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The background papers are written by officials in the Presidency and other government departments using inputs from literature reviews, commissioned research, government reviews and reports and roundtable discussions with a range of stakeholders. The views reflected in the background papers do not represent those of the Presidency, but rather reflect authors' views on sector developments.

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Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................. 2
Policy Summary .................................................................................. 3
Executive Summary ............................................................................ 4
Review .................................................................................................. 7

1. Introduction and background .............................................................. 7
   1.1 Constitutional foundations ....................................................... 7
   1.2 Context of building a capable and developmental state .............. 8
   1.3 Overview of findings of government’s periodic reviews ............... 9

2. The journey since 1994 ...................................................................... 10

3. Reflection on achievements ............................................................... 11
   3.1 Electoral democracy ................................................................. 12
   3.2 Creating spaces for participation ............................................... 15
   3.3 Public participation and accountability mechanisms .................. 16
   3.4 Civil society ............................................................................ 24
   3.5 Traditional leadership .............................................................. 27
   3.6 The media .............................................................................. 29
   3.7 Mediation and protest .............................................................. 31

4. Towards improvement ....................................................................... 33

References .......................................................................................... 37
## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABET</td>
<td>Adult Basic Education and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDW</td>
<td>Community development worker</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGE</td>
<td>Commission for Gender Equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPF</td>
<td>Community Policing Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWP</td>
<td>Community Work Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPME</td>
<td>Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPSA</td>
<td>Department of Public Service and Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPWP</td>
<td>Expanded Public Works Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICASA</td>
<td>Independent Communications Authority of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEC</td>
<td>Electoral Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Internal Security Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDF</td>
<td>Local Development Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDDA</td>
<td>Media Development and Diversity Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEC</td>
<td>Member of the Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACH</td>
<td>National Anti-corruption Hotline</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Peace Accord</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Public Service Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>SABC</td>
<td>South African Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAHRC</td>
<td>South African Human Rights Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPS</td>
<td>South African Police Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARS</td>
<td>South African Revenue Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SGB</td>
<td>School Governing Body</td>
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<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
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Policy Summary

The following is a headline view of selected highlights that have impacted on democracy and citizenship in South Africa since 1994.

- South Africa has established a constitutional system of electoral democracy that is admired and respected around the world. Elections are managed effectively and there are high levels of confidence in the results. Turnout levels have, inevitably, declined since the landmark 1994 elections, but have still remained strong.
- The transition to democracy marked a move from racially defined forms of citizenship to a system of constitutional democracy that protects and promotes the rights of all South Africans. This shift incorporated a focus on the need for a participatory democracy where citizen engagement in public affairs runs throughout the processes of policy formulation and implementation, and citizens’ ability to hold the state accountable is not limited to voting in elections.
- In the initial post-1994 period, interactions with the state were often unstructured, drawing on organisations that had been established to fight apartheid and now wanted to contribute to the task of transformation. This was particularly true when the focus was on the formulation of new policies and legislation. Over time, the focus has shifted towards the effectiveness of implementation. This has meant a greater need for civil society to scrutinise the work of government and hold it accountable. The space for such criticism has provided an important mechanism for citizens to highlight areas where government needs to improve.
- A wide range of mechanisms have been established for citizen participation. These provide for different forms of participation through participatory governance and advisory structures, consultative forums, grievance mechanisms and routine accountability mechanisms. These mechanisms provide important channels for citizens to engage with the state in a broad range of ways, from raising concerns to influencing policies. However, participatory processes have too often become formulaic and there is a need to focus on ensuring that participatory structures are used effectively and taken seriously by both citizens and the state. There is also a need to focus more attention on engaging citizens in their own spaces outside the structures and forums established by government, as well as ensuring a greater focus on routine day-to-day accountability at the point of delivery.
- Protest has increasingly been used as a tool for citizens to express their concerns or discontent. Particular attention has been focused on where these protests take a destructive or violent form that involves harm to people or property. These protests provide the most visible evidence that the state has struggled to ensure that people in poor communities feel their concerns are being listened to. It is important to note that these protests are caused by a wide range of issues and not only by issues of service delivery.
Executive Summary

South Africa has combined political democracy with high levels of economic and social inequality. The vision of a developmental state explicitly assigns the state responsibility for overcoming these historic inequalities, and of channelling the demands created through political equality towards tackling ingrained social inequalities. This paper focuses on the relationship between citizens and the state within this context. It looks, in particular, at electoral democracy, participatory mechanisms designed by the state to enable ongoing citizen participation between elections and other forms of participation that take place through spaces, organisations and forums created by citizens.

The journey since 1994

Apartheid legislation dictated where people could live and travel, who they could and could not marry, what jobs they could do, even where they were allowed to sit and which doors they could use to enter public buildings. This racist system restricted political rights to a small segment of the population who conformed to specific ethnic criteria, and denied political and economic rights to the majority of the population. The relationship between the apartheid state and the majority of the people was confrontational and antagonistic.

The transition to democracy marked a major shift in the relationship between citizens and the state. It moved from racially defined forms of citizenship to a constitutional democracy that protects and promotes the rights of all South Africans. It meant moving from a system where the state was illegitimate in the eyes of most South Africans, to a state with a constitutional democracy serving its citizens. This shift incorporated a focus on the need for participatory democracy where citizen engagement in public affairs runs throughout the processes of policy formulation and implementation, and citizens are able to hold the state to account, so that democratic citizenship is not limited to voting in elections.

While these shifts were landmark moments, the process of giving substantive content to these changes has proved to be a constant battle. A broad range of mechanisms have been put in place to give substance to the vision of a participatory democracy, but these have not always contributed to bringing about a dynamic relationship based on accountability and responsiveness of the state to its citizens.

Progress since 1994

Over the past 20 years, South Africa has put in place credible institutions and systems that underpin a robust electoral democracy. The electoral system and management of elections enjoy high levels of credibility, and elections are seen to be free and fair. The electoral system has allowed for broad representation, with even parties that win only a small share of the national vote being able to secure representation in Parliament. Despite an inevitable decline in turnout after the
landmark 1994 elections, turnout levels have remained good and, following declines in 1999 and 2004, actually increased in the 2009 elections.

South Africa has also gone beyond the formal provisions of electoral democracy to develop policies and spaces that are intended to facilitate the emergence of a participatory democracy that allows for citizen engagement on an ongoing basis and not just during periodic elections. As the attention moved away from developing new legislation towards a greater focus on implementation, a major policy focus for the state has been on formalising the channels for participation. A range of forums and mechanisms has been created to enable citizens to participate in and inform governance processes in all three spheres of government. In particular, attention has been given to establishing participatory governance, and advisory structures and consultative forums. In addition, the state has increasingly sought to identify ways of facilitating less formalised interactions, including through the provision of grievance mechanisms and improving the state’s responsiveness to citizen needs and concerns at the point of delivery.

The democratic state has made impressive gains over the past 20 years in establishing an architecture for accountability and public participation. This is evident in the policy and legislative framework, and in the creation of numerous statutory bodies, structures and programmes to give effect to the ambition to create a participatory democracy. Local government has been conceptualised as the most participatory sphere of government that should enjoy the closest connections to communities. A range of mechanisms was set up to facilitate and enable citizen participation in local government processes. The White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele White Paper) (Department of Public Service and Administration, 1997) described a people-centred transformation of public service delivery where government is responsive to the needs of its citizens. Legislation such as the Promotion of Access to Information Act (Act 2 of 2000) and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (Act 3 of 2000) has sought to empower citizens with the mechanisms to access state information and administrative justice.

**Overcoming challenges**
A common trend that emerges across the different statutory participation structures is the challenge of turning formal structures into dynamic mechanisms that help secure meaningful community engagement. One of the major challenges is the perception that these structures are not always taken seriously by the state. This is a particular concern in poor and historically disadvantaged communities where resource constraints, social inequalities and prevailing power relations, combined with weaknesses in state capacity, present major obstacles to meaningful citizen engagement.

The performance of these mechanisms has been uneven and questions have been asked about how effectively these participatory mechanisms are linked to wider
government processes. The credibility of participatory mechanisms has been called into question where they are run as isolated events without feedback mechanisms to ensure that they inform (and are informed by) government processes. A critical issue here has been the capacity and willingness of government structures to bring participatory processes to life.

A further challenge has been improving the routine accountability mechanisms that inform the day-to-day interactions between citizens and the state. This is identified as a particular priority in the National Development Plan (NDP), together with the need to place more emphasis on engaging citizens in their own spaces rather than always expecting citizens to make use of the forums and structures established by government. Specific steps that are identified in the NDP include the following:

**Ensuring responsiveness of services:**
- Placing a greater focus on routine day-to-day accountability, particularly at the point of delivery
- Ensuring frontline staff are sufficiently empowered and supported to address citizens’ concerns
- Ensuring a sustained focus on improving management and operational systems, so that staff at the frontline are better able to respond to citizens’ needs and concerns
- Strengthening the developmental commitment and professional ethos of the public service and local government administration by ensuring that the work environment is conducive to fostering a sense of professional common purpose

**Ensuring that participatory processes provide meaningful spaces for engagement:**
- Placing a greater focus on engaging citizens in their own spaces, as well as through formal participatory mechanisms
- Ensuring participation in integrated development planning (IDP) processes (this is deliberative with citizens being involved in identifying and resolving trade-offs rather than simply identifying lists of priorities)
- Ensuring that participatory processes are run by elected representatives and officials rather than being outsourced
Review

1. Introduction and background
The focus in this 20-year review is on the relationship between citizens and the state within the context of South Africa’s constitutional democracy\(^1\). It looks, in particular, at electoral democracy, participatory mechanisms designed by the state to enable ongoing citizen participation between elections, and other forms of participation that take place through spaces, organisations and forums created by citizens.

The transition to democracy marked a major shift in the relationship between citizens and the state. It moved from racially defined forms of citizenship to a constitutional democracy that protects and promotes the rights of all South Africans. It meant moving from a system where the state was illegitimate in the eyes of most South Africans, to a state with a constitutional democracy serving its citizens. This shift incorporated a focus on the need for a participatory democracy where citizen engagement in public affairs is evident throughout the processes of policy formulation and implementation, and citizens’ ability to hold the state to account is not limited to voting in elections.

While these shifts were landmark moments, the process of giving substantive content to these changes has proved to be a constant battle. This review explores what has been achieved and what remains to be done. It celebrates the broad range of mechanisms that have been put in place to give substance to the vision of a participatory democracy. It also seeks to identify and analyse some of the obstacles to participation and to achieve a dynamic accountability and responsiveness of the state to its citizens.

1.1 Constitutional foundations
The Preamble to the South African Constitution states that the Constitution is intended to “lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law”. The notion of citizenship is further elaborated on in Chapter 1 of the Constitution (Founding Provisions of the Constitution), which states that:

- There is a common South African citizenship.
- All citizens are:
  - equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and
  - equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship.

\(^1\) Citizenship is a broad term and other aspects of the concept of citizenship are dealt with in other background papers, including a separate paper that deals with the issues of identity and non-racialism.
The Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution) further develops these high-level principles, including the freedom of expression and freedom of association. These constitutional principles inform the understanding of democracy and citizenship taken throughout this review.

1.2 Context of building a capable and developmental state
South Africa is committed to the vision of building a capable and developmental state and has recognised that constructive state-society relations are central to this vision. The National Development Plan (NDP) defines a developmental state as a state that “brings about rapid and sustainable transformation in a country’s economic and/or social conditions through active, intensive and effective intervention in the structural causes of economic or social underdevelopment” (National Planning Commission, 2012: 409).

Alongside the role of a capable and developmental state, the NDP emphasises the importance of active citizenship. At the heart of this notion is the question of how to build the forms of synergistic state-citizen interactions that are a fundamental component of a developmental state. Duncan Green’s book, From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States Can Change the World, defines active citizenship as follows:

“By active citizenship, we mean that combination of rights and obligations that link individuals to the state, including paying taxes, obeying laws, and exercising the full range of political, civil and social rights. Active citizens use these rights to improve the quality of political or civic life, through involvement in the formal economy or formal politics, or through the sort of collective action that historically has allowed poor and excluded groups to make their voices heard” (Green, 2013: 10–11).

Perhaps the most important contribution of Green’s work is to highlight the linkages and potential synergies between “active citizens” and “effective states”. He cautions against the tendency to elevate one in relation to the other, arguing that one must pay attention to both together. Active citizenship is defined in terms of how individuals interact with the state, while the effectiveness of the state ultimately manifests itself in how the state behaves towards, and impacts upon, the lives of its citizens. This relationship is central to our understanding of state effectiveness, particularly in the context of developmental states – states that have brought about rapid and sustained transformation by tackling the underlying causes of underdevelopment. This analysis has resonated in South Africa, and has influenced policy discourse, through the attention given to “embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995) as a critical precondition for a developmental state. The concept refers to the need for the state to be sufficiently independent so as to be free from capture by any particular interest group, but also sufficiently connected to society to ensure it has access to information and is also able to influence the approach other sectors take to
implementation. The optimal approach to achieving this balance has proved to be an ongoing challenge for the South African state over the past 20 years.

1.3 Overview of findings of government’s periodic reviews

This review builds on the analysis presented in government’s 10-year Review (The Presidency, 2003) and its 15-year Review (The Presidency, 2008) of the progress made in establishing institutions of electoral democracy, and strengthening participatory mechanisms. Both these reviews identified the fact that government had made the most progress in areas that were directly under the control of the state, and less progress in areas where it needed to mobilise and draw on the efforts of other sectors of society. This was an important motivating factor behind the policy focus on building a developmental state. The 15-year Review identified the “multiple role of the state … as an actor providing services and helping to create an appropriate environment for development; as a leader in forging a framework of encompassing interest among social actors; and as an agent of its own transformation” (The Presidency, 2008: 5).

The 15-year Review also highlighted that “South Africa has become a well-functioning democracy in a comparatively short time” (The Presidency, 2008: 6), with high levels of electoral participation and strong confidence in the fairness of the system and the results it produces:

“Strong institutions of representative democracy have been built, including Parliament, provincial legislatures and municipal councils. Independent institutions support them, including the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), the Public Protector, the Auditor-General of South Africa and Commission for Gender Equality (CGE). A democratic culture prevails, in which citizens can articulate and pursue their political views and ideals. Extensive constitutional freedoms of speech and assembly have been exercised without limitation. An independent judiciary has been established – the great majority of citizens trust it as the final arbiter of conflicts and disagreements, and have accepted its decisions as legitimate” (The Presidency, 2008: 7).

Perhaps most importantly, the 15-year Review identified that “the institutions of governance enjoy deeper support and legitimacy among citizens than would have seemed conceivable” in 1994 (The Presidency, 2008: 7).

In addition to this progress with regard to the formal institutions of governance, the 15-year Review emphasised that substantial attention has been given to developing policies and laws for public participation, ranging from participation in the formulation of municipal integrated development plans (IDPs) to the establishment of Thusong service centres to improve access to services and information. However, it also identified the challenges to ensuring that these formal requirements are turned into
vibrant systems that are taken seriously by elected representatives, public officials and citizens, highlighting that “questions remain about linkages between such platforms, their effectiveness and the extent to which members of representative bodies, such as ward committees, are linked in practice to the communities they serve” (The Presidency, 2008: 8). It concluded that there is “a need for more effective accountability of public representatives and citizen participation in public affairs, especially between elections” (The Presidency, 2008: 8). This finding was supported by the observation that “confidence in national and provincial government tends to increase during election periods, and decline between them,” and the suggestion that:

“... increasing public confidence during election periods suggests that more sustained interaction between public representatives and the public would strengthen legitimacy. More regular availability of information about services and implementation of government’s mandate would do likewise” (The Presidency, 2008: 12).

One of the central challenges identified in the 15-year Review therefore related to the ongoing task of building and sustaining constructive relations between the state and its citizens.

2. The journey since 1994

Apartheid legislation dictated where people could live and travel, who they could and could not marry, what jobs they could do, even where they were allowed to sit and which doors they could use to enter public buildings. This racist system restricted political rights to a small segment of the population who conformed to specific ethnic criteria, and denied political and economic rights to most South Africans. The relationship between the apartheid state and the majority of the people was confrontational and antagonistic.

The changes in the Department of Home Affairs provide a striking example of how the relationship between citizens and the state has changed. Under apartheid, the functions of what is now the Department of Home Affairs were carried out through “eleven separate structures” (Department of Home Affairs, 2013: 3). While “white South Africans were served by a national department called Home Affairs that was characterised by modern, relatively efficient services similar to those in countries with advanced economies” (Department of Home Affairs 2013: 4), Africans were subject to a system that denied them the rights of citizenship. The system was designed to fulfil the requirements of the Population Registration Act of 1950, which was only repealed in June 1991, that people be classified according to race, and of the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970, which excluded residents of the Bantustans from being citizens of South Africa. The act was not repealed until 1994 (Department of Home Affairs, 2013: 4–5).
The Department of Home Affairs cites the experience of a white employee who joined the apartheid-era department in the 1970s to illustrate how this system of racial classification impacted on the way the department interacted with the majority of South Africans:

“Working in birth registration at the counter she describes how a baby was typically brought to the office by the mother and was taken by staff to a tea room. They locked the door while they unclothed the child and examined it to determine the race according to the Population Registration Act. In difficult cases, specialists from Social Services were called in … The entire life of the child depended on the racial identity it was given in that office or through the Bantu Administration System. In the case of Africans, there was the denial of citizenship, freedom of movement and political rights” (Department of Home Affairs, 2013: 3).

Today, by contrast, “the registration of the birth of a South African child by Home Affairs guarantees that the child has an inalienable right to the status of being a citizen and to all the equal rights and responsibilities set out in the Constitution” (Department of Home Affairs, 2013: 5).

This formal equality is of enormous importance in our highly unequal society. While many people’s lived experiences continue to embody historic inequalities, the right to expect to be treated equally by government departments that were previously focused on implementing a system of segregation is of enormous symbolic and practical importance. A hypothetical example from the Department of Home Affairs highlights the following:

“Consider the experience of a worker in a small rural town waiting to be served in an office of the Department of Home Affairs. She sees the flag, photographs of the President, Deputy President and Minister, and posters explaining how early birth registration protects the security of her citizenship and that of her child. She sees citizens of every class and colour having to queue to affirm their status and claim their rights as citizens. Extremely unequal relationships of power and wealth persist in South Africa. Nevertheless, the experience of citizens reaffirming their identity every time they use an enabling document contributes to the building of a common identity. Affirming the right of citizens to vote during elections is one important example” (Department of Home Affairs, 2013: 6).

3. Reflection on achievements
South Africa has combined political democracy with high levels of economic and social inequality. The vision of a developmental state explicitly assigns the state responsibility for overcoming these historic inequalities, and of channelling the
demands created through political equality towards tackling ingrained social inequalities.

Over the past 20 years, South Africa has put in place credible institutions and systems that underpin a robust electoral democracy. It has also gone beyond the formal provisions of electoral democracy to develop policies and spaces that are intended to facilitate the emergence of a participatory democracy that allows for citizen engagement on an ongoing basis and not just during periodic elections. In addition, the state has sought to identify ways of facilitating less formalised interactions, including through the provision of grievance mechanisms and an increased emphasis on improving the state’s responsiveness to citizen needs at the point of delivery.

3.1 Electoral democracy

The 15-year Review highlighted that “strong institutions of representative democracy have been built, including Parliament, provincial legislatures and municipal councils”. The country has an electoral system that is seen to be free and fair; trusted by the competing political parties, voters and the international community. South Africa also has legislative systems that allow for citizen engagement with and transparency of the legislative process. The proportional representation system based on a closed list ensures that the composition of Parliament accurately represents the share of votes secured by different parties, with even those parties that secure a very small share of the vote being able to secure representation.²

South Africa’s first elections in 1994 took place after four years of negotiations. The years following the unbanning of liberation parties in 1990 were marred by political violence, which threatened to derail negotiations. There was a voter turnout of 86 percent in those first elections, as 19.5 million South Africans cast their vote.

There have been three general elections and three local government elections since that first poll in 1994, and confidence in the electoral system has remained high. A voter survey conducted before the 2011 local government elections revealed that over 90 percent of the electorate were satisfied with the voting process, Electoral Commission (IEC) officials and voting stations; 86 percent claimed never to have experienced any form of irregularity, intimidation or interference during the voting process (Electoral Commission, 2011). In addition, opinion surveys indicate high levels of confidence in the democratic system. For example, in a 2005 Markinor survey, “85 percent of the respondents stated that democracy was the best system of governance, and 72 percent was happy with democracy as the system of governance” (Booysen, 2011: 236). Both the 1994 and 1999 elections experienced significant levels of violence, with “nearly 300 people [dying] in election-related

² The voting system for national and provincial elections has been subject to extensive debate and specific investigation by the Van Zyl Slabbert Commission.
violence in the five months prior to the [1999] poll” (Southall, 2013: 126). However, “overall, violence levels have markedly declined, with much-reduced levels of killing and intimidation characterising both the 2004 and 2009 campaigns” (Southall, 2013: 126).

One of the successes of the last 20 years is in the management of elections. The IEC is a highly trusted institution and most voters are satisfied with its performance and independence. Booysen and Masterson (2009) note that “the IEC has been effective in ensuring the continuous preparation for and management of free, credible elections”. Southall reaches a similar conclusion that the IEC “is regarded as having maintained a commendable level of independence, which it has combined with notable efficiency … elections have been declared by international and domestic observers and media as free and fair” (Southall, 2013: 103).

Despite an inevitable decline in turnout after the landmark 1994 elections, turnout levels have remained good and, following declines in 1999 and 2004, actually increased in the 2009 elections (see Table 1). Although lower, turnout levels have also been good in local government elections, with the data indicating an increase, particularly in the most recent (2011) local government elections (see Table 2).

Table 1: Turnout in national elections

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total valid votes</td>
<td>19.5 million</td>
<td>16.0 million</td>
<td>15.6 million</td>
<td>17 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout as a percentage of registered voters</td>
<td>No voters’ roll</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of voting age population registered</td>
<td>No voters’ roll</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout as a percentage of estimated voting age population</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Turnout in local government elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2011</th>
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<tr>
<td>Turnout as a percentage of registered voters</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout as a percentage of estimated voting age population</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
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The white, and overwhelmingly male, representation that characterised Parliament under apartheid has been replaced by a Parliament that reflects the population of the country. South Africa has achieved particular success in the representation of

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3 This table is a summarised version of the table presented in Booysen (2011: 222).
4 This table is a summary version of the table presented in Herzenberg (2012: 93).
women in Parliament. Following the 2009 election, female representation in Parliament went up to 45 percent, the third highest after Sweden and Rwanda. At local government level, female representation increased to 38 percent in the 2011 local government elections, up from 19 percent in 1995 (Hassim & Smith, 2012: 272).

In a highly unequal society, the provision for everybody to participate and be counted equally provides a lever for change. Symbolically, it is one of very few spaces where people are treated equally; politically, it provides an important counterbalance to the obstacles to poor people participating in many other areas of public life. It is therefore important to avoid complacency and make every effort to sustain high levels of electoral participation across all sections of society.

The IEC is mandated to inform “civil society with a view to maximising citizen participation in democracy and electoral processes” (Electoral Commission, 2009). In 1994, the IEC reported that it had reached 85 percent of the population through voter education programmes: 20 percent received direct voter education, while the rest was reached through the national broadcast and print media. Booysen and Masterson (2009) argue that, although the IEC measured the success of these programmes through the low percentage of spoilt ballots (0.97 percent), other surveys showed that only 9 percent of people perceived voter education as an important source of electoral information. Resources for voter education were reduced in the 1999 elections, but were increased again in 2004 and 2009.

In 2004, the IEC conducted a targeted awareness campaign to encourage people to register and vote. Following the 2004 election, analysis showed that the majority of the 7 million eligible voters who did not register were below the age of 35. The IEC then embarked on a large-scale campaign to encourage young people to register for the 2009 elections. Young people born after 1994 will make up about 2 million of those eligible to vote in 2014 and many of them will not have had access to earlier rounds of voter education. A study commissioned for government’s 20-year Review found that young people are less likely to vote, but more likely to follow election campaigns and discuss issues relating to the campaign. They are no less likely than other age groups to participate in election-related activities such as political rallies (Mattes & Richmond, 2013).

Significant steps have been taken to create space for participation within parliamentary processes, including through legislative committees and Chapter 9 institutions. In practice, as Booysen notes, these channels are often better suited to engagement by structured organisations than individual citizens (Booysen, 2011: 185). Nonetheless, they represent an important channel for extending electoral democracy beyond the act of voting in elections and are complemented by the broader mechanisms for public participation described below.
3.2 Creating spaces for participation

The democratic state has made impressive gains over the past 20 years in establishing an architecture for accountability and public participation. This is evident in the policy and legislative framework and the creation of numerous statutory bodies, structures and programmes to give effect to the ambition to create a participatory democracy. In the immediate post-1994 period, with the focus on developing new policies and replacing apartheid-era legislation with democratic legislation, “popular consultation retained high-priority status” (Booysen, 2011: 181). From the late 1990s onwards, more structured arrangements were developed for enabling participation and securing citizen buy-in.

The commitment to building a participatory democracy was encapsulated in the Reconstruction and Development Programme White Paper:

“Irrespective of race or sex or age, or whether they are rural or urban, rich or poor, the people of South Africa must together shape their own future. Development is not about the delivery of goods to a passive citizenry. It is about involvement and growing empowerment … The Government therefore commits itself to maximum transparency and inclusivity” (Republic of South Africa, 1995: 8).

Similarly, the White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery (Batho Pele White Paper) (Department of Public Service and Administration, 1997) described a people-centred transformation of public service delivery where government is responsive to the needs of its citizens. Legislation, such as the Promotion of Access to Information Act (Act 2 of 2000) and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (Act 3 of 2000), seeks to empower citizens with the mechanisms to access state information and administrative justice.

Local government has been conceptualised as the most participatory sphere of government that should enjoy the closest connections to communities. The Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000) (Section 16(1)) requires municipalities to:

“develop a culture of municipal governance that complements formal representative governance with a system of participatory governance and must for this purpose encourage, and create conditions for, the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality”.

A range of mechanisms were set up to facilitate and enable citizen participation in local government processes. These include the IDP process, community development worker (CDW) initiatives, the Izimbizo Programme and the ward committee system (Booysen, 2011: 186). In addition, CDWs, together with Thusong centres, were intended to make the state more visible at the local level, and thereby facilitate citizens’ access to a range of services.
3.3 Public participation and accountability mechanisms
Public participation and accountability mechanisms can be divided into four broad categories:

- Participatory governance and advisory structures
- Consultative forums
- Grievance mechanisms
- Routine accountability mechanisms

Each of these mechanisms is intended to serve a different objective, by providing for different forms of participation that will be used by different sections of the population at different times. Understanding the respective strengths and weaknesses of these different mechanisms is central to the ability of the state to promote meaningful and ongoing public participation at all levels.

3.3.1 Participatory governance and advisory structures
Participatory governance and advisory structures provide a forum for community representatives to provide a combination of advice, influence and oversight to elected and administrative structures. They are created through legislation to enable community participation in the provision of services. They are therefore different from the other three participatory mechanisms in that they are more formalised structures with membership limited to specified community representatives. These structures include community policing forums (CPF), school governing bodies (SGB), clinic committees and ward committees.

Community policing forums
Given the central and repressive role that the former South African Police Force played in enforcing apartheid, reform of the police service was an urgent task for the new government. Community policing was a central tenet of this reform. The South African Police Act of 1995 required CPFs to be established at police-station level. The establishment of these forums contributed to “enabling the police to establish alliances with community power brokers and other community members amenable to working with them”, and “provided a setting for representatives of community formations and police to ‘find each other’ and work through some of their mutual mistrust and antagonism” (Bruce, 2011: 3). In its 2011/12 Annual Report, the South African Police Service (SAPS) reported that CPFs had been established in all but three of the 1125 police stations in South Africa. The three stations without these structures were new facilities and a process was underway to establish them at these stations.

Bruce (2011: 6) notes that “the wide differences between communities … have been one of the defining features of the CPF experience in South Africa”. Research conducted in the mid-2000s on CPFs in Gauteng found challenges in poorer
communities where limited resources constrained the ability of CPFs to represent community interests adequately (Maroga, 2005).

Clinic committees
Government has emphasised the need for a people-centred approach to health care through a primary health care system that goes beyond a clinical approach towards addressing the underlying social and economic drivers of health (Haricharan, 2011). The White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System in South Africa (Department of Health, 1997) established community participation in the planning and provision of health care services as part of a wider reform of the health care system. This was formalised in the National Health Act (Act 61 of 2003), which required the creation of clinic and community health centre committees.

These committees are intended to serve as a link between the health services and the communities they serve. The National Health Act stipulates that each clinic should have a health committee made up of government councillors, heads of health facilities and one or more members of the community (Haricharan, 2011). In contrast to SGBs and CPFs, clinic committees are not elected. These committees are formed through a variety of mechanisms, including volunteering and community meetings.

School Governing Bodies
The election of SGBs at more than 25 000 schools can be celebrated as a major achievement in building local democratic capacity involving the time, energy and commitment of hundreds of thousands of citizens (Ministerial Review Committee, 2003). SGBs are made up of parents, educators, members of staff and learners of Grade 8 or higher. They have responsibilities in areas such as budget management, the appointment of teachers and school policy development. The Department of Basic Education’s Action Plan up to 2014 notes that:

“an important aspect of the struggle against apartheid was its grass-roots nature and its reliance on local democratic structures. South Africa’s SGBs are an important embodiment of this tradition and should be upheld as a means of maintaining accountability to local communities” (Department of Basic Education, 2010: 19).

SGBs are not merely consultative, but have considerable power in the operation of schools. However, as with CPFs, there is wide variation in the level of authority that SGBs exercise in practice and how effectively they are equipped to perform the intended governance functions. The Ministerial Review Committee identified that:

“at present, that relationship is defined in dependent terms. The principal continues to be the pivot of the school’s future. In many of the studies, the fact is very evident that plans have been worked out by the staff and the principal and are brought to the SGB for ratification. This is especially the case with
educational programmes and infrastructural development. In the poorer schools, SGBs are not substantially involved in the initial planning sessions where these issues are discussed” (Ministerial Review Committee, 2003: 173–174).

Naidoo (2005) reached a similar conclusion, observing that most SGBs (particularly in poorly resourced schools) are operating less as the ultimate governing authority in the school and more as a support structure whose prime purpose is to ensure that school management (principals and teachers) can undertake the day-to-day running of their schools efficiently. This suggests that SGBs can make an important contribution to facilitating community engagement and buy-in. Naidoo and others note “a pattern across the country where SGBs in more privileged schools have assumed a degree of authority envisaged by central-level policy-makers” (Naidoo, 2005: 113). This highlights the fact that participatory governance mechanisms do not operate equally effectively everywhere, and are often most effective in middle-class suburbs where people are more likely to feel empowered to hold the state accountable. Evidence suggests that specific attention needs to be given to supporting SGBs in poorer schools.

Ward committees
Ward committees are created in terms of the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) “to promote regular interaction between communities and their municipalities”. The Act empowers a ward committee to “make recommendations on any matter affecting its ward” to the ward councillor or, through the ward councillor, to the municipal council.

Several challenges have been identified as impeding public participation through ward committees. These include tensions with pre-existing community structures, the accessibility of councillors, the long distances between communities in rural areas hampering the formation of ward committees, under-resourcing, tensions between elected and local traditional leaders, as well as a “general perception” that councillors and ward committees are accountable to political parties and the municipal council, and not to communities (Hicks, cited in Department of Public Service and Administration, 2009). The limited influence of ward councillors has also been identified as an issue. Bénit-Gbaffou (2008) finds that ward councillors often fail to represent their constituents’ views and needs in Council and that there is a tendency for the ward not to be “considered a relevant scale for negotiation and decision-making” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008: ii). There have been attempts to make ward committees more active and for them to play a stronger role in local governance, but in practice, many ward committees are not yet fulfilling the role they are intended to play.

A common trend that emerges across these different statutory participatory structures is the challenge of turning formal structures into dynamic mechanisms that
help secure meaningful community engagement. One of the major challenges is the perception that these structures are not always taken seriously by the state. This is a particular challenge in poor and historically disadvantaged communities where resource constraints, social inequalities and prevailing power relations present major obstacles to meaningful citizen engagement. Specific attention needs to be given to CPFs, clinic committee structures and SGBs in poorer communities, where limited capacity – both in terms of resources and skills – constrain their effectiveness. Support could include training and tools for monitoring specific standards, together with clear procedures for reporting findings, and structured and regular communication with oversight bodies.

**Consultative forums**
Alongside participatory governance structures, which rely on the participation of a small number of community representatives, it is important that there are also channels for broader consultation, which can include both mechanisms for identifying community priorities and sharing information about government activities. In general, these two objectives should operate in tandem, thus allowing for broad-based dialogue and communication between citizens and the state.

The state has established a number of programmes to bring government closer to the people. The Imbizo Programme was launched by government in 2001. The programme brought the President, Deputy President, ministers, provincial premiers and members of the Executive Committee (MECs), as well as mayors and councillors face to face with communities to discuss issues affecting them. This engagement with communities allowed politicians direct contact with the challenges people were facing and enabled citizens to raise issues with senior politicians. The Imbizo Programme was replaced in 2009 by the Public Participation Programme, and then by the Siyahlola Presidential Monitoring Programme, which was launched in July 2012. President Jacob Zuma announced the relaunch of the Imbizo Programme in March 2013 to expand the Siyahlola programme.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) has championed public participation through several initiatives, including public hearings on service delivery issues and annual citizen satisfaction surveys focused on specific government departments. The PSC has also developed a toolkit for conducting citizen forums, providing government departments with a structured approach to incorporating the views and perceptions of citizens into service delivery. These resources have yet to be widely utilised.

The Department of Home Affairs established stakeholder forums in 90 percent of municipalities across the country as part of the National Population Registration Campaign, which was launched in 2010. These were “actively involved communities, other departments, and local and provincial governments in identifying and meeting needs and providing oversight” (Department of Home Affairs, 2013: 24). These forums provided an important mechanism for assisting the department in achieving
its service delivery objectives and they “became partners in the transformation of the department and the development of caring and responsive officials” (Department of Home Affairs, 2013: 24).

The Municipal Structures Act requires municipalities to consult local communities as part of the IDP process. IDP forums have been established as stakeholder forums to enable this. While legislation and local government policy envisage a people-driven planning process, research points to several shortcomings in the IDP consultation process, including an over-reliance on external consultants, inadequate capacity to integrate input from communities, the exclusion of community groups and individuals, poor communication and a lack of feedback.

The NDP highlights similar challenges and makes three recommendations to improve the IDP process. First, the IDP needs to be led by the municipality and not driven by consultants. Second, the process needs to be “deliberative and engage citizens in prioritising and making trade-offs”. Third, local government officials and politicians “must be prepared to engage citizens in their own spaces … and not expect them to come to government forums” (National Planning Commission, 2012: 437–438). This requires consideration of how participatory mechanisms can make better use of the forms of organisation that citizens use to structure their lives.

There have been successful examples of extending community participation in the IDP process. For example, during the early 2000s, a system of community-based planning was piloted in Mangaung and then extended to some other major municipalities, such as eThekwini, Tzaneen and Mbombela, as well as smaller rural municipalities. This involved a participatory planning process at ward level, facilitated by municipal staff and ward committee members, whereby a ward plan was developed. This was used to provide the participatory component of the IDP process. A small amount of funding was provided per ward that could be used to fund small investments and voluntary activities envisaged in the plan. Where these approaches were implemented effectively, community-based planning helped make ward committees more effective at promoting citizen involvement (Khanya, 2004). Recently, the Community Work Programme (CWP) has developed an organisational workshop modality to help communities organise and plan for the implementation of the CWP. In the Richtersveld, community-based planning was used to plan for the CWP. The rollout of the CWP provides an important space where participatory planning mechanisms can be institutionalised. The application of these approaches has been uneven and further consideration is needed of how such approaches can be used to improve the effectiveness of both ward committees and IDP processes.

Consultation forums provide an important mechanism for listening to people and sharing information. However, in order to be effective in responding to the needs of citizens, they require careful planning and skilled facilitation. Most importantly, commitments made by government need to be realistic and implemented according
to agreed time frames, supported by ongoing feedback to the community. Failure in this regard can lead to increased frustration and disillusionment in communities. This means that engagement cannot be consigned to periodic consultative forums, but must be accompanied by mechanisms for ongoing communication. Consultative processes should not operate in isolation from wider executive and administrative structures, but need to be informed by (and in turn help to inform) the identification of priorities and assessments of what can realistically be achieved.

Grievance mechanisms
Significant attention has also been given to developing mechanisms through which citizens can raise complaints about specific issues. The South African Government Information website lists over 60 hotlines for national and provincial government. The Presidential Hotline, which was launched in September 2009, provides citizens with a mechanism for raising issues they have been unable to resolve elsewhere. By June 2013, the Presidential Hotline had logged over 200,000 cases, with a resolution rate of close to 90 percent. Another example of a national grievance hotline is the National Anti-corruption Hotline (NACH), which was launched in 2004 and is managed by the PSC. It creates a central mechanism for the reporting and investigation of allegations of corruption in the public sector.

The list on the South African Government Information website is by no means exhaustive, with many more call centres and hotlines available to citizens at all three spheres of government to lodge complaints and seek information. The Complaints and Compliments Management Policy Framework developed by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) in 2013 began the process of developing norms and standards for the many call centres. The DPSA has established a Batho Pele Gateway call centre to support the monitoring of compliance with these standards.

Citizens also have access to statutory watchdog bodies such as the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), the PSC, the Public Protector and the Independent Police Investigative Unit, where they can lodge complaints. Thus, government has made significant progress in setting up grievance mechanisms, with a combination of mechanisms located in government departments that draw on the authority of the Executive, and independent oversight mechanisms including those provided for in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 of the Constitution.

3.3.2 Routine accountability mechanisms
Despite the successes achieved in establishing community governance and advisory structures in many sectors, and efforts to bring government to the people, a critical aspect of citizen participation in service delivery remains underdeveloped. This is the area of routine accountability. Routine accountability describes the scope for citizens to provide feedback at the point at which they receive services, and then for that input to drive improvements. Given that the vast majority of citizens experience
government primarily through interactions around specific services, this is a critical aspect of democratic accountability.

Findings of the PSC highlight the low level of citizen satisfaction with redress mechanisms. A review of citizens’ experience of five service delivery departments (Public Service Commission, 2011a) found that only 23.6 percent of respondents of a Citizen Satisfaction Survey were satisfied with the redress measures that were taken where service delivery had fallen short of the expected standards. These findings are echoed by the Frontline Service Delivery Monitoring Programme of the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), which found that:

“… generally, there is no management of systems in most facilities that have suggestion boxes or complaint and compliment books and/or logs. Where these systems exist, the citizens interviewed indicated that they have lost trust in the systems, as no feedback is received after complaints are lodged” (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, 2013a: 6).

This highlights the fact that effective administrative processes are critical for creating a conducive environment for constructive day-to-day interactions between the state and its citizens. Many of the mechanisms for this are provided for in the Batho Pele principles. The NDP stresses the need to refocus attention on adherence to these principles:

“When entering a public building, citizens should be able to see what services they can expect, and where to go and to whom they can talk if they do not get that service” (National Planning Commission, 2012: 428).

The NDP also highlights the fact that frontline staff should be empowered and supported to address concerns as and when they arise, and that this requires focused attention on improving systems of delegation, supported by improvements in management and operations systems.

The NDP notes that “routine accountability would enable citizens to provide ongoing insights into service delivery” (National Planning Commission, 2012: 427). The process of creating a responsive frontline service delivery interface has the potential to drive far-reaching improvements in government’s capacity to deliver. The combination of providing effective mechanisms for citizens to provide feedback on their experiences of service delivery and empowering frontline officials to address issues that arise could create a virtuous cycle of improvements. Feedback from citizens could help to drive improvements in service delivery and the evidence of improved services would help to sustain citizen engagement. The new citizen-based monitoring programme (Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, 2013b), which is being developed by the DPME in conjunction with relevant sector departments, is intended to help bring this virtuous cycle into effect.
3.3.3 Citizen involvement in service provision and community development

One of the areas where there has been a major expansion in citizen involvement with the state has been in the provision of community-based services. CDWs are employed to facilitate and liaise between citizens and the state. In addition, there are many areas where work done by volunteers paid a stipend has helped to expand the reach of services. These workers play an important role in a wide range of sectors, but are particularly important in the health sector. Examples of such workers include home-based carers, direct observation therapy workers, community health workers, peer educators working in HIV programmes, adult literacy workers in the Kha Ri Gude Programme (see case study), agricultural support workers in the Community Work Programme and early childhood development practitioners. The social Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) has funded many of these. This can help provide access to foundational services for a large number of people.

Case study: The Kha Ri Gude Mass Literacy Campaign – “let us learn”

The Kha Ri Gude Mass Literacy Campaign, initiated and managed by the Department of Basic Education, was launched in February 2008 with the intention of enabling 4.7 million South Africans to become literate and numerate in one of the eleven official languages by 2012.

Kha Ri Gude enables learners to read, write and calculate in their mother tongue in line with the unit standards for Adult Basic Education and Training (ABET) Level 1, and also to learn spoken English. The Kha Ri Gude material teaches reading, writing and numeracy in an integrated way. Life skills and themes like health, gender, the environment and social justice are mainstreamed across the curriculum.

Kha Ri Gude is available at no cost to adults with little or no education. Classes are held in communities at times that are convenient to the learners, and take place in homes, churches and schools. The Kha Ri Gude material has been adapted for use in Braille in eleven languages, and for use by the deaf.

The campaign was piloted in 2008. In the period 2008–2012 the Kha Ri Gude campaign reached 2.9 million adult learners. It was anticipated that a further 676 800 learners would enrol in 2013, bringing the total to about 3.6 million learners. Completion rates have risen from 80 percent in 2010 to 93 percent in 2012. The average cost per learner has been reduced from R1 271 in 2008 to R869 in 2012, enabling it to reach more people.

The campaign is not only impacting on learners’ lives, but also provides volunteers with a small income.

There are a number of categories of community-level workers, including community development practitioners, CDWs, ward councillors and ward committee members,
volunteer community workers with stipends, as well as community-based organisations and traditional structures. The lack of clarity about the roles of these different organisations sometimes causes competition or conflict.

3.4 Civil society

The anti-apartheid movement mobilised many people in organisations working to oppose the apartheid regime. This mobilisation reached a new scale during the 1980s. People organised themselves into local popular structures, such as street committees, civics, student representative councils, self-defence units, people’s courts and local development forums (LDFs) as ways of establishing alternative forms of democratic local government. The civic associations that developed during this period focused on particular issues affecting people’s daily lives and were “built on a strong ethos of participatory democracy” (Johnson & Jacobs, 2012: 68). Many of these civic associations subsequently joined the United Democratic Front (UDF), thus “link[ing] their local struggles to those at the national level” (Johnson & Jacobs, 2012: 68).

With the unbanning of the liberation movements in 1990, apartheid South Africa entered a transition period. The negotiations between the apartheid state, business and the liberation movements, together with trade unions, took place against the backdrop of intense conflict in many disenfranchised communities. This violence was countered by a national peace effort, which succeeded in building participatory local spaces for advancing conflict resolution and peace. The National Peace Secretariat, with its 11 regional peace committees and more than 200 local peace committees, trained 15 000 peace monitors across the country, drawn from all sections of society (Camay & Gordon, undated). Camay and Gordon (undated) argue that:

“an essential element of the success of the National Peace Accord (NPA) surely was the building of grassroots support and extensive participation by individual citizens in the peace process. Those communities who felt that the NPA structures were being imposed from above declined to participate. Those who initiated peace moves themselves, with eventual help from the peace structures and civil society, were empowered through new skills and confidence-building, which permitted them to improve governance at the local level”.

Following the end of apartheid, civic associations were an important vehicle for democratic participation. Initially, a range of civil society organisations participated in the process of developing policies and legislation. Habib (2013) highlights the steps that were taken to develop “an enabling environment for non-governmental organisations (NGOs)” after 1994 by repealing repressive apartheid legislation, introducing new legislation, including the Non-profit Organisations Act (Act 71 of 1997) and putting new funding mechanisms in place (Habib, 2013: 147–151). However, the post-1994 civil society sector also faced a series of challenges,
including an erosion of their funding base, staff leaving to join the public and private sectors, and the need to redefine their role for a democratic context (Davids, 2006: 3). Davids highlights that “the NGOs that survived the ‘1990s crisis’ were the ones who could rapidly develop new ways of relating to the democratically elected government, politically liberate communities and donor-funding fashions” (Davids, 2006: 3). A key debate has been about how such organisations position themselves in relation to their former struggle allies who are now in government. Although more formalised structures were established for engagement, interactions became increasingly “adversarial” (Booysen, 2011: 176), particularly as the focus became about perceived shortcomings in government’s ability to deliver on its commitments (Booysen, 2011: 176).

Another area where there was tension was between LDFs established in the early 1990s to bring together local stakeholders and involve local people in development, and the transitional local government structures implemented after 1994. Tensions often emerged between newly elected councillors, these LDFs and traditional authorities.

One of the challenges has been to come to terms with these changing relations and recognise the contribution they can make to the post-apartheid state. Archbishop Thabo Makgoba (2013: 60) highlights that:

“in today’s South Africa ... civil society bodies and religious communities need to reflect continuously on where we should stand in solidarity, and where we should voice disapproval. It is fair to say – and we would all be helped by acknowledging this – that both we and those within the political sector are still learning how to deliver and how to receive criticism that is constructive. We are also still learning what it means to hold and exchange diverse perspectives. But what is not negotiable is the duty of all of us to support and even encourage these exchanges, and respect one another’s rights to speak freely and frankly”.

In many cases, civil society organisations fluctuate between adversarial and cooperative relations with the state. This reflects the effective use of the provisions available in our constitutional democracy, so that a civil society organisation may bring a legal challenge against the state, but the same organisation may also work with the state on improving delivery or developing legislation. The ability to combine these different modes of interaction highlights the robustness of our democratic system, as well as the mutual dependencies that exist. Meaningful engagement between civil society organisations and the state is essential for there to be an “understanding of each other’s positions and aims” (Ranchod, 2007: 10–11).

Even as some civil society organisations have closed, due to a lack of funding or key people leaving to join the public sector, new organisations have emerged and new
forms of funding have developed. One major source of funding for the more established civil society organisations is outsourcing and consultancy work done for government in relation to implementation, research and policy processes. This has created a mutual dependency that is not without risks. It means that the public service sometimes outsources its core policy expertise, which has had serious implications for its ability to develop and reproduce skills. It also means that some civil society organisations have become increasingly focused on responding to the priorities of government at the expense of carrying out their core work or developing stronger grass-roots ties. This is a situation that delivers diminishing returns.

A related concern is that many civil society organisations today lack the depth of the roots they held in the 1980s. Friedman and McKaiser (undated: 9) identify a “strategic need for current CSOs to deepen their roots in order to avoid a legitimacy crisis”, based on their analysis that civil society “is vigorous, effective – and shallow”. They highlight the following (Friedman & McKaiser undated: 15):

“Most of the unemployed, casually employed and informally employed are not directly represented by CSOs. Different organisations are shallow to differing degrees but almost all are unable to claim adequate proximity to, and organised participation by, the poor. Civil society’s vigour is demonstrated by the fact that decisions in national, provincial and local government are subject to debate and influence by a variety of organisations with an ability to shape the debate – and, in some cases, to prompt government authorities to alter decisions. Perhaps the most celebrated example is that of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) which won a change in government attitude to HIV and AIDS”.

Friedman and McKaiser (undated: 32–34) maintain that organisations that engage strategically are able to influence and inform government decisions on key priorities, but that many organisations are deterred from engagement by the difficulties of identifying who in government they need to approach. However, they also suggest that “there is substantial evidence that social movements on the ground have been subject to harassment”, where they are seen to challenge interests at the local level, and that this can undermine people’s constitutional rights (Friedman & McKaiser, undated: 45). This contributes to a situation where many people in society “have the formal citizenship rights which allow them a say, but not the means and the contacts to use them” (Friedman & McKaiser, undated: 17–18). This echoes a concern raised in government’s 15-year Review about how far communities are adequately organised to take advantage of the mechanisms that exist for participation.

The experience of civil society organisations since 1994 highlights the difficulty the state faces in facilitating meaningful citizen engagement in government processes. This engagement is often mediated through civil society organisations (including a range of local-level religious and political organisations), and the weaknesses in
these structures, as well as power relations at the local level, can create obstacles to participation that are not easily overcome through government policy.

### 3.5 Traditional leadership

Few issues have divided public and expert opinion as much as the role of traditional leaders in post-apartheid South Africa. Approximately 15 million people live in areas covered by traditional leaders (Hagg & Kanyane, 2013: 141). In these areas, “traditional leaders have extensive control over the lives of their communities through their cultural and historical rootedness, and their control over land and the customary courts” (Hagg & Kanyane, 2013: 141). Some analysts identify an important role for traditional leaders in rural governance, while others oppose the idea of any formal role as being undemocratic.⁵ The government has sought to take a middle road, recognising the role traditional leaders can play in rural areas, but seeking to find ways both to democratise the institution of traditional leadership and to make it compatible with the wider democratic system.

During the apartheid and pre-apartheid era, the government sought to co-opt traditional leaders and use traditional leadership to legitimise first the British colonial system of indirect rule and then the creation of the “homelands” or Bantustans. The “Black Administration Act, 1927 ... gave limited powers and roles to traditional leaders” (Department of Traditional Affairs, 2013: 8), while the 1951 Black Authorities Act was designed to bring traditional leaders under the control of the apartheid regime. For many, this legacy called the credibility of traditional leadership into question. In the democratic era, the challenge was therefore to find a way of “defining the place and role of the institution of traditional leadership in the new system of governance” (Department of Traditional Affairs, 2013: 8).

Government’s 15-year Review highlighted work that had been started to democratise traditional leadership and emphasised that:

> “issues that require continuing assessment include whether the exercise of traditional power and authority reflects the spirit and letter of the Constitution, without the emergence of two classes of citizens: those ruled by democratically elected institutions and those ruled by unelected traditional leaders” (The Presidency, 2003: 9).

This balancing act remains the central challenge confronting government policy regarding traditional leadership, and is particularly important for gender issues, because of the dominance of men in traditional systems.

Land rights constitute one of the most controversial aspects of traditional leadership. Critics argue that the power over land can entrench gendered inequalities in access

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⁵ For a discussion of the opposing viewpoints, see Sithole and Mbele (2008).
to land and deter people from challenging traditional leaders. Mdoda (2011) argues that “the power that traditional leadership has over the land provides them with a measure of control over the communities and thus limits prospects and spaces for meaningful participation where they can be held accountable by villagers” (Mdoda, 2011: 83). The issue of land rights is also a major area of tension between traditional and municipal authorities.

Based on a comparative analysis of other African countries, the Department of Traditional Affairs has identified that “South Africa, in the 20 years of democracy, has made significant progress in relation to the recognition, reaffirmation and support of traditional leadership and establishment of recognised and legitimate structures of traditional leadership” (Department of Traditional Affairs, 2013: 3). Government has highlighted the transformation of traditional leadership as a key priority. One of the core objectives of the 2003 White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance was to “transform the institution in accordance with constitutional imperatives” (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2003: 11). This has included a focus on improving gender representation in traditional leadership structures. However, the department also highlights the fact that the development of legislation has not entirely fulfilled the objectives of ensuring constructive relations between traditional leaders and government or the “total transformation of the institution of traditional leadership’s customs and practices to fully appreciate and embrace democracy and the constitutional principles of equality, human rights, efficient governance, transparency and accountability” (Department of Traditional Affairs, 2013: 3).

For some, the focus on legislation is an area of concern. Analysts highlight that tradition necessarily evolves over time and that legislation needs to allow space for communities to constantly contest and redefine the meaning and role of traditional leadership. This process of contestation is not a threat to traditional leadership, but is the very basis of the social significance of tradition. Tradition has never been fixed, but is subject to contestation, which means traditions evolve even as they continue to influence people’s lives. This is demonstrated by the large number of disputes over the selection of traditional leaders (Hagg & Kanyane, 2013: 147). The challenge is therefore to “build on the resilient underlying values and indigenous entitlements ... yet avoid the danger of reinforcing distorted constructs of unaccountable chiefly power” (Claassens, 2008: 375).

Specific pieces of government legislation have encountered opposition partly because critics have believed they narrow the space for this contestation and evolution to take place. However, in broad terms, analysts argue that government’s approach should be viewed as an “emerging approach” (Sithole & Mbele, 2008: 36). The Department of Traditional Affairs (2013: 18) describes this approach as follows:
“The various policies and pieces of legislation related to the institution of traditional/indigenous leadership introduce an eclectic approach to institutional development by striking a balance between the imperatives of the traditional/indigenous norms, customs and traditions, on one hand, and the values and principles that underpin the Constitution, on the other hand, in a manner that assures the existence of the institution of traditional/indigenous leadership in a constitutional and democratic state.”

This approach implies that legislation should not be overly prescriptive (Sithole & Mbele, 2008: 25). Debates about how this balance could best be achieved took place through debate on the Traditional Courts Bill, which was withdrawn in December 2012. These debates focused attention on a range of issues, including the gender balance in traditional leadership, the need to ensure that the principles of the Constitution are not undermined, and the rights of individuals to opt out of traditional systems. The fact that such a vibrant debate could take place around this issue is a sign that the democratic system is providing a space within which different interest groups can grapple with and work through hotly contested issues.

3.6 The media

The media plays an important role in enabling citizens to learn about, and influence public policy. This makes issues of access, ownership and editorial control central questions for democracy and citizenship.

The apartheid regime pursued an aggressive strategy of media control, attempting to shape and restrict access to ideas and information, as the following quote from Dr Albert Hertzog, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs at that time, in a speech to Parliament in 1953 demonstrates (cited in Mosia, 1994):

“The problem is that the moment we give the native a radio and encourage him to listen, we place in his hands a weapon that may harm the native himself. He may not use his radio to listen to what is good for him, but listen to all the propaganda coming from abroad... The problem is to provide this radio service to the native in such a way that he will derive what is good from it, but will not be exposed to these evils.”

As the struggle against apartheid intensified in the 1980s, the state responded with media restrictions under the State of Emergency, as the following analysis (Human Rights Council, 1989) from the late 1980s highlights:

“The Internal Security Act (ISA) prohibits the quoting of a ‘listed’ person. The Police Act and the Prisons Act restrict reporting on the actions of the police and the conditions in prisons respectively. Other Acts serve to suppress ‘sensitive’ information on the production and procurement of armaments, petroleum products, nuclear products, etc. State of Emergency regulations
forbid the reporting of ‘unrest’, actions of the security forces, treatment of detainees, conditions of detention, etc. The regulations also prohibit the publishing or advertising of ‘subversive statements’, defined by a long list. During 1988 alone, 2,240 reports of subversive statements were investigated. Blank spaces to indicate self-censorship are also forbidden. At present, a number of prosecutions are in progress for alleged contraventions of the above Acts and regulations."

Since 1994, democratic South Africa has enjoyed a high level of media freedom, with freedom of speech, freedom of the media and access to information enshrined in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The electronic media has been transformed from an entirely state-owned landscape (save for a handful of commercial music radio stations licensed to operate by the apartheid homeland regimes) to a diversity of independent radio stations licensed under community and commercial licences, issued by the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), a state broadcaster under apartheid, has been reinvented as a public broadcaster, governed by an independent board. The governance of the SABC has attracted significant attention, given the public interest in the role and functioning of the SABC as the public broadcaster. The Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA), created by an Act of Parliament, focuses on transforming the media and championing access to the media in historically excluded communities. These independent institutions are important achievements that contribute to the robustness of the country’s democracy, and the NDP highlights the need to protect the “independence and autonomy of media institutions and regulatory bodies” (National Planning Commission, 2012: 464).

Parliament’s indaba on the transformation of the print media in 2012 noted the continued dominance by a small number of media companies and an overall “lack of diversity in the ownership and control, language, race, gender, content, sources of news, employment equity, etc.” (Parliament, 2012). The importance of the transformation of the print media goes beyond the print media itself, as it is also an important source of online content (Bird & Smith, 2012).

The patterns of media control and production contribute to uneven levels of access that favour the better off. Media Monitoring Africa (Bird & Smith, 2012) notes that for the middle class and urban population, there is significant diversity of media, whereas in rural areas people are often limited to the SABC and the community media sector. Providing affordable access to broadband would help to diversify this media access.

The state has an important role to play in broadening access to the media and protecting the space for freedom of expression and the exchange of ideas by creating an enabling environment to support the sustainable entry of alternative
voices in media production, distribution and ownership through the commercial media, as well as non-commercial community and public media initiatives.

3.7 Mediation and protest

The apartheid history of conflictual relations between the state and citizens has not always been easy to overcome. Under apartheid, government facilities such as schools, police stations and municipal offices were the target of people’s rejection of an oppressive system, with the call to render South Africa ungovernable taken up by communities across South Africa from the mid-1980s. Since 1994, at times there was a return to these strategies as citizens in poor communities turn to protest, and sometimes violence, in order to articulate their demands and seek a response from the state.

Much citizen engagement with the state does not take place through the formal structures set up to facilitate participation. Often citizens are reliant on a range of local powerbrokers to access government resources and elevate concerns. While the range of mediators can play an important role in facilitating access to government resources, these forms of mobilisation tend to operate outside the constitutional norms of formal participation mechanisms, sometimes operating on (or beyond) the boundaries of illegality and violence.

Friedman and McKaiser (undated: 19) criticise the use of the term “service delivery protest” for reducing the complex causes and demands of protesters to a narrow narrative about service delivery. The findings of a recent study, The Smoke that Calls, confirm this. The study identifies that local community life has been defined by “rapid processes of class formation – through which on the one hand a new (local) elite is emerging and, on the other, a large underclass of unemployed and precariously employed, together with the dislocations of the transition from apartheid to democracy – is generating fierce struggles over inclusion and exclusion both within the elite, between elites and subalterns, and within the subaltern classes themselves” (Von Holdt, 2011: 6–7). These struggles “over citizenship and exclusion” often manifest themselves in violent forms that draw on practices of “insurgent civil society of the struggle against apartheid” (Von Holdt, 2011: 6–7). Demands include “claims for work and housing, for an improvement in municipal services, and to be heard and recognised” (Von Holdt, 2011: 23). Protests often target local government as the most visible sphere of government, even for issues outside municipal responsibility, as “local government has become the scapegoat for failures higher up in the provincial and national government spheres” (Booysen, 2011: 128).

There has been an increase in the frequency of protests and “protests have become increasingly violent, marked by the destruction of public and private property, and confrontations between armed police and stone-throwing crowds” (Von Holdt, 2011: 5). These are variously referred to as service delivery protests, “local community
Protests are concentrated in poor areas with high levels of unemployment, and “unemployed youth were frequently at the forefront of protest” (Booysen, 2011: 160). However, there is no direct correlation between poverty and protest levels. Protests have predominantly been in metropolitan municipalities or neighbouring townships (Booysen, 2011: 128), although research by the Community Law Centre shows that since 2010, more protests have taken place in non-metro municipalities than in metros (Community Law Centre, 2013). Protests are typically prompted by a range of concerns relating to access to services, the quality of services and the perceived non-responsiveness of local government (Booysen, 2011: 134–136). Indeed, Booysen suggests that “in many instances the protests would not have materialised had it not been for community exasperation with non-responsive and/or absentee local government ‘representation’, broken promises by local governments, along with community observation of mismanagement, cronyism, patronage and corruption in local councils” (Booysen, 2011: 136). This range of grievances can give rise to protest where local-level leadership groups emerge, often on a temporary basis, that harness people’s concerns and mobilise them into protest.

These conclusions broadly confirm the analysis presented in the 15-year Review:

“The protests that engulfed some communities in recent years have had a variety of causes. They have been about service delivery and reflected local political dynamics. They have also arisen from failures of public representatives to account or fully involve citizens in decision-making that affects their lives; and failures of communities to exploit the opportunities of representative institutions … At the same time, the trends in direct protest action do not signify disillusion with representative democracy as such – areas affected by protests before the 2006 local government elections tended to see high levels of voter participation and strong results for the incumbent party of the area” (The Presidency, 2008: 8).

Protest should not be seen as a sign of disengagement and detachment from electoral politics, since it often coexists with electoral participation, but this should not obscure the downside of a reliance on protest as a strategy for engagement with the state. The frequency of violence in protests threatens both life and property. The greater the reliance on protest, the more other mechanisms will be seen as being ineffective. The priority is therefore to ensure that other channels for participation and accountability work effectively to convince citizens that they can use these channels, and that these channels are taken seriously. This approach should not only focus on better utilisation of the formal participatory structures, but also on
improving routine engagement and communication at the local level. This routine communication needs to form the centre of democratic politics, thus allowing both elected representatives and government officials to pre-empt the sense of alienation and marginalisation that lies at the heart of many violent protests.

4. Towards improvement
South Africa has made enormous progress over the first 20 years of its democracy in establishing the constitutional and legal principles that give all citizens the right to participate in and influence the formulation of policy and the delivery of services.

In the past 20 years, the democratic South Africa has succeeded in establishing an ambitious policy framework for a people-centred society. However, the terrain for implementation is a society that has been shaped by centuries of colonialism and apartheid. This legacy of power over people is deeply rooted in society, and replicates itself through the daily realities of life. The formal elected spaces have been transformed, with people able to vote at local, provincial and national level regardless of race, gender or class. Yet, despite the formal equality in opportunities for participation, “most South Africans are experiencing a de facto inequality of access to participation – a division that is along almost identical race and gender lines to those of the past, but with the empowered class now both black and white. Hence, it may be argued that the constitutional and legislative requirements for community participation that have been instituted are a necessary but insufficient condition for meaningful community participation in the South African socio-economic context” (Davids, 2006: 5).

The efforts to transform the state and society into a participatory democracy have largely relied on legislation and supply-driven initiatives that attempt to fit the citizen into the hierarchical architecture of the state. The PSC notes that “public participation in South Africa is still too much of a public relations exercise – inputs are solicited from the public, but there is little evidence of how this influenced public policy or service delivery design” (PSC, 2011: 54). This highlights the need to ensure that participatory processes are taken seriously by public representatives and officials, as citizens are unlikely to engage if they feel participatory processes are only being done for show.

Obstacles identified for people participating in local government processes include distance, time constraints and “participation fatigue” (Davids, 2006: 6). Participatory mechanisms have been built up over time, but the expansion of participatory mechanisms does not automatically translate into a deepening of participation. There is a tendency to view mechanisms of participation from the perspective of the state, but this focuses attention narrowly on the “invited spaces” (the formal spaces for structured participation created by the state). The focus is also often on the lower end of the spectrum of participation, with participation being facilitated to inform or
placate rather than to consult and empower. Empowered citizens can challenge the state, whether at the level of a school, a health clinic, or a local government, which could threaten the interests of some people. As a result, the formal spaces for participation can become hollow, without a clear focus, energy or power.

A fuller public participation process needs to pay more attention to the many “invented spaces” (the less formal spaces that emerge organically through the way citizens structure and organise their own lives). The nature of citizenship in a democratic state should not be reduced to a narrow account of how citizens utilise the formally provided spaces for interaction. Formal policies and programmes only tell part of the story. Constitutionally defined freedoms of speech, movement and association enable citizens to develop and utilise many other channels for interacting with the state. Invited spaces typically operate in isolation from the wider lives of citizens and are instead defined by the logic of governance, by the ways they interact with the state. By contrast, invented spaces are likely to emerge out of citizens’ wider lives, structured through the social, economic and political relations that shape people’s wider lives. To think seriously about how the state interacts with its citizens, careful consideration needs to be given to how elected representatives and government officials engage with these spaces.

Particular attention also needs to be given to improving the scope for routine day-to-day accountability at the point of delivery, so that citizens’ concerns about the quality or availability of services can be addressed promptly.

Understanding the ways in which citizens interact with the state is an important first step towards thinking about how these interactions can be improved. From this point of view, it is a cause for concern that there is little information on how citizens experience their interactions with the state, including when and how they rely on particular forms of mediation. It is important to ask why academia, civil society and the media have not played a bigger role in telling these stories.

The examples of successful turnaround strategies in government, such as the dramatic reduction in time taken to issue ID books and passports, and the modernisation of the South African Revenue Service (SARS), have been achieved through a problem-focused process that did not begin with a detailed plan for the end solution. Instead, improvements have been achieved by looking at a given operational process with an open-minded problem-centred lens and co-creating solutions with the people involved in the given process, and with a commitment to improving the quality and responsiveness of service provision. The improved system therefore emerges through the aggregation of small improvements, taking the people involved along with each step of the improvement process, and ensuring that achievements are consolidated and built upon. This approach to enabling continuous improvements may hold the key to unlocking the potential for using the different forms of public participation more effectively. By
ensuring that frontline staff have clarity about their roles and the systems within which they operate, these improvements also help ensure that staff are better able to respond to and address specific concerns as and when they arise, thus helping to strengthen the routine accountability that is central to constructive day-to-day relations between the state and its citizens.

Now that participatory mechanisms have been established, the priority is to focus on improving the effectiveness and credibility of these mechanisms. This cannot be achieved through any individual policy or regulation, but rather requires ongoing attention and effort. Citizens will not take participatory processes seriously if they feel they are only done for show. It is therefore important to reflect on the reasons why citizens do not engage more with participatory processes and also why the state is not more effective in responding to issues raised through participatory processes.

In future, the focus needs to be on ensuring that participatory mechanisms provide effective channels for sustained engagement between citizens and the state, which will allow the state to develop a better understanding of citizens’ priorities and concerns, and for citizens to more fully appreciate the resource and other constraints faced by the state. An obstacle to this is the decline in the responsibilities and expectations of many junior and mid-level officials in the public service. The result is that those officials who should be responsible for facilitating and driving participatory processes are often insufficiently empowered and capacitated to fulfil this responsibility.

The NDP identifies a number of focus areas to improve relations and trust between the state and citizens, to improve the quality and consistency of service delivery, and to strengthen the participatory dimension of South Africa’s democratic system.

These areas include the following:

Ensuring responsiveness of services:

- Placing a greater focus on routine day-to-day accountability, particularly at the point of delivery
- Placing a greater focus on delegation to ensure that frontline staff are sufficiently empowered to address citizens’ concerns
- Ensuring a sustained focus on improving management and operational systems, so that staff at the frontline are better able to respond to citizens’ needs and concerns
- Strengthening the developmental commitment and professional ethos of the public service and local government administration by ensuring that the work environment is conducive to fostering a sense of professional common purpose

Ensuring that participatory processes provide meaningful spaces for engagement:
• Placing a greater focus on engaging citizens in their own spaces, and on formal participation mechanisms
• Ensuring that participation in IDP processes is deliberative, with citizens being involved in identifying and resolving trade-offs, rather than simply identifying lists of priorities
• Ensuring that participatory processes are run by elected representatives and officials rather than being outsourced
References


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