

# Synthesis Evaluation of the Agriculture and Rural Sector

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACB	Agricultural Credit Board
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
ARC	Agricultural Research Council
ARD	Agriculture and Rural Development
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
CASP	Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme
COGTA	Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
COS	Council of Stakeholders
CPDS	Comprehensive Producer Development Strategy
CRDP	Comprehensive Rural Development Programme
CRLR	Commission on Restitution and Land Rights
CWP	Community Work Programme
DAFF	Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
DALRRD	Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development
DBE	Department of Basic Education
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DOH	Department of Health
DPME	Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
DPW	Departments of Public Works
DRDLR	Department of Rural Development and Land Reform
DSBD	Department of Small Business Development
DSD	Department of Social Development
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
DWS	Department of Water and Sanitation
EPWP	Expanded Public Works Programme
ERP	Extension Recovery Plan
FNS	Food and Nutrition Strategy
FSP	Farmer Support Programme
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IDF	Integrated Development Frameworks
Local GAP	Local Good Agricultural Practice

LRP	Land Restitution Programme
LARP	Land and Agrarian Reform Programme
MAFISA	Micro-Agriculture Financial Institutions of South Africa
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NAMC	National Agricultural Marketing Council
NARYSEC	National Rural Youth Service Corps
NDP	National Development Plan
NEPF	National Evaluation Policy Framework
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NGP	New Growth Plan
NLP	National Land Care Programme
NLRP	National Land Reform Programme
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act
PGDS	Provincial Growth and Development Strategies
PICC	Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission
PMU	Programme Management Units
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RECAP	Recapitalisation and Development Programme
RESIS	Revitalisation of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes
SACNAP	South African Council for Natural Scientific Professions
SASAE	South African Society for Agricultural Extension
SFS	Smaller holder Farmer Sector
SOP	Standard Operation Procedures
SPSS	Strategic Plan for Smallholder Support
VFM	Value for Money

## 1. Introduction

Agricultural development is regarded as one of the fundamental means to eradicate extreme poverty, boost shared prosperity and provide food security to a projected 9.7 billion people around the globe by 2050 (FAO, 2004). Anecdotal evidence posits that growth in the agriculture sector is two to four times more effective in raising sustainable incomes among the poorest compared to other sectors.

The history of agriculture dates back thousands of years, and its development has been driven and defined by greatly different climates, cultures, and technologies. The Agriculture sector comprises of establishments primarily engaged in growing crops (agronomy), raising animals (animal husbandry), agriculture engineering, agriculture economics and harvesting fish (fisheries) and other animals from a farm, ranch, or their natural habitats.

It is undisputable that the agriculture sector is crucial to economic growth ,as in 2014 alone, it accounted for one-third of the global gross-domestic product (GDP). Conversely, agriculture-driven growth, poverty reduction, and food security are at risk due to climate change that reduces crop yields, especially in the world's most food insecure regions. Nhamo etal (2015) contents that despite the positive aspects of agriculture, forestry and land use change are responsible for 25% of greenhouse gas emissions. They further argue that that the current food system likewise threatens the health of people and the planet as agriculture accounts for 70% of water usage and generates unsustainable levels of pollution and waste.

### 1.1 Background

Citofield has been commissioned by the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) to undertake a synthesis evaluation of six reports in the Agriculture and Rural Sector. This report seeks to summarize the evaluation reports, capturing main points, commonalities and variations on the baseline, findings, conclusions and recommendations. The evaluations synthesised included, the diagnostic evaluation of the Government Support Smaller holder Farmer Sector (SFS), Implementation evaluation of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP), the Implementation evaluation of the Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP), the implementation evaluation of the Land Restitution Programme (LRP), the implementation evaluation of the Extension Recovery Plan (ERP), and the implementation evaluation of the Recapitalization and Development Programme (RECAP). These evaluation reports covered the baseline state, findings incorporating policy reforms, conclusions and recommendations.

## 2. The Agriculture Sector in South Africa

South Africa covers an area of 122 081 150 hectares (ha) of land in total of which approximately 14 million ha (13%) is cultivated land. It is estimated that about 35% of the people in South Africa are directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture for employment and income (DAFF, 2016). The primary agricultural sector contributes about 2.6% to the GDP and 7% to formal employment. The agricultural sector is made up of commercial farmers, smallholder and subsistence farmers. If the entire value chain of the agriculture sector is considered, its contribution to GDP reaches about 12% (DAFF, 2016). Agricultural activities range from intensive crop production and mixed farming to cattle-ranching in the bushveld and sheep-farming in the more arid regions. About 12% of South Africa's surface area can be used for crop production. High-potential arable land comprises only 22% of total arable land (DAFF, 2016).

Natural forests cover less than one million ha, plantation forestry less than 1.27 million hectares (ha) and the woodlands, also known as savannahs, collectively cover about 30 million ha. The natural vegetation includes shrubs and desert grasses in the dry central and western parts of the plateau, fynbos in the south western parts of the country with its Mediterranean climate and grasslands, savannah, bushveld and forest depending on the altitude in the eastern parts. There are 528 protected areas, including 20 marine areas. Over 3.75 million ha are protected in 20 national parks and 7 trans boundary conservation areas (DAFF, 2016).

Irrigation in South Africa is estimated to be 1.6 million ha and it uses 60% of the available water (DAFF, 2016). About 50 000 ha is located in the former homelands and is allocated to smallholder farmers. Most commercial irrigation occurs in the Orange, Crocodile, Lower Vaal, Sundays & Fish rivers basins and in the Western Cape region. Irrigated agriculture contributes to about 30% of the agricultural production of South Africa and has a huge potential impact in rural areas (DAFF, 2016). Small-scale farmers play a vital role in irrigated agriculture and are estimated to be 250 000, most of which have very small plots for self-consumption, and irrigation commercial farmers are less than 30 000. In addition, 120 000 permanent jobs as well as numerous seasonal workers equating to 10 to 15% of the total agricultural employment in irrigated agriculture has been created (DAFF, 2016).

Large areas of the Republic of South Africa are subject to hot and dry climatic conditions, high evaporation and a low and intermittent rainfall, where optimal crop production is not possible without supplementary irrigation. The predominant hot and sunny climate is however advantageous for plant growth and a large variety of crops are successfully cultivated under



irrigation in areas where suitable soils and sufficient water sources occur. It is embraced that irrigation contributes substantially to agricultural production for the local as well as for the export market. Furthermore, private irrigation development, took place parallel to the development of state and irrigation board schemes. Approximately 44% of the land currently under irrigation was developed by private enterprise, against 26% on state water schemes, which include 4% small farmer schemes and 30% on irrigation board schemes (DAFF, 2016).

Despite the significant contribution of the agriculture sector in ensuring food security, smallholder farmers in South Africa face various challenges that impede their growth and ability to effectively and efficiently contribute to food security as compared to the commercial farmers, such as increased population growth, lack of funding and climate change hindering their capacity to increase food production (Dube & Sigauke 2015). Harvey et al., 2014 claims that pests and disease outbreaks, extreme weather events and market shocks poverty, lack of access to credit, and lack of savings, insecure property rights and lack of insufficient access to markets are some of the challenges haunting the emerging farmers. Further concerns such as lack of information and knowledge of appropriate adaptation measures, lack of access to agricultural inputs, the intense labour demands caused by lack of mechanisation, and the lack of capital to invest in building productive soils in harsh environments were mentioned by small holder farmers as the areas that are limiting their growth (Ringler *et al.*, 2011; Fan *et al.*, 2013).

Kiem & Austin (2013) states that smallholder farmers have become increasingly vulnerable to a spectrum of emerging climate conditions, unpredictable price fluctuations, and financial risks and challenges, infrastructure, and technology; high marketing and transport costs and limited resources (Fan *et al.*, 2013). Because smallholder farmers typically depend directly on agriculture for their livelihoods and have limited resources and capacity to cope with these aforementioned shocks, any reductions in agricultural productivity can have significant impacts on their food security, nutrition, income and well-being (Harvey *et al.*, 2014). In comparison with commercial farmers, smallholder farmers often experience an inferior productivity and the production quality does not meet the market standards, due to lack of resources , limited knowledge, weak management and technical skills, poor access to information and in some cases, illiteracy. Moreover, smallholder farmers are inadequately able to develop their farms due to ineligibility to acquire credit from financial institutions. Other difficulties smallholder farmers face is lack of access to high-value reliable markets, lack of appropriate and affordable means of transport and high transaction costs (Hendriks, 2014).

The agricultural sector clearly plays a very important role in the overall South African economy, particularly, with regard to employment creation and income from export earnings. Furthermore, there is a clear link between land reform and agricultural production. While agriculture plays a major role in poverty alleviation, the poverty problem in South Africa cannot

be solved by promoting smallholder agricultural growth alone. More attention should be directed to the promotion of non-farm activities, particularly those that are linked to the smallholder agricultural sector. A strategy that pays attention to the strengthening of farm or non-farm linkages is likely to yield better results in terms of employment and income generation.

## 2.1 Socio-Political Context of the Agriculture Sector

Farmer support programmes (FSP), was started in 1986 aimed to assist smallholder farmers or rural households to improve their agricultural production in the former homeland areas (van Rooyen *et al.*, 1987). This programme was introduced by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) as an initiative to address constraints faced by farmers in the rural areas (Kirsten & Van Zyl, 1998). It was designed by the government to alleviate poverty and improve economic development and growth (Nel *et al.*, 1997). To overcome most of the challenges confronting smallholder farmers in South Africa, the government implemented various programmes such as National Land Care Programme (NLP), Strategic Plan for Smallholder Support (SPSS), Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP), Revitalisation of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (RESIS), and Micro Agricultural Financial (MAFISA). Despite the government trying to provide these services, often a few of the services provided managed to reach the intended beneficiaries which are the poor smallholder farmers (Hall and Aliber, 2010).

The support of farmers has been an issue since 1994, but the efforts which were implemented to promote smallholder farmers did not yield the anticipated results. The differing roles of organizations in service provision should be defined by realistic criteria governing the smallholder farmer livelihoods. Apart from unfavourable conditions, supportive instruments have been put in place, in order to assist agricultural development. Such instruments include the Agricultural Research Council, the Land Bank, and the Provincial Departments of Agriculture. However, these institutions are still learning how to deal with the special circumstances and needs of smallholder farmers (Hall & Aliber, 2010). Furthermore, government assistance has been often unreliable and late, so in many areas, the situation grew worse than before (Jacobs, 2009).

Agricultural programmes implemented by the government since 1994 to improve the livelihoods of the former underprivileged farmers had a low success rate (Rootman *et al.*, 2015). Systematic support for smallholder agriculture resurfaced on the agenda after being discussed and essentially shelved in the early-to-mid- 1990s (DAFF, 2013). This opened the space for contestation. The dominant model of smallholder agriculture concentrates on the efficiency of production and integration into national and global circuits of capital, but the debate allows for alternative visions of smallholder agriculture to emerge (DAFF, 2013). These

are oriented towards the grassroots, rather than towards concentrated economic and political power. They identify the potential for smallholder agriculture to transform the structure of land ownership and production in South Africa, while simultaneously securing food production and bringing access to food and economic activity closer to direct, grassroots control (DAFF, 2013).

The structural factors underpinning the current global economic crisis would not go away when the short-term 'green shoots of recovery' finally arrive (DAFF, 2013). These factors include deepening immiseration of the world's poor; skyrocketing food and resource prices caused by market manipulation and growing resource scarcity; ecological damage that threatens the existence of the human species and a crisis of political representation, where private economic agents dominate over the public interest (DAFF, 2013). Regardless of the short-term fortunes of the global economy, these factors are set to deepen the increasingly apparent contradictions in the global economic and political system (DAFF, 2013). An approach to smallholder agriculture that can be sustained beyond crises will need to respond to these structural factors in its design and implementation (DAFF, 2013).

There is a general concern that the current approach followed by the government to strengthen the small-scale farming sector has constantly relied on a linear technology transfer approach rather than the use of collective intelligence where stakeholders interactively learn from each other. It has been recognised in the other parts of the world especially in the developed countries like Britain, USA etc. that a continuous process of innovation is essential if food security is to be addressed (Stevens & Letty, 2014). The agriculture sector worldwide is moving into an era of rapidly changing markets, technological, social and environmental circumstances that are evolving in often unpredictable ways. Coping with these challenges of this new era will require extension change agents, researchers, policymakers, consumers, entrepreneurs to seamlessly organise their interactions in order to mobilise knowledge and continuously innovate in the face of change (Stevens & Letty, 2014).

Factors such as the lack of access to land, water, markets, finance, communications infrastructure, education and skills training, still prevent marginalised South Africans from making substantive progress in primary farming, forestry and fisheries, as well as in upstream and downstream enterprises associated with them (DAFF, 2014). These are some of the factors that gave way to a cycle of skills deficit, crushing poverty, underdeveloped markets, low rates of public and private sector investment and a lack of infrastructure, reinforcing the cycle by impacting on the ability of black communities to engage in meaningful rural-based economic activities (DAFF, 2014). Broad-based black economic empowerment and land reform initiatives are regarded as vitally significant catalysts to address these imbalances (DAFF, 2014). Most national programmes explicitly targeting the so-called second economy within agriculture, forestry and fisheries, with the expected outcome of transforming the sector

and building equity, fall short because they were not designed to impact at the scale required to make a difference at a socioeconomic level. Furthermore, these programmes have acted in isolation of each other, leaving beneficiaries seeking support from a fragmented array of projects and programmes (DAFF, 2014).

Several scholars agree that there is limited capacity within the government and state-owned enterprises to reach and offer efficient and sufficient support, limiting their scope to achieve the required scale (DAFF, 2014). In agriculture, there has been a significant growth in budgets to provide direct support to black and disadvantaged smallholder farmers in the form of grants for infrastructure, production inputs and other items and recently through an extension service recovery programme (DAFF, 2014). However, these interventions have not been far-reaching and failed to attain the desired impact (DAFF, 2014).

Two decades into democracy, there was near consensus that the National Land Reform Programme was unsuccessful (Rootman *et al.*, 2015). It has fallen short of both public expectation and the official targets that were set, due to the fact that the envisaged programme of rural development failed to materialise (Rootman *et al.*, 2015). Most importantly rural development efforts failed to make any significant inroads into rural poverty. Institutional efforts have also not provided a strategy to reduce agrarian dualism in South Africa (Rootman *et al.*, 2015). However, due to the fact that the number of smallholders and subsistence producers is so vast relative to the extension corps, the actual support rendered to smallholders and subsistence producers has been patchy and generally inadequate (DAFF, 2012). Contrarily, DAFF argues that since 1994, state support has largely shifted away from the large-scale commercial farming subsector, in favour of smallholders and subsistence producers (DAFF, 2012).

The defining characteristic of successful farmers is an extensive non-agricultural source of income. Schirmer (2000) argues that the characteristic feature of successful white farmers in the Lydenberg District, during the 1900s was that they had access to non-farming sources of income and that it was this intrinsic motivation that led them to invest in agriculture. Thomas (1994) found similar evidence among smallholder farmers in the former homelands, where access to regular income had given some households the ability to accumulate capital and invest in agriculture. The implication of this argument is that successful smallholder farming will exclude the poorest households from participating because all methods aimed at increasing production demands adequate resources.

It is also debatable whether a land reform programme based on smallholder farming will significantly alleviate poverty. The evidence indicates that the poorest households are not likely to benefit significantly from a land reform programme based on smallholder farming. The evidence suggests that those who already have access to some resources stand to benefit

most from such a programme. It, therefore, stands to reason that a land reform programme based on smallholder farming could contribute to greater imbalances among rural people. The primary reason for this elite capture of the benefits of land reform is the failure emanating from agricultural development policies to take account of social differences in rural areas.

The discussion around land reform has largely been defined by those supporting smallholder farming. The limited nature of this discussion has ensured that many of the complications around land reform have been omitted from the development of land reform policies and strategies that aim to increase agricultural production. Supporters of a land reform programme based on smallholder farming have argued that commercial farming undermines economic development, sustainability, ecology, and uses resources inefficiently (ANC, 1994; Hall & Cliffe, 2009). One of the arguments most frequently employed against land reform based on smallholder farming and land reform is that the country's economies depend heavily on the export earnings generated by commercial farming (Thomas, 1994). Lodges (2002) claims that smallholder farmers tend to consume their own output and therefore reduce the marketed surplus. Furthermore, if commercial farms were redistributed to smallholder farmers it would have a negative impact on the economy in terms of export earnings and a consequent decline in the trade balance (Thomas, 1994).

Cross *et al.* (1996) maintain that Africans are not interested in farming and that those who are interested in farming have lost the skills and resources required to farm. The argument is that Africans are not likely to return to rural work because decades of participation in urban labour markets, lack of opportunities in rural areas, poverty and the experience of dispossession have destroyed agricultural skills and accustomed people to a lifestyle with regular incomes. As noted by Thomas (1994), commercial farmers have the ability to adopt new technology than smallholder farmers.

Weiner *et al.* (1997) also argued that redistributing land to smallholder farmers would place an insurmountable financial burden on the government. A smallholder farming strategy would have to include the provision of physical infrastructure, training, extension services, credit and financial grants. Such support would be required because smallholder farmers would be unable to compete with commercial farmers in a free market system in terms of access to land, agricultural inputs, credit, high transaction costs, information and technology and, would be forced out of the agricultural sector unless they receive assistance (Weiner *et al.*, 1997).

The access to agricultural support services remains a major factor constraining the growth of smallholder agriculture in the former homelands. Experience from other countries like Zimbabwe indicates that a comprehensive approach to the provision of farmer support services is required to achieve growth in the smallholder agricultural sector (Ramaru *et al.*, 2009). This approach has been embraced in South Africa as demonstrated by the launch of the Food

Security Programme (FSP) and Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). These programmes were expected to address the problem of lack of access to farmer support services, especially for land reform beneficiaries. To achieve a broad-based smallholder farming development, it was necessary to broaden the scope of the programme to include smallholder farmers in the former homelands.

### 3. Background to the synthesis evaluation

There has been a shift in public sector management as numerous internal and external forces have converged to champion for governments and organizations to respond to good governance issues, accountability, transparency, greater development, effectiveness and delivery of tangible results. As demands for greater accountability and results grew in South Africa, a demand for useful and useable results-based monitoring and evaluation systems to support the management of policies programs and projects also increased. This led to the establishment of the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in January 2010 (now called the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation) in the Presidency. The department became fully operational in April 2010.

The initial rationale for the Department was to enable the establishment of 12 priority outcomes (later 14 national development outcomes) for the government and the development and monitoring of plans against those priority outcomes. In early 2011, The DPME developed the National Evaluation Policy Framework (NEPF) which was approved by Cabinet in November 2011. The evaluation framework was envisioned to promote quality evaluations which can be used for learning in order to improve the effectiveness and impact of government interventions, by reflecting on what is working and what is not working and revising the interventions accordingly (NEPF, 2011). Further to that, the framework sought to establish basic norms and standards for conducting evaluations in South Africa.

The framework adopted a utilisation-focused approach which aimed to use evaluation findings as evidence needed for programme improvement, enhanced accountability, effective evidence-based decision-making, and the promotion of knowledge creation and dissemination. As expressed in the framework, the NEPF envisage the use of various pre and post evaluation methodologies with the aim of attaining the set objectives. These include diagnostic evaluations which seeks to establish the predominant status quo; the design evaluation to reaffirm the robustness of the design; the implementation evaluation appropriate to assess the progress and propose the improvement of the intervention; the impact assessment associated with the post-intervention assessment; and the economic or cost-effective evaluation which establish correlational relationship between the outputs and costs (value for money).

It is upon this premise that, DPME has since undertaken key strategic evaluations as reflected in the annual National Evaluation Plans with a quest to generate evidence for policy formulation that will ensure public value. The Department has since embarked in rolling out numerous evaluations. Some of the evaluations undertaken over a 5-year period were in the Agricultural sector. Furthermore, DPME is currently in the process of synthesising these evaluations with an intention of learning and deriving emerging themes, commonalities and differences across various studies conducted in the Agriculture sector.

This synthesis (or synoptic) evaluation sets out to identify key areas that have contributed towards programme and policy outcomes (both positive and negative), the differences and commonalities between and within the evaluations reviewed. It will serve as a meta-analysis of six already highly detailed set of evaluation reports. It is anticipated that this synthesis will assist in providing strategies on how these can be mainstreamed into and utilised by the national evaluation process and contribute towards the creation of a continuously evolving and expanding evidence database.

Furthermore, this synthesis evaluation seeks to draw together common thematic evaluation features of the Agriculture Sector and draw together the critical threads from a series of selected evaluations already concluded. The Micro Agricultural Financial Institutions of South Africa (MAFISA) was not part of the six evaluation reports, but because of the impact it has on the agriculture landscape, it is summarised below:

### 3.1. Micro Agricultural Financial Institutions of South Africa (MAFISA)

Access to finance is one of the main constraints in the agriculture sector, particularly among subsistence, smallholder producers and agribusiness entrepreneurs. Limited access to finance leads to limited production as producers and entrepreneurs are unable to acquire the necessary inputs for optimal production. Previously farmers (particularly white small-scale farmers) who did not qualify for loans from the Commercial Banks and Land Bank were financed by the Agricultural Credit Board (ACB). They were provided with seasonal loans and disaster relief funds. On the contrary, black small-scale farmers were excluded from the financial services that were available to those white farmers. During 1998, the government decided to close down the ACB and the credit provision functions of the national and provincial departments were discontinued, and the loan books were transferred to the Land Bank. As a result, the Land Bank was mandated to fill the gap that resulted from the closure of the ACB, however not much was achieved in terms of this arrangement. The state found that financial services available for smallholder farmers were inadequate and that the support for farmers was neglected in the budgetary process.

It was shown that there was a need to re-establish an agricultural credit scheme in the then Department of Agriculture. The Strauss Commission of Inquiry then proposed state intervention to support smallholder farmers by facilitating and co-coordinating the provision of financial services, rather than through direct credit delivery. Therefore, the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) and the Micro Agricultural Financial Institutions of South Africa (MAFISA) were introduced in 2004 and the latter was implemented as one of the financial pillars for the CASP programme. The main intention to establish MAFISA was to facilitate the provision of equitable and large-scale access to financial services by smallholder operators on an affordable, diversified and sustainable basis. As a market catalyst, MAFISA



aims to leverage financial resources from the market through forging alliances with strategic partners in the sector.

## 4. Methodological Approach

While synthesis evaluation is not new within the Department (DPME, 2014), it forms part of the new Hybrid Model. Undertaking a synthesis evaluation means scanning through potential similarities and differences across existing and previous reports and evaluations. The synthesis evaluation is seen as resource optimisation approach (quick and cost-effective) as the evaluation information is already in existence and it helps to systematically distil and integrate data from several existing reports and evaluations to draw more informed conclusions about a given question or topic. Through synthesis approach, various elements of different reports are integrated to form or develop a new whole and generalise the findings from a new perspective. The DPME (2014) developed synthesis evaluation guidelines with the following objectives/purpose:

- ✚ The synthesised findings from several evaluations can help decision-makers make better judgments by bringing together available evidence that can be critically appraised (for quality) within the decision-making timeframe.
- ✚ Synthesis evaluation makes use of existing evaluation data and research about programmes and issues in service delivery, so it draws on more data than a single evaluation. This brings a broad perspective.
- ✚ Synthesis evaluation integrates evaluation findings, establishes an accessible base of knowledge and identifies knowledge gaps or needs for a specific topic or theme, which can then guide future evaluations (DPME, 2014).

There are several Agriculture and Rural Development evaluation studies conducted by DPME in strategic partnership with sector Departments, more particularly the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development (DALRRD) as the overseer of the Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) competency. The outcomes of these reports have been mainstreamed through, incorporated and encapsulated into the Departments' Annual National Evaluation Plans, Annual Performance Plans and Operational Plans. The Department, as part of the Hybrid Evaluation Approach, has in the current financial year set a consolidative indicator in its Annual Evaluation Plan to synthesise all finalised A & RD evaluations conducted over years. The specific aims of this synthesis evaluation can be demarcated as follows:

- ✚ To use existing evaluations by assessing their relevance and reliability to explore and describe the possible linkages and integration amongst the Agriculture and Rural Development (A & RD) initiatives.
- ✚ To determine the statistical probabilities of the sector contributing towards the attainment of National Development Plan (NDP) vision 2030 commitments, based

on the current trends (643 000 direct employment opportunities, 346 000 indirect opportunities).

- ✚ Explore through Situational Diagnostic Analysis the opportunities and threats within the sector.
- ✚ Determine the extent that the service delivery and infrastructure contributed towards the Agricultural and Rural Sector.
- ✚ Based on the information convergence/triangulation/synthesis, develop ten core areas of focus (key focus areas).

While the reports evaluated the implementation and impact of various programmes in terms of policy and relevance, all reports focused mainly on policy imperatives in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. The interpretive document review was used to synthesis the selected evaluations reports. Document analysis is described as the procedure or method for reviewing or evaluating documents. The unit of analysis in this synthesis study was text (words), sentences, and paragraphs (Atkinson & Coffey, 1997). The data analysis method for the study is qualitative meta-summary, where summaries of previous studies are consolidated and synthesised together.

The synthesis evaluation guidelines by DPME (2014) provide main ways or approaches for summarising synthesis data. The first method is meta-analysis, which entails the use of statistical method for combining or synthesising statistical data to produce a weighted average effect size. The meta-analysis can be used for statistical comparison of alternative interventions. The meta-analysis is associated with the positivistic paradigm and quantitative research studies. The statistical data involves generation of data that can be subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis (formal and rigid) (Kothari, 2004).

The second approach to presentation of synthesised data is narrative empirical approach which consolidates the results of empirical research that are narrative in nature. For example, while a meta-analysis presents statistical data, a narrative empirical synthesis is interpretive and detailed. This approach can be associated with the interpretivist or phenomenological and qualitative research. The narrated analysis approach will enable thematic analysis and content categorisation of summary of findings on the attitudes, opinions and behaviour of the subjects, as well as the narrated and interpreted views of the evaluators from six sampled studies.

The third approach is referred to as conceptual synthesis approach as it consolidates different approaches deemed appropriate to create an understanding (research product). This approach is associated with the pragmatic mixed methods as it combines and synthesises the elements of both the qualitative and quantitative studies. This evaluation study used the mix meta-analysis as a mix or combination of methods to answer the research objectives.

The triangulation of both approaches is deemed fit for this study as it provides a more complex understanding of this synthesis that would be difficult through a single approach (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). In addition, the use of both statistical and narrated data complementarily enhances and improves the research quality, reliability and validity.

The identified population for this synthesis is all A & RD reviews or evaluations conducted in the period 2012 to 2019. The primary literature review identified nine (9) reviews of which six (6) were selected through non-probability judgemental sampling. The other three (3) did not meet the parameters of the study.

## 5. Findings and Recommendations of the Agriculture Sector

### 5.1. Government Support for Smallholder Farmer Sector (SFS)

The evaluations synthesised included, the diagnostic evaluation of the Government Support Smallholder Farmer Sector (SFS) was commissioned by the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in partnership with the Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries (DAFF) and Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) in 2015. The evaluation was undertaken by Khulisa Management Services (Pty) Ltd supported by the Institute for Monitoring and Evaluation (IME) of the University of Cape Town (UCT), and Lima Rural Development Foundation (Lima). The central purpose of this diagnostic evaluation was to clarify the nature of government supported smallholder farmer interventions in South Africa and to synthesize the lessons from existing evaluations to develop the basis (diagnostic) for a coherent overall policy framework. The scope of this evaluation included the CASP, CRDP, MAFISA, RECAP and Restitution programmes, and it further reviewed other relevant programmes and policies. The summary findings were as follows:

#### 5.1.1 The targeted beneficiaries

The two programmes that selected the beneficiaries based on targeted criteria resulted in a weak or inadequate sample. Below are the challenges experienced due to inadequate targeting of the beneficiaries:

- i. Marginal groups were not reached as intended
- ii. Resources were spread too thinly
- iii. There were challenges in determining what services should be provided since the target population was not clearly identified

The objectives and measures of effectiveness and sustainability of current interventions overlap considerably. For the most part, insufficient progress has been made towards food security and limited success has been achieved in facilitating sustainable income and empowering communities. There is limited information on the research and development activities undertaken in government supported smallholder farmer programmes. Nevertheless, the evaluation indicates that only one of five programmes used a needs analysis to inform programme design while only two of five programmes conducted a local pilot.

A wide range of services is offered in the current suite of government-supported smallholder farmer programmes. The evaluation found that four of five programmes provided extension services; three of five provide on-and off-farm infrastructure; three of five provide microfinance and grants; and only one programme provided support to form cooperatives. Many

programmes offer similar services, which are primarily tailored to crop farmers. Furthermore, the sectors that received fewer services in these programmes included livestock, aquaculture and fisheries. Access to on- and off-farm infrastructure was found to be the most significant success factor across four of five programmes. In three of these programmes, market access, access to irrigation, extension support and ownership/leadership were identified as success factors. The evaluations identified lack of project or farmer sustainability/self-reliance and limited coordination among departments as major shortcomings. For four of these programmes, poor buy-in, confusion of roles, as well as internal politics, were highlighted as key shortcomings.

With respect to institutional arrangements, a lack of coordination among governmental structures was found to be one of the key factors undermining programme success, leading to duplication of funding and effort within and between programmes. Networks and agreements, rather than coordinating structures, dominate the current integration of support to smallholders. In relation to programme efficiency, poor targeting and uncertainty regarding programme scope emerged as a key constraint effecting programme effectiveness and efficiency. Another challenge found was the shortage of credible and skilled human resources undermining programme implementation, coordination and management. The evaluation also found that a lack of data management systems, or poorly designed monitoring and evaluation systems, have led to poor management of programmes.

Considering the support needed for different target groups, several literature suggests that definitions of smallholder farmers need to be aligned with targeting strategies. The interventions with the most potential for success include cooperative membership and support, and land reform and redistribution. Notably these interventions are not proposed for every smallholder category but rather are targeted at those particular categories that are in the best position to take advantage of the opportunity.

The Literature Review found that smallholder risks include:

- i. High failure rate in contracting projects
- ii. Inequality in the distribution of assets
- iii. Inability to meet quality and safety standards, leading to the exclusion from commercial supply chains
- iv. Price risk and uncertainty, difficulties of contract enforcement, insufficient numbers of middlemen, and high cost of putting together small quantities of farm produce
- v. High transaction costs
- vi. Inability to gain economies of size and access to technology required to be competitive.

Local literature ironically emphasised the role of the government in making available the support and infrastructure to facilitate the management of these constraints. Scholars like Nhamo (2013) also highlighted the importance of developing policies aimed at augmenting the capacity of small farmers to produce better quality output, dissemination of market information, formation of producer organisations to increase bargaining power and sales volumes, promotion of trust between buyers and sellers and government investment in infrastructure and extension services, as well as broader macro-economic reform.

### **5.1.2 Support Services given to Smallholder Category**

Holistically, the support services offered to smallholders have had limited success. The evaluation team recommends that government aligns the Comprehensive Producer Development Strategy and the operationalization of the Extension Policy with the activities and programmes proposed in this evaluation.

Four high level services have been identified as critical for subsistence-oriented smallholders: water access; capital-related inputs; community-based extension; and village savings and loans. There is a contradiction between what is needed and what is currently offered through existing programmes and so a new delivery mechanism and new approach is required. The role of National Treasury should be to provide a Conditional Grant Schedule 4 to enable DAFF to contract with Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and other service providers. DAFF does not have the extension corps necessary to reach this large group with intensive community-based extension services. If DAFF is going to take on this new area, it is likely that they will need to assume a different role. This evaluation propose that the key roles DAFF should play in this category are to ensure that the regulations of the Comprehensive Producer Development Strategy enable implementation of this programme; conduct the initial audit of NGOs who will implement the programme; set targeting and eligibility criteria; and establish a national link with the Community Work Programme (CWP) as a mechanism for funding stipends. This could reduce cost and facilitate going to scale.

To further explore issues of water access DAFF, need to link with the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS). To link to the Food and Nutrition Strategy, DAFF needs to establish a partnership with the Department of Health (DOH), DWS, Department of Social Development (DSD), Department of Basic Education (DBE) and the Department of Small Business Development (DSBD). The subsistence programme should be a single programme with the departments in a steering committee, but with DAFF as the overall implementing agency.

Six high level services have been identified as critical for smallholders in informal (loose) value chains: transformation of water rights; tenure reform; a combination of subsidised cooperative membership with scaling up of Local Good Agricultural Practice (Local GAP) standards via provincial extension services, mobile phone-based market information dissemination;

microfinance and/or revolving credit; and small scale agro processing. Existing programmes offer some solutions, but do not cater for this category sufficiently. Multiplicity of support, via a combination of public and private services, is regarded as in alignment with the new Extension Policy. The evaluation stakeholders propose that DAFF should play a high level role, funding a cooperative membership subsidy programme (focusing on supporting farmers to join established well-functioning marketing cooperatives); managing overall M&E and learning; learning from the pilot SMS market information system; addressing gender issues regarding access to resources, particularly land; and actively promoting linkages with commercial agricultural institutions and the range of service providers on information from weather patterns, markets and technology. In addition, DRDLR should finalise tenure policy reform. Within this approach, provincial departments will concentrate on setting up and providing extension support to producer forums via district extension services. They will also establish partnerships with retailers/SABS to collaborate in Local GAP training and coordinate the establishment of a Local GAP standards training programme. DAFF could also establish a partnership with Department of Health (DOH), Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS), Department of Social Development (DSD), Department of Basic Education (DBE) and Department of Small Business Development (DSBD) to negotiate procurement for food security programmes and/or school feeding programmes. Water access needs to be addressed in collaboration with the DWS. Service provision should be enabled through policy reform, linkage with the private sector, and provincial extension services.

Six high level services have been identified as critical for smallholders in formal (tight) value chains: transformation of water rights; tenure reform; off-farm infrastructure (particularly roads and ICT); subsidised user pay system for private extension and advisory services; cash grants or access to microcredit (not both); and producer forums. Service provision to smallholders in formal (tight) value chains should be enabled through policy reform and linkage with the private sector. The evaluation stakeholders propose that DAFF should play a limited role in this category, while at the same time creating an enabling environment to promote integration. DAFF's primary roles would include the facilitation of access to finance through appropriate intermediaries; institutional development to increase/elevate farmers' voice; facilitation of inter-governmental relations to improve coordination; partnership with the Departments of Public Works (DPW) and Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) and participation in the Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission (PICC) through the National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC) to accelerate provision of off-farm infrastructure. Provincial departments should establish protocols with industry; potentially implement a voucher system to part pay for private service provider training; facilitate increased involvement of commodity organisations/agricultural bodies in the allocation of support budgets; and potentially facilitate linkage with Agri Parks (should these be



implemented, this evaluation is not advocating for Agri Parks). Water access needs to be addressed in collaboration with the DWS.

Six high level services have been identified as critical for small-scale commercial farmers: transformation of water rights; tenure reform; needs-based off-farm infrastructure; specialized, commodity-linked extension support, incentivising private sector specialists such as agricultural economists for market information, and veterinarians and agronomists to assist with product quality checks; a wider range of finance products; and research and development. Off-farm infrastructure is important for improved market access through a partnership between DAFF, PICC, and NAMC, and the DPW, DWS, DRDLR, Roads, and local government. Livestock represents by far the biggest sector and requires special attention. Stakeholder consultation and input from agricultural specialists, suggests that the primary roles DAFF should play in this category are to build institutional capacity to monitor progress with supplier development commitments of retailers and the fresh produce markets; facilitate, but not implement, funding through appropriate intermediaries; lead institutional development to increase the involvement of commodity groups, buyers, and input suppliers; improve public private partnerships in the provision and leveraging of comprehensive, needs-driven off- and on-farm infrastructure (DAFF leading collaboration with relevant line departments, DRDLR, DPW, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), etc.). Provincial departments should play a supporting role. Government extension workers should not play a large role in this category.

### **5.1.3 The recommendations for strengthening the SFS were as follows:**

This evaluation highlights that while there are small pockets of success, strategies to support smallholders are not working effectively or efficiently. The biggest problem is with subsistence smallholders, and farmers in informal (loose) value chains, where services are not currently in place. Where services do exist, they are either fragmented or duplicated with limited impact.

#### ***Key proposals to facilitate an integrated response include:***

The findings of this evaluation advocates for the final revision of the CPDS and the operationalization of the new Extension Policy. Particular support services ought to be identified for each of the four categories of smallholder farmers, with clear targeting and eligibility criteria.

A set of proposed services and roles is recommended for the four farmer categories, some of which involve some significant changes. A task force under the auspices of the CPDS should be established to review the services and institutional mechanisms needed and develop a plan of action for the different farmer categories. It is likely that this process will take several months and involve the input of numerous stakeholders, including smallholder farmers. There is poor data on smallholder farmers as Stats SA has historically focused on commercial farmers.

- ✓ A survey should be conducted to provide a sound and reliable baseline data on these four categories of smallholder farmers.
- ✓ DAFF should develop a new programme for subsistence-oriented smallholders to contract NGOs (or other local service providers) to provide environmentally appropriate community-based extension services. Funding should be provided by National Treasury as a Schedule 4 Conditional Grant and ring-fenced for implementation by NGOs or other service providers.
- ✓ A link with the CWP should be explored as a mechanism for funding stipends for community-based extension workers. Sustainable water saving and harvesting methods should be explored with the DWS. DRDLR programmes on land reform should also be linked.
- ✓ DAFF should target provincial and district extension services to smallholders in informal (loose) value chains, where they are likely to have the most impact. Scaling-up of training in Local GAP standards should be considered as a key extension service to this group supplemented by paid-up cooperative membership to facilitate cooperative access. Other services to this group should be provided through policy reform (tenure security led by DRDLR; water access), linkage with the private sector (via producer forums), and provision of market information (via an SMS-based market information system, based on pilot results).
- ✓ DAFF should aim to create an enabling environment for the provision of private extension services to smallholders in formal (tight) value chains, and to enhance the farmer's voice and facilitate equitable access. Facilitation of linkages with the private sector, and mediation, should take place through producer forums.
- ✓ Creation of an enabling environment should be implemented through policy reform (tenure security led by DRDLR; water access) and linkages with the private sector (potentially including Agri Parks, under certain conditions, notably involvement of farmers to decide how this is implemented).
- ✓ DAFF should take forward an alternate extension model that provides part-funding to allow smallholders in tight value chains to receive private extension services, which is already being piloted.
- ✓ DAFF should consider integrating small-scale commercial farmers into the dynamic commercial services sector, through a combination of incentives and using Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) targets to achieve greater parity in service delivery.

## **5.2. Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP)**

An impact evaluation of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) was commissioned by the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in partnership with the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) during 2013. The evaluation was undertaken by Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd.

The purpose of this evaluation was to assess whether CASP is achieving its policy goals. The evaluation focuses on the impact of CASP on its targeted beneficiaries in terms of the effects of the programme on production, marketing development, farmer development and livelihoods of the farmers and their households. The evaluation covered the period from the inception of the programme in 2004 through the end of the 2012/13 financial year. The evaluation covered all the nine provinces of South Africa.

**The findings are summarized below were as follows:**

### **5.2.1 Reaching the target population**

The programme has succeeded in reaching most of the target groups. However, relatively few youth and disabled persons are involved in the programme and the situation has remained the same before and after CASP.

### **5.2.2 Support**

Support was not comprehensive on the project level, and also government officials pointed out that CASP places too much emphasis on the infrastructure pillar at the expense of other pillars. Support was always too late and not tailor-made. However, it had done a good job of identifying markets for beneficiaries' products, but it had not achieved much success in terms of linking the beneficiaries to markets. The programme focused more on quantity than quality and comprehensiveness of support, resulting in the support being thinly spread among a large number of beneficiaries. On-farm infrastructure provision is one area in which CASP has made progress. There is an improvement in the availability of both on-farm and social infrastructure after CASP

### **5.2.3 Capacity for on-going management and resilience (self-reliance)**

CASP has made a positive but insufficient contribution to capacity building for on-going management and self-reliance through skills and knowledge transfer. Project managers have benefitted more from skills and knowledge transfer than employees. Areas in which capacity building is most insufficient include cultivar selection, livestock marketing, livestock disease control and produce marketing.

### **5.2.4 Impact on agricultural production**

The area cultivated for most crops increased after CASP, but the increase was small. The production of major crops such as maize, wheat and sugarcane only increased in less than half the number of provinces covered in the evaluation. Vegetable production increased in most (6) provinces included in the evaluation CASP. The number of animals kept on CASP-supported projects increased significantly after CASP. The increase in livestock numbers occurred in all nine provinces for livestock such as broilers, cattle, goats and sheep.

### **5.2.5 Impact on livelihoods**

There was recorded employment increase after CASP, but the increase is insignificant. Also, the increase in employment is not sustainable as it has largely benefited mainly part-time employment. Most respondents agree that CASP has contributed positively to employment in neighbouring rural communities. CASP's contribution to food security is limited in nearly all provinces.

### **5.2.6 Impact on market access**

Overall, market access for the farms included in the evaluation has not improved since participating in CASP. A significant proportion of farmers who experienced problems with market access before CASP continue to experience these problems. Market access is one of the weakest areas of CASP support.

### **5.2.7 Impact on farmer development (commercialisation)**

Little progress has been achieved in terms of promoting commercialisation of the farms/projects – only about 33% of the farms can be considered to be commercial, based on their participation in formal markets. Limited progress in commercialization was linked to the failure of the programme to promote market access.

### **5.2.8 Achievement of objectives**

CASP has made progress towards achieving some of its intended objectives (e.g. enhancing agricultural support, increasing production, etc.), but insufficient progress has been made in promoting commercialisation, market access, employment and achieving food security. There is limited coordination of CASP within DAFF and the provincial departments of agriculture and the programme is not aligned to other government programmes (e.g. those of DRDLR, Water and Sanitation, etc.). Within DAFF, there is lack of active participation from key directorates.

***The major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives were as follows:***

CASP is an essential programme with the potential to make a difference amongst emerging farmers. However, there is limited coordination of CASP within DAFF and the provincial departments of agriculture and the programme is not aligned to other government programmes (e.g. those of Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Department of Water and Sanitation, etc.). Within DAFF, there is lack of active participation from key directorates.

The scope and coverage of CASP are too wide, resulting in resources being thinly spread. This limits the effectiveness of the programme in achieving its objectives. The programme focuses on only one component of the value chain, agricultural production, to the exclusion of other components beyond production. There is limited participation of some of the directorates within DAFF in CASP. The emphasis on the infrastructure pillar leaves little funding available

for the other pillars and this limits the involvement of other directorates in the implementation of CASP.

Infrastructure provided through CASP is of poor quality, and sometimes the installation thereof is not even completed. This is attributed to lack of proper monitoring of the service providers by the provincial departments of agriculture and appointment of incompetent contractors. The management of CASP takes too long to respond to challenges on the farms. Delay in supplying inputs has been identified as a significant factor negatively affecting farm production levels as beneficiaries are forced to miss planting seasons, resulting in low or no production at all. There is a lack of trust between farmers and the provincial departments of agriculture. The situation is worsened by the lack of openness on the part of the departments, especially with regard to finances. The selection of the beneficiaries is poor, and this is blamed for the poor performance of projects, especially in cases where there are many beneficiaries.

Lack of a well-defined CASP exit strategy at the project level has also been identified as a challenge; with some beneficiaries suggesting that CASP support should continue until the farm is viable. Once-off interventions are regarded as setting beneficiaries up for failure, especially when the programme is not comprehensive enough at the project level.

Furthermore, CASP support is biased towards LRAD projects and does not necessarily focus on dedicated and progressive farmers. CASP is placing too much emphasis on the infrastructure pillar at the expense of the other programme pillars and is not well understood by those involved in its implementation. This is mainly attributed to a lack of proper documentation regarding programme policies and implementation guidelines.

The absence of national policy directives has a negative effect on CASP's effectiveness as it is difficult to ensure programme implementation in a coordinated manner, with different role players emphasising different aspects of the programme. Evidence also points to the fact that DAFF does not have adequate human resources with appropriate skills to manage CASP and it is not institutionalised within departmental structures.

CASP is not sufficiently resourced financially and most often these funds are too little in relation to the many deserving cases. As a result, the provinces are forced to spread the funds too thinly, sometimes at the expense of projects viability. Lack of skills in technical areas, such as agricultural engineering, has been identified as the cause of poor-quality physical structures provided by service providers as provincial departments of agriculture do not have the capacity to do quality assurance.

There is a lack of stability and continuity of top leadership and management structures in both provincial and national departments of agriculture. This situation does not only affect the

understanding of and commitment to CASP but also results in continuous organisational restructuring. This creates uncertainty amongst staff and leads to organisational paralysis.

CASP does not have an information management system and this makes reliable reporting on CASP implementation difficult. This also affects CASP monitoring and evaluation negatively and mistakes are usually realised when it is already too late to rectify them.

The grant approach of CASP discourages self-reliance on the part of the beneficiaries and encourages a dependency and entitlement mentality. The lack of commitment on the part of beneficiaries resulting from the grant approach, also leads to poor maintenance and safeguarding of CASP-provided infrastructure.

Some provinces focus on big projects without a proper analysis of market viability, usually leading to project failures. This problem has been identified as being more prevalent with broiler projects where a few multi-million Rand projects have been shut down or were forced to be at the mercy of a few big operators.

The funding structure of CASP encourages biased support towards certain enterprises. The need to spend money within a given financial year compels officials to focus on short-term enterprises and infrastructure projects at the expense of long-term enterprises, such as subtropical crops. This situation results in unintended wasteful expenditures in order to achieve spending compliance.

#### **5.2.9 The recommendations for strengthening CASP were as follows:**

CASP should be institutionalized within DAFF to inter alia ensure participation of directorates that should be playing key roles in the implementation of the programme. The implementation of the various pillars of CASP should be entrenched within the various directorates responsible for such services and supported with the necessary budgets and human resources.

- ✓ CASP should focus more on actions driving performance towards achieving outcomes, such as increasing employment and incomes. Moreover, DAFF should endeavour to improve the involvement of youth, women and people with disabilities in CASP-supported projects, particularly in project management.
- ✓ The current CASP funding approach of a wholesale grant for on-farm infrastructure should be discontinued as it:
  - ✚ Encourages dependency and, thus, works against the objective of achieving sustainability
  - ✚ Promotes an entitlement mentality and limited commitment on the part of beneficiaries.
- ✓ National Treasury should facilitate the planning, alignment, coordination and integration of farmer support programmes between DAFF and other government

departments, such as the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to avoid duplication and/or wastage of public resources.

- ✓ DAFF and provincial departments of agriculture should increase their efforts to promote market access. This should involve provision of support to components of the agricultural value chain beyond production (e.g. agro-processing) and collaboration/partnerships with the private sector.
- ✓ DAFF should encourage provincial departments of agriculture to exchange lessons on their experiences in implementing CASP. This can involve good performing provinces extending support to poor performing ones through farmer-to-farmer exchange visits and exchange of management or business models.

### **5.3. Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP)**

An impact evaluation of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) was commissioned by the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in partnership with the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) during 2012. The evaluation was undertaken by Impact Economix (Pty) Ltd. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess whether the institutional arrangements that were set in place to support the implementation of the CRDP, such as political champions, council of stakeholders, and the CRDP technical committee are appropriate and clear about their roles and responsibilities; assess whether the CRDP is achieving its policy goals; and recommend how the programme can be strengthened and up-scaled through learning from what has been done. The scope of the evaluation will cover the implementation of the CRDP from its inception in 2009 until June 2012.

## **FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION**

The findings on key evaluation questions are summarised according to the following four core themes:

### **5.3.1 The CRDPs institutional and service delivery arrangements**

The CRDP is a cross-cutting programme which requires effective partnership between a number of stakeholders across all spheres of government, numerous departments and with the private sector and civil society, as well as coordination with numerous related government programmes. A wide range of CRDP structures have been established at national, provincial and local level to support implementation of the CRDP and the involvement of numerous role-players. Key dynamics mentioned by respondents included that the CRDP is seen as a top down national initiative and the buy-in, capacity, and the will to implement it at the local level is low, and that there is still not a wide-spread understanding of the CRDP. Furthermore, there has been insufficient support from Provincial and Local champions, and poor commitment to participating in CRDP structures.

Nationally, the DRDLR has not been able to mobilise all departments and spheres of government to work together and examples of silo approaches still challenge effective CRDP implementation. Stronger horizontal alignment of all departments contributing to the CRDP as well as improved alignment of the spheres of government in planning, budgeting and implementing is urgently needed. At a provincial level, Premiers and MECs are not playing their champion's role strongly enough. The role of Provinces in implementing the CRDP needs to be strengthened through a range of measures, including the need for the Provincial Offices of the Premier to take on a more hands-on approach to CRDP coordination and monitoring. Stronger coordination with the Departments of Agriculture at national and provincial level is critical to improving CRDP effectiveness.

At local level, the overwhelming perception from key stakeholders is that the municipalities are on the whole not playing their part in the implementation of the CRDP. The majority of Council of Stakeholders (COSs) in the case study sites is not functioning effectively. In addition, a wider network of strategic partnerships with NGOs and local (and possibly national) organised business is required in order to meet the huge needs in these poor and under-serviced rural wards.

The monitoring of the CRDP has also been weak and this has negatively impacted on implementation and delivery.

### **5.3.2 Attainment of targets**

There has been mixed progress in achieving CRDP goals with numerous issues requiring further attention in order to improve the achievement of CRDP goals:

***Goal 1: Is the CRDP mobilising and empowering communities effectively to take control of their own destinies?***

This evaluation found that limited progress has been made towards mobilising and empowering communities. In every CRDP case study site, respondents claimed the COS is not consulting adequately with the wider community. Low levels of education and skills were also identified as key challenges influencing the extent to which rural communities are empowered and mobilised to participate in their own development.

***Goal 2: Is the CRDP stimulating rural job creation and promoting economic livelihoods?***

The key CRDP interventions reviewed in this report to address this policy goal include skills development and job creation through EPWP, CWP and NARYSEC; the promotion of smallholder farmers; establishing rural cooperatives; and supporting community and household food gardens. On the whole, the vast majority of opportunities created have been infrastructure-related short-term jobs, with relatively low wages and which have not resulted in



subsequent long-term jobs or permanent entry into the labour market. Also, the CRDP has had limited success in supporting sustainable cooperatives. The CRDP approach focuses almost exclusively on registering cooperatives with very little attention to-date on providing capital for start-up costs, technical training, mentoring or establishing crucial market linkages.

The CRDP's food garden initiative was one of the more successful CRDP components, and in several cases was found to be a good strategy to improving household access to food and, in a limited number of cases, also allowed beneficiaries to sell a surplus. However, too often, water shortages affected the production of food in households and community food gardens (as well as undermining several other livelihood projects). The CRDP's contribution to establishing smallholder farmers and providing extension support has also been limited. In this regard, there should be a stronger relationship between DRDLR and DAFF to provide support with extension services.

**Goal 3:** *Is the CRDP improving access to basic needs for beneficiaries in CRDP sites?*

This is the goal where the CRDP is having the most success. It is especially apparent in some of the pilot sites where enormous investments have been made. In many cases this has managed to transform the lives of communities and living standards significantly. However, several projects have started off successfully but, because the CRDP did not have a clear maintenance strategy in place, investments run the risk of not being sustainable.

**Goal 4:** *Is the CRDP adding value to land reform processes in CRDP sites?*

The CRDP has not added much value to land reform processes in CRDP sites because apart from tenure reform (which has had a poor record) the potential for land reform in CRDP sites is limited. In several of the case studied the community identified lack of access to land (mainly where communal land and municipal commonage land was involved) as directly impacting on their food security and the ability to secure sustainable livelihoods.

**Goal 5:** *Is the CRDP reaching the appropriate target populations?*

The benefits of the CRDP have successfully reached most members of the target groups, including women, youth, elderly and the unemployed. However, the CRDP has had challenges with targeting the disabled, people living with HIV/AIDS and child-headed households.

### **5.3.3 Value for money (VFM) being achieved**

Average CRDP per capita expenditure across the 18 sites was R3 261/ person and R13 138/ household (between June 2009-June 2012) (actual expenditure levels will be higher). A preliminary estimate of the cost to roll-out the CRDP to all +- 2920 rural wards in South Africa over the next 18 years at a similar level of expenditure found in the 18 case studies (a minimum

average of R42 million. Across the three spheres of government per site), is R61.5 billion. Many examples where VFM is not being achieved in the CRDP have been identified. These relate to both poor efficiency (for example where provided facilities, infrastructure, equipment is not being utilised at all or utilised effectively and therefore is not delivering benefits) as well as poor effectiveness where infrastructure or support services is either insufficient or inappropriate in terms of being able to produce the intended desired results. It is therefore imperative that a range of measures are put in place to address the underlying causes behind these VFM challenges so that future up scaling of the CRDP achieves better VFM as well as overall sustainability.

#### **5.3.4 The recommendations for strengthening CRDP were as follows:**

These recommendations are aimed at strengthening the CRDP's design and implementation in order to improve the impact on CRDP goals / objectives, and ultimately the sustainable development of rural communities and, in particular, the poor.

##### ***5.3.4.1 Strengthening the CRDP's institutional arrangements***

Implementation Protocol Agreements need to be negotiated between DRDLR and the Provinces to clarify / strengthen roles and responsibilities of the national, provincial and municipal spheres (in terms of the Intergovernmental Relations Act of 2005 and Implementation Protocol Guidelines published by COGTA in 2007).

- ✓ The Provincial Offices of the Premier should take a hands-on approach to coordination and monitoring to ensure that various stakeholders play their role in the CRDP.
- ✓ DRDLR should facilitate a process with Provincial Governments to establish provincial Programme Management Units (PMU) to improve CRDP project management and streamlined CRDP monitoring and reporting systems.
- ✓ DRDLR to develop a Guideline for the development of Integrated Development Frameworks (IDFs) for all CRDP sites as a planning process and instrument to coordinate, sequence and align government plans and expenditure and to phase in IDFs for CRDP sites. IDFs need to be developed based on input from all three spheres of government as well as key partners (e.g. DBSA) and aligned to municipal Spatial Development Frameworks. The process for establishing IDFs needs to be driven by the offices of the premiers to ensure wide involvement of all actors across the spheres.
- ✓ DRDLR to ensure that each CRDP site have a full time CRDP project manager who should be an experienced rural development practitioner and should be nominated by the technical committee.
- ✓ DRDLR, in partnership with Provincial Governments, to put in place stronger support measures to strengthen the COS. A number of measures also need to be employed to improve the functioning of the Technical Committees.

#### ***5.3.4.2 Improving the attainment of CRDP objectives***

Improve the CRDP's Strategy to Mobilising and Empowering Communities through the communication plan should be developed for each site.

- ✓ A revised Theory of Change must be developed for the CRDP's community mobilisation and empowerment component. This must reflect a clear logic in terms how community empowerment will be developed at various levels and must inform program delivery improvements.
- ✓ Improve the CRDP's Rural Job Creation Model and Support for Economic Livelihoods through skills development and job creation through NARYSEC, EPWP and CWP needs to be enhanced.
- ✓ DRDLR should initiate a scoping study to investigate the feasibility of creating a job placement agency that focuses on placing NARYSEC recruits and possibly EPWP and CWP recruits from CRDP sites in jobs in the public and private sector once their jobs in the community projects end. The agency can be coordinated with other departments in order to know when vacancies arise in the public sector.
- ✓ Establish smallholder farmers and providing comprehensive extension support (with DAFF): DRDLR should initiate a scoping study into the possible establishment of a Food Procurement Programme (in partnership with DTI), similar to Brazil's Government Food Procurement Programme which facilitates and improves access to institutional markets, such as schools, prisons and hospitals by purchasing products and foodstuffs directly from smallholder farmers and land reform settlements. This will assist CRDP farmers have access to markets.
- ✓ DRDLR should facilitate the formalisation of a clear and integrated strategy for supporting marketing cooperatives (rather than primary cooperatives) in partnership with DAFF and DTI. DRDLR should provide funding for value chain pilot projects (possibly in partnership with DAFF and the DTI to test various value chain development approaches).
- ✓ Improve the CRDP's Support for Basic Needs through the Implementation Protocol Agreements between DRDLR, other national departments, provincial governments, and municipalities need to be entered into and which commit, amongst other issues, responsible organisations to develop Operations and Maintenance Plans for all funded infrastructure and to make budgetary provision for infrastructure maintenance .
- ✓ Rural transport projects should focus on improving small roads and tracks that most rural people use for local transportation as well as providing major roads which are far more costly. Intermediate means of transport (IMT) such as bicycles and carts, which can be used on rural paths to eliminate the length of travelling time and increase the unit volume of goods transported be invested in IMT.

- ✓ The CRDP should explore alternative energies to cost-effectively meeting the needs of rural communities Improve the CRDP Approach to Targeting appropriate Groups (including women, youth, elderly, unemployed, disabled, people living with HIV/AIDS and child-headed households). The COS should mobilise and facilitate participation of vulnerable groups in the CRDP.

#### ***5.3.4.3 Up scaling the CRDP and Improving Value for Money***

- ✓ Improve the CRDP's Value for Money through effective development of Integrated Development Frameworks to promote improved VFM by accurate scoping of agricultural potential of CRDP sites so that support is only provided for feasible crops / projects; identification of dependencies between projects and improved sequencing of projects so that projects are not implemented which cannot function effectively until other projects are implemented and that adequate training and operational support plans are in place to ensure infrastructure and business projects can be effectively operated;
- ✓ ensuring that plans exist, and funds have been budgeted for to deal with the life cycle management and maintenance of projects.
- ✓ DRDLR, with possible support from the Presidency, should facilitate the development of revised and more detailed Theories of Change for the community Mobilisation and empowerment; and the CRDP Job Model.
- ✓ DRDLR should complete a process to ensure that national norms and standards for the delivery of infrastructure in rural areas are developed by all relevant sectors/ departments where a case exists to differentiate between urban and rural infrastructure norms and standards.
- ✓ DRDLR should develop a collaborative CRDP Procurement Strategy to maximise economies of scale and coordinated bulk purchasing to obtain more competitive prices across multiple CRDP sites. The scope of this CRDP Procurement Strategy could include different components, such as aggregating procurement across national departments (e.g. DRDLR and DAFF), provincial departments, and municipalities. It might also only focus on a selected number of goods (e.g. fencing, boreholes etc.).
- ✓ DRDLR should ensure that cost-effective technologies are used in rural areas that are simple to maintain, especially with respect to water and energy.

#### ***5.3.4.4. Broader rural development recommendations.***

- ✓ Strengthen horizontal coordination to support rural development, including a rural development policy white paper and strategy needs to be finalised in consultation with national departments, provincial and local government, and other key stakeholders.

- ✓ The relationship and alignment between the DRDLR and DAFF programmes and budgets need to be strengthened. Alignment at national level between DRDLR and DAFF in planning, budgeting, indicator and target determination is needed.
- ✓ Establishing smallholder farmers and providing comprehensive extension support (with DAFF); Extension support in CRDP sites needs to be significantly scaled-up if livelihoods from agriculture and livestock farming are to improve.
- ✓ The resettlement programme should target CRDP sites which are heavily overcrowded, and which have little potential for agricultural or general economic growth. The CRDP should be linked to the DRDLR's existing Decongestion of Communal Areas Programme.
- ✓ Refine Government's Approach to Traditional Authorities and to Tenure Reform in Communal Areas; a broad consultative process involving inputs from civil society and most importantly the voice of those living under traditional leadership in communal areas (some of which are in CRDP sites) should inform a new approach to both traditional authorities and tenure reform in communal areas.
- ✓ Design and implement a Rural Land Reform Awareness Campaign; and develop stronger mechanisms for conflict resolution in rural areas.

#### **5.4. Recapitalisation and Development Programme (RECAP)**

An implementation evaluation of the Recapitalisation and Development Programme (RADP, henceforth abbreviated as RECAP) was commissioned by the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation in partnership with the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) during 2012. The evaluation was undertaken by Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd in November 2012 to July 2013. The purpose of the evaluation was designed to provide the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) and the intended beneficiaries of RECAP with information and recommendations on how to improve the implementation of RECAP in line with its targets and objectives. The evaluation covers the implementation process of the RECAP from its inception in 2010 until June 2012. In implementing the evaluation, data was collected from land reform beneficiaries, government officials, strategic partners and mentors in six provinces: Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and North West. The results of the evaluation were envisaged to be useful in informing policy processes on land reform, especially what needs to be done to ensure that the implementation of RECAP is improved.

**The summary findings were as follows:**

##### **5.4.1 Common understanding of RECAP**

There are varying degrees of understanding among RECAP stakeholders of what RECAP is all about. RECAP stakeholders do not have a common understanding of the nature, operation and purpose of the programme. Of all the components of RECAP, the funding component of

is emphasised most by most stakeholders. Even among government officials, there seems to be no common understanding of RECAP, its objectives and operation. The understanding of RECAP does not only differ between national and provincial officials but also between officials within provinces.

#### **5.4.2 Appropriateness of RECAP design**

RECAP was not appropriately designed to achieve its intended objectives as the objectives were too ambitious, with most of them not directly linked to the programme design and purpose. For example, one of the objectives of RECAP is to “guarantee food security”. This cannot be achieved through RECAP alone and, therefore, should not be made a specific objective of the programme. Another objective of RECAP is to “establish rural development monitors”. The relevance of this objective to the purpose of RECAP is unclear.

The evaluation also found that there were no clear selection criteria for projects and beneficiaries. This leads to a questionable selection of farms and beneficiaries for participation in RECAP. RECAP lacks a clear and structured programme monitoring and evaluation system. Hence, monitoring and evaluation of projects, in cases where it is undertaken, does not happen in an orderly and coordinated fashion. Furthermore, monitoring and evaluation of projects is not undertaken on a regular basis.

RECAP does not have a well-defined organisational structure, both at national and provincial levels, with the necessary level of authority and staff to ensure effective execution of its mandate. The absence of an organisational structure is one of the reasons RECAP does not have its own full-time staff leading to skills shortage and general shortage of RECAP staff fully dedicated to the programme across all provinces. The RECAP funding model is a one-size-fits-all and does not take into consideration the varying characteristics of farm enterprises and agro-ecological contexts as the RECAP funding is based on the sole financial model of a multi-year injection of capital. Although such models might be relevant for certain farm enterprises, they might not be adapted to others.

The requirement for farmers to have a strategic partner/mentor to qualify for RECAP support, regardless of their farming background, leads to wastage of valuable resources, in some instances. Some of the farmers whose farms were recapitalised had the necessary skills and experience to run their farms without the strategic partners/mentors. However, because it is a requirement for RECAP support to have a strategic partner/mentor, a strategic partner/mentor may be paid for services that are neither rendered nor needed on the farm.

The RECAP grant funding approach is not sustainable in view of the available pool of already limited resources. The RECAP grant funding approach requires limited commitment from the farmers/beneficiaries in terms of additional investment and creates some form of dependency

on state funding, which is an unintended objective of the programme. The programme encourages an entitlement mentality on the part of the beneficiaries. Hence, in some cases, budgets are inflated by strategic partners/mentors and beneficiaries in the development of business plans.

The RECAP design does not promote collaboration with the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries in the implementation of the programme. RECAP ventures directly into the domain of agricultural support and one would have expected closer collaboration between the two departments (i.e. DRDLR and Agriculture) in the implementation of the programme. Such collaboration is important especially when it is considered that it is the failure of agricultural support programmes that has contributed to many of the land reform projects being in distress. The RECAP design promotes centralisation of decision making with respect to approval of funding applications.

The absence of delegation of authority to the provinces to approve funding applications leads to delays in approval of funding applications and disbursements of funds, resulting in loss of production on the farms.

#### **5.4.3 Alignment of RECAP project cycle to farming operations**

The RECAP project cycle is not aligned to the farming operations. Beneficiaries have indicated that the approval process for RECAP funding is lengthy and bureaucratic. Furthermore, the average time between funding approval and disbursement of funds was more than five months. This has resulted in delays in undertaking farm operations and, in some cases, abandonment of projects. Often, funding for projects is approved but the actual disbursement of funds is delayed by one or more years due to budget constraints. Although all provinces are affected by this, the problem was more serious in Limpopo.

#### **5.4.4 Effectiveness of strategic interventions**

The strategic interventions are not resulting in a broad-based capacitation of the beneficiaries/farmers. RECAP effectiveness in capacitating the farmers/beneficiaries is not satisfactory, with different results for the different capacitating roles. A breakdown of RECAP effectiveness in terms of specific capacity building activities is as follows: Technical expertise (66%), farm management (71%), funding (76%), output markets (88%), input markets (62%), and other tasks, such as monitoring, etc. (25%). The evaluation of the effectiveness of RECAP and the strategic partners and mentors with regard to specific capacitating roles was found to be least positive in providing input markets.

The strategic interventions of partnership and mentorship are not equally effective in all projects and provinces. In some projects and provinces, the interventions seem to work well while in others there are serious problems between beneficiaries and strategic

partners/mentors. The strategic partners and mentors have not been able to provide the required funding or properly identify training needs. Hence, the adoption of a haphazard and uncoordinated skills transfer approach. In addition, an assumption has been made that all strategic partners and mentors will necessarily be good trainers, and this has not always been the case. In many instances, the development of entrepreneurial skills is limited because farmers have little decision-making power and control over production. In some instances, inexperienced persons are appointed as strategic partners. Such strategic partners do not contribute to the desired capacity building of beneficiaries and, therefore, contribute to the failure of RECAP to achieve its objectives. There is an instance where a dentist without any farming background was appointed as a strategic partner.

There seems to be an assumption within RECAP that experienced commercial farmers necessarily make good managers and businessmen. The fact that a strategic partner is an experienced commercial farmer does not necessarily mean that he will be a good manager and professionally minded person who fully understands practical farm management. Although RECAP provides for strategic partners to contribute financial and infrastructural resources, very few strategic partners are doing so. The limited resource contribution on the part of strategic partners may be partly attributed to a lack of built-in mechanisms to secure the investment of strategic partners in the projects/farms. The short-term nature of the lease period for the farms and uncertainty regarding compensation for possible losses due to factors beyond the strategic partner's control (e.g. natural disasters) discourage strategic partners from making their resource contribution.

#### **5.4.5 Effectiveness of RECAP in building capacity to participate in commercial production**

The effectiveness of RECAP in capacitating beneficiaries to produce for the market is limited. The effectiveness of RECAP in developing beneficiaries to participate in commercial production can be assessed in terms of the number of beneficiaries/farms ready to participate or already participating in commercial production. In all provinces, there was a general consensus among government officials that, although RECAP had not yet produced commercial farmers, many of the beneficiaries were on their way to becoming commercial farmers.

#### **5.4.6 Reaching of targeted beneficiaries**

The issue of whether RECAP is reaching the targeted beneficiaries is affected by lack of consensus among government officials on the number of targeted beneficiaries in each province. Within provinces, project officers and provincial government officials responsible for RECAP do not seem to agree on the number of projects/beneficiaries targeted for recapitalisation. This difference in opinions and views on the number of targeted beneficiaries also exists between provincial and national government officials. It is our view that this



difference in opinions is largely attributable to the confusion around the meaning of recapitalised projects.

RECAP design has resulted in the inclusion of beneficiaries/farms that did not really need to be assisted, partly because of lack of clarity on the selection criteria for beneficiaries/projects and possible political interference. There were instances where it was difficult to understand how some farms came to be included in RECAP because the owners seemed to be financially strong and could afford to provide their own funds. In some provinces, it was reported that some farmers by-passed provincial government officials and contacted senior politicians to have their farms prioritised for recapitalisation.

#### **5.4.7 Achievement of intended objectives**

RECAP has made some progress towards achieving its intended objectives, but there is room for a significant improvement in many areas.

Market access for farmers/beneficiaries is rarely improved. 47% of the respondents benefiting directly from the programme (only 39% of the total number of beneficiaries interviewed) noted that their market access has improved. Employment creation, both direct and indirect, has been positive, although weak. Employment on the farms has increased to 58% of the cases who benefited effectively from RECAP funding, representing a mere 43% of all the RECAP cases interviewed. Capacitation of farmers/beneficiaries remains low, as skills transfer by strategic partners is not effective. About 44% of the beneficiaries effectively benefiting from RECAP noted that the programme had positive impacts in terms of skills transfer; this represents 34% of the total RECAP cases included in this evaluation. This is the lowest impact rate assessed and is of great concern as skills transfer is one of the key elements of RECAP.

The input procurement processes employed by some strategic partners often do not lead to benefits for local communities and business. Inputs are often sourced from external suppliers, sometimes outside the province in which RECAP farms are located. In addition, local skills are not considered as outsiders are hired to perform simple tasks like fencing. This goes against one of the objectives of RECAP of creating employment opportunities.

The economic situation of the farmers/beneficiaries is considered to have improved, although the improvements remain small in absolute terms. Economic impact has been rated the highest overall: About 72% of the people benefiting effectively from RECAP mentioned that their economic situation had improved. This accounts for 57% of all the respondents included in the sample.

The social status of farmers/beneficiaries has also improved, although its sustainability is questionable. As in the case of economic impact, the social impact of RECAP is considered to be among the greatest. About 70% of those effectively benefiting from RECAP and 55% of

the total number of beneficiaries included in the evaluation stated that the programme had positive impacts on their social status. This was not unexpected as significant amounts of funds have been injected in the projects, resulting in beneficiaries directly benefiting materially (e.g. acquisition of bakkies) and socially (higher status in the community). In some cases, expenses on non-productive assets (e.g. cars) seem to have been prioritised, making the sustainability of the projects and social status of the beneficiaries questionable.

Food security of farmers/beneficiaries is considered to have improved. About 59% of those benefiting effectively from RECAP noted that RECAP had impacted on their diet (mainly on quantity, but also on the quality and diversification of their diet). However, if all beneficiaries included in the evaluation are considered, the proportion falls to 47%.

#### **5.4.8 Resource use efficiency and value for money**

RECAP spending per project is relatively high, questioning the financial sustainability of RECAP itself and of its efficiency overall. The RECAP budget amounts to 25% of DRDLR's baseline land redistribution and restitution of land rights budget and was about R3.3 billion for the 2012/13 financial year. Considering the 98 projects included in the evaluation, the efficiency of the RECAP programme, measured in terms of investment expenditure against results, is low. On average, R2.9 million is spent per project in the six provinces included in the evaluation. However, only 70% of the RECAP projects were generating income from agricultural production at the time of the evaluation, with a few of these projects not showing any potential to be sustainable.

As RECAP benefits a relatively small number of beneficiaries, spending per beneficiary and per job created is relatively high. On average, R463 284 is spent per beneficiary or R588 284 is spent to create one job in the six provinces included in the evaluation. One of the highest expenditures is in the Free State where R1.02 million is spent per beneficiary and where RECAP spending has not been associated with the creation of a single additional full-time job. RECAP has contributed to the achievement of objectives such as employment creation. However, the number of employment opportunities created is too small to justify the investment. The figures reported earlier provide a partial answer to the question of whether there is value for money in RECAP. A thorough financial analysis would be required to provide a full answer. However, the absence of established and precise targets/thresholds, lack of continuous monitoring and evaluation, lack of baseline data, etc. will make it difficult to evaluate the efficiency of RECAP.

#### **5.4.9 The recommendations for strengthening RECAP were as follows:**

The best and lasting solution would entail a redesign and overhaul of all public agricultural support programmes and doing away with existing silos of funding agricultural support services, including post-settlement support. This would entail the establishment of an all-

inclusive fund to support land acquisition, extension and mentorship, agricultural finance and market access. Implementing our proposed best solution would render RECAP and similar programmes unnecessary as they would be subsumed under a single programme for agricultural support.

The soundness of our proposal will be appreciated if it is considered that the basis for RECAP's existence is the absence of alignment and coordination between agricultural support programmes and land reform processes. In an ideal situation, the provision of adequate and quality agricultural support services (inputs, finance, extension, market information, etc.) would have been in place upon the transfer of land to beneficiaries. However, because the delivery of these services has been unsatisfactory, essential agricultural support services for land reform beneficiaries are not in place. Hence, the implementation of RECAP, which is essentially providing support services, should be provided by DAFF and the relevant provincial departments of agriculture.

With the realisation that the provision of adequate agricultural support services for land reform beneficiaries is not possible in the foreseeable future without programmes such as RECAP, there is justification for the programme to continue in the interim (i.e. until the best and lasting solution is found). Hence, the following recommendations are meant to strengthen RECAP whilst a lasting solution is sought:

- ✓ Review the objectives of RECAP to make them clearer and more specific. This should include defining the meanings of key terms used in the programme (e.g. distressed farms, recapitalisation, development, commercial farmer, etc.). (Please refer to our suggested main objective of RECAP in this report).
- ✓ Ensure a common understanding of RECAP among its stakeholders by engaging in an all-inclusive process to discuss the nature, operation, purpose and objectives of the programme.
- ✓ Establish a separate organisational structure for RECAP and ensure that the programme has its own full-time staff and do away with the current arrangement of seconding staff from other units of DRDLR to work for RECAP part-time. A separate organisational structure would also help to address the current problems experienced related to reporting arrangements between provincial and national RECAP offices. The lifespan of the proposed organisational structure will be dependent on how long it takes to implement the best solution proposed above.
- ✓ The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of DRDLR should establish a structured and systematic monitoring and evaluation programme for RECAP. This will ensure a systematic and regular monitoring and evaluation of RECAP rather than the current uncoordinated and sporadic monitoring and evaluation of projects.

- ✓ Provide additional and appropriately qualified personnel dedicated to RECAP to improve its administrative and functional efficiency. This will address the problem of understaffing in RECAP and lack of skills, especially among project officers. Inappropriately qualified personnel could be retrained rather than replaced.
- ✓ Review the proposed RECAP theory of change for future use. This should ideally be accomplished through a workshop with those who developed the theory of change. Develop clear and specific selection criteria for beneficiaries and land reform farms for recapitalisation and development in line with the objectives of RECAP. The criteria should be developed to ensure that only deserving land reform farms and beneficiaries are selected for participation in RECAP.
- ✓ Review selection criteria for strategic partners and mentors to ensure that only those that are competent and committed to RECAP objectives are selected.
- ✓ The requirement to have a strategic partner or mentor to qualify for participation in RECAP should be applied selectively to exempt beneficiaries with adequate experience and capacity to manage their farms. This will require conducting skills and needs assessment to determine the readiness of beneficiaries to carry out farming activities without a mentor/strategic partner. For beneficiaries requiring the assistance of strategic partners/mentors, it is important to ensure that such assistance is not provided even after the beneficiaries have acquired the skills and experience to operate their farms successfully.
- ✓ Review the funding model to make it more flexible and adjustable to the enterprise production cycle and the identified funding needs. A funding model based on phases along the value chain rather than fixed periods (e.g. years) would be more appropriate.
- ✓ Establish delegations of authority to decentralise decision making and delegate provinces to approve applications for RECAP support within delegated amounts (e.g. R1 million per project). This may require upgrading the agricultural economics capacity of RECAP staff in the provinces. Implementation of this recommendation would help shorten the process of approving applications and disbursement of RECAP funds.
- ✓ Replace the current RECAP grant funding with loan funding. RECAP funding should differentiate recapitalisation needs from farm development or growth needs, with a view to encourage beneficiaries to take responsibility for their enterprise/farm growth. Changing to loan funding would also increase the coverage of RECAP in terms of the number of beneficiaries assisted as the money paid back would become available for on-lending to more beneficiaries. Loan funding would also ensure proper appraisal of the farms/projects and beneficiaries, especially if the loans are channelled through a financial institution.
- ✓ Establish guidelines to limit the amount of RECAP funding per project in order to widen the coverage of the programme and ensure that the funding model is adapted to the

various agricultural production systems. The lease period for land reform farms should be reviewed in relation to the varying characteristics of enterprises to encourage farmers and strategic partners to invest in the farm. In addition, the project cycle should depend on the condition of the farm, farm needs and type of enterprise.

- ✓ DRDLR should investigate the possibility of delegating or handing over the responsibility of handling RECAP funds to an entity that is non-bureaucratic. This is to ensure the needed flexibility, responsiveness and a business-minded approach to farm financing. Improve coordination with the DAFF with respect to the provision of technical support to beneficiaries to ensure long-term project sustainability.
- ✓ In future, DRDLR should give greater attention to the design of an institutional framework before any programme launch. That is, appropriate programme policies, implementation manuals, organisational structures, delegations of authority, etc. should be in place before programme launch. This will ensure a smooth, effective and efficient programme implementation.

### **5.5. Land Restitution Programme (LRP)**

An implementation evaluation of the Recapitalisation and Development Programme (RADP) was commissioned by the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation in partnership with the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR). The evaluation was undertaken by Genesis Analytics (Pty) Ltd in 2013. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess whether the Restitution Programme has been implemented efficiently and effectively, and to identify how the programme can be improved for the next phase of restitution. The evaluation covers the implementation of the programme from the lodgement through to the finalisation of restitution claims. The time period under review is from January 1999 to 31 March 2013. The evaluation covers the following five provinces: Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and the Free State.

#### **The summary findings were as follows:**

The overall picture that emerges is one of inadequate and incomplete project, poor performance and information management systems, and the proliferation of decision-making and accountability structures within the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) and the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. These have been aggravated by continual processes of restructuring and business process re-engineering which has seen claim settlement shift from a predominantly legal process to an administrative one from restitution research being managed in house to being outsourced and then brought back in-house again. The absence of consistent and clearly defined operating procedures has resulted in variations in the processes and approaches to claim settlement across different provinces, as well as inconsistencies in the process over time. The development of the requisite institutional and managerial capacity within the Programme has been undermined by an

extremely weak human resources function, de-linked from the CRLR. This has resulted in a rate of high turnover and redeployment of staff, poor systems of induction, and inadequate training and mentoring.

Many of these problems have been comprehensively identified in the past but remain unresolved. This raises serious questions about the efficacy of the Programme's management and the extent to which it is able to fulfil its constitutional mandate and to realise its developmental purpose. The key components of this assessment can be summarised in terms of problems relating to the Programme's Function and to its Operation.

At the heart of many of the difficulties experienced by the Programme is its increasing focus on issues which are beyond its specific constitutional mandate, i.e. to administer the lodgement, research and settlement of claims for restitution. In practice, the focus of the CRLR has expanded to take responsibility for a variety of project needs which lie beyond its mandate and competence. These include taking responsibility for post-settlement outcomes, resolving on going community and local political economy disputes, and taking responsibility for broader local economic development issues. These all lie beyond the legal and administrative scope of the restitution function, and they detract from the core tasks of the restitution process. Focus is blurred, resources are diluted, and the process itself becomes mired in innumerable tasks and interventions which lie beyond the CRLR's core administrative and research functions, and which its staff are not equipped to manage. Beyond the burden that this places on staff and resources, it results in the restitution process becoming 'relationship-driven' and subjective in nature, as opposed to adhering rigorously to a well-defined business process - a clearly defined and structured path with a well-defined beginning and a definitive end.

This reality is enabled and exacerbated by the absence of clearly documented operational procedures and functional administrative systems, the second major source of inefficiencies. These weaknesses can be broken down into process elements, management and procurement systems, and staffing functions.

### **5.5.1 The restitution business process**

The restitution process is characterised by a number of distinct steps, centred around: Lodgement and Registration; Verification and Research; Valuation; Gazetting; Negotiations with Landowners; and Settlement. The research reveals problems with the clear and consistent definition and fulfilment of tasks associated with each of these steps. The poor documentation of claims and incomplete files, both crucial to the legitimacy of any legal process and absolutely essential for the efficiency and integrity of the restitution programme, was a striking finding of the research. Beyond this, the claimant verification and research process were compromised by the incomplete and inconsistent application of procedures (no single uniform standard exists) and contributed to the poor quality of the research. This in turn has resulted in the

proliferation of review and authorisation steps which dilute accountability and undermine efficiency across the system.

These problems are compounded by the inexperience and lack of legal skills of programme personnel, inadequate archival systems and reference material, the inherent difficulty of eliciting the facts from claimants, and difficulties in accessing deeds information. Weak arrangements for outsourcing research and managing the quality of outsourced work add to the problem. The practice of bundling claims not merely for research but also for settlement has also in many cases seriously compromised the outcomes of the research process. Taken together, these factors result in repeated 'send backs' of claims and conflict at later stages of the settlement and post-settlement process. An important consequence of weak research is the referral of significant numbers of claims to the Land Claims Court (where, typically, challenges to the CRLR are upheld), at great cost to the CRLR in terms of time and resources, and in terms of undermining the legitimacy and public respect for the restitution process.

### **5.5.2 Management and Information Systems**

In respect of the Programme's management information systems (MIS), the research noted a long evolution of different systems which are incomplete, unlinked and unsuitable as a tool for the effective management of the restitution process. The disjointed architecture of the CRLR's information management systems is compounded by the absence of any current Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) which define in precise detail the operating requirements and components of every stage of the restitution process. A paper-based system of approval still prevail which results in delay, loss of documentation and the proliferation of decision-making milestones and authorisations.

The absence of an effective MIS undermines the CRLR's ability to monitor and manage the performance of its staff, to identify and remedy bottlenecks in the system and to guide its training and support functions. It similarly undermines the scope for effectively monitoring and evaluating progress, and for capturing and communicating the learning (from both good and bad practice) that should be a core feature of the process.

### **5.5.3 Staff Functions**

While the definition and allocation of provincial RMSO staff functions appears to be appropriate, a range of weaknesses are apparent: project officers are typically inexperienced, under qualified and not formally inducted or trained; legal practitioners lack experience and are unable to translate cases into a coherent overall legal framework to guide the legal processes of the CRLR; staff do not apply rigorous or rule-based administrative processes resulting in the perpetuation of poor records; quality assurance managers are frequently drawn into the resolution of cases and community dynamics rather than assuring adherence of the technical, procedural and substantive details of claims. These problems are a consequence of

a very weak human resource function and capacity which, because it resides in the DRDLR and not the CRLR, is not adequately aligned to the CRLR's needs. These problems are enabled and reinforced by a weak performance management system which does not capture and monitor the necessary indicators of performance across the system and inadequately differentiates between quantitative and qualitative performance measures. This results in weak incentives for performance.

The Programme's monitoring and evaluation arrangements are focused on assessing the performance of only two indicators. The number of claims settled, and the number of claims finalised. There is no monitoring of the efficacy or quality of the claims process, of intermediate outputs or the overall qualitative aspects of settled claims. These inadequacies currently limit the ability of the system to pinpoint and respond to problems in the restitution process, dilute the quality of its deliverables, and compromise its effectiveness, efficiency and impact.

The overall finding of the report is that, taken together, the current ill-defined operational autonomy and focus of the CRLR; its inconsistently applied operating procedures and inadequate management systems; and its weak human resource capacity, performance management and quality control systems have severely compromised the efficiency and effectiveness of the Restitution Programme.

The report concludes with a number of recommendations which need to be considered, finalised and adopted to avoid the prospect of systemic dysfunction. It is suggested that these recommendations be adopted in advance of the second phase of restitution becoming operational, as a necessary pre-requisite for its success.

#### **5.5.4 The recommendations for strengthening LRP were as follows:**

- ✓ The recommendations offered focus on the key high-level elements of the Restitution Programme, which have a direct bearing on the CRLR's ability to efficiently and effectively implement its mandate. In formulating these recommendations, the emphasis has been on addressing a limited number of crucial inadequacies, bearing in mind the extremely demanding context, the limited management resources and the demanding timescale at the disposal of the CRLR. The recommendations are largely interlinked and mutually reinforcing and should be viewed and applied as an integrated package of reforms. They are deemed to be a crucial pre-requisite for any prospect of success with the second phase of the restitution process, recently announced:



***5.5.4.1 The focus and function of the CRLR and the Restitution Programme must be more clearly defined and better communicated***

- ✓ Internally, politically across different departments that comprise the rural development cluster, and to the public at large. The CRLR's role must be clarified to be concerned exclusively with administering the legal process associated with the lodgement, review and settlement of restitution claims. The process thus defined must in all cases adhere to a strictly prescribed logical sequence and must have a precise beginning and end point (the formal registration of a claim and its final settlement). The availability of the capital budget for restitution should have no bearing on the claim settlement process. The clear definition and communication of the CRLR's core mandate and function, and the need for a rigorous application of the procedures, will help to screen its staff from involvement in or interference from communities or affected parties whose concerns lie beyond the role of the CRLR.

***5.5.4.2 The Restitution Programme's business and decision-making process must be reviewed, finalised and documented in terms of a strict, rule-based procedure***

- ✓ This should take account of a careful review of best practice and must be documented in a detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) Manual and should take account of every aspect of the agreed business process. It should be widely distributed and supported by training provided to all relevant staff – at national and provincial level.
- ✓ The defined restitution business process must be systematically applied, without deviation, to every claim lodged with the CRLR. Derogations from the SOPs Manual should require the formal authorisation of the CLCC. Thus, standardised and documented restitution procedures will greatly enhance the consistency and efficiency of the restitution process, its measurability and its impact.

***5.5.4.3 The different management information systems currently in operation or development should be rationalised into a single, web-based management information system***

This should provide for the electronic management and oversight of every step in the business process and should serve as the core vehicle for all relevant documentation and authorisations. It should provide for a clear location of responsibility and authority at every step in the process, from registration to settlement. This will enable the claim settlement process to be more structured, systematic and objective. It will enable real time project oversight and performance management. An integrated MIS will greatly facilitate, and indeed is a prerequisite for, effective monitoring and evaluation, the collation and communication of best practice and learning, and performance management of the CRLR's staff, all areas which are currently lacking.

***5.5.4.4. The CRLR's provincial offices should be given responsibility for all non-capital aspects of provincial programmes***

This should include authority (and budgets) for filling vacant posts and procuring services relevant to the restitution process. Budget planning and management training must be provided including into the requirements of the PFMA. The Department's Shared Service Centres may continue to be used to support the CRLR's procurement functions, but authority for procurement and appointments should rest with the delegated CRLR official.

***5.5.4.5. Performance management systems should be put in place which manage national and provincial staff according to specific, measurable indicators***

These should at the least include: the quality of research; adherence to agreed procedures and systems; the integrity of the claims process and the quality of the settlement agreement; and the rate of settled claims. Linked to the MIS, this will enhance the objectivity and integrity of the system, facilitate a focused project management approach to the settlement process against consistent targets and indicators, and provide for greater accuracy and rigor in the management of claims. Roles and responsibilities of staff at national and provincial level need to be clearly defined and delineated, and indicators of performance developed for each.

***5.5.4.5 A competent human resource (HR) management capacity should be established within the CRLR***

This should be independent of the DRDLR and be dedicated to serving the needs of the CRLR in respect of its performance management, training and staff development functions. Its focus and operations should be driven by the long-term targets, indicators and circumstances of the restitution programme. A priority should be the formalization of effective, PFMA compliant arrangements for outsourcing critical research functions (which can never and should not be an internal function of the CRLR), and for ensuring adequate quality control and performance management measures.

***5.4.5.6 The current Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system should be broadened to measure intermediate outputs of the settlement process as well as qualitative aspects of both the settlement process and its outcome***

It should provide independent oversight and quality assurance of each step in the process and should be linked to the performance management system. The M&E framework should include a learning and communication function whereby good and bad practice is captured and lessons are learned and effectively communicated. The business process should be open to structured review and change in the light of this learning.

Beyond facilitation and coordination activities (which take place before a claim is settled) the CRLR should be formally absolved of any responsibility for post-settlement support, local

economic development processes and funding of related activities (beyond that associated with the financial settlement of claims). The CRLR should concern itself exclusively with the adjudication of restitution claims and the restoration of rights in land.

***5.5.4.7 In terms of immediate priorities, three recommendations are made:***

- ✓ The current filing and record system must be cleaned up and systematised. Concluded files should be reviewed to ensure they are complete in terms of content and chronology.
- ✓ Current files should be assessed in terms of their completion and compliance with legal process and should be updated and systematised into the new MIS.
- ✓ All future cases should be managed through the MIS, strictly in relation to the procedures and the authorisation process defined in the SOP Manual.

Looking forward, all outstanding claims should be settled before any work begins, on the processing of new claims arising from the recently announced second phase of restitution. Given that the window for new claims has been opened, the lodgement of new claims may proceed, but only in accordance with the requirements of the SOP Manual.

No new claims should be processed before the criteria and focus determining access to the second restitution window have been translated into the SOP and incorporated into the new MIS.

## **5.6. Extension Recovery Plan (ERP)**

An implementation evaluation of the Extension Recovery Plan (ERP) was commissioned by the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation in partnership with the Department of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries (DAFF). The evaluation was undertaken by McIntosh Xaba in Association with RMI in 2015. The LIMA Rural Development Foundation was subcontracted by MXA to conduct the farmers' survey and assist with the case study literature review. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess whether the ERP was implemented efficiently and effectively, and to identify how the Plan can be strengthened going forward. This evaluation covers the seven-year period from the start of the ERP in 2008/09 to the end of the 2014/15. The study was conducted between November 2015 and September 2016.

### **The summary findings were as follows:**

A common theme that emerges from the literature review is the fact that South African policy statement and documentation clearly reflects many of the key international trends and themes on best practice, such as participatory approaches, demand-led extension, decentralisation and institutional pluralism. However, evidence on the actual implementation and impact of best practices and approaches is limited. In brief, there appears to be a gap between policy statement and practice. Furthermore, there have been calls amongst academics for new

modes of extension practice in South Africa that incorporate practical ways of achieving input from, and interaction with, the ultimate clients of extension, the farmers. There have also been calls for a more integrated approach to bring together agricultural education, research and extension. There is little evidence in the South African literature that such practices are being generally adopted.

### **5.6.1 Digital Pen System**

This digital record keeping system was implemented in all provinces but not with the same level of adoption and use by practitioners. The level of use was high in Western Cape and Gauteng, but low in the Eastern Cape and Limpopo. The system is considered useful by 52% of extension practitioners, with the highest rating in the Western Cape (89%) where the system originated and is the most advanced. Problems associated with the implementation of the system were largely managerial and technical: the system was not rigorously implemented by management in all provinces; it was not always optimally configured for effective application; and it was often not supported with the right cell-phones and by adequate network connectivity. The clear majority of practitioners and managers recognise the potential of the system as an information sharing and management tool but achieving this requires appropriate technical management of the system by provinces as well as data design coordination in which DAFF needs to play a leading role.

### **5.6.2 Vehicles**

The maintenance and purchase of vehicles for extension visit with ERP funds was introduced as an allowance by DAFF. This was highly welcomed by extension managers and practitioners alike, who view this intervention as having had a big impact on increased extension visibility and on service delivery. The only unfavourable comment on this intervention was that the level of access to and funding for vehicles is still insufficient. This will continue to be a problem unless transport costs for extension are adequately prioritised in the PDA's budget.

### **5.6.3 Uniforms**

The concept of corporate wear and its contribution to visibility and professionalism was generally appreciated by managers and practitioners alike, but the rollout of the initiative was criticised by almost half of the practitioners who questioned it as not being effective. Respondents complained about poor quality, limited choice and availability of uniforms. This is partly because provinces were only reluctantly allowed to purchase such wear in the absence of a clear national policy on uniforms. This policy was only approved in 2015 and is still to be implemented.

### **5.6.4 Extension Conferences and Awards**

The study revealed that hosting extension conferences and issuing awards were highly valued in improving the image and professionalism of the extension work. Many commented that the

awards made practitioners feel appreciated and motivated to do their best. Nationally, 71% of practitioners interviewed rated conferences as “very useful” (45%) or “somewhat useful” (26%), with a similar high rating for awards. The sampled provinces that recorded the highest usefulness rating were Limpopo and Gauteng. The high rating for Limpopo reflects the success and regularity with which this Province hosts extension conferences. A number of practitioners interviewed criticised the limited opportunities available to attend conferences and indicated that the choice of who should attend was not always fairly decided. Some provinces were reluctant to offer financial rewards for excellence arguing that staff should not be remunerated beyond their salaries as there are already rewards given to staff in line with their performance agreements. There were calls for clear guidelines on the issuing of awards

### **5.6.5 Affiliation with Professional Bodies**

The ERP gave impetus to Extension Science being incorporated as a professionally recognised Field of Practice under the South African Council for Natural Scientific Professions (SACNAP) in January 2014. Nationally, 87% of practitioners in the country have applied for, or renewed, their registration in 2014/15, while 81% of practitioners interviewed rated registration with Professional Councils as useful. However, the process of registration is slow, and many complained about the cost of annual renewal of registration, which they must pay for themselves. Affiliation with professional associations, notably the South African Society for Agricultural Extension (SASAE), was also encouraged through the ERP. This was welcomed by managers and practitioners alike but the usefulness rating of affiliating with professional associations was rated lower at 61% nationally. Many practitioners were lukewarm about the relevance and effectiveness of SASAE. These study results need to be considered by SASAE to retain its reputation and enhance its membership.

### **5.6.6 Recruitment of Extension Practitioners**

The effect of staff recruitment on the extension-to-farmer ratio was significant, but less than expected. An estimated 1 796 practitioners were recruited with ERP funding versus a target set of 2 374 recruits. This resulted in 821 additional practitioners being employed nationally from 2006/07 (the year before the implementation of the ERP) to 2014/15. This represents a net increase of 37% in extension practitioners. However, this is still only 34% of the national target of 9 000 extension personnel to serve the sector (DAFF, 2011). There was a shortcoming with the intervening logic of this Pillar, namely that it focuses solely on staff recruitment to achieve the required extension-to-farmer ratios: not enough attention was given to targeted recruitment, staff retention, induction training and formal mentorship. Partly because of this shortcoming, the funds were used for more than the recruitment of practitioners, namely for the recruitment of extension managers and support staff, as well as covering staff maintenance costs. Moreover, the limited extent to which the targets set had

been achieved raises the question of whether the service delivery model for extension should not be changed to make farmers less reliant on a large force of extension practitioners.

### **5.6.7 Qualification Upgrading of Extension Practitioners**

Qualification upgrading and targeted skills development contributed to better skilled extension practitioners. Between 2008/09 and 2014/15 a total of 3 861 annual bursaries were issued with ERP funding. By the end of 2014/15 this had produced 1 042 qualifications. The drop-out and failure rate has not been monitored in the past and the effectiveness of delivery could therefore not be assessed. Figures on the type of qualifications obtained are not readily available. However, during the last three years under review more than half of all bursary holders were studying for bachelor's degrees, followed by Masters Degrees, Honours Degrees and Diplomas (DAFF, 2015). The study found that the curriculum of the agricultural qualifications obtained from universities were often not aligned to the skills required by extension practitioners; and degrees selected were not always appropriate to the extension needs in the provinces. The reason for this is that, during the period under review, there has not been much movement in convincing universities to offer more extension-friendly curriculum, the Norms and Standards for extension and advisory services has not been very specific with regards to qualification requirements and the ERP has not been very specific with regards to other conditions for study. Since 2015 qualification upgrading is no longer being funded through the ERP. Information on the levels of qualification of extension staff at the end of the period under review (2014/15) was not forthcoming from most provinces. It was therefore not possible to assess to what extent the target of a minimum four-year bachelors' degree for extension practitioners had been achieved. However, there continues to be a need to fund qualification upgrading to deal with the shortfall in subject matter specialists.

### **5.6.8 Targeted Skills Development for Extension Practitioners**

It is estimated that at least 14, 500 short courses were attended by practitioners during the evaluated period. About 42% of these courses were on Information Communication Technologies (ICT) skills, 33% on technical skills and 25% on soft skills. Some 83% of practitioners rated skills upgrading as having been useful. The usefulness rating for targeted skills development was also high at 85% for ICT skills, 83% for technical skills and a lower 67% for generic soft skills. There have been inefficiencies with regards to targeted skills development, particularly those related to soft skills: the training provided was often the result of the availability of courses rather than needs based; the training available was seen by many users as being too generic and not relevant to specific work needs; and training service providers were often of inferior quality in terms of their knowledge of subject-matter.

### **5.6.9 ICT infrastructure and other resources**

The provision of ICT infrastructure contributed a great deal to better equipping extension practitioners. This, together with Extension Suite Online (ESO), greatly assisted in establishing a foundation for the future use of modern ICT technology in extension. The point has also been reached where the use of ICT has been mainstreamed into extension operations. A total of 86% of the respondents countrywide considered the supply of laptops as “very effective”. The corresponding figure for cell-phones was 76%. This lower rating is largely because more practitioners experience internet connect or network problems.

Nationally, 79% respondents said that they had regular access to the ESO system. Most Practitioners surveyed (73%) rated the effectiveness of the ESO system as either “very effective” (42%) or “somewhat effective” (31%). However, 40% of the registered users do not use the ESO systems and low usefulness rating given to the ESO by a sizable portion of practitioners (27%) points to room for improvement.

### **5.6.10 The recommendations for strengthening ERP were as follows:**

#### ***5.6.10.1 ERP has been a valuable intervention that should continue***

The ERP has been a valuable intervention that has contributed to increase the availability and to an improved quality of the extension services and expert advice provided to farmers. It has done so by giving much needed attention and financial support to professionalising, equipping and skilling extension practitioners, as well as managers and support staff to help them do their work more effectively. The ERP has done much to introduce extension staff to ICT technology and to its use in their daily work. This has greatly assisted in establishing a foundation for the future expansion of ICT technology in extension.

The study has also shown that all the ERP objectives and their activities continue to be relevant, except for the management diary and Farmers Green Book which have been shown not to be useful. However, a distinction should be made between those objectives and activities that represent “uncompleted business” and should continue to be pursued as “recovery” interventions, and those that have been successfully mainstreamed. The latter needs be treated as on-going extension delivery requirements and steps are needed to ensure that sufficient funds continue to be available for their implementation. The study has also found that provinces rely on the continuation of the ERP funding source. Moreover, available information points to high levels and increased dependence on ERP funding. The sustainability of extension service delivery could be undermined if this trend continues.

#### ***5.6.10.2 The need to strengthen the policy, procedures and systems for ERP implementation***

The study points to shortcomings in the policy, procedures and systems that guides and facilitates the implementation of the ERP. Thus, different provinces apply the rules for ERP funding in different ways, and not necessarily in the most effective manner. For example,

qualification upgrading, and skills development often respond to what training opportunities are available, rather than to the extension needs on the ground. Moreover, certain ERP services such as the provision of training and uniforms could greatly benefit from coordinated contracting arrangements.

#### ***5.6.10.3 The need to strengthen national and provincial capacity to management and monitor the ERP***

The study revealed that DAFF has capacity constraints in relation to its ability to manage, monitor and to strategically direct the ERP. Furthermore, many provinces do not have the required capacity (in terms of staff and systems) within their PDA's and other support departments (HR, IT, transport, logistics, procurement and finance) to effectively implement the Plan. The study also revealed that inadequate attention is given to financial reporting that will enable cost-efficiency analysis in terms of expenditure to budget and costs against expenditure items. This defines a set of outcomes, outputs, activities and inputs for performance planning and assessment going forward.

#### ***5.6.10.4. The need for increased farmer participation in the extension programme***

The study points to the need to encourage farmer participation in extension for several reasons:

- ✓ To ensure that the extension services are more responsive to the needs of farmers
- ✓ To ensure that farmers contribute towards the knowledge triangle
- ✓ To make extension less reliant on a large force of extension practitioners
- ✓ To capitalise on the new opportunities offered by the spread of ICT

#### ***5.6.10.5 The need for inter-programme coordination in delivering farmers support services***

The Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (CRDP) and Land and Agrarian Reform Programme (LARP) places additional demands on PDA's to deliver extension services to land reform clients as identified by the DRDLR. Greater consideration needs to be given to quantifying these demands when designing and budgeting for extension services, including for ERP funding for these services. The ERP funding must continue but make on the condition that there is equitable sharing of costs by provinces towards extension and advisory services, which should gradually increase over time. This will ensure that Provinces become less dependent on ERP funding. The purpose and conditions for future ERP spending must also be clearly defined and This is necessary to ensure that ERP funding is used to achieve strategic objectives and is not used to top-up normal expenditure. Given the short-term nature of conditional grant support, DAFF and PDA's should develop a readiness programme with realistic time frames for its future termination.

The study points to shortcomings in the policy, procedures and systems that guides and facilitates the implementation of the ERP. Thus, different provinces apply the rules for ERP



funding in different ways, and not necessarily in the most effective manner. For example, qualification upgrading, and skills development often respond to what training opportunities are available, rather than to the extension needs on the ground. Moreover, certain ERP services such as the provision of training and uniforms could greatly benefit from coordinated contracting arrangements.

## 6. Synthesis

This synthesis analysis covers main themes which emerged from the six reviewed evaluations which included CASP, CRDP, RECAP, LRP, SFS and ERP. Based on the above findings, it can be argued that the reports were very comprehensive especially in relation to identifying the challenges witnessed within all the synthesized six reports. In as much as there was poor coordination of activities or projects within various sectors, the synthesis identified that the findings and given recommendations were credible as they were highlighting common trends across all the reports. Furthermore, the reports managed to identify gaps which other credible official data sets proved to demonstrate that there were gaps within various projects. The main themes which emerged include sustainable income, empowering communities and market access, coordination, monitoring and evaluation, human resources and infrastructure.

### 6.1 Sustainable income

Sustainable income emerged as one of the main themes where the evaluation on SFS showed that within the NEP evaluations lack of project or farmer sustainability/self-reliance and limited coordination among departments was a challenge which led to major shortcomings. Such shortcomings led to poor sustainable income for communities. In addition to that, four of the SFS programs demonstrated poor buy-in from officials, confusion of roles, as well as internal politics leading to poor sustainable income. On the other hand, there were notable achievements in CASP in enhancing access to support services, increasing agricultural production, increasing income for beneficiaries while the CRDP showed that there was limited success in supporting sustainable cooperatives. In addition to that, the CRDP approach focused almost exclusively on registering cooperatives with very little attention to-date on providing capital for start-up costs, technical training, mentoring or establishing crucial market linkages. Hence this led to insufficient sustainable income for beneficiaries or communities. Moreover, the CRDP did not have a clear maintenance strategy in place where investments ran the risk of not being sustainable. Several RECAP stakeholders interviewed embraced that food security had improved after the introduction of RECAP thereby implying sustainable income. This evaluation also learnt that the grant funding approach in RECAP which on a positive note could lead to sustainable income was not sustainable given the limited resources available and promoted dependency.

### 6.2 Employment creation and recruitment

Employment creation is one of the key priorities in agricultural and rural development initiatives. In synthesizing the six selected evaluation reports, the study uncovered that employment creation was generally weak in three evaluations: LRP, CRDP and SFS. The CRDP acknowledges successes in other areas but reported less success on the aspects of community empowerment and job creation. This means the programme has not achieved much regarding the creation of employment opportunities. The LRP did not make mention of

creation of employment opportunities. This might have been influenced by the nature of the programme. The SFS on the other hand indicated that the prime focus of current interventions is weak on employment creation evidenced by failure to fully include marginal groups as intended (no clear targeted population).

The ERP has attained the recruitment of an estimated 1 796 practitioners with ERP funding versus a target set of 2 374 recruits. This resulted in 821 additional practitioners being employed nationally from 2006/07 (the year before the implementation of the ERP) to 2014/15. This represents a net increase of 37% in extension practitioners. However, this is still only 34% of the national target of 9 000 extension personnel to serve the sector (DAFF, 2011). Additional success story in terms of employment creation was also noticed in CASP. The evaluation uncovered that employment on the projects included in the evaluation had increased after the CASP intervention. The study could reveal that the average number of full-time employees per project before and after CASP was 11 and 16, respectively, while the average number of part-time workers rose from 6 to 14. Moreover, CASP is reaching most of its target groups, with a relative number of youth and disabled persons being involved in the programme. Further demographics indicate that youth and females are better represented in project ownership than in project management – 15% of project owners are in the youth category and 42% of project owners are female.

Approximately, 70% of the beneficiaries of CASP were emerging or fully practice commercial farming. The evaluation further notes how RECAP was successful in creation of both the direct and indirect employment opportunities. The evaluation also raises concerning areas which are weakening the full potential of the programme in fully attaining the envisaged employment opportunities. This means there are still gaps to be addressed. On the other hand, while the RECAP projects and business plans have not focused on activities and investments that are labour intensive, the employment rate on the farms increased by 58% of the cases that benefited effectively from RECAP funding, representing a mere 43% of all the RECAP cases interviewed. In as much as various challenges were noted in relation to common threads around employment creation and recruitment, it cannot be overlooked that the reviewed reports sought to focus on economic transformation of the citizens of South Africa through employment creation. All the synthesized reports sought to create employment which was regarded as a common purpose and intent. However, several challenges were noted, and lessons have been drawn from these challenges where the overall recommendation on the common issues focuses much on coordination of both projects and the recruitment of technical experts who should be ensuring proper implementation of projects which leads to creation of more opportunities and employment.

### **6.3 Empowering communities and access to market**

Out of the six reviewed evaluations, four of the findings revealed that empowering communities is an area that requires more attention and great emphasis when implementing various programs. Access to on- and off-farm infrastructure was found to be the most significant success factor across four of five programs within SFS. In addition to that SFS evaluation indicated that access to market, access to irrigation, extension support and ownership/leadership were identified as success factors whereby communities were empowered. Various high-level services were identified as critical for subsistence-oriented smallholders and these included water access; capital-related inputs; community-based extension and village savings and loans.

CASP also showed that access to services, such as extension and training, improved after the programme with about 84% of the project managers included in the evaluation indicating that they received extension services. Such extension services ensured that communities are empowered as the managers were involved in empowering communities through extension support. The income of both project managers and beneficiaries increased from the moment they commenced participating in CASP-supported projects. The nominal monthly income of a project manager-beneficiary was 44% higher after CASP whilst that of an owner-beneficiary had risen by 36%. This clearly demonstrated that CASP empowered communities. Market access however decreased after CASP though this did not mean that CASP was responsible for the decrease. Government officials also identified lack of market access as a constraint. The program's failure to include role players in the value chain beyond primary production failed to help to promote market access and commercialization. It was established that agricultural information tended to focus on production issues and less attention was paid to other types of information, such as marketing information. On a positive note, RECAP made much progress in the facilitation of market access for farmers.

There was mixed evidence regarding the various CRDP mechanisms and how well these were working and delivering benefits or empowering communities. This synthesis found that success was attained through meeting basic needs; however, only limited success was achieved with community empowerment and job creation. CRDP was a top down national initiative and the buy-in, capacity, and will implement it at the local level was low, and that there was still not a wide-spread understanding of the CRDP. Regrettably, this compromised empowering communities. There was also limited progress made towards mobilizing and empowering communities. Such limited progress could have been caused by the water shortages that affected the production of food in household and community food gardens (as well as undermining several other livelihood projects). Other issues emanating from the evaluations is that the ERP lacked alternative funding recourse against a time when ERP funding was withdrawn. Key policy consideration is deemed to have been aligned with Cabinet

approved extension policy to involve farmers more directly in the delivery of extension services through peer-to-peer learning and support. This however did not help in relation to empowering communities due to lack of funding.

#### **6.4 Coordination**

Addressing challenges facing the agriculture sector requires coordinated responses that draw on the strength of all stakeholders. They must be addressed within coherent national strategies for agriculture, in partnership with the provincial departments of agriculture, other government departments, farmers, the private sector and civil society. This requires putting in place apposite policies, legislation, programme and institutions, as well as mobilizing resources at the national, provincial and local levels.

Coordination emerged as a theme where minimum coordination among governmental structures was found to be one of the crucial factors undermining programme success which led to duplication of funding within and between programmes especially in the SFS evaluation. This evaluation revealed that poor targeting and uncertainty regarding programme scope emerged as a key constraint effecting programme effectiveness and efficiency. The CRDP was also noted to be a cross-cutting programme which required effective partnership between several stakeholders across all spheres of government, numerous departments and with the private sector and civil society, as well as coordination with numerous related government programmes. Stronger coordination with the Departments of Agriculture at national and provincial level was critical to improving CRDP effectiveness. It was however noted that coordination of projects among government structures was a challenge. All the reviewed and synthesized documents demonstrated that the government structures lacked coordination of activities. Some of the departments were not able to ensure that projects were efficiently monitored during implementation. Unfortunately, such a gap compromises the relevance and sustainability of various projects.

#### **6.5 Human Resources**

In all the six evaluation documents synthesized it was noted that the issue of human resources was common. The SFS evaluation showed that a shortage of credible and skilled human resources undermined programme implementation, coordination and management while CASP made a positive but insufficient contribution to capacity building for on-going management and self-reliance through skills and knowledge transfer. CASP programme imparted technical and farm management skills and knowledge to project managers and employees on the projects. Areas in which capacity building was most insufficient included cultivar selection, livestock marketing, livestock disease control and produce marketing which compromised the efficiency of the available human resources. Considering the CRDP evaluation, it was noted that a wide range of CRDP structures had been established at

national, provincial and local level to support implementation of the CRDP and the involvement of numerous role-players. Such structures at all levels ensured that human resources were strengthened. The development of the requisite institutional and managerial capacity within the CRLP Programme was however undermined by an extremely weak human resources function that was de-linked from the CRLR. In addition to that, focus was blurred, resources were diluted, and the process itself mired in innumerable tasks and interventions which lie beyond the CRLR's core administrative and research functions, and which its staff were not equipped to manage. Moreover, inexperience and lack of legal skills of programme personnel, inadequate archival systems and reference material and the inherent difficulty of eliciting the facts from claimants presented a human resource challenge within the government. Due to human resources challenge, the CRLR encountered difficulties in accessing deeds information which then compromised the work done by the government. It was also noted that staff within the CRLR evaluation did not apply rigorous or rule-based administrative processes resulting in the perpetuation of poor records.

Quality assurance managers were frequently drawn into the resolution of cases and community dynamics rather than assuring adherence of the technical, procedural and substantive details of claims within the CRLR evaluation. It also emerged that the CRLR's inconsistently applied operating procedures and inadequate management systems; and its weak human resource capacity, performance management and quality control systems severely compromised the efficiency and effectiveness of the Restitution Programme. The ERP, however, encouraged and enabled extension staff to use Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in their daily work which lacked within the CRLR evaluation. The use of ICT laid a foundation for a future expansion of ICT in extension work. The effect of staff recruitment on the extension-to-farmer ratio was significant, but less than expected. There was a shortcoming with the intervening logic of this pillar as it focused solely on staff recruitment to achieve the required extension-to-farmer ratios. It was observed that there was not enough attention given to targeted recruitment, to staff retention, or to induction training and formal mentorship within the ERP programme evaluation. However, qualification upgrading and targeted skills development both contributed to better skilled extension practitioners within the ERP. RECAP also made some progress towards achieving its intended objectives, but there was room for significant improvement. About 540 additional jobs were created (111 full-time and 429 part-time) on the 98 farms included in the evaluation after RECAP was implemented.

## **6.6 Monitoring and Evaluation**

Four of the six synthesized evaluation documents revealed that monitoring and evaluation emerged as a theme. Within SFS, it emerged that lack of data management systems, or well-designed monitoring and evaluation systems, led to poor management of programmes and

associated resources. The monitoring mechanism of the CRDP was emaciated resulting in weak implementation and optimum delivery. The LRP signalled that there was no monitoring of the efficacy or quality of the claims process, of intermediate outputs or the overall qualitative aspects of settled claims. A common finding across provinces and at national level proved that there was a need for improvement in performance reporting, and in the monitoring and evaluation of ERP activities. There was an ironic emphasis on the need to strengthen the policy and procedural framework for implementation across national and provincial capacity to manage and monitor the ERP. This clearly demonstrated that monitoring and evaluation systems for the ERP were inadequate and were compromised by poor data collection and target setting, and by a lack of critical performance reporting systems and performance assessment. Generally, most provinces reported that they had limited capacity to do monitoring and evaluation in all the evaluated documents.

### **6.7 Infrastructure**

In relation to infrastructure, the available evidence demonstrates that the availability of both on-farm and social infrastructure improved after the introduction of CASP. In the case of on-farm infrastructure, the largest improvement was recorded for chicken houses (8% before and 21% after CASP) whilst electricity infrastructure showed the largest improvement for social infrastructure (58% before and 75% after CASP). Therefore, provision of infrastructure was one of the areas in which CASP made a significant contribution. While CASP made massive contribution to infrastructure development, there were, however, many complaints related to the process of appointment of service providers and the quality of the infrastructure provided. The quality of infrastructure provided was also questioned in other programmes though LRP focused much on the documented operational procedures and functional administrative systems which were regarded as not clear. The provision of ICT infrastructure and ESO contributed a great deal to better equip extension practitioners and mainstreamed ICT in extension operations thereby building infrastructure within the ERP.

### **6.8 Policy and other strategic matters**

There are evident policy gaps and strategic misalignments across all evaluations. In fact, issues of policy and other strategic matters came out strongly in all six evaluations. ERP evaluation suggested the need to strengthen the policy, procedures and systems for ERP implementation. The Restitution Programme identified unclear procedures in its business and decision-making process as problematic and counterproductive with objectives. This means the programme lacked consistent procedure and a clear policy direction. A need was also identified within the CRDP to improve its policy and strategy. The scope of CASP appears to be too wide and unfocused. This contributed to a strain in the allocated resources. Unfortunately, this restricts the efficacy of the programme in yielding intended objectives. In addition to the wide scope of the programme, the evaluation also unearthed the absence of

real value for money in the funding approach of a wholesale grant. The funding approach was said not to only encourage a dependency syndrome but also promoted an entitlement mentality and limited commitment on the part of beneficiaries. Like CASP and RECAP the evaluation found that the strategic interventions of the programme are not resulting in a broad-based capacitation of the beneficiaries due to broad objectives which are unspecific. Unique are the policy findings of the SFS, unlike with the other evaluations where policy and other strategic matters are found to be impacting on the effectiveness of the programmes, the SFS has found insufficient evidence to support or refute the suggestion that policy reforms will reduce the impacts of market volatility and seasonality, and also improve the overall institutional context for smallholders. The study further found that the objectives and measures of effectiveness and sustainability of current interventions overlap considerably.

Considering the cross-cutting findings and recommendations, it can be argued that these conclusions and recommendations are useful to implementors and policy makers as issues such as the limited impact of the projects were highlighted. In addition to that, the analysis noticed delays in appointing service providers, the questionable quality of infrastructure, land reform program being regarded as a threat to the departments without clear documents on procedures and administration system on land reform, the issues of access to market for the farmers and mainly the decline in employment creation were noted and deemed of paramount importance for the project implementors and policy makers to address.



## 7. Key Policy Implications

Despite CASP and FSP programmes to make provision for agricultural support to targeted beneficiaries of the land reform, after two decades into democracy there is agreement that the NLRP has failed to improve the livelihoods of the former underprivileged rural people (DAFF, 2016). It has fallen short of both public expectation and the official targets that were set. The envisaged programme of rural development failed to materialise. Most importantly rural developmental efforts failed to make any significant inroads into rural poverty. There are a number of reasons why the NLRP policy on smallholder farming failed to improve the livelihoods of rural people.

According to Weiner et al. (1997), the failure of policy developers to take adequate account of the significant variations in people's socioeconomic conditions, skills, desires and aspirations have contributed to failed land reform policies. Hall & Aliber (2010) argue that the agricultural and economic policies are biased to urban and resulted in poor performance of the smallholder farming sector in South Africa. Such policies take primarily two forms and assume that commercial farming is more efficient than smallholder farming. The first form is an anti-agricultural bias that involves policies to industrialise at the expense of agriculture such as mines (Lipton *et al.*, 1996).

South African intra agricultural policies pioneered the emergence of a poor smallholder farming sector and a commercial capital-intensive farming sector (ANC, 1994). This has led to inequality and economically irrational. Competing for land use is a common cause of conflict between agriculture and industry such as mining in rural communities across South Africa. The conflict over land use has arisen when locals perceive that industries are using land that has traditionally been used for agriculture, livestock grazing or other traditional uses, without farmers being given suitable or agreed on alternative land. Conflicts over whether farming communities have given free, prior, informed consent to mining developments can lead to perceptions that farmers have been unjustly evicted, particularly where land tenure systems are informal, and farmers cannot produce titles deeds for their land.

The second form is an intra-agricultural bias that involves laws and institutions that favour commercial farming and discriminate against smallholder farming (Lipton *et al.*, 1996). Agricultural liberalisation policies did not level the playing field because these policies did not address the fact that systematic support to white farmers had placed them in a dominant position that, they are able to maintain. Emerging farmers, without the same access to statutory privileges, cannot compete with the dominant and established agricultural sector. This suggests that without substantial state support and involvement, smallholder farming in South Africa's former homeland areas is not likely to succeed.

Policy changes should aim to re-orient institutional mind-sets to be the enabling environment for change. It should be recognised that managing change in the smallholder livestock sector will be a slow and difficult process and policy goals should reflect that. There is a serious lack of farmer-centred baseline information to guide the development of policies and appropriate strategies for smallholder farming; hence establishing such a knowledge base should be a policy aim. Therefore, South Africa has to develop a land reform policy that ensures that the white commercial farming sector is competitive, efficient, and employs people. The agriculture in the former homeland areas must be developed to alleviate poverty and to generate income from profitable commercial smallholder farming. It is important that services like extension should be actively involved in the development of strategies. Smallholder farmers have a greater chance of success when attention is not only paid to capacity building in areas related to marketing, like conducting research of the market environment but also to overall organisational management skills, such as problem-solving and conflict resolution skills, that could help those groups to operate independently. Furthermore, the farmers need business training, such as the ability to budget and keep records in order to ensure financial sustainability.

Revitalizing the agricultural sector, and specifically smallholder agriculture, is a precondition for achieving high and sustainable growth, poverty reduction and food security in South Africa. The above-mentioned themes demonstrated that there were some achievements made in various aspects though challenges were faced. Sustainable income showed that there is a need for supporting sustainable cooperatives through proper implementation of various projects. Such projects should ensure sustainability within the communities and building community income. There is a direct need for funding to ensure that projects implemented within communities will last long and ensure sustainability and empowering communities through access to markets. It cannot be ignored that sundry interventions were implemented to facilitate market access for farmers and a need to ensure continuous funding to farmers was reiterated. A need for stronger coordination with the Departments of Agriculture at national and provincial level is critical to improving effectiveness of the agricultural sectors within South Africa. The evaluated programmes presented the presence of weak coordination within the departments. This was also worsened by the human resources challenge where staffs were not well equipped in the implementation of some projects which they were supposed to manage though the ratio between managers or extension workers and beneficiaries was enough. A need for capacity building for staff is hence recommended.

Skills development and managerial capacity building of staff seem to be urgent in order to ensure that future programmes and current programmes can be effectively and efficiently implemented. It is also worth noting that lessons emerging from the use of ICT in the extension work should be utilised to augment the effectiveness of employees and programmes.

One of the main challenges compromising the department's work is lack of monitoring and evaluation of programmes. There is a need for putting in place monitoring and evaluation systems and constant reviews of systems in place and an overall evaluation by external evaluators. Pertaining to employment creation and contribution towards the 2030 NDP goals, considering the rate of 21 800 employment opportunities per year, the sector is projected to add less than 500 000 (half a million) new employment opportunities by 2030. This means the country could potentially miss the NDP (2030) employment commitment target by half.

It is crucial for government to pay more attention to the areas of improvement as flagged by this study in order to alleviate the challenges facing the sector today. Improvement in agricultural interventions means an improvement in food security and economic growth. While the current interventions have been acknowledged, government needs to even provide a more hands-on support considering increasing factors associated with climate change, technological changes and economic adversities. If issues of ICT infrastructure development which the government must provide are still regarded as a major concern in the sector, we could therefore safely state that the sector is not ready for technological changes associated with the 4th Industrial revolution. More hands-on support, necessary policy reforms and new models of support and approaches are required. The more hands would provide certainty in that the national imperatives will be achieved. The fact that the NDP target of creating employment opportunities may potentially be missed by wholly 50% is a cause for concern with regards to the current support interventions.

Moreover, South Africa should implement transparent decision-making process based on integrated land use and resource planning and management. This comprises the necessity for explicit mapping of the spatial resource trade-offs and opportunities created by competing needs for food, water and energy from a constrained resource base. The synthesis evaluation also demands for strengthened extension support services, research and technology transfer and greatly improved monitoring and enforcement of resource uses. Sustainable farming requires the use of farming methods that can strike a balance between the social and economic needs of an equitable and just society, whilst ensuring the security of the natural resource base and, the protection of the long-term productivity of the land.

Furthermore, South Africa agriculture sector must promote change and transformation in agriculture according to the National Development Plan. This requires the mobilisation of the resources, including its men and women, as well as a particular focus on small farms, which make up the majority of South Africa's productive units and have the greatest development potential. There is also a need for increased financial resources, institutions and technical capacity for agriculture for there to be sound success.

In summation, the overall picture presented in this synthesis is that the support programmes are not fully effective and are failing to produce the intended and designed results. The NDP (2030) and Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 2019 commitments are under threat if more is not done to support the farmers. The food security and the national economy are equally under threat due to unsatisfactory support rendered by the government. Furthermore, implementation of recommendations of these evaluations should be enforced and encapsulated into the Agricultural Policy Action plan, which places more focus on the value chains with high potential security, job creation and economic contribution, the revitalisation of the agricultural and agro-processing value chain.

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## planning, monitoring and evaluation

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