	R 7,6 billion	R1,1 billion	R428,8 million	R9,2 billion	4,589
Oil and Gas	R15 billion	R14,8 billion		R29 billion	234
Aquaculture	R260 million	R940 million		R1,2 billion	2,367
Marine Protection and Oceans Governance	R58,5 million			R58 ,5 million	41
Small Harbours Development	R500 million			R500 million	719
Coastal and Marine Tourism	R164 million			R164 million	433
Total	**R23,6 billion**	**R16,9 billion**	**R428,8 million**	**R41 billion**	**8,383**

Source: Ocean Economy (LCC) Progress Report (November 2021)

Table 18 shows progress made towards 2019 targets as reported on 1 October 2021 and broken down into focus areas is as follows:

Table 16: Oceans Economy Lab progress report 2021

Initiative	Focus Area Activities Due	%Focus areas complete	Gvt tenders & Expenditure	Jobs	Private Sector Investment	Jobs
Maritime Transport and Manufacturing	346	18	R2.7 billion Transnet Infrastructure	3684	R1.15 billion	705
			R4.94 billion	200		

			R429 million DTI Incentives			

Source: Ocean Economy (LCC) Progress Report (November 2021)

Table 19 shows the levels of public and private sector investments as of October 2021-(Target: GDP-$2.2 billion annually until 2033):

Table 17: Public and private sector investments in the Oceans Economy, 2021

Institution	Investment
Private Sector	R14.85 billion (2014 -October 21)
Government	R15.00b billion (2014 – October 21)
Total Investment	R29.85 billion (Seismic surveys and exploration)

Source: Ocean Economy (LCC) Progress Report (November 2021)

Table 20 shows the achievement of targets by the Oceans Economy Lab (Offshore Oil and Gas) as of October 2021:

Table 18: Offshore Oil and Gas progress on targets, 2021

Item	Target	Achievements
Wells	30 Wells in 10 Years	From 2014 to October 2021, a total of five (5) (16.7 %) wells were drilled of which one was by the private sector and 4 by the government (Petro SA).
Job Creation	130 000 Direct Jobs	Disaggregated jobs: NA Women/Youth/People with disabilities- N/A Only PetroSA is producing employment: 234 workers
Transformation		Section 2d wasn't implemented as of October 2021. Transformation targets are envisaged to be realised during the development and production stage. However, participation of Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSA) participation is as follows: 1. Out of 16 Exploration rights, 1 is held by a company that is 100% owned by HDSA's and another with 10% HDSA participation interest. 2. Out of 6 Production Rights, 1 has 10% HDSA PARTICPATION 3. Out of 2 Technical Co-operation Permits, 2 are held by companies that are 100% owned by HDSA'S

Source: Ocean Economy (LCC) Progress Report (November 2021)

The total number of Oceans Economy Aquaculture Projects as of October 2021 were 47 (28 in production and 17 were still in planning stage). Table 21 below demonstrates the realised jobs from a targeted figure of 6500.

Table 19: Oceans Economy Aquaculture Targets vs Actual Realised

DIRECT ON-FARM JOB CREATION		
Total jobs on the 36 farms in 2018	237	Disaggregated jobs (of Total Jobs on the farm) **Gender**: Females (984), 42% **Males** (1383)-58% **Age:** Youth (1175) -50% **Race**: African Black (1411)- 60% Coloured – (760) -32% White – (194) -8% Asian (2) -0,1% **Disabilities** (14) -16% **Veteran**s (2) – 0,1%
Previous total jobs on 35 farms in 2017	2030	
New jobs created in 2018	337	
TOTAL NEW JOBS SINCE 2014: 301 (IN 2015) + 224 (IN 2016) +224 (IN 2017) =337 = 1033		

Source: Ocean Economy (LCC) Progress Report (November 2021)

A total of R2.8 billion (Government and the private sector) since 2014 was required to unlock an additional 2,618 direct jobs, 20,970 tons production capacity and increase turnover across the 36 projects to over R1.6 billion per annum as shown below.

Table 20: Investments in aquaculture throuh Oceans economy initiatives

Performance Measurement Area	Target and Achievement
Investment (2018)	By the end of 2018, total actual investment committed to Operation Phakisa Aquaculture Projects was over R1,78 billion, of which over R280 million was from Government. The additional actual investment (private & gov) in R557 million
Production (2018)	3547.79 tons per annum (Operation Phakisa Projects Production) which is 33,71 tons less than 2017. This equates to an 8.69% decrease in 2017.
Transformation (2018)	SMMEs: 16+ Cooperatives: 1 Average BBBE: <4

Source: Ocean Economy (LCC) Progress Report (November 2021)

According to the Operation Phakisa report (2021), a total of 10 initiatives have been proposed for the Marine Protection Services and Ocean Governance (MPG). A total of 325 activities were due, and 75% of activities were completed, as of October 2021. Table 23 below shows the investment that were made in MPG:

Table 21: Investments made in Marine Protection Services and Ocean Governance

Budget/Year	Government	Private Sector	Other
2017/2018	R31, 200, 000	R0	R0
2018/2019	R27, 350,000	R0	R0
2019/2020	R50,859, 416	R0	R0
2020/2021	R5,871, 000	R0	R0

Source: Ocean Economy (LCC) Progress Report (November 2021).

The table 24 below shows the achievements of the MPG

Table 22: Job creation resulting from MPG initiatives

Jobs Created (57)	Women	Youth	People with disabilities
Laboratory (6)	4	4	0
Community Workers (0)	-	-	-
Coastal monitors (33)	15	26	0

Coastal and Maritime Tourism implementation was approved by Cabinet in August 2017 with the aim of growing a world class and sustainable coastal and marine tourism destination that leverages South Africa's competitive advantage in nature, culture, and heritage. This plan contains tourism projects integrated with the creative industries and culture heritage. Opportunities include enterprise development such as local supplier development access to markets, skills development, and improvement. Table 25 below shows the projected and current investments in the Coastal Marine and Tourism and the metrics of performance.

Table 23: Projected and current investments in the Coastal Marine and Tourism

Item	Progress
Investment	Private Sector: Current **projected** private sector investment R112 billion Government: R164,345 million over 3 years
Job Creation **These are disaggregated jobs for the Blue Beach Programme**	People with disabilities (0) Projected government jobs (1,189) Projected Private Sector Jobs (71,942 full-time, 153,377 part-time) Projected investment and job figures will increase as and when more projects move into implementation.
Transformation	SMMEs are still to be determined Cooperatives are still to be determined BBBEE measures are still to be determined

The Small Harbours Development focus area identified 15 initiatives. As of June 2021, a total of R500 million has been given by the government and yielded the below progress

Table 24: Progress on targets for Small Harbours Development

Item	Progress
Jobs Creation	719 Men (621), Women (98), Youth (383), People with disabilities (3)
Transformation	SMME companies are empowered to the value of R81 million BBBEE Level 1 Companies (55), Level 2 Companies (12)

Source: Ocean Economy (LCC) Progress Report (November 2021).

As discussed above, several challenges that are a threat to the full realisation of the aspirations of the Lab has been identified and the mitigation measures put in place as shown in Table 27:

Table 25: Challenges impeding progress in the Oceans Economy Lab

Current Challenges Impacting on the Achievement of Oceans Economy Targets	Proposed Mitigating Measures
Depressed global and local economic climate	
Global trade growth and commodity prices under downward pressure	Review of current plans considering economic climate.
Low oil prices impacting negatively on the oil and gas sector.	
Slowdown in investments especially from the private sector	Direct engagements with private sector and other key stakeholders
Reduction in demand	Focus on current demand and expand such initiatives
Reduced investor appetite	
Funding for implementation of initiatives	
Commitment to Operation Phakisa methodology	Re-commitment to Operation Phakisa methodology – capacitation of implementing departments
Slipping back into business as usual	Re-commitment to Operation Phakisa methodology – capacitation of implementing departments

Source: Ocean Economy (LCC) Progress Report (November 2021).

5.2.2.4 Scaling Up the Ideal Clinic Realisation and Maintenance Programme (ICRM)

Implementation of the Ideal Clinic programme has its roots in the findings of a Baseline Audit commissioned by the National Department of Health (NDoH) in 2011.The audit revealed that only one health facility in South Africa's public-health sector (a hospital in North-West Province) fully met the required health-facility standards, as per the audit tools. The Ideal Clinic programme therefore aimed to systematically transform all primary health care (PHC) facilities to meet national standards in preparation for the introduction of the ICRM programme. The ICRM was designed to respond to several challenges adversely affecting the quality of PHC services in South Africa and the Lab's purpose was to develop an implementation plan to transform 100% of PHC facilities across the country to Ideal Clinic status (from a base of 0 in 2014). The ICRM initiative aspired to transform PHC in line with broader national priorities, as set out in Chapter 10 of the NDP 2030, the MTSF 2014-2019, and the National Health Insurance policy. The initiative was also aligned with the increasing global focus on primary and community-based care, which is seeing many developed and developing countries revising their models of the primary health clinic. Ultimately, the ICRM initiative aspired to ensure that, by 2019, every one of South Africa's 3,467 PHC facilities displayed some elements of the "Ideal Clinic".

An Ideal Clinic is a clinic with good infrastructure, adequate staff, adequate medicine and supplies, good administrative processes and adequate bulk supplies that use applicable clinical policies, protocols, guidelines as well as partner and stakeholder support, to ensure the provision of quality healthcare services to the community.

The ICRM programme entered its seventh year of implementation in 2021/2022 financial year. After the conceptualisation and identification of a few learning sites (where the model was tested) from 2013 to 2014, the programme was fully implemented in 2015/16 Financial Year. Several facility quality improvement activities were initiated to achieve the goal of converting all PHC facilities in the country to "Ideal" status. The ICRM programme uses the Operation Phakisa Ideal Clinic Laboratory initiated quality improvement plans to improve the functionality of these primary healthcare facilities (clinics and community health centres). An online monitoring system was developed prior to implementation.

A target of 600 facilities were selected for improvement in the first year of implementation which is 2015/16 financial year and 322 facilities achieved Ideal Clinic status. More facilities (1,430) were targeted for the year 2016/17 and by the end of March 2017, 786 additional facilities were rated as "Ideal". Unfortunately, of the 322 facilities that were Ideal at the end of the 2015/16 year, 71 clinics lost their status. ***This means that by the end of 2016/17, there were 1,037 Ideal Clinics in the country.*** These regressed facilities were subjected to peer review updates at the end of the financial year. In the 2017/2018 financial year another new 100 cohort of facilities were identified for scaleup. At the end of the 2017/2018 financial year, the total number of the ideal clinic were 1,507 Ideal Clinics (43.3% of the 3,478 facilities). This represents an increased number of Ideal Clinics by 470 facilities in 2017/2018. At the end of the 2018/19 financial year, a total of 1,920 (55%) clinics were ideal. This represents an increased number of Ideal Clinics by 428 out of 1000 facilities in 2018/19 for scaling up (Ideal Clinic Lab Progress Report, 2022).

Although there is an increase of facilities that are turned ideal each year it has been noted that some facilities regressed and lost their Ideal Status. During the 2019/20 financial year, 226 facilities lost their IC status. At the end of the 2019/2020 financial year, a total of ideal clinics was 1,906 (55% of the 3,467 facilities). This represents an increased number of Ideal Clinics by 212 facilities in 2019/2020. By the end of the 2020/21 financial year, the total IC dropped from 1,906 at the end of 2019/2020, to 1,444. This means 462 facilities lost their IC status. At the end of 2021/2022 financial year, the total number of ideal clinics increase to 1,928, which is a 484 increase. Since the year 2017/2018 to date in the last quarter of each financial year districts teams are allowed to subject regressed (lost/ dropped Ideal status) facilities to peer reviews updates after the facility managers worked on quality improvement plans. (Ideal Clinic Lab Progress Report, 2022).

Importantly, three thousand and eighty-nine (3,089) clinics and 341 Community Health Centres were subjected to the baseline status determination, using version 19 and version 1 respectively for the ideal clinic realisation and maintenance programme in the 1st quarter of the 2021/2022 financial year. Two hundred and nine (209) PHC facilities were put on the scale-up plan for 2021/2022. (Ideal Clinic Lab Progress Report, 2022).

5.2.2.5 Leveraging on ICT in Basic Education

In 2015, the government launched Operation Phakisa Education (OPE), an implementation strategy aimed to fast-track digital technology into all public schools. It is imperative to note that this strategy was not funded but the DBE used the Universal Service Access Obligation (USAO) initiative as well as the voted funds to implement some of the projects. The issue of lack of resource commitment by the government was cited by several respondents as one of the enablers of implementation failure as mentioned below:

> *Operation Phakisa promised a lot of returns but for the government to get returns there should invest as well. The challenge is that for benefits to be harvested, the government should have invested more resources, but this was opposite – Respondent 11*

The OPE model was designed to ensure the realisation of the plan to transform basic education with computer technology first formulated in the 2004 White Paper on e-Education: *Transforming Teaching and Learning through Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)*. This Lab projected to ensure the digitalization of 75% of learning materials and a total of 100% enriched, digitised textbooks developed and available as well as 100% of broadcasting content materials developed. Additionally, it was the aim of this Lab to ensure that the cloud service should be fully functional (100%) and 100% of all content was stored and available offline. Moreover, all (100%) of post level 1 teachers were to be enrolled in ICT learning pathway training. Five work streams were identified by the Operation Phakisa Education Lab process:

1. Connectivity
2. Devices
3. Teacher Professional Development
4. Digital Content Development and Distribution
5. E-Administration

1. Universal service access obligations

The DBE, DCDT and ICASA in collaboration with the Mobile Network Operators namely, Vodacom, Cell C, MTN and Liquid Intelligent Technologies implemented the Universal Services Access Obligation (USAO). ICASA imposed obligation to MNOs to provide 5250 schools with connectivity as well as assistive devices. The school were divided as follows:

- ✓ Phase I: 4690 Ordinary schools and
- ✓ Phase II: 560 Special schools

Phase 1: Ordinary schools

The DBE, ICASA, DCDT in collaboration with the licensees completed the installation of ICT equipment and connectivity (LTE) to the 4834 ordinary schools as part of Phase I of the Universal Service Access Obligations and the breakdown is as follows:

Table 26:Number of Installations per Province

#	PDES	Cell C	Liquid Intelligent Technologies	Vodacom	MTN	Total	Number of learner devices
1	Eastern Cape	201		377	204	782	18 480
2	Free State	21	186	236	166	609	14 592

3	Gauteng	92			72	164	3 000
4	KwaZulu-Natal	218	187	306	358	1069	25 608
5	Limpopo	260		51	205	516	12 360
6	Mpumalanga	210		107	43	360	8 136
7	Northern Cape	176		220	141	537	13 368
8	Northwest	86	56	143	70	355	6 528
9	Western Cape	96	184	61	101	442	10 656
	Total	**1360**	**610**	**1501**	**1360**	**4834**	**112 728**

Source: DBE (2022)

It should be noted that Vodacom provided additional 141 schools with ICT equipment and connectivity as part of the USAO. Furthermore, a total of 112 728 ICT devices were provided to the ordinary schools as part of the USAO project.

Phase 2: Special Schools

The licensees completed the installation of ICT equipment, assistive devices relevant to the needs of each school and connectivity (LTE) to the 275 Special School as part of Phase II of the Universal Service Access Obligations and the breakdown is as follows:

Table 27: Installations in Special Schools

#	Province	Vodacom	MTN	Cell C	Liquid Telecoms	Total	No of laptops
		140	**140**	**140**	**140**	**560**	
1	EC	16	9		7	32	960
2	FS	11	2		5	18	540
3	GP	38	17			55	1650
4	KZN	19	7	1	16	43	1290
5	LP	13	11	1	8	33	990
6	MP	4	3	1	2	10	300
7	NC	5	1			6	180
8	NW	13	12	3	7	35	1050
9	WC	21	4		19	44	1320
	Total	**140**	**66**	**6**	**64**	**275**	**8280**

Source: DBE (2022)

It should be noted that Vodacom provided has provided all the 140 Special Schools that were allocated to them as part of the obligations. A total of 8280 ICT devices were provided to the ordinary schools as part of the USAO project. Furthermore, each Special School received assistive devices appropriate to the needs of the learners.

2. Digital Content Development

The DBE has developed a total of 1075 titles of free digital state-owned content resources consisting of

- ✓ 344 Workbooks,

- ✓ 594 Graded Readers,
- ✓ 25 Mind the Gap Study Guides; and
- ✓ 112 Textbooks.

These resources are in various formats such as pdf documents, ePub and HTLM 5. Furthermore, approximately 96% of the high-enrolment subject textbooks have been digitised. The table below indicates the number of resources developed, per grade and the digital format of the resources.

Table 28: Number of resources developed per grade

Grades	Subjects	No. Titles	DIGITAL FORMAT			
			PDF	ePUB/ eBook	HTML 5: Interactive	Teacher Guide
2017-20						
Grade R	Numeracy and Literacy Workbooks	44	√	√	√	
Grade 1-3	Life Skills Workbooks	66	√	√		
Grade 1-3	Mathematics	66	√	√	√	
Grade 1-6	Languages (HL) Workbooks	132	√	√		
Grade 1-6	Languages (FAL) Workbooks	12	√	√	√	
Grade 4-9	Mathematics Workbooks	24	√	√		
Grade 1-3	Readers & Big Books	594	√	√		
Grade 4-6	Natural Science & Tech	12	√	√	√	√
Grade 7-9	Natural Science	12	√	√		√
Grade 7-9	Technology	12	√	√		√
Grade 4-12	Mathematics	36	√	√		√
Grade 10-12	Physical Science	12	√	√		√
Grade 10	Maths Literacy	4	√	√	√	√
Grade 10	Life Science	4	√	√		√
Grade 10-12	Technical Mathematics	7	√	√		√
Grade 10-12	Technical Science	7	√	√		
Grade 12	Study Guide: Mind the Gap	25	√	√		
Grade 10-12	Computer Application Technology (CAT)	9	√	√		√
Grade10-12	Information Technology (IT)	9	√	√		√
Grade R-12	Open Educational Resources (OER)	2755	√			√

Source: DBE (2022)

3. Connectivity

The schools are connected using various connectivity models such as 3G, fibre, satellite, and other technologies. Many of the connectivity models are not ideal for teaching and learning. Some of the schools in various provinces have broadband connectivity that is ideal for teaching and learning. The table below indicates the cumulative number of schools that are connected to the internet.

Table 29:Connectivity per Province

Province	Total no schools	Baseline 2014/15	USAASA	USAO 2017	Baseline 2017/18	USAO 2018	Baseline 2018/19	USAO 2019	Baseline 2019/20	SA Connect	USAO 2020	Baseline 2020/21
Eastern Cape	5 727	2 521	537	723	3 781		3 781	47	3 828	138	25	4 036

Free State	1 327	781		384	1 165	185	1 350	39	1 389	99	13	1 501
Gauteng	2 183	2 164		125	2 289		2 289	0	2 289	0	55	2 344
KwaZulu Natal	5 937	1 667		1 034	2 701		2 701	33	2 734	110	26	2 870
Limpopo	3 924	1 150		281	1 431	200	1 631	34	1 665	46	24	1 735
Mpumalanga	1 948	879		340	1 219		1 219	0	1 219	64	8	1 291
Northern Cape	573	460	10	424	894		894	133	1 027	39	6	1 072
Northwest	1 542	1 029	8	220	1 257		1 257	52	1 309	103	25	1 437
Western Cape	1 614	1 610		353	1 963		1 963	91	2 054	0	44	2 098
Total	24 775	12 261	555	3 884	16 700	385	17 085	429	17 514	599	226	18 384
%					67,41%	770	68,96%	858	70,69%	910		74,20%

5.2.2.6 Agriculture, Land Reform, and Rural Development

Section 24 (b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) states that everyone has the right to secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting economic and social development. According to the National Development Plan (NDP, 2011: 199), the government should invest in new agricultural technologies and development of resilient and environmentally sustainable strategies to support and service rural farmers. The Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF) and the subsequent Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) solidify this. Based on these policy imperatives this Lab aimed to enhance and transform the agricultural sector as well as accelerate land reform to ensure an inclusive rural economy. This was viewed as critical for addressing constraints in ensuring the equitable access to land, both towards economic development and agrarian transformation

According to DAFF (2017), the broad aim of the Lab was to stimulate growth, foster job creation and instil transformation along the agriculture and rural development value chain. Objectives of this Lab included growing sustainable rural enterprises and industries, creation of one million jobs, acquiring a total of 2 million hectares of strategically situated land by 2019, developing a total of one million hectares of under-utilised land in communal areas and land reform projects for production, and developing and implementing spatial development plans to guide how land is used while prioritizing resource poor districts as contained in the Revitalisation of Agriculture and Agro processing Action Plan (RAAVAC). Figure 22 below shows the progress regarding activities attained as October 2021 and it can be seen that the Lab failed to meet the targets set in most the activities that were due. It is also important to note that there was limited performance data availed to the evaluators for this lab. Some of the stated reasons include failure for the lab to implement its initiatives due to resource constraints so there is minimum to report on. This was supported by the below respondent:

> *The challenge is that some of the targets could not be achieved because of technical and policy challenges. We needed harmonised support for farmers but because of lack of resources, this was quite difficult as the resources were not matching the level of effort to be put in for success to be attained and what was supposed to be achieved* – Responded 28

Figure 22: Progress on revitalisation of Agriculture and Agro processing action plan, 2021



5.2.2.7 Galvanising Growth, Investment and Employment Creation along the Mining Value Chain and Mining Related Communities.

The broad aim of the Mining Phakisa was to galvanise growth, investment, and employment creation along the mining value chain in relevant input sectors and in mining related communities (Chamber of Mines South Africa, 2016). Alongside this broad aim, shorter-term priorities were also prioritised to deal with the immediate financial and employment challenges created by the global downturn. Longer term priorities underpinning this Lab included building a foundation for next generation mining systems, beneficiation technologies, capital goods production and sustainable community development.

The Mining Lab projected achievements in specific initiatives in the sector, which included attracting up to a total of 6% investment in the South African mining cluster by 2020, creation of a total of 979 888 additional employment opportunities by 2020, increasing the level of exploration in South Africa through the increase in the percentage of global expenditure from less than 1% in 2016 to a total of 2.5% in 2020 and the number of exploration projects from 0 in 2016 to a total of 36 in 2020 (Operation Phakisa, 2015).

The Mining Phakisa focused on some of the immediate challenges facing the industry as well as putting in place the foundations for the Next Generation Mining Cluster. It was the aim of this Lab to intervene in the mining sector to a greater extent, to keep the industry afloat during commodity price slumps. Additional goals of this Lab included putting in place initiatives that place the mining cluster on a firm foundation to grow, trigger transformation, and optimize the contribution of the industry to the economic and social development of mining related communities and the nation as a whole agenda.

Unfortunately, no reports regarding progress were received at the time of report writing. We understand from information provided that there had been disagreements between the DPME, the DMRE and the mining Lab right from inception, and that this had significantly impacted performance. This was in part due to the fact that the DPME took a lead role during the convening of the Lab, which resulted in the DMRE taking a back seat and not leading implementation. The consequence of this was that other stakeholders could not contribute to implementation, owing to the approach by the DMRE. In simpler terms, DPME deviated from the methodology, and this led to the stagnation of the lab. Instead of the DMRE being the Secretariate of the lab, the responsibility was overtaken by DPME. The evaluation concludes that all the money that was used in setting up the lab and consultant fees can be regarded as fruitless expenditure. One of the respondents mentioned the below:

> *Regarding why there is little success in the mining lab is that the mining sector was very suspicious that the government was getting into partnership with the private sector hence there were many issues. On the issue of OP in the education sector the challenge was regarding the cost of data hence affected the affordability resulting in limited implementation* - **Respondent 73**

5.2.3 Drivers for Success

5.2.3.1 Availability of commitment, skills, and capacities

Skills, availability, and behaviour can be understood as a sequence in which one change leads to the next action or induces it. Evidence from the interviews and surveys conducted in this evaluation suggest that the success of the "delivery unit" model in achieving BFR has been heavily dependent on core capacity issues:

- The extent to which departments had the requisite in-house skills and capacities to drive the plans once they were agreed.
- The extent to which leadership within departments were prepared to assign and/or second key expert capacity to the work of the Lab.
- The extent to which departments were prepared to bring in external expertise to support the work of the Labs.

As the political head often champions the delivery approach, it is acknowledged that the approach can have a limited life span. Capacitating officials on the methodology needed to be a critical part of departmental succession planning and empowerment processes as this approach is ultimately what ensures the progression and sustainability of initiatives like Operation Phakisa. The concept of the Delivery Unit, which is central to achieving BFR, is based on the premise that small and highly skilled teams can gather and analyse a constant stream of performance data and be on the alert for any roadblocks. In the event that the desired results are not materialising on the ground, the teams are mandated to investigate and intervene. There is also an assumption that these teams have the expertise to scrutinise policy proposals to see whether implementation plans are feasible, and to address delivery capability gaps in the public sector workforce through activities such as training and co-designing implementation plans. In looking at the achievements (and non-achievement) of the Operation Phakisa Labs this emerged as a critical issue.

One of the challenges in improving government effectiveness is the way in which capacity and expertise within the public sector is identified and deployed. Within the framework of the BFR methodology the conditions under which an initiative such as Operation Phakisa is likely to succeed is premised on the availability of understanding, skills and expertise that are commensurate with the capacities required to achieve Lab outcomes and targets. One informant noted that there was a need to have "the correct employees in the right positions, who speak the right language, and who have the most appropriate skills." The below figure 23, shows the responses regarding the lab's capacity to deliver:

Figure 23: Level of availability of capacity to deliver n = 44



Survey respondents were asked whether, in their opinion, it was possible to successfully deliver on BFR with the current government staff component (in terms of commitment, skills and capacities). A total of 27% of the respondents believed that government departments had strong or adequate commitment, skills, and capacities to deliver on the Lab plans, while 17,8% were unsure and a further 55% felt that there was insufficient commitment, skills, and capacities at departmental level. From the interviews, a total of 55% of the respondents claims that the government has limited capacity in terms of human and financial resources. This has been evidenced from the many references to the lack of technical and financial capacity to implement and manage some of the Labs.

5.2.3.2 Advocacy and Communication about Operation Phakisa

Survey respondents were asked whether in their experience the information sharing and messaging (advocacy) about Operation Phakisa in their respective departments, agencies or organisations had been clear, consistent, and effective. Respondents stated that that there was minimal or no effectiveness (58%) in the advocacy and communication function of Operation Phakisa, whilst 9% and 24% cited very much so and to some extent. This points to limitations within the ISU capacity to undertake this critical task in an efficient and effective manner and highlights the opportunity costs related to poor communication and information sharing.

Figure 24: Levels of effectiveness of advocacy and communication n = 44



Active and continuous problem-solving engagement must be implemented to ensure delivery blockages are dealt with speedily. According to Barber (2016), the delivery unit should have a non-hierarchical relationship with the system, residing outside the traditional line department hierarchy. It should not be managed by any of the people or organizations it is trying to influence, nor should it be directly managing those people or organizations. This independence was meant to enable the unit to deliver urgent and difficult messages but also sustain trust and credibility with actors in the system. The independence of a delivery unit was intended to be a unique strength of the methodology that negated several issues arising from conflicts of interest and intra-departmental dynamics in more traditional performance measurement frameworks. There should be clear lines of communication and relationships between the delivery unit and the departments it oversees (Barber, 2016).

According to the blueprint *Operation Phakisa Framework* document, the Operation Phakisa Unit was supposed to be the custodian of the Operation Phakisa Communication Strategy and Plan. This strategy spells out the communication processes, sharing of information and the institutional arrangements to achieve this, the frequency of reporting on the various Labs, as well as distribution to different media and communication costs.

In 2015 a guidance note for *Process for the Communication of Operation Phakisa-related content on the Operation Phakisa Website* was released. This document determined the process for the acquisition, quality assurance and publishing of content. The understanding was that the BFR delivery mechanism should advance the achievements of the Labs. The status and performance of the Operation Phakisa website illustrates the poor performance of the Operation Phakisa communications strategy. The home page details the 2014 launch together with the speech made by the previous president at the launch. The website currently provides no indication of any upcoming events or initiatives being undertaken under the Operation Phakisa umbrella. The photo gallery has a few photos of government officials at the 2014 launch, visuals from the Oceans Economy launch and a few project photos. Performance graphs displayed on the website show that the Agriculture Lab

has an activity completion rate of between 0% and 6%. The ICT in Education Lab has reported nothing since 2016 and none of the other Labs appear to have any interesting information to share. According to the drop-down menu the Operation Phakisa communications centre has had no information to share since the 2014 launch. The public and broader stakeholder groups of Operation Phakisa hoping to see progress or deepen their knowledge would find a national government programme that has either stalled or is no longer active. Step 8 of the BFR methodology states that "periodic reporting breeds accountability", which places an emphasis on communications - advocating and producing Annual Reports to give departments, their stakeholders, and the broader public a birds-eye view of overall transformation progress. These findings point to several concerning issues, including:

- The ISU lacked capacity to ensure that the Operation Phakisa website was kept up to date.
- Leadership within DPME have not provided adequate oversight to ensure that this critical information sharing function was operational and achieving its purpose.
- The lack of information sharing meant that Labs effectively operated in isolation from one another and were not able to use the communications tools available to share information on progress or to interact on operational and implementation issues related to accelerated service delivery.
- The lack of information generated by the ISU reflects a failure to mean one of the BFR core steps – that of transparency and accountability to the citizenry.

5.2.4 Role of the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) and the Intervention Support Unit (ISU)

Operation Phakisa involved many different government departments, government agencies and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), as well the business sector, industry, the unions, research institutions and other civil society organisations. The wide ranging and complex nature of the initiative required both centre of government oversight responsibility and an efficient coordination mechanism that could manage, coordinate, and report on the involvement and performance of multiple stakeholders. Since the inception of Operation Phakisa in 2013, it has been monitored by the DPME which has also been responsible for the overall management of the Operation Phakisa methodology. Through the Operation Phakisa Unit (OPU), later to become the Intervention Support Unit (ISU), DPME was also tasked with the coordination, performance monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of Operation Phakisa.

Initially President Zuma had created the ministry in 2009 within the office of the Presidency to ensure that government ministries were more accountable and more collaborative, and to encourage them to focus on policy planning and on monitoring and evaluating the impact of their policies. In 2014, the newly elected president (Jacob Zuma) transferred the Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation from the Presidency to the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), which followed as part of the reconfiguration of government necessitated by the changes made to the National Executive in May 2014. According to the Presidency at the time the intention of the President was to institutionalise planning as well as monitoring and evaluation in government and to house these functions in one Department to ensure cohesiveness and focus. Several key informants indicated that the removal of the ministry from the centre of government (the Presidency) to become a stand-alone government department meant that it lost much of its impetus and authority. For many of the key informants moving the DPME out of the Presidency deprived Operation Phakisa of its political legitimacy and apex leadership, as well as its proximity to

the President. This was viewed both as politically motivated and for Operation Phakisa as a fundamental misunderstanding of the Malaysian experience where the Prime Minister was integrally involved in the implementation of BFR programmes. The DPME's role was generally viewed as weak and lacking in the necessary levels of leadership, authority and management capacity that were required to coordinate the implementation of the seven Labs. Even though DPME had in-house Outcome Facilitators with sector expertise many departments felt that DPME did not have a sufficiently deep understanding of sector issues to coordinate and oversee the work of the Labs, and that the tracking of implementation needed to be fully controlled by the responsible departments.

Based on this background survey respondents were asked to reflect on the extent to which they believed that DPME was the appropriate and strategic location for the coordination of a multi-sectoral initiative like Operation Phakisa.

Figure 25: Extent to which DPME was appropriate location for coordination n = 44



Figure 25 above shows that a total of 73.4% of respondents felt that DPME was appropriately located to strategically manage and coordinate activities under Operation Phakisa, while only 13.3% felt that DPME was not the appropriate agency to undertake this role. This data may however be somewhat skewed given that a significant number of survey respondents were DPME staff members.

The DPME ISU was given the role of overseeing the rollout of Operation Phakisa, based initially on its location within the Presidency and its planning, monitoring and evaluation mandate. The role that the ISU has sought within the public sector is as a trusted broker, providing process expertise and neutral intermediation rather than acting as decision maker. While DPME sector specialists (outcomes facilitators) were assigned to the various Labs, the ISU (originally the OPU) was the "face" of the DPME. The ISU was mandated to monitor the planning and implementation work of the Labs through its oversight, coordination, and data management functions. Survey respondents were asked to reflect on whether, in their view, the DPME through the ISU had played a responsive and decisive leadership and oversight role in Operation Phakisa and the responses are captured in the below figure:

Figure 26: Extent to which the ISU had played a decisive leadership and oversight role n = 44



As shown in figure 26 above, a total of 44.4% of respondents felt that the DPME has played a strong strategic role in overseeing the roll out of Operation Phakisa, while a total of 33.3% expressed misgivings as to DPME's role in leading coordination efforts. Key informants were generally critical of the poor performance of the ISU, noting that it was poorly managed, lacked capacity and fell short of the competence required to coordinate complex, multisector initiatives. The implementation data coming in from the various Labs was poorly managed to the extent that some Labs refused to report directly to the ISU. Critically, for the purposes of this evaluation, the ISU was unable to provide accurate, consolidated data on the performance of the seven Labs – a factor which slowed down the evaluation process. The evaluation team also found a troubling leadership dysfunctionality within the ISU that has impacted negatively on the ability of the ISU to effectively coordinate OP but has also hampered the evaluation team in accessing vital OP implementation data. Below are the sentiments of one the respondents regarding the functionality of the ISU office:

> *There are a set of bureaucrats that are there, that have no understanding of the issues that need to be dealt with, they are there doing their jobs and not understanding why it is important for them to be able to design unblockages, fighting with one another all the time. The Chief Director misunderstands his role and sees himself as a traditional bureaucrat … a terrible team that is in place. Every single person that has been involved in Phakisa fought those individuals in the Phakisa Unit…a team that is not innovative, that has no sense of why it is urgent, no sense of the issues that pertain to every single Phakisa - DPME have not brought in the relevant experts to assist them, and have not reached out to other people in government to support them* – ***Respondent 55***

5.2.5 Governance Arrangements

The Operation Phakisa methodology is premised on governance structures that are mandated for monitoring, issue resolution, coordination, and implementation. The Operation Phakisa conceptual design explicitly recognized bureaucratic and cumbersome government processes as a potential hinderance to unlocking investment from the private sector and ensuring accelerated service delivery. In addition, preparatory work was undertaken by DPME to put in place an operational and management structure based on the approach that had been used in Malaysia by PEMANDU. This resulted in the development of the *Operation Phakisa Framework*, which guided stakeholders in the

process of setting up and managing the Labs. Unfortunately, at the time of writing this report, the governance structures put in place have not been fully executed and utilised for their intended purposes. This has led to several critical good practice functions essential to the success of Operation Phakisa not being satisfactorily implemented. Specific issues related to the involvement of DGs and Ministers in their respective committees, and the incorrect use of the issue resolution committee which poses a risk of insufficient buy-in from the relevant parties came out strongly. Some respondents felt that there was an "abdication of responsibility and accountability from the beginning and this was never regained". One of the respondents reiterated the importance of effective governance structures:

> *"Effective, data-driven performance management routines must be instituted to enable honest conversations about delivery progress. These routines must take place frequently and be attended by the executive and political leadership"* ***– Respondent 37***

In some Labs DGs did not participate in the process and instead delegated in some cases to more junior staff at the level of Assistant Directors, which according to one respondent "made the whole activity futile from the get-go". Figure 27 below shows the governance structures that were put in place at the conceptualisation of Operation Phakisa.

Figure 27: Operation Phakisa governance structures



The PEMANDU approach in Malaysia was to ensure that the Malaysian NTP (GTP[12] and ETP[13]), BFR and other government processes were interlinked and shared governance structures. With Operation Phakisa there was no direct governance links to the NDP priority outcomes. This suggests that the fundamental difference existing between the South African approach and the Malaysia approach is that Operation Phakisa was not integrated into government policymaking and implementation processes and therefore has become an additional task to be performed by bureaucrats instead of becoming part of their key daily tasks. The effectiveness of the Operation Phakisa model has, therefore, been limited by the broader public sector capacity as well as its governance architecture and design. Moreover, Operation Phakisa relies on the existing sophisticated system of planning, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting. However, a plethora of institutions both at the centre of government and among the implementation agencies creates overlaps and duplications, blurred accountabilities, and coordination challenges. Aside from the Operation Phakisa mandate, which involves reporting on KPIs, departments and the ISU have several other performance tracking obligations to manage.

In the survey conducted respondents were asked to reflect on the governance arrangements set up for the Operation Phakisa Labs and the extent to which they were efficiently and effectively operationalised.

Figure 28: Performance of governance arrangements n = 44



Figure 28 shows that while a total of 58% of respondents felt that the governance arrangements were efficient and effective, 42% were either unsure or felt that the governance arrangements were not as robust as they could have been. These responses, taken together with the open-ended responses provided suggest a wide variation in governance performance across the different Labs.

[12] Government Transformation Programme
[13] Economic Transformation Programme

Some of the responses claim that Operation Phakisa has required government departments and their key stakeholders to operate in a "business unusual" paradigm. The resultant Lab structures have effectively been created as structures operating parallel to existing state structures, with their own mandates, rules, and responsibilities.

Those respondents who expressed positive views indicated that the governance structures were well organised, and that the format of the Labs enabled effective engagement among the stakeholders. The governance arrangements were properly constituted, and all the role players were consulted in advance. Meetings and topics for discussion were well structured and organised and support provided where needed. The Labs have been well managed because they have monthly meetings where progress has been discussed and challenges and possible interventions identified. According to some respondents, the Lab teams put in exceptional effort to ensure that Labs were run effectively. In some Labs every work stream had facilitators, there were regular feedback sessions, travel arrangements were well managed, access to required resources was good, and the work streams were well structured. Adequate resources were made available, and everything was done professionally and on time according to work plans.

Those respondents who expressed more critical perspectives indicated that some aspects of the Lab process could have been changed to better suit the prevailing circumstances. There was a feeling that governance mechanisms became too dogmatic and inflexible, and as a result responded poorly to changes within government. Intra-governmental capacity to execute was sub-optimal. While meetings and appointments were well communicated, and feedback provided many respondents voiced concern that there were no tangible results. This was exacerbated by the fact that there were inadequate monitoring mechanisms to ensure sustained management of the governance structures. Leadership issues appear to have been a major challenge for some of the Labs. This conclusion is summed up in the table below:

Table 30: Rating of likelihood that Labs will achieve intended outputs

5.2 After three years of convening the last Lab of the seven Operation Phakisa delivery Labs, do you think the various Operation Phakisa Labs are likely to achieve the intended outputs and outcomes?					
Evaluation Questions	Definitely yes	Yes	Undecided	No	Definitely no
Were the outcome targets set out in the various Lab processes realistic?					
How realistic were the timeframes?					
Are the Operation Phakisa Labs likely to achieve outputs and outcomes within the set timeframes?					
Are outputs or outcomes likely to ever be achieved?					
Biodiversity Lab					
Chemical and Waste Lab					
Ocean Economy					
Ideal Clinic					
ICT in Education					
Agriculture					
Mining					
Are there factors that have influenced the achievement or non-achievement of					

objectives?					
Are the institutional & administrative arrangements in place to implement Operation Phakisa working as envisaged by the initial strategy?					
Have key success drivers for the success of Operation Phakisa initiatives been applied?					
Can key success drivers be replicated easily in other sectors?					
Has there been buy-in and ownership of the Lab outcomes by key stakeholders?					

5.3 To what extent has the Operation Phakisa delivery transmission mechanism inculcated the "business unusual" approach in government

A key element of Operation Phakisa was to strengthen cooperation between government, organised business, civil society, and organised labour. This included working on detailed problem analysis, priority setting, intervention planning, innovation, and delivery. Furthermore, DPME (2020), acknowledges that the Operation Phakisa projects were envisaged to be impactful, fast tracked, characterised by the business unusual, hands-on approach that is results driven to ensure attainment of the projected outcomes. This section looks if Operation Phakisa succeeded in inculcating a business unusual approach in government processes.

5.3.1 Promoting a "Business Unusual" Approach through Operation Phakisa

While modelled around the Malaysia's BFR this delivery mechanism was domesticated to the South African context and reflected the government's commitment to deliver priorities in the NDP 2030 in a faster, more efficient, and effective way.

The literature review tracks how national and sub-national governments around the world have adopted some version of the accelerated delivery mechanism to drive accelerated service delivery across sectors. Survey respondents were asked to reflect on whether they felt that Operation Phakisa, since its inception in 2013, has in fact promoted a "business unusual" approach within government.

Figure 29: Extent to which Operation Phakisa drove a "business unusual" approach n = 44



Figure 29 shows that a total of 45% of respondents felt that Operation Phakisa had failed to promote "business unusual" as a practice within government, and 18% were unsure. While a total of 33% of the respondents felt that the "business unusual" approach had to some extent been successful only 4% were convinced of its value. A mixed range of positive and negative reasons were provided for these responses.

A key achievement of Operation Phakisa so far has been the ability to address disjointed sector planning and the tendency to work in silos, particularly, the establishment of intergovernmental platforms to streamline work in a systematic and cost-efficient manner. Labs have been a relevant problem-solving platform, ushering in consensus building and bringing various stakeholders together with new ways of thinking. This is a significant departure from a system that is fundamentally fragmented, lacking inter-agency trust with almost no effective coordination mechanisms. Nevertheless, while the aim behind bringing a 'new way' to deliver government programmes may be relevant and urgent for the South African context, it is unlikely to succeed if the relevant officials, particularly those at the apex of the organisations at ministerial and DG level, do not have sufficient motivation to adapt to this way of working and to adjust their departmental planning processes accordingly.

Overall, findings indicate that the Operation Phakisa methodology has been well received. This is not surprising given the pressure that government has been under for many years to meet the service delivery demands of the country. In particular, Operation Phakisa's integrated and systematic multi-sectoral intervention has helped in some ways to overcome logistical implementation obstacles, promote scale-up and synergistically maximize the effect of each sector, leveraging the strengths and diverse approaches in different initiatives were praised by several interview participants. However, most of the programmatic problems are associated with funding constraints and absence of political support.

5.3.2 Partnerships for Delivery

In a resource-constrained environment of government austerity it was critical that through Operation Phakisa government was able to convince key private sector partners, through the establishment of strategic public-private partnerships, to invest and co-fund critical interventions so that there is sufficient and available funding for activities. Inclusiveness in problem identification and solution formulation is fundamental to the Operation Phakisa Methodology. Conversely, the dominant challenge with the participation of stakeholders with possibly divergent perspectives, interests and operational models is realizing alignment between them to promote or ensure contribution and/or resource commitments. The evaluation has set out to assess the relevance and effectiveness of relationships and partnerships between stakeholders at the implementation level. The different stakeholder engagements enabled the evaluators to view a range of relationships and partnerships and their effect on the accelerated service delivery.

According to several respondents, while the Operation Phakisa highlighted the importance of coordination among government departments and agencies, it was only moderately successful at achieving this. This is also premised on the understanding that government itself must strengthen its own intergovernmental and interdepartmental collaboration and coordination processes to increase service delivery efficiencies. In addition, while this area is within the influence of the government, the real determinant of the success of the process would have been the extent to which multiple

stakeholders representing a wide range of interests coalesced around a common transformation agenda based on the NDP priorities.

Reflecting on the strength of partnerships with the private sector and strength of intergovernmental coordination, respondents felt that these were very strong (6,7% and 4,4%) or somewhat strong 44,4% and 37,8%).

Figure 30: Levels of achievement on partnerships and coordination n = 44



Most of the respondents agreed that strengthened technical competencies and skills to forge strategic alliances have been institutionalized, as shown by the sustained publication of reports, the permanence of the networks built and their continuous engagement in working together on a common agenda. Additionally, new specialised knowledge, stronger skills and opportunities for dialogue and forging consensus are clearly identifiable contributions that the Operation Phakisa has made to the strengthening of partnerships between the private sector, and other government departments.

Attracting private sector expertise into the work of the Labs has to some extent infused the public sector with innovations and urgency. Several respondents noted, however, that mutual mistrust remains. Government is often suspicious of private sector agendas and is cautious in ceding any of perceived authority to “external” agencies. At the same time, against the backdrop of “state capture” the private sector has been cautious in how it engages with government. The existing literature finds that that the types of skills that a successful Lab must attract include specialised technical skills as well as “soft” skills such as negotiation, creative problem solving, and collaboration. Although their natural reservoir appears to be in private sector consulting, such skills can arguably be found in both private and public sectors. Finding the right balance of public and private sector partnership, collaboration and approaches can mitigate the downside risks and reduced costs. This conclusion is summed up in the table below:

Table 31: Extent to which the BFR inculcated a "business unusual" approach

5.3 To what extent has the Operation Phakisa delivery transmission mechanism inculcated the "business unusual" approach in government?					
Evaluation Questions	Definitely yes	Yes	Undecided	No	Definitely no
Has the programme provided the country with a ***blueprint model for faster and more accountable service delivery***?					
Has the programme empowered civil servants and created a streamlined policy decision-making process?					
Has the programme improved intergovernmental coordination and collaboration, including between the state and non-state entities?					
Have there been unintended consequences / externalities of the Operation Phakisa programme?					
Is there observed change in the attitudes of those responsible for delivery of Operation Phakisa Lab outputs?					

5.4 What lessons can be learned from the implementation of Operation Phakisa in South Africa?

5.4.1 Replicability and Sustainability of the Operation Phakisa Delivery Model

Based on their understanding and experience of the BFR approach in Malaysia, the Delivery Unit model envisaged by the South African government was intended to be a longer-term solution to the challenges faced in delivering on the NDP priorities. The initial vision was to test out the BFR approach in several key NDP priority sectors with the intention at a later stage of somehow integrating the accelerated service delivery model as a "whole of government" approach. This understanding implied that the model would be both replicable across sectors and sustainable in the medium to longer term. Survey respondents were asked whether, in their view, the Operation Phakisa model of BFR (accelerated service delivery) was sustainable under South Africa's current developmental conditions.

Figure 31: Extent to which the BFR model is sustainable n = 44



Some of the respondents believe that with proper institutional arrangements, legislative realignment and streamlining supply chain management processes as well as strong accountability, the delivery model can produce the desired results and long-term sustainability. Figure 31 above shows that a total of 49% of respondents were positive or cautiously optimistic that the BFR model was a sustainable approach that could be integrated into government's way of operating. A total of 47% of respondents, however, were less optimistic about the sustainability of the BFR model. The survey results tend to reinforce the findings from the key informant interviews where opinions on the sustainability of the model were quite mixed, and often dependent on experience of a specific Lab and / or the type of involvement that the respondent had had with Operation Phakisa. The positive feedback that was provided in most cases came with very clear caveats about sustainability under current circumstances.

In addition, a range of views have been expressed on scaling up and these entail different perspectives on supporting government capacity to deliver. On the one hand, there is a view about embedding reform successfully in some of the Labs to learn how processes work well, and then scaling up based on what is known from those initiatives, taking account of the complexities of local and national contexts, and appropriately building the capacity of government to deliver. However, the findings of this evaluation indicate that Operation Phakisa as a flagship presidential initiative is unlikely to continue in its current format, but what is more likely is that the concept of accelerating service delivery may continue to resonate in departments and within other priority government initiatives.

5.4.2 Adaptation of Operation Phakisa

At the time of this evaluation, Operation Phakisa has been operational for eight years. This is an expansive window from which to assess its performance and reflect on whether it is a model that, based on experience, needs to be adapted to fit current circumstances. Survey respondents were asked whether they felt that changes needed to be made to the current format (design) of Operation Phakisa.

Figure 32: Extent to which changes to the Operation Phakisa model are required n = 44



A majority (71%) of the respondents felt that Operation Phakisa model requires change, with only 16% feeling that the model was still fit for purpose. Respondents who answered yes were asked to elaborate on the answers that they had provided and to suggest what changes they thought were necessary. These contributions are infused into the recommendations that this evaluation is proposing. It is important in this evaluation to mention some of the success stories that several respondents cited, listed in Table 34 below:

Table 32: Operation Phakisa success stories

Respondent	Lab	Quote
4	Ideal Clinic	When we started Operation Phakisa, there were only 10 registered Ideal primary health care facilities (clinics), but by 2020, there were about 1920 primary health care facilities (Clinics and Community Health Centres).
16	Ideal Clinic	When the lab ended, people went back to their original activities. With the Ideal Clinic, they managed to get right, the availability of medication at their facilities (90%), the waiting time has been reduced to less than 3 hours. They are now having an appointment system; they are able to schedule the appointments accordingly. Clinics are not as full. Supply chain management processes managed to improve and the turnaround time for ordered supplies period shortened. There were small improvement strides made in Infrastructure and human resources for health though challenges still persist due to financial challenges in provinces. In addition, maintenance of buildings and equipment is still a challenge, and lastly the sustainability of good gains is still a challenge since some facilities happen to drop or regress when the focus is shifted to others. To date more than 55% of primary health care facilities had been turned ideal.
33	Oceans Economy	Liked about the methodology – its ability to illuminate pathways to doing what was required to resolving complex problem and complex challenges. In the oceans economy – to resolve the problem of South Africa not fully leveraging our oceans economy's

		potential. The methodology gave them an incredibly detailed set of proposals and pathways through the 3feet plans in addressing issues.
24	Oceans Economy	The upstream oil and gas exploration activities that were borne by OP are one example, bar the global fall in the price of oil. For in the middle of the planning phase of OP, beginning in June 2014, the nominal blend price of crude oil began a rapid decline, falling from $112 in June to $62 in December, a 6-month decline of 44%. This price drop had a negative impact on exploration budgets of oil majors, and SA suffered a share of this exploration withdrawal. But the successes of organising the institutional, regulatory and governance arrangements for the upstream oil and gas sector through OP, were a resounding success
24	Oceans Economy	The biggest outcome that OP ushered in was time reduction concerning the applications, registrations and licences relating to mining activities e.g., Water Use Licences, (WULA) and Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), a one stop shop was implemented, and this assisted in speeding up the processes. This was possible because several government departments had to work together and speed up the processes – Efficiency. There were many institutional reforms that were brought about through the collaborative approach in solving problems. The government was supposed to invest more to get more, where there was limited investment, there are less returns.
38	Chemicals And Waste	The collaboration has been excellent e.g., people understood that it is a presidential programme, and they are willing to participate. Also, the other work that we have done with the other partners (Consumer Goods Counsel) has started off well to an extend that every time they are seeing positive results and are keeping on coming back. Some SMMEs are having collaborations with big companies such as Pick and Pay and Woolworths by feeding off from their waste e.g. (boxes, food waste or plastics). The consumer goods counsel and Phakisa therefore is giving support to the small businesses for their mutual benefit.
12	Biodiversity	At the initial stages they were very enabling. As a lab we had a lot of challenges, e.g., in EC and KZN there were nature reserves that were stuck for the past 20 years because they were reserved as agricultural land and with the OP, we managed to resolve this, and got permissions in the form of authorisations from the Department of Environmental Affairs for those lands to be rezoned. This happened successfully because of the priority assigned to Phakisa projects and the interdepartmental dialogues and cooperation that was taking place.
18	Oceans Economy	Key to OP is its “business unusual” element, meaning that South Africa can be overly ambitious and aspirational in the future, and dedicate resources to implement agreed-upon plans, and faster to

		achieve desired results. There are many good practice examples and results that can be cited. One being the creation of a one-stop-facility for the offshore oil and gas upstream exploration activities. In the past, an oil company had to deal with multiple departments for the necessary licensing requirements. But with the advent of OP, not only were all these activities centralised into one entity – Petroleum Agency of South Africa (PASA) – but PASA was also migrated out of one government department (Department of Energy) to another (Department of Mineral Resources) at the time, for the said smooth and centralised one-stop functions.
18	Oceans Economy	Detailed way of planning is the incontrovertible strength of the methodology. The second OP good practice example was the significant lowering of number of years/months/days for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and issuing of certain licenses in the fisheries sector. So, one can indeed profess that this OP methodology is a feasible approach to planning and implementation of its programmes.
71	Oceans Economy	To find evidence-based answer in public policy is difficult but Operation Phakisa added a certain amount of value, it raised awareness of some of the problems with the key priorities. It had success in the oceans economy i.e., fishing sector, aquaculture, work around the harbours, some of the successes there had their origins and roots in Operation Phakisa. It had some impact but not to the extent that BFR had in Malaysia. "We produced relatively small, dispersed results in some areas."

5.4.3 Addressing Cross-Cutting Developmental Issues

In the South African context – where inequalities are so prevalent – planning for service delivery must take the complex issues of equity and inclusion into consideration to ensure that the transformative promises (leave no one behind) of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals and the NDP are realised. This includes core transformation concerns around racial and gender equity, as well as inclusion issues that relate amongst other issues to skills development. While the concept of accelerated service delivery is built into the BFR model, speeding up planning and implementation processes still need to keep the issues of equity and inclusion at the core of the development agenda. Survey respondents were asked to reflect on the extent to which the plans developed in the Labs responded adequately to equity issues, as well as the broad area of skills development as a direct outcome of implementation.

5.4.4 Value for Money

This question examines the systematic elements in an assessment of the adequacy and efficient usage of the financial and human resources to support the implementation of the Operation Phakisa activities. The study reveals that the challenges in the implementation of Operation Phakisa are linked with budget constraints and the anaemic state of the South African economy. There were very few positive statements on the allocation of national resources to Operation Phakisa initiatives. Several respondents expressed frustration at the perceived lack of support provided by National Treasury and the limited role that they played in supporting Operation Phakisa initiatives. The lack of

additional financial allocations to the Labs was criticized by numerous respondents as leading to the lack of commitment to and prioritization of activities related to Operation Phakisa. It was reported that one cannot expect departments to implement and integrate their services if there is no adequate allocated budget for activities in terms of the Operation Phakisa. Additionally, according to the ToC, the resource allocation should be adequate to support all the elements of implementing and coordinating the programme.

Because of the technical demands and high stakes involved in the Operation Phakisa methodology implementation, the Labs were facilitated by experienced international consultants such including McKinsey and Deloitte, and they required a substantial budget that could only be committed by waiving standard public-procurement rules. Labs by their size involve a range of departments, from those provisioning services in their vicinity to agencies responsible for regulating their impact. They are also sensitive to flaws in their underlying assumptions, putting a premium on operationally demanding flexibility, and liable to a range of unforeseen complications. Further to that, the Labs demanded a substantial commitment of time and expertise from the leadership of civil society organizations, the private sector, and the government. Administering such a process requires a skilled level of financial dexterity. The evaluators found that the process of determining the true costs of convening the Labs was a challenging one, as some departments were unwilling to provide the necessary information. For this end, some of the figures are partial, as they consist of either facilitation only or some parts of facilitation. Table 35 below depicts the funding from the public purse that was allocated to support the costs of convening the Labs.

Table 33: Expenditue of Lab convening

Lab	Cost of convening the Lab
Agriculture	R65,15 million
Biodiversity	R 4,400 million
Chemicals and Waste	Not provided
ICT in education	R16 million
Ideal Clinic	R17 million
Mining	R13 million
Oceans Economy	R48,72 million

Realising the ambitious targets established by the Operation Phakisa Labs was always going to be dependent on the availability of adequate financial and human resources for planning, delivery, and monitoring. A key constraint facing implementing partners has been the lack funding to implement projects and this is further compounded by the fact that resources are now limited in the public sector currently. This has been substantiated by the below respondent.

> *Money was put in, but the returns haven't been justified yet. Resources have been invested unproductively. the things that were supposed to be achieved then still needs to be achieved now, but now there are no resources. State resources are now limited as compared to when the methodology was adopted* – ***Respondent 71***

The initial conceptualisation was premised on the notion that government was going to avail resources to the early phases of implementation and that this would then catalyse and unlock private sector investment. Thereafter, government would gradually divest and permit "crowding in of the" private sector. The sustainability of the methodology hinges on this assumption. As a result,

the government needs to have access to sufficient budget to fund the initial phases of the initiatives. Sufficient buy-in from the private sector is crucial to funding the implementation of the 3-feet plans. Most of the respondents have repeatedly noted this as a shortcoming of the Operation Phakisa process and have suggested the urgent need for the Operation Phakisa Unit to source or unlock funding for implementation to take place as envisaged. Operation Phakisa in its entirety involves an arena of large projects that involve huge capital investments from several hundred million to several billion Rands. These views are substantiated by the respondents as shown below:

Figure 33: Respondent perspectives on the "value for money" of the Labs n = 74



The survey responses as shown in Figure 34 below show a mixed picture of the value of money for the Labs, where a total of 43.2% impeccably stated that the Labs do not exhibit any value for money, whilst 36.4% consider these costs a reasonable investment. However, a total of 20.5% were unsure as to whether the Labs demonstrate any value for money and the return on investment is likely going to be significant. These divergent views might be a result of a panoply of reasons ranging from the poor performance by most of the Labs, questionable sustainability of the methodology and failure to yield the anticipated results. Additionally, the issue of long-term financing was raised across all the Labs with some of plans having not been implemented or only partially implemented because of budgeting constraints.

Figure 34: Extent to which Labs were perceived as "value for money" n = 44



This conclusion is summed up in the table below:

Table 34: Lessons learned from the implementation of Operation Phakisa

5.4 What lessons can be learned from the implementation of Operation Phakisa in South Africa?					
Evaluation Questions	Definitely	Yes	Undecided	No	Definitely no
How desirable is it to continue to use this methodology for policy imperatives going forward?					
Are there aspects of the methodology that should be improved, or be improved upon in the future?					
Are there aspects of the methodology that can be adapted to make future roll out of the methodology more effective?					
Are there distinguishing factors that make one Lab more effective than the others?					
Are these successes factors observed specific to a particular sector?					
Are the successes peculiar to a particular lead department and its leadership?					
Have the convened Labs shown value for money?					

6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD

While recognising the unique purpose, priority focus and composition of each of the Labs the scope of this evaluation was to look at Operation Phakisa in its entirety, and the recommendations are therefore generic across all Labs rather than specific to any individual Lab. The results of the evaluation point to a mixed perspective on the utility of Operation Phakisa as an accelerated delivery mechanism for key priorities in the NDP. The recommendations are informed by the following:

- A review of the global literature on Delivery Units and lessons learned from implementing accelerated service delivery models.
- Engagement with key DPME staff.
- The consolidated perspectives obtained from the survey.
- The perspectives of key informants who were interviewed.
- The quantitative performance data from the Labs.

One strong viewpoint that emerged from the evidence gathered during the implementation evaluation was that in its entirety Operation Phakisa had not achieved its ambitious objective of fast-tracking progress on critical national development priorities. The inability to accelerate delivery can be attributed in the main to the difficulties that government has faced in adapting departmental systems to the BFR model imperative of "business unusual" – the cutting of red tape, speeding up procurement, and fast-tracking critical decision making. The majority of the respondents recommend that government make a policy decision to phase out Operation Phakisa as a stand-alone flagship initiative but also ensure that those components of OP that have actually worked well are retained within relevant departments or clusters of departments.

Table 35: Recommendations and required actions

Government should take a strategic decision to phase out Operation Phakisa as a standalone initiative in a structured manner and absorb its functioning parts into line department programmes.	
Recommendation	**Required Action**
R1: Phase out Operation Phakisa	Government – at cabinet level – uses the findings of this evaluation to take a strategic decision to phase out (terminate) Operation Phakisa as a standalone development initiative and absorb its more successful and functioning components into relevant line department programmes or migrate these components into other currently operational strategic interventions.
R2. Streamline National Efforts to Meet Priorities	South Africa currently has numerous ongoing national development initiatives – including Operation Phakisa. To avoid a dilution of resources and effort the government should make a strategic decision to integrate OP into components of other national strategic development initiatives to create one or two highly focused and well-resourced responses to key national priorities.
R3. Develop a phased strategy to migrate Operation Phakisa activities	DPME ISU in collaboration with sector experts and other key stakeholders should come with a strategy to infuse the three feet plans and associated implementation activities into other Departmental/ Sector Plans and use the sector monitoring branch to monitor implementation. The concept of "business unusual" should continue to be infused into the operational culture of departments – and perhaps even branded as a set of working principles similar to the Batho Pele model.
R4. Redeploy key personnel	Government officials who have been working full time on OP activities must

	be redeployed to other lines of duty within government where they can effectively utilise the expertise, knowledge and skills gained through their involvement with OP.
R5. Document Lessons Learnt	The positive lessons learned from the establishment and operations of the Operation Phakisa Labs should be documented and shared as good practice for future initiatives that require inter-departmental collaboration, or multi-sector engagement. This will ensure the maintenance of relevance and commitment, as well as the potential sustainability of the tools developed

7. CONCLUSION

In line with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/ Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria, this evaluation assessed the findings against relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, emerging impact, and sustainability. A set of questions were proposed as per the OECD/DAC criteria, against which, the findings of the evaluation report have been presented. The assessment of the Operation Phakisa in terms of effectiveness and efficiency introduces the causal mechanisms that were designed to bring about the expected change. These criteria also provide a lens through which to assess the implementation framework, which highlights successes and challenges experienced by the programme in the process of implementing the different Labs. This section concludes with an assessment of the effectiveness of the interventions and the overall benefit that these interventions produced considering the desired outcomes**.**

7.1 Relevance

When evaluating the relevance of a programme, it is important to assess whether its objectives are consistent with the requirements of the country, the needs of the beneficiaries and national policy priorities. In this evaluation, the relevance criterion consists of two distinct components. The first component measures the extent to which the objectives of the programme align with the needs and priorities of the target beneficiaries. The second component of relevance examines whether the design of the intervention was relevant and appropriate to the problem and realities faced by the local communities and the country.

The Operation Phakisa strategic vision is founded on strong logic and is compelling. The review findings have emerged from an assessment of the extent to which the Operation Phakisa methodology design and approach was suitable in terms of achieving its desired effect and working in its given context. This includes assessment of whether the program was of a suitable type or style to meet the priorities and needs of all identified major stakeholder groups. In this domain, there is a questioning as to whether the program theory/program logic was correct in being able to envisage the causal relationships that were predicted between the program outputs, outcome, and impacts.

Additionally, the evaluation found that the design of the Operation Phakisa is logical, and the outputs and outcomes are clearly defined. Operation Phakisa as a methodology responds to the underlying problems and commonly accepted challenges that impedes accelerated service delivery and it is clear that *if* Operation Phakisa is implemented systematically and successfully, it becomes more relevant to the South African economic context, well-aligned with the government's overall economic growth, transformation, and job creation objectives.

Further to the point of relevance, the initial design of the methodology was not based on a Theory of Change (ToC) as confirmed by KII findings. Usually, a ToC should be discussed and agreed by key

actors (both in intervention design and in evaluation processes) so that it represents a shared understanding that describes the intervention. In essence, a TOC reflects a negotiated understanding or interpretation of the project intervention logic – it is both contextual and temporal. It should also be regarded as dynamic - subject to changes / modifications as contexts change over time. As such, a lack of a ToC created from the early stages exhibits a narrowed understanding for the interventions. However, given the strong understanding of the DPME ISU officials and the methodology stakeholders of the realities and needs on the ground and given the continuous engagement with beneficiaries, additional findings and causal and effects linkages were identified.

In sum, and through a process of document review and interviews with key stakeholders it became evident that the project is strategically placed within an overall strategic goal of addressing longer-term solution to the challenges faced in delivering on the NDP priorities. The Operation Phakisa methodology theory was appropriate and relevant in general terms, but could have been more defined, explicit, clear regarding the financial protocols in the majority of the Labs and better linked to other government processes after the design and inception phase. Although there are areas of improvement, in general, the methodology is relevant, aligned to the NDP, needs of the citizens and the general economic environment of South Africa.

7.2 Efficiency

Efficiency measures whether the Operation Phakisa and the results were delivered in an optimal and cost-effective manner. The central question that needs to be answered here is: how cost-effective is the Operation Phakisa? However, to respond to this question, the evaluators must first ask: what is cost-effectiveness?

Efficiency is linked to the ability of the Operation Phakisa Labs to spend its funds according to the agreed budget and work plans, and to ensure that its reporting includes accurate forecasting to ensure that financial shortfalls are not experienced. The Australian Productivity Commission (2010) defines cost-effectiveness as “achieving the maximum level of output for a stated level of inputs or costs”. To analyse the cost-effectiveness of this initiative, it is necessary to compare expenditure to outputs. In this evaluation, there is limited expenditure data to work with, unit costs that can provide valuable insights on changes in the quantity and price of inputs used to produce a service or highlight any shifts in the productivity of the delivery initiatives under each Lab. As mentioned throughout the present evaluation report, most of the Labs or focus areas do not have a dedicated budget apportioned to them for implementation. The implementing departments are required to redirect their existing funds which has a negative impact to other equally significant programs. This is quite different from how PEMANDU in Malaysia where we learnt the methodology from operates. One of the respondents mentioned that there are doubts if National Treasury is sufficiently supportive of the Operation Phakisa process.

Realising ambitions targets espoused by Operation Phakisa depends on the availability of adequate financial and human resources for planning, delivery, and monitoring. A key constraint facing implementing partners is the lack of funding to implement projects. The initial conceptualisation was premised on the notion that government was going to avail financial resources to the early phases of implementation and that this would culminate in unlocking private sector investment. Thereafter, government would gradually divest and permit the private sector to crowd-in. The sustainability of the methodology hinges on this assumption. As a result, the government needs to have access to

sufficient budget to fund the initial phases of the initiatives. Sufficient buy-in from the private sector is crucial to funding the implementation of the 3-feet plans. Most of the respondents have repeatedly noted this as a shortcoming of the Operation Phakisa process and have suggested the urgent need for the Operation Phakisa Unit to source or unlock funding for implementation to take place as envisaged. Operation Phakisa in its entirety involves an arena of large projects that involve huge capital investments from several hundred million to several billion Rands.

7.3 Effectiveness

Effectiveness focuses on results, not processes and the evaluators examines if the programme has delivered on its planned outcomes and met intended objectives.

The evaluation team made an assessment on the extent to which programme and broader stakeholder objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, considering their relative significance.

According to Ostrowick (2022), the documents, plans and strategies of most government departments contain an extensive list of what the problem is (also known as "admiring the problem' or "as-is" or situation analysis) and then a long list of deliverables or desirables "to be" scenarios, without specifying how the "as-is" is to be converted into the "to be". This has been the chief cause of failure in the public space. Departments focus on diagnosing, reporting, and planning instead of delivering and those departments who could potentially deliver – namely the other tiers of government -fail to do so for other reasons, such as misaligned priorities. The big challenge in program or project implementation is the preparation of extensive plans with inadequate action so that those plans propel the vehicle of implementation. This situation is better illustrated by the image in Figure 33:

Figure 35: The implementation conundrum



Based on the understanding and experience of the BFR approach in Malaysia, the Delivery Unit model envisaged by the South African government was intended to be a longer-term solution to the

above-mentioned challenges faced in delivering on the NDP priorities. The initial vision was to test out the BFR approach in several key NDP priority sectors with the intention at a later stage of somehow integrating the accelerated service delivery model as a "whole of government" approach. Overall, findings indicate that the Operation Phakisa methodology has been well received, and in particular, Operation Phakisa's integrated and systematic multi-sectoral intervention helped to overcome some logistical implementation obstacles, promote scale-up and synergistically maximize the effect of each sector, leveraging the strengths and diverse approaches in different initiatives. Unfortunately, several programmatic problems associated with funding constraints and absence of political support that are critical to ensure success were identified.

The original purpose of the Operation Phakisa methodology was to fast track the implementation of priorities contained in the NDP 2030. The delivery transmission mechanism was to fast track the convening of delivery Labs, as well as accelerating the planning, implementation, monitoring, and reporting processes. This thinking was premised on the government's desire to catalyse a service delivery paradigm shift towards doing "business unusual." Conversely, given the supposed link of Operation Phakisa to political power, one would assume that the methodology came with authority, resources, flexibility and striving for provision of timely advice and quick turnaround i.e., a sense of urgency that can potentially cut through bureaucratic roadblocks. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with Operation Phakisa, as bureaucratic traits have gradually infiltrated back just after the Labs were set up. Several respondents cited that Government and lead departments are still using bureaucracy for delivery and reporting, which is against the spirit of BFR. If Operation Phakisa had a business unusual approach, then a significant number of outcomes would have been achieved, impacting positively on growth, investment, and employment.

According to the analysis conducted as part of this evaluation, several of the weaknesses in administrative efficiency and implementation can be traced back to a lack of adequate planning, follow up and contingency measures to address resource constraints. The methodology for example, reflects well on commitments and agreements made during the Lab process but it does not establish how and where there are going to ensure uninterrupted supply of financial resources to implement the activities and plans.

7.4 Sustainability

Sustainability establishes whether the capacity and programmes developed, and the results achieved by the project are likely to be sustainable. Overall, it is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of the project are likely to continue after the Operation Phakisa support has come to an end.

Lack of continuity of public policies and priorities from one government administration to the next, as well as the high rotation of middle management and technical staff is a threat to sustainability of government interventions. Sustainability in this context connotes the ability of the Operation Phakisa to sustain the flow of benefits over time. In addition, threats to sustainability abound as sustaining the Operation Phakisa methodology may require frequent adjustments in investment patterns and forms of organization, especially in the framework of an integrated and volatile global economy.

The delivery unit approach (as manifested in Operation Phakisa) depends on the visible backing of the head of government and effective delegation to key decision makers. When President Ramaphosa took office in February 2018, replacing President Zuma who had initiated Operation

Phakisa, there was a sense that he may not want to continue supporting an initiative developed by his predecessor. While some of the Labs continued to operate post-Zuma, their impact appears to have been different – with evidence suggesting that still functioning Labs have been more focused on the way the civil service operates than its immediate delivery on key priorities using the BFR methodology. However, even a Lab that only existed for a short period of time or that has been non-functional may have used the experience and the opportunity of being exposed to the BFR model to embed new practices within the work of their departments and may see some of this work continue even if this happens under a different name or organisational form. It is unclear within government circles whether Operation Phakisa is expected to be a short-term intervention linked to a particular administration or whether in some form or other it becomes a permanent feature at the centre of government. It appears that the current administration is placing less emphasis on Operation Phakisa and focusing its resources more on post-COVID recovery interventions and on the work of Operation Vhulindlela and Master Plans.

A range of views have been expressed on scaling up and these entail different perspectives on supporting government capacity to deliver. On the one hand, there is a view about embedding reforms successfully in some of the Labs to learn how processes work well, and then scaling up based on what is known from those initiatives, taking account of the complexities of local and national contexts, and appropriately building the capacity of government capacity to deliver. However, the findings of this evaluation indicate that Operation Phakisa as a flagship presidential initiative is unlikely to continue in its current format, but what is more likely is that the concept of accelerating service delivery may continue to resonate in departments and within other priority government initiatives.

7.5 Emerging Impact

Most development projects aim to 'make a difference' but that difference needs to be measured and demonstrated. Being able to measure impact reflects the difference between perception and evidence-based change. It asks the questions: what would have happened if this project hadn't existed? Can positive change in the economic circumstances in accelerated service delivery be attributed directly to the Operation Phakisa? Impact encapsulates the changes, either positive or negative, that are brought about by the programme.

State interventions include regulatory (policies) and facilitatory interventions such as national development plans for implementation by the government departments and agencies. The NDP Chapter 13, details a comprehensive vision for a well capacitated state, underscoring coordination, cooperation, and synergy across all three spheres of government. In South Africa, many of our service delivery challenges and reforms such as inequality, basic health care, food security etc are complex interventions. Operation Phakisa has demonstrated the value of using a structured approach to tracking the performance of such complex programmes even within the constraints of available capacity, expertise, and governance arrangements**.**

An achievement of Operation Phakisa so far has been the ability to address disjointed planning and working in silos, particularly, the establishment of intergovernmental platforms to streamline work in a systematic and cost-efficient manner. Labs have been a relevant problem-solving platform, ushering consensus building and bringing various stakeholders together with new ways of thinking. This is a significant departure from a system that is fundamentally fragmented, lacking inter-agency trust with almost no effective coordination mechanisms. Nevertheless, while the aim behind bringing

a 'new way' to deliver government programmes may be relevant and urgent for the South African context, it is likely to continue being enervated if the relevant officials, particularly those at the apex of the organisations at ministerial and DG level, do not have sufficient motivation to adapt to this way of working and adjust their plans and processes accordingly.

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9. ANNEXURES

9.1 Evaluation Framework

No	Secondary evaluation questions	Evaluation Criteria	Sources of Data	Targeted Respondents	Analytical methods
EQ1	**TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE OPERATION PHAKISA PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY BEEN APPROPRIATELY DESIGNED FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ITS OBJECTIVES?**				
S.1.1	What was the rationale for adopting the BFR model?	Relevance	Literature review, Programme document analysis and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units	Document review / content analysis. Statistical Analysis[14] Narrative Analysis Thematic Analysis[15]
S.1.2	How might the Lab methodology be contextualised / adapted to the unique economic, social, and political conditions in South Africa?	Relevance	Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units	Thematic analysis, content analysis and statistical analysis

[14] **Statistical analysis** means investigating trends, patterns, and relationships using quantitative data
[15] **Thematic analysis** is a qualitative data analysis method that involves reading through a data set (such as transcripts from in depth interviews or focus groups) and identifying patterns in meaning across the data.

No	Secondary evaluation questions	Evaluation Criteria	Sources of Data	Targeted Respondents	Analytical methods
S.1.3	To what extent is South Africa's political context and its institutional arrangements ready for a model (BFR) that introduces new delivery transmission mechanisms? Is there demonstrated political will in this regard?	Relevance	Literature review, Programme document analysis and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units	Document review / content analysis. Statistical Analysis[16] Narrative Analysis Thematic Analysis[17]
S.1.4	What is the overall Theory of Change (ToC) (or theories of change) for the Operation Phakisa and is it (are they) working as planned?	Relevance	ToC, Focus groups, and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Lab Committees	Document review / content analysis. ToC Workshop and content Analysis
S 1.5	Is the overarching ToC well conceptualised? (The TOC should provide a detailed explanation of how the BFR methodology was applied, how the initiatives were conceptualised and how	Relevance	ToC, Focus groups, and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa	Document review / content analysis. ToC Workshop and content Analysis

[16] **Statistical analysis** means investigating trends, patterns, and relationships using quantitative data
[17] **Thematic analysis** is a qualitative data analysis method that involves reading through a data set (such as transcripts from in depth interviews or focus groups) and identifying patterns in meaning across the data.

No	Secondary evaluation questions	Evaluation Criteria	Sources of Data	Targeted Respondents	Analytical methods
	they are working in practice)			Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Lab Committees	
S.1.6	To what extent is the Operation Phakisa methodology relevant in achieving its implementation objectives?	Relevance	Literature review, ToC, Programme document analysis and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units	Document review / content analysis[18] Narrative Analysis[19]
S.1.7	How were the Lab participants and Implementing Agents chosen? How transparent and appropriate was this process?	Effectiveness Relevance	Literature review and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units	Document review / content analysis. Narrative Analysis
S.1.8	To what extent has there been buy-in and ownership of the Lab process and outcomes by key stakeholders?	Relevance Coherence	Literature review, Programme document analysis and key	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts,	Document review / content analysis. Narrative Analysis

[18] **Content analysis** is a research tool used to determine the presence of certain words, themes, or concepts within some given qualitative data (i.e., text). Using content analysis, researchers can quantify and analyse the presence, meanings and relationships of such certain words, themes, or concepts

[19] **Narrative analysis** refers to a cluster of analytic methods for interpreting texts or visual data that have a storied form.

No	Secondary evaluation questions	Evaluation Criteria	Sources of Data	Targeted Respondents	Analytical methods
			informant interviews	DPME officials, Focus Area Delivery Units, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff	
S.1.9	To what extent has the planning process introduced, strengthened, and sustained coordination among key stakeholders?	Coherence Effectiveness	Literature review, and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Lab Committees, Sector partners and funders	Document review / content analysis. Statistical Analysis
S.1.10	To what extent have the key stakeholders been involved in the planning processes (how substantive was this involvement)?	Relevance Coherence	Literature review, Programme document analysis and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Focus Area Delivery Units, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Civil society and private sector role players	Document review / content analysis. Narrative Analysis
S.1.11	How effectively has the Lab methodology allowed the Focus Area Delivery Units and Implementation Agents to adapt their strategy plans in response to new	Effectiveness	Literature review, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials,	Document review / descriptive and content analysis.

No	Secondary evaluation questions	Evaluation Criteria	Sources of Data	Targeted Respondents	Analytical methods
	information?			Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff Focus Area Delivery Units, Lab Committees	Statistical Analysis
S 1.11	Has Operation Phakisa been implemented according to the design set out in the Operation Phakisa Framework? (The programme design should clearly outline the implementation and operational mechanisms and processes (steps) involved in the programme).	Effectiveness	ToC, Programme documents, Focus groups, and Key informant interviews	DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Lab Committees	ToC workshop, Document review and content analysis
EQ2	**TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE VARIOUS OPERATION PHAKISA LABS ACHIEVED THE INTENDED OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES?**				
S.2.1	Retrospectively, how realistic were the outcome targets set out in the various Lab processes? How realistic were the timeframes? (Based on progress against targets)	Effectiveness Efficiency	Literature review, Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Lab committees	Document review / content analysis. ToC analysis Statistical Analysis
S.2.2	Which Operation Phakisa Labs are likely to achieve outputs and outcomes within the set timeframes? Which outputs or outcomes are unlikely to ever be achieved? (Where applicable).	Effectiveness Efficiency	Focus groups, programme document analysis and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa	Document review / content analysis. Statistical Analysis

No	Secondary evaluation questions	Evaluation Criteria	Sources of Data	Targeted Respondents	Analytical methods
				Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Lab Committees	
S.2.4	What have been the main challenges experienced in implementing the planned initiatives?	Effectiveness Efficiency	Literature review, Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Lab Committees, OP Sector (private sector) Partner Funders	Document review / content analysis. Thematic Analysis
S.2.5	Are the current institutional arrangements and administrative arrangements set in place to implement Operation Phakisa still working as envisaged by the initial strategy documents?	Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency	Literature review, Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Civil society and private sector role players	Document review / content analysis. Thematic Analysis Statistical Analysis
S.2.6	How has the Operation Phakisa programme improved intergovernmental and sectoral coordination and collaboration, including between the state and non-state entities?	Impact Effectiveness Coherence	Literature review, Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa	Document review / content analysis.

No	Secondary evaluation questions	Evaluation Criteria	Sources of Data	Targeted Respondents	Analytical methods
				Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, OP sector partners	Thematic Analysis Statistical Analysis
EQ3	**TO WHAT EXTENT HAS OPERATION PHAKISA BEEN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT IN THE DELIVERY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM APPROACH IN GOVERNMENT?**				
S.3.1	To what extent have the seven convened Labs shown value for money?	Efficiency Value Add	Literature review, Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Executive & Staff, OP Sector Partners and Funders, Lab Committees	Statistical analysis Financial Analysis
S.3.2	Has the programme provided the country with a blueprint for faster and more accountable service delivery?	Relevance Effectiveness	Literature review, Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, OP Sector Partners and Funders, Lab Committees	Thematic analysis, content analysis Statistical analysis
S.3.3	Is there any evidence of the Operation Phakisa programme having contributed to	Relevance Efficiency	Literature review, Programme document	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents,	Thematic analysis, content analysis and statistical

No	Secondary evaluation questions	Evaluation Criteria	Sources of Data	Targeted Respondents	Analytical methods
	improved service delivery and job creation in the targeted sectors?	Impact	analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Panel of industry experts, Beneficiaries, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Civil society and private sector partners	analysis
S.3.4	What has been the observed positive change in the attitudes of those responsible for the delivery of Operation Phakisa Lab outputs?	Efficiency Impact	Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, Beneficiaries, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Lab Committees	Thematic analysis, content analysis and statistical analysis
S.3.5	How sustainable is it to continue to use this methodology for social and economic policy delivery going forward?	Sustainability	Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff Focus Area Delivery Units, Private sector partners, Lab committees	Thematic analysis, content analysis and statistical analysis

No	Secondary evaluation questions	Evaluation Criteria	Sources of Data	Targeted Respondents	Analytical methods
S.3.6	Are the outcomes that the Operation Phakisa has achieved to date likely to be sustainable going forward?	Sustainability	Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units, Private sector partners, Lab committees	Thematic analysis, content analysis and statistical analysis
S.3.7	What are the unintended consequences / externalities of the programme?	Relevance Impact	Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units	Thematic analysis, content analysis and statistical analysis
EQ4	**WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATION PHAKISA IN SOUTH AFRICA? (HOW CAN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATION PHAKISA BE STRENGTHENED?)**				
S.4.1	What aspects of the methodology should be improved, or be strengthened in the future? What aspects of the methodology can be adapted to make future roll out of the methodology more effective?	Sustainability	Literature review, Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff	Thematic analysis, content analysis and statistical analysis
S.4.2	How desirable is it to continue to use this methodology for economic policy delivery	Sustainability	Programme document analysis, Focus groups	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents,	Thematic analysis, content analysis and statistical

No	Secondary evaluation questions	Evaluation Criteria	Sources of Data	Targeted Respondents	Analytical methods
	going forward?		and key informant interviews	Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units	analysis
S.4.3	What types of adaptation are needed to make future iterations of the methodology more effective?	Sustainability	Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariats, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units	Thematic analysis, content analysis and statistical analysis
S.4.4	What can be improved in the current planning and implementation methodology?	Effectiveness Efficiency	Programme document analysis, Focus groups and key informant interviews	Lab Secretariates, Implementing Agents, Panel of industry experts, DPME officials, Operation Phakisa Principals & Staff, Focus Area Delivery Units	Thematic analysis, content analysis and statistical analysis

9.2 Evaluation Instruments

planning, monitoring & evaluation
Department:
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

OPERATION PHAKISA
planning | implementation | growth

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS: ACADEMIA / RESEARCH INSTITUTES

Dear Respondent

On behalf of the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) Citofield is conducting an implementation evaluation of Operation Phakisa. It is critical for us to gauge the views, perspectives and experiences of stakeholders who have been involved in some capacity with Operation Phakisa. You have been selected to participate in the evaluation. We would be most grateful if you could participate.

Please answer the questions as openly and fully as you can. Please note that your participation in this study is voluntary and your individual responses will be kept confidential within the evaluation team. We will not show your answers to anyone who is not part of our evaluation team.

Yours sincerely

Stanford Muhomba
Principal Investigator
Evaluation of Operation Phakisa
Tel. 071 910 3636

Philip Browne
Principal Investigator
Evaluation of Operation Phakisa
Tel. 082 574 5739

Respondent Name	
Department / Agency	
Job Designation	
Interview Date	
Interview Time	

1. Please describe your role and responsibilities as they pertain to Operation Phakisa?

2. What is your understanding of the purpose of Operation Phakisa?

3. In your experience, do stakeholders have a common understanding of and buy into the Operation Phakisa methodology (BFR) and process? (Probe – how do you understand the concept of "business unusual", is it a feasible approach for government?)

4. For you, what have been one or two of the most successful aspects of how the Operation Phakisa has been implemented?

5. In your view what could have been done more efficiently in terms of the implementation of OP? (e.g., operational, and financial management, administration, oversight, strategic direction)

6. To what extent was South Africa's political context and institutional arrangements ready for a model (BFR) that brings in a new delivery transmission mechanism? (Probe: Is there still demonstrated political will in this regard? Is there a genuine appetite for "business unusual"?)

7. To what extent has the Operation Phakisa BFR methodology been relevant in achieving government's priority outcomes? Do you think that this is a sustainable approach going forward?

8. To what extent have resources allocated to Operation Phakisa been used in an efficient / value for money way? Would you say that the funds allocated to the Labs has been sufficient for them to do their work? Are there any ways that resourcing issues could have been improved?

9. Do you feel that the Lab processes paid enough attention to research, research capacity building and skills development? To what extent do you feel that the implementation plans relating to R&D and skills development were relevant and realistic?

10.Retrospectively, how realistic, and achievable were the implementation outcome targets set out in the various Lab processes? How realistic were the timeframes?

11. To what extent did the *Operation Phakisa Framework* (as a blueprint) inform the institutional, administrative and implementation arrangements for the Labs?

12. In your opinion, has Operation Phakisa, as a model for fast tracking public-private partnerships, been effective in terms of delivering on NDP priority areas? Please substantiate your response.

13. Operation Phakisa was introduced into government at a specific moment in South Africa's social, political, and economic trajectory. In your view is it still an appropriate model for delivering on NDP priorities? Please substantiate your response.

14. In your experience of working with the Lab(s) do you feel that the research and data driven components of Operation Phakisa planning and implementation have been sufficiently integrated? Where could the research element have been improved / strengthened?

15. In your view were adequate funds and other resources allocated for the research component of the Labs? Please expand on your answer.

16. In your experience of working with the Lab do you feel that sufficient focus was given to priority issues such as training, skills transfer and capacity strengthening? (Probe: where did you see successes? What were some of the challenges?)

16. In what ways do you feel that your academic institution could have added greater value to the research component and evidence base of the Lab planning processes? (Probe: was your expertise adequately leveraged in the Lab?)

17. Are there any other issues that you would like to raise about Operation Phakisa that we have not already covered?

9.3 List of Key Informants

Date	Interviewer	LAB
CONCEPTUALISERS		
06-12-2021	Mr Rudi Dicks	Several Labs
08-12-2021	Dr Andre Shere	Oceans Economy
09-12-2021	Dr Sean Philips	Oceans Economy
10-12-2021	Dr Thabo Mabokwane	ICT in Education
10-12-2021	Mr Thulani Masilela	Several Labs
14 -12 2021	Mr Tshediso Matona	Oceans Economy
20-02-2022	Mr Ismail Akhalwaya	Several Labs
WORKGROUP CHAIRS AND DELIVERY UNIT HEADS		
12-11-2021	Maneo Dichaba	ICT in Education
15-11-2021	Mr Xolani Dlamini	Oceans Economy
07-12-2021	Surprise Zwane	Chemicals and Waste
10-12-2021	Dr Julian Japhta	Agriculture and Land Reform
10-12-2021	Lesetsa Mabokela	Mining
25-01-2022	Mr Mpahlwa Chuma	Oceans Economy
26-01-2022	Mr Tembalethu Tanci	Oceans Economy
27-01-2022	Mr Shonisani Manyaga	Oceans Economy
28-01-2022	Mr Yuval Tchetchik	Biodiversity
LAB COORDINATORS		
07-12-2021	Ms Manaka Budu	Chemicals and Waste
06-12-2021	Ms Hombakhazi Blou	Chemicals and Waste
IMPLEMENTING AGENTS		
25-11-2021	Mr Neil Crouch	Biodiversity
10-11-2021	Ms Bella Kgaswane	Ideal Clinic
10-12-2-21	Mr Tsunduka Khosa	Agriculture and Land Reform
09-12-2021	Mr Sizwe Nkukwana	Chemicals and Waste
23-11-2021	Dr Daniel Motiang	Agriculture and Land Reform
27-01-2022	Mrs Tanswa Cici	Oceans Economy
26-01-2022	Mr Sefalani Montsi	Oceans Economy
24-11-2021	Dr Idan Chiyanzu	Chemicals and Waste

28-01-2022	Ms Nomalanga Sokhela	Oceans Economy
27-01-2022	Ms Tsepiso Taoana Mashiloane	Oceans Economy
DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES		
22-11-2021	C Labuschagne	ICT in Education
29-11-2021	Francois Neil	Chemicals and Waste
23-11-2021	Zimaso Nhlapo	Chemicals and Waste
24-11-2021	Mahlako Kgwiti	Ideal Clinic
03-12-2021	Tshepiso Rakgosi	Chemicals and Waste
07-12-2021	Darlene De Vos	Ideal Clinic
07-12-2021	B Manaka	Chemicals and Waste
07-12-2021	Elspeth Khembo	ICT in Education
8-12-2021	Abigirl Khoza	Chemicals and Waste
9-12-2021	Ronald Maditse	Chemicals and Waste
23-11-2021	Kgari Manotwane	Agriculture and Land Reform
24-11-2021	Ms Elizabeth Mgedezi	Chemicals and Waste
15-02-2022	Anonymous	Bioprospecting Economy
14-01-2022	Focus group discussion led by Mr Mosa Mabusa (3 x Participants)	Mining
ACADEMIA		
22-11-2021	Dr. Ken Findlay	Oceans Economy
23-11-2021	Ms Isabel Meyer	ICT in Education
29-11-2021	Linda Godfrey	Chemicals and Waste
27-01-2022	Ms Nwabisa Matoti	Oceans Economy
27-01-2022	Mr Odwa Mtati	Oceans Economy
28-01-2022	Dr Tsakane Ngomane	Several Labs
THE PRIVATE SECTOR		
25-11-2021	Dr Jan Jooste	Chemicals and Waste
25-11-2021	Mr Lance Anderson	Oceans Economy
25-11-2021	Mr Bronwyn Jones	Chemicals and Waste
26-01-2022	Mr Prasheen Maharaj	Oceans Economy
LAB FACILITATORS		

15-11-2021	Ms Govender	Co-Lab Facilitator - Chemicals and Waste
12-12-2021	Ms Lindi Guard	Lab Facilitator – Mackinsy Ideal Clinic and ICT in Education
27-01-2022	Mr Peter Present	ICT in Education
10-02-2022	Mr Sipho Dayel	Several Labs
10-02-2022	Mr Jitendra Harvagovan	Several Labs
DPME OUTCOME FACILITATORS		
3-11-2021	Mr Zakhele Mdlalose	Outcome Facilitator
07-11-2021	Ms Jeanette Sprinkhuizen	Outcome Facilitator -DPME
10-11-2021	Mr Clive Pillay	Outcome Facilitator - DPME
12-11-2021	Ms Nkateko Mkhacane	Outcome Facilitator- DPME
17-11-2021	Josephilda Nhlapo-Hlophe	Outcome Facilitator - DPME
10-12-2021	Thabo Mabogoane	Outcome Facilitator - DPME
DPME ISU		
03-12-2021	Rudzani Mudau	DPME
11-01-2022	Lwandile Socikwa	DPME (Former)
26-01-2022	Mr Teboho Zide	DPME
01-02-2022	Mpumzi Bonga	DPME

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planning, monitoring and evaluation

Department:
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

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