TWENTY YEAR REVIEW
SOUTH AFRICA
1994 - 2014

BACKGROUND PAPER:
SOUTH AFRICA IN THE
GLOBAL ARENA
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Disclaimer
The background papers are written by officials in the Presidency and other government departments using inputs from literature reviews, commissioned research, government reviews and reports and roundtable discussions with a range of stakeholders. The views reflected in the background papers do not represent those of the Presidency, but rather reflect authors' views on sector developments.
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<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<td>AGOA</td>
<td>African Growth and Opportunity Act</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanism</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India and China</td>
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<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMP 7</td>
<td>7th session of the Conference of the Parties (serving as the Meeting of the Parties) to the Kyoto Protocol</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>COP 17</td>
<td>17th session of the Conference of the Parties</td>
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<td>DBSA</td>
<td>Development Bank of Southern Africa</td>
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<td>DIRCO</td>
<td>Department of International Relations and Cooperation</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>(United Nations) Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of 20 significant economies in the world</td>
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<td>G77</td>
<td>Group of 77 (Forum)</td>
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<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight countries</td>
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<td>IBSA</td>
<td>India-Brazil-South Africa (Forum)</td>
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<td>ICBC</td>
<td>Industrial and Commercial Bank of China</td>
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<td>IDC</td>
<td>Industrial Development Corporation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information technology</td>
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<td>KPCS</td>
<td>Kimberley Process Certification Scheme</td>
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<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>NAASP</td>
<td>New Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership</td>
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<td>NAMA</td>
<td>Non-agricultural Market Access</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGP</td>
<td>New Growth Path</td>
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<td>NIPF</td>
<td>National Industrial Policy Framework</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAT</td>
<td>South African Tourism</td>
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<td>SPP</td>
<td>Southern African Power Pool</td>
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<td>The dti</td>
<td>The Department of Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>UNHRC</td>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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Review

1. Introduction and background

As the free South Africa reaches 20 years since the first democratic elections in 1994, reflections on what it has achieved in the global arena and what challenges remain are apt. This is because the South African problem – racial domination and marginalisation – and the achievement of democracy had global significance, enabling the free South Africa to immediately become a global citizen of note. The iconography of Nelson Mandela and other freedom fighters, South Africa’s cultural and performing artists and its sportmen and -women combined with the fame of the famous democratic transition to give South Africa notable prestige globally. South Africa’s policies and actions since 1994 have helped to enhance this further with benefits for its population, while domestic challenges and weaknesses in its conduct have at times had a weakening effect on this stature. This review provides a critical appraisal of South Africa’s role in the global arena since 1994. It does so mindful of the contested nature of the global arena itself and South Africa’s role in it.

Because there have been two comprehensive reviews in the recent past – one at ten years after democracy in 2004 and another at the fifteen-year mark in 2008 – this report does not substantively repeat the detail on the achievements and challenges outlined in the international relations sections of Towards a Ten-year Review (The Presidency, 2003) and Towards a Fifteen-year Review (The Presidency, 2008), both commissioned by government. The report also draws on inputs submitted by various departments, in particular the comprehensive input from the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).

The review reflects on and amplifies, where necessary, the findings of the previous reviews, while building on the findings to paint a nuanced picture of how South Africa’s role internationally could be understood. It is mindful of the fact that the narrative about South Africa’s international engagements is a contested terrain, subject to all manner of interpretations and coloured by different ideologies (silent and overt). The report draws on official documents that have been produced by government over the years, scholarly literature and conversations with stakeholders like civil society formations.

This review provides a concise assessment of the history of South Africa’s role globally since 1994 in the context of the limited choices and huge commitments the country had, including how the dynamics of transition impacted on this. It furthermore reflects on achievements of government over the past 20 years, and the significant accomplishments that can be celebrated. It concludes by contemplating the future: Why South Africa is doing well in some areas and not in others, and what we can do differently, particularly with regard to relations between government and civil society.
To this end, the review reflects on South Africa’s approaches to international relations, South Africa’s African agenda, south-south cooperation, north-south cooperation, multilateralism and the reform of institutions of global governance, economic diplomacy, international marketing and branding, parliamentary oversight and international relations, foreigners in South Africa and South Africans abroad.

1.1 Paradigm and outlook
Both the achievements and shortcomings of South Africa’s position and role in international political and economic relations relate in part to matters of doctrine, paradigm and approaches to international relations. This is because these provide a normative framework for the choices made and choices not made. Derived from the progressive internationalism doctrine\(^1\) of the liberation struggle against apartheid, this paradigm continues to hinge on the following:

- A belief in democracy, strong governance and human rights, without an inclination to impose this belief on others.
- A commitment to justice and international law in the conduct of relations between nations.
- A dedication to international peace and the use of mechanisms for peace-making that are agreed upon internationally, thus a rejection of unilateralist conducts.
- A commitment to the interests of Africa in international affairs, including economic development through regional and international cooperation.
- A commitment to global reform in order to create an equal, fairer, just and democratic international order.

This paradigm also finds expression in the intention to balance matters of national interests with those of principles, values and norms of responsible global citizenship. South Africa has always avoided tilting the balance too much one way or the other. The need to attract investments, for instance, is not supposed to turn the country into a mercantilist actor looking only after its interests.

This paradigm also bears imprints of a multidimensional national identity of South Africa after formal apartheid. As a country born out of compromise between

\(^1\) Progressive internationalism is the approach taken during the struggle when the liberation movements linked change in South Africa to the struggle for a new global order marked by justice, fairness and equality. See Zondi, S. ANC’s international solidarity and progressive internationalism. In: Khondlo, K, Saunders, C & Zondi, S. (eds.). “ANC centenary perspectives: The end of history?” Forthcoming
apartheid and anti-apartheid forces, South Africa has instincts that drive it towards negotiated solutions and diplomacy as the way to pursue trade, security and peace. Its approach to southern Africa’s regional integration, and trade and investment engagements in Africa is development integration. This means contributing to the expansion and the diversification of economic production, rather than merely opening markets for South African businesses. But, this too, is contested, including by those who see South Africa as part of the Euro-American world system. As a country that has recently found its home in Africa after decades of isolation, African interests or African renaissance continues to undergird its choices and decisions. It does not always draw a distinction between its national interests and pan-African common good. It also has inbuilt reformist instincts, born out of its identification with the global periphery for whom the reform of the global order is the only way to a fair, just, inclusive and prosperous world order.

1.2 Advancing the national interest
Whether or not South Africa has advanced its national interest, whether it has advanced it in full or in part, and what this national interest means, is a hotly debated subject in discourses on the country’s role in the world. While those within government assume their unanimity on what national interest mean and on the argument that South Africa has substantively advanced it, their differences surface when questions are raised about the so-called return on investment the country has made in helping potentially rich African countries out of conflict. They are also divided when asked about how the flurry of activities and outputs that government reports on regularly, especially in areas of political and security diplomacy, translate into meeting the country’s domestic imperatives in the form of eradicating poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Differences in the general civil society about interest-driven or values-driven foreign policy and economic diplomacy often epitomise ideological differences over state-business relations, but also the problems of narrow definitions that see a distinction between values and interests. Differences also epitomise a divergence of views about whether or not Africa’s common good is part of the country’s national interests.

Some of the differences have to do with the unfinished work on the new national identity forged in a long struggle to defeat racial and colonial domination in the hope of building a non-racial, non-sexist, just, equal and peaceful society. Here, too, there are tensions between the commitment to struggle values and liberal values (economic and political), propounded by others as “universal” when, in fact, they are

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2 This is the thinking behind the approach of the Department of Trade and Industry (the dti) to trade and investments in Africa, according to the dti’s input to the methodology workshop on South Africa at 20 years.
provincial, nothing more than “Eurocentric pretensions”\textsuperscript{4}. In this myriad of perspectives and competing demands, the country’s national interests have been, by and large, defined by default; they have been derived from action rather than declarations. Such action has placed the building of a human society, justice and peace for all, and a better life (socio-economic prosperity) for all, in South Africa and in Africa, above all other considerations.

While this has not been uniformly and evenly adhered to, it is, by and large, the guiding light of South Africa’s economic, trade, political and social relations with the world community. The revised National Development Plan (National Planning Commission, 2012), adopted in 2012, has gone a long way in defining the domestic imperatives that underpin the national interest and how this guides international engagements. The challenge is to work further to refine this in order to ensure that it is fully integrated into the way South Africa thinks about its role in the world and how it deploys its resources in world affairs.

1.3 Government capacity

The state machinery and the governing party remain major drivers in the evolution of both the framework and content of the country’s international conduct. For this reason, as both the ten-year review and the fifteen-year review of government show, since 1994, there has been an enduring focus on the transformation of the state apparatus to position it to achieve ambitious international relations goals. In the first decade, this was about transforming, expanding and strengthening the Department of Foreign Affairs (now known as the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)), amalgamating similar departments from the Bantustans, the apartheid state and the liberation movements.

This process was largely successful; hence today the foreign policy architecture and the institutional framework responsible for South Africa’s international relations is strong and comprehensive. This refers to DIRCO, the Department of Trade and Industry (the dti), National Treasury, the Department of Defence and Military Veterans, and subnational governments, as well as the Cabinet Cluster responsible for international affairs.

The second focus was on strengthening coordination among government departments, which was also successful to the extent that coordinating meetings are held to harmonise work, but not to the point that there is sufficiently strong cohesion in strategic thinking and action among stakeholders within and outside government.

Formal diplomatic representation was successfully expanded, with the result that the number of diplomatic missions abroad increased from 65 in 1994 to over 125 by

March 2013 (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012:19). This includes a number of consulate and liaison offices, and missions to international organisations. The country now accredits 123 embassies or high commissions and 35 external missions of international organisations based in South Africa. However, the quality of this representation depends on the quality of diplomats being appointed as the number of missions increase beyond the size of the skills set available, as well as on the worrying increase in the number of political appointees without strong performance track records or exposure in international relations.

Yet, on the face of it, the data on trade and public perceptions of South Africa suggests that, on the whole, the diplomatic representation, especially in Africa, remains strong enough both in number and political capability to continue to impact positively on the country’s standing in Africa and its trade with the continent.\(^5\)

While South Africa has promised a stronger combination of political and economic diplomacy since the end of the first decade, the deployment of diplomatic skill and capacity does not adequately demonstrate this intention, especially in the period since 2009, given the tilting of the ratio of career diplomats versus political appointees in favour of the latter.

Secondly, government has not significantly leveraged the availability of economic and commercial expertise in various departments, civil society and in the business sector in order to enhance its capacity for economic diplomacy. The introduction of economic diplomacy into diplomatic training programmes is a small, but significant step in the right direction. Ultimately, effective economic diplomacy will come from better coordination between DIRCO, the departments working on economic and finance matters, and the private sector. It also depends on the identification of talent in the areas of trade and commercial diplomacy, and the intelligent deployment of expertise for the country to attract productive investment. This will help give South African business a competitive advantage, especially in Africa and growing parts of the global south.

1.4 Intra-governmental coordination

Increasingly, South African diplomacy and development cooperation have taken place through the intense activities of the municipalities and provincial governments. This accounts for some foreign direct investment, development assistance and lesson-sharing. There have been efforts to improve coordination among the activities of these subnational governments and between them and national government, including by developing an accessible manual to guide subnational governments on international engagements and aligning their activities to the national agenda. There is also the Consultative Forum on International Relations, chaired by the Director-

\(^5\) Presentation of the findings of the foreign policy public perceptions survey by the University of Cape Town and University of Stellenbosch at the Institute for Global Dialogue Seminar on 29 July 2013, Pretoria.
General of DIRCO, in which national and subnational governments can help deepen cohesion and build a common approach to international diplomacy. Yet, paradiplomacy remains disjointed, haphazard and ad hoc. The extent to which this coordination at the level of officials is linked and in sync with intergovernmental coordination at the political level in the form of presidential and ministerial coordinating forums is open to conjecture.

The following challenges can be identified with regard to South Africa’s approach to international relations:

- Developing deeper internal consensus in government and in South African society about the meaning and implication of national interest in South Africa’s international relations remains work in progress.
- Developing a shared understanding in government and in the broader society of the country’s doctrine and paradigm gives its international role a normative framework.
- The coordination of intergovernmental relations strengthens international diplomacy at both the level of officials and the political level.

2. The journey since 1994

2.1 South Africa’s African agenda 1994-2012

Since 1994, South Africa has reoriented its international relations from a pro-Western posture towards a pluralistic posture with Africa as the priority of priorities. The African agenda grew remarkably in scope and depth during the first decade of democracy under the rubric of “African renaissance”, with the focus equally devoted to strengthening the institutional framework that might support the renewal process (the African Union (AU)) and the policy agenda that gives it content (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)). The pillars of South Africa’s African agenda are as follows:

- Promote peace, stability, security and post-conflict reconstruction and development.
- Support and promote socio-economic development.
- Strengthen bilateral relations on the continent.
- Enhance African unity and integration through the strengthening of continental institutions of governance and development like the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), later the AU, NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
- Strengthen regional integration and institutions, with a special focus on the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

2.2 Enhancing the African unity and integration

In the first five years, the normative framework of South Africa’s African agenda was successfully established, so that African renewal became a default basis for most of
the country’s decisions on international relations. South Africa’s engagement with the rest of Africa was thus expanded through the prioritisation of African capitals for the establishment of diplomatic missions, the posting of diplomats to the OAU and SADC, high-level participation in institutional reforms from the OAU to the AU, and the strengthening of the SADC structures. By the end of the decade, South Africa had contributed immensely to the strengthening of Africa’s common agenda around African renewal and its voice in international diplomacy through NEPAD, as evidenced by the quality of Africa’s engagement with the Group of Eight (G8) countries, the EU and the USA.

The *Fifteen-year Review* (The Presidency, 2008) found that, at the beginning of the second decade of the free South Africa, the key challenge was the operationalisation of these two focal areas. In terms of government’s Outcome 11 of 2009–2014, which provides for an enhanced African agenda and sustainable development, South Africa has continued to play a prominent role in championing common positions on intra-African integration and on Africa’s international relations since 2008, with a special focus on strengthening the AU Commission and ensuring concrete infrastructure development under NEPAD. It has also given a lot of focus to building strong relationships with other key African powers to promote collective leadership for a better Africa, registering some success in some cases, while difficulties remain in a number of relations.

The infrastructural development focus is given effect by South Africa’s coordination of continent-wide spatial development corridors within the ambit of NEPAD. The country has also put significant effort into the alignment of continental integration initiatives through the creation and consolidation of the East African Community (EAC)/Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)/SADC Tripartite, and the implementation of the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. The challenge is to build strong partnerships with other key states, the private sector and international organisations for the achievement of ambitious plans.

With regard to the intention to consolidate the African continental architecture through the strengthening of the AU Commission, as the engine of the African integration process, South Africa made Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, one of its strongest policy implementers, available in 2012 for election as the Commission chairperson, and campaigned actively in support of her election bid. Whether her election will lead to greater internal efficiency and the effectiveness of the Commission as an executing agency of the AU collective is contingent on the support South Africa gives to her efforts to win full political support across Africa for her plans.

During its second tenure in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in 2011/12, South Africa successfully promoted AU-United Nations (UN) cooperation in dealing with African
challenges. It presided over the UN-AU coordination meeting in April 2008 and helped put the coordination issue firmly on the UN agenda, resulting in the unanimous adoption of the UNSC Resolution 1809, which advised the Secretary-General to establish a panel to recommend ways of strengthening the relationship. Its outcomes, tabled in 2009 (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2009:44), resulted in dialogues that culminated in the UNSC Resolution 2033 in 2012, which formalised the cooperation between the AUPSC and the UNSC (Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2012:20). South Africa also promoted its African agenda commitments through dialogue within both councils and organs of the AU and the UN, taking advantage of its membership of both. The challenge is that there is no evidence suggesting that this huge step forward has been harnessed by successor African countries in the UNSC by ensuring effective coordination on the ground. This raises questions about the value of investing so much in getting decisions made if their implementation is not promoted with similar vigour.

South Africa’s chairing of the SADC Organ on Defence, Politics and Security Cooperation during 2011/12 focused on strengthening the synergy in peace and security processes at UN, AU and SADC levels, and to support negotiated political solutions in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. To promote and entrench democratisation and good governance in the region, it has played a positively influential role in SADC Election Observation Missions and the operationalisation of the SADC Electoral Advisory Council.

As recorded in the *Fifteen-year Review* (The Presidency, 2008), South Africa has continued to maintain strong bilateral relations in Africa, with a special focus on countries considered influential in various regions. While efforts to boost relations with virtually every country in Africa and most countries in the global south and north are notable, with over 35 structural bilateral relations frequently managed through dialogue forums in the years since 2009 – building on the same attitude before then – the further elevation of certain bilateral relations is worth noting. For instance, there has been a clearly intense focus on relations with Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Ghana and Kenya. The strengthening of relations with Botswana and Nigeria, while significant in their own right, was occasioned by difficulties that surfaced in the course of the current term of government.

### 2.3 Socio-economic development in Africa

The focus on socio-economic development in Africa has related mainly to the building of trade and investment relations, on the one hand, and the pursuit of development cooperation, on the other. The expansion of a diplomatic presence on the continent from the onset facilitated the expansion of South Africa’s trade relations with the continent through private sector and public sector investments. Trade relations and investment in Africa have grown significantly over the past two decades.
and they continue to grow to this day. This has resulted in the reversal of apartheid era economic isolation from the continent (The Presidency, 2008:34; Marais, 2001). There is yet to be a change in the balance of trade with the continent due to uneven levels of development and the relative power of the South African economy vis-à-vis many African countries.

South Africa also focused on cross-border infrastructure and services to enable better movement of persons, goods and services between South Africa and the continent in the hope of increasing investment and trade (Vickers & Ajulu, 2008). SADC’s spatial development initiatives on energy, oil and gas extraction, electrical power generation, and water and transport enhance the potential for South Africa’s influence on regional economies. The following serve as examples:

- The Maputo Corridor through Mozambique and South Africa was created in August 1995 and continues to boost trade in south-east Africa.
- The Trans-Kalahari Corridor, which connects Namibia’s port of Walvis Bay to South Africa, began operating in 1998, helping to undo economic disconnect with the west of the region.
- The Lesotho Highlands Water Project immensely benefited the landlocked and poverty-stricken Lesotho, while it helped boost South Africa’s water supply, which was critical for household consumption and for the economy.
- The Trans-Kalahari Highway, which links the economies of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia, has been agreed upon.
- The Southern African Power Pool (SPP), which connects the power grids of all SADC member states through the construction of linking systems, has been established at a cost of over R2.1 billion.
- Other initiatives in which South Africa has played an influential role are the Unity Bridge between Mozambique and Tanzania, the Beira Corridor between Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and the Congo-Bas Corridor, which joins the DRC, Angola and the Congo Republic.

Following the 1996 SADC Trade Protocol, aimed at phasing out trade barriers among member states as a preliminary step towards a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), South African development finance institutions, such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), as well as state-owned enterprises, increased their investments into infrastructure development. These institutions are also behind the recently agreed R8 billion SADC fund to develop subregional infrastructure.

South Africa’s role in the consolidation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), as well as its championing of SACU negotiations with the USA in 2008, India in 2009 and South America’s Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) in 2009, contributed to the regional pursuit of industrialisation. In 2011, South Africa hosted a
crucial SACU Summit that made progress towards the resolution of two major challenges (divergence among SACU members over the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the European Union (EU) and the dramatic decline in customs revenue in the context of the global economic crisis) possible. The summit also adopted measures to strengthen the institutional framework of SACU.\(^6\) South Africa’s concern has been to manage its relationship with smaller SACU member states that depend quite significantly on SACU customs revenues. Questions about the relationship between SADC and SACU membership, and the challenges of overlapping membership continue to be raised.

In the years after 2008, there has been a stronger focus on infrastructural development in southern Africa and Africa. Since 2009, South Africa has become the champion of the AU/NEPAD Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative in global platforms on behalf of the continent. This includes the idea of a north-south road and rail corridor.

As a result, South Africa’s trade and investment portfolio in Africa has continued to increase dramatically. South Africa exceeded R210 billion in 2012, almost double the volume of trade with North America, and trade statistics show an upward trend going forward. South Africa’s trade with the SADC region has grown strongly over the 2009–2013 period, helping to put this region second only to the EU as a destination of exports. The decline of the share of trade with the global north has been more than compensated for by the rise of trade with Africa and emerging economies. The balance of trade with the region and the rest of the continent remains in favour of South Africa, with the volume of its exports almost double its imports from Africa.

3. Reflection on achievements

3.1 Peace and post-conflict reconstruction and development

The Fifteen-year Review (The Presidency, 2008) found that South Africa’s contribution to peace, stability and post-conflict transition has been integral to post-apartheid Africa policy. From its role in the stabilisation of Burundi and the DRC in the first decade to its facilitation of transition to peace and democracy in Madagascar and Zimbabwe, South Africa had become the leader in peace diplomacy in Africa. The country is increasingly being invited into regions it is not traditionally associated with, and its involvement in the resolution of conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and Sudan, as well as growing involvement in the central African efforts to stabilise the Central African Republic, is a case in point. South Africa has earned a reputation for being an accomplished mediator with presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma having played prominent roles in major negotiated settlements in Africa. Mbeki’s mediation

\(^6\) “South Africa and the South African Customs Union”, presentation by Minister Rob Davies, MP, to the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry on 30 July 2013.
in Sudan and Zuma’s facilitation role in Zimbabwe are examples of this in the last five years of this review.

South Africa’s peace support gained currency during the period under review. The country has continued to contribute troops, military police, civilian experts, peace expertise and resources to UN-sanctioned peacekeeping missions. South Africa’s contribution to peacekeeping in Africa has remained constant, with troop contributions to UN-sanctioned missions having continued to increase in the period after 2008. South Africa’s military capability has been deployed in peacekeeping missions and capacity-building missions that have mainly been focused on the reform of the security sector in over ten countries in Africa, with the majority of troops and equipment deployed to the DRC, Burundi and Sudan. New missions began after the *Fifteen-year Review*, such as Operation Copper in Mozambique and Operation Fibre in Liberia, as well as deployments in Tanzania and Equatorial Guinea. The deployment of 56 troops in the Central African Republic, in keeping with a bilateral defence agreement, had to be reinforced with further troops when the rebellion broke out in the north of the country in December 2012, but this failed to prevent the killing in March 2013, of which 36 were by rebels of the DRC and Sudan.

The decision to contribute troops and equipment to the African and SADC Standby Forces will further expand South Africa’s contribution to security capacity in Africa. The contribution of the South African civil society formation in the form of research and analysis by organisations like the Institute of Security Studies, the Centre for Conflict Resolution and the Afro-Middle East Centre, capacity-building initiatives in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the convening of second-track dialogue in post-conflict countries by the Institute for Global Dialogue and technical support for mediation provided by the Centre for Mediation, is part of South Africa’s growing role in peace-building in Africa.

Table 1  
SA troops’ deployment in UN-sanctioned peace operations in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation/mission</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Mistral</td>
<td>DRC (eastern)</td>
<td>1 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Teutonic</td>
<td>DRC (security sector reform)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Curriculum</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1 053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Cordite</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Espresso</td>
<td>Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Vimbezela</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Bongane</td>
<td>Uganda (northern)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Ndui</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2 900</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Annual reports of the Department of Defence and Military Veterans, 2013*
The African Renaissance Fund, which is being replaced by the Partnership Fund under the South African Development Partnership Agency, has been used to fund post-conflict reconstruction, with a particular focus on the building of state capacity and humanitarian relief. Further resources continue to come from individual government departments and agencies involved in various forms of capacity-building, from the training of tax officials in the DRC to technical assistance with the establishment of key national departments in newly independent South Sudan. The intended goals of stabilising transitioning states – the promotion of democracy and socio-economic development – have been advanced with varying success. The country has been particularly successful in building stable capacity through military and police training, as well as promoting democratic transition through the support of elected post-transition governments and electoral assistance.

In particular, the electoral assistance to the Comoros in 2007 and to the DRC in 2006 and 2011 were critical for the progress of transitions in these conflict-ridden countries. The technical and financial support to the peace facilitation in Burundi in 2006, in Zimbabwe in 2008 to 2012 and in Madagascar in 2012 played a decisive role in the success of these peace processes. The multifaceted support to the rehabilitation of Timbuktu in Mali in 2006 to 2008 was intended to preserve crucial history and thus boost the confidence of a conflict-prone country, while the assistance to UN efforts against drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau in 2008 contributed to the fight against the capture of a state by international drug moguls. Funding towards the independence of South Sudan was a vital contribution to state building.

By the time it was decided to replace the fund, questions were already being raised about capacity to manage, monitor and evaluate projects as their numbers increased. It was also expected to do more to help coordinate South Africa’s efforts spread through different departments and agencies. Its successor is expected to deepen coherence, coordination and synergy in South Africa’s development partnership initiatives in Africa.

### 3.2 People-to-people relations in Africa

South Africa’s relatively diversified economy, good educational and scientific institutions, integration into the global networks of people and capital have remained major attractions for both middle classes and the poor from other African countries. As a result, the immigration of people from the rest of the continent increased dramatically after 1994 and continued to grow through the past two decades. This has helped to strengthen links and understanding between the country and the rest of the continent from which it had been isolated for decades. South Africans have, in many ways, learned to be at peace with fellow Africans who have also taken their place in the economy (albeit on the fringes), culture and arts, and sports. This can also be used to explain the growth of the small business sector and the rise of incoming tourists from African countries, especially countries with which South Africa
has strong bilateral relations. Targeted by South African business looking for skilled and cheap unskilled labour, and educational institutions, African migrants have contributed to South Africa’s growth and development, while they have also deepened the country’s African identity.

However, the misunderstanding, mistrust and even hatred of African nationals by South Africans remain high enough to be a cause of concern going into the future. Recent opinion surveys show that, although the number of South Africans that do not trust African nationals has slightly declined in the second decade of democracy, at 6–7 out of 10 respondents, it remains high. This only partly explains the outbreak of violence against poor African immigrants in competition over scarce resources and job opportunities (Zondi, 2008:26–35). With high unemployment, income poverty and difficult living conditions on the South African peri-urban periphery, this problem has increased in informal settlements and townships. The explosion of violent attacks on African immigrants in urban fringes in 2008 helped force government and social partners to promote dialogue and social cohesion in poor areas more seriously than before, which helped reduce the scourge. As sporadic and isolated attacks continue, they serve as a reminder of the need to drive the process of promoting pan-African consciousness among South Africans, in particular, thus reversing the colonial and apartheid legacy of division and self-hatred.

The following challenges can be identified with regard to South Africa’s African agenda:

- Translating the appointment of Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma into effective leverage for a more effective central organ of the African Union.
- Translating extensive political relations in Africa into real growth in trade and investment both ways.
- Combating xenophobia, Afrophobia and concerns among African citizens about South Africa’s national interests and the activities of its big businesses.
- Dealing with the consequences of the furore over the EU approach to the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations, especially the possible redrawing of the structure of regional schemes.
- The balance between strengthening all bilateral relations and giving special attention to regional powers with which South Africa has a common pan-African agenda.
- The relationship between SADC and SACU well into the future, including the best model to reduce the uneven economic development in the southern African region.

7 Written input from the Department of Tourism during the Methodology Workshop, August 2013.
8 See, for instance, the survey on South Africans’ attitudes to African foreigners by the Afrobarometer in 2012 at www.afrobarometer.org.
• Dealing with the insufficient link between development cooperation and public diplomacy/international marketing in strengthening South Africa’s soft power.

3.3 South-south cooperation
South Africa’s south-south cooperation commitment has been pursued in three key ways: participation in the formulation of developing country positions in key international forums, engaging in global south forums with the objective of promoting the African agenda and the interests of the south, and strengthening bilateral relations with countries of the south in support of national priorities and the African agenda. These layers of the south-south agenda coalesce around the promotion of global reforms, multilateral solidarity, market access, trade and investment. The formation of coalitions of the south, independent of north-dominated trade, climate and financial architecture institutions, remains a major focus of South Africa.

As suggested in the Fifteen-year Review (The Presidency, 2008:65), by 2008, South Africa had become a major champion of south-south solidarity in pursuit of a change in world affairs and deeper economic cooperation among developing countries. Informed by the principles of cooperation and multilateralism, the country has been successful in positioning itself strategically in key south platforms like the Non-Aligned Movement, whose summit it hosted in 1998 and chaired in the period 1998–2002, and the Group of 77 (G77) and China Forum that it chaired in 2006. In both chairing roles, South Africa pushed for internal revitalisation in order to strengthen the two institutions’ ability to champion common developing country negotiating positions internationally in a context where shifts in global power opened opportunities for the agency of the global south in global decision-making. It was also able to do a lot towards aligning the south’s broad agenda with Africa’s specific interests.

The Fifteen-year Review viewed the formation, in 2003, of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Forum as “a potential source of new energy and substantial progress in south-south collaboration, balancing the politics of solidarity with the bricks and mortar of economic activities, including support for NEPAD projects” (The Presidency, 2008:65). With intra-IBSA trade having reached R220 billion, the forum has made a strong case for its consolidation and even upgrading. The IBSA Trust Fund has indeed given meaning to this, with successful support for crucial projects in African countries, promoting productive economic activities in countries like Guinea-Bissau. Having begun with a strong focus on key priorities of energy, infrastructure and marine cooperation, however, IBSA expanded its list of priorities to no less than 15 activities, thus increasing the demand on individual governments and the scope of internal disagreements. Thus, IBSA has not injected the envisaged energy and remains a potential catalyst of new south-south cooperation yet to be realised.'
South Africa’s leading role in deepening intercontinental cooperation has been gradual since the establishment of the New Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership (NAASP) in 2005. The NAASP Summit, which South Africa was billed to host in 2009, was postponed due to internal political changes in the governing African National Congress (ANC), but it still did not take place as rescheduled in 2010 or in 2011. NAASP was tabled and adopted as a strategic project by the AU Summit in January 2013, signalling its resuscitation and South Africa’s regaining of initiative on Afro-Asia solidarity. However, the challenge is what will be done to link this to other southern initiatives like IBSA, so that they do not duplicate, but rather complement and reinforce one another.

South Africa was the founding member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation in 1997, thus positioning itself strategically in the shift of economic geography from the north Atlantic geo-economic zone to the south, including the south Atlantic/Indian Ocean zone. This has offered South Africa huge opportunities to harness its huge marine resources, having control over international waters that are home to a large component of world marine trade. However, the country is yet to fully harness this, having not yet built transport corridors and cargo hubs to ensure that it benefits from international shipping business and other opportunities that go around the Cape coast.

Africa-South America partnership has gained momentum since the Abuja Summit of November 2006. South Africa’s role was prominent at the first summit, a bit subdued at the Isla de Margarita Summit in 2009 due to the ANC’s internal transitions, and critical at the Malabo Summit of 2012. The partnership is still expected to agree on concrete cooperation programmes to the benefit of both continents. The SACU-MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement of 2009 promises to change the patterns of Africa’s transatlantic trade to the benefit of South Africa and southern Africa. The country has also been instrumental in Africa-China, Africa-India, Africa-Turkey and Africa-Arab World partnerships, but there has not been an adequate articulation of overlapping regional-national interests in these configurations.

South Africa’s strategic approach to south-south cooperation has evolved to the point where it is aware of how it could benefit directly from it. This includes ensuring that south-south cooperation takes the form of support for key African priorities, thus seeking to share the burden for the region with the rest of the south. The focus of the IBSA Fund and programmes of other platforms demonstrate this, with Africa’s infrastructure development becoming increasingly the focus of south-south cooperation. Thus, south-south cooperation, while informed by the country’s strong identity as a developing state, and the shared history and challenges with many countries of the developing world, is also motivated by a need to diversify trade partners and seek opportunities for economic development. The formation of key alliances and partnerships that further South Africa’s agenda for international
relations and building solidarity for socio-economic development has become the centrepiece of changing south-south cooperation.

The following challenges can be identified with regard to South Africa’s south-south cooperation commitment:

- Constantly shifting priorities in the south have led to older relations declining out of neglect, while new ones are being consolidated. The examples of Indonesia and Vietnam are a case in point.
- Capacity constraints, including dedicated institutional and human resources capacity, dedicated to south-south cooperation, continue to limit the potential of South Africa’s role.
- South Africa allowed its focus on the BRICS Forum to overshadow its attention to IBSA and other south platforms, a mistake that could have been avoided by the development of a strategy on south-south cooperation broadly.
- Weak political engagement with key south partners, many of which did not enjoy state visits at political level for up to six to seven years, sent a negative signal to these partners in the building of beneficial south-south collaboration.
- Insufficient thinking led to the failure of developing a strategy to align political and economic diplomacy in order to focus south-south cooperation on catalysing development in the south, including through alternative development models and lesson-sharing.
- The failure to host the NAASP for three years led to its near death, and its rediscovery needs to be linked to other southern platforms to ensure cohesion around similar agendas.

3.4 South Africa: From BRIC to BRICS

The birth of the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) Forum in 2009 sent yet another strong signal about shifts in global power to the advantage of global south powers. South Africa immediately identified with the agenda for global reform, international economic cooperation and intra-BRIC cooperation on the developing world. Its show of interest in membership of the BRIC Forum was rewarded by an invitation for it join at the Sanya BRIC Summit in 2011, thus converting BRIC to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). This has given the country a voice in a significant alliance through which it also influences discussions in the Group of 20 significant economies in the world (G20), the premier institution for international economic cooperation. It is thus regarded as a significant emerging power in the world, worthy of attention in global decision-making, enabling it to punch above its actual weight of hard power. South Africa set out to do three things within BRICS: to consolidate its position as a member, to identify and leverage opportunities for South Africa’s developmental agenda, and to enhance the African agenda.
It was immediately successful in including Africa’s priorities in the BRICS agenda, as a result of which the Sanya Summit expressed support for infrastructure development and industrialisation in Africa in the context of the NEPAD framework – a clear consequence of South Africa’s influence. This was further elaborated on at the New Delhi Summit in 2012. When it was South Africa’s turn to host the fifth BRICS Summit in March 2013, it set a theme that made its agenda in BRICS obvious: BRICS-Africa partnership for development, integration and industrialisation. For the first time, BRICS had an agenda on a region, Africa, and formally made an outreach to key leaders of the AU and its regional economic communities that South Africa had invited to attend. The summit decision to establish the BRICS-led Development Bank to complement existing international financial institutions in financing development met South Africa’s expectation of a mechanism that would be used to concretise BRICS’s commitments on Africa’s development.

At the bilateral level, relationships with key actors of the south were established early in the first decade and were solidified in the second decade. As a result, South Africa has established relations with all BRIC countries and all emerging powers. Relations with South American countries like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela have strengthened. Relations with Turkey and key Gulf states have also improved. Relations in South-east and East Asia have focused on China, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam. In South Asia, relations with India, Bangladesh and Pakistan have also grown at different speeds. The expansion of relations in the Russian Federation, or the former Soviet Union, has also been largely successful, with a strong trade element.

3.5 North-south cooperation
As indicated in the Fifteen-year Review, South Africa approaches north-south relations as an opportunity to bridge the divide between the north and south on matters relating to the reform of global governance, the reform of the global economy, enhanced market access for developing countries, more favourable terms of trade, debt relief and new forms of partnership for development. It has continued to project itself as a responsible global citizen, acting in the best interest of the global commons and finding synergy between the north and the south. It also approaches it as critical to its domestic economic interests, given the fact that South Africa’s trade and investment relations with Europe and North America are well entrenched, although in need of transforming towards more equality and evenness. In the first decade, South Africa was largely successful in engaging the G8 and the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as premier platforms of the global north; thus using them to strengthen its economic relations with key countries and the EU. As a result, trade with the north has grown consistently and remains strong, notwithstanding the impact of the global economic crisis on the north. Even as the north is forced to redefine its relations towards
greater focus on market access and trade, rather than development assistance, the structured relations enable a mature management of this transition.

The principal multilateral forums in which South Africa has engaged the north in the quest to reform the rules of the global economy (with variable success) include the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The agenda has been to promote the interests of developing countries by promoting a rules-bound international political and economic order. The engagements with the IMF have remained difficult and outcomes are negative on the whole. Negotiations in the WTO remain stalled since the collapse of the Doha Round of Trade Negotiations in Cancun in 2005, when the global south asserted its collective power to the chagrin of the powerful north. Interactions in the UNCTAD have become even more significant as a result of the hunger for new ideas during the global economic crisis.

After a few years of engagement from an observer status, in 2007, the OECD Ministerial Council decided to strengthen its engagement with South Africa and other BRICS countries, giving it an “enhanced engagement” status in recognition of the global significance of South Africa as the 29th largest economy in the world. This has the potential to lead to full membership in future, a development that can enable or limit the country’s bridge-building role. The effects of being designated a developed country on the country’s pro-reform agenda and on its status as a recipient of development assistance mean that full membership will not be taken without careful thought. The challenge is that the OECD has remained a preserve for the rich and it is now expanding to the newly rich: what Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) calls the “semi-periphery”, which threatens to preserve the core periphery dynamic, despite the shift in the economic geography in the post-Cold War era.

In the period since the Fifteen-year Review was published, the G20 countries have assumed a central role in defining the framework and nature of international economic cooperation and setting out the normative framework for global economic governance. South Africa’s membership has given it the opportunity to contribute in shaping the agenda towards a new economic order, one that places Africa and the south’s interests at the centre. It is now the co-chair of the Development Working Group, which has been responsible, since the G20 Summit in Seoul in 2010, for defining the global development agenda. The country decided to use this to promote a southern development agenda, including reformed aid, debt relief, trade and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Whether the country has used this optimally to infuse new thinking and paradigms, however, is a matter for debate. The change in the country’s personnel responsible for this and their ability to set the agenda is also a matter for much thought. Studies show poor coordination between The

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Presidency, DIRCO and National Treasury. The lack of a concrete country strategy to guide the harnessing of this strategic opportunity may account for limited outcomes.

The engagement with the G8 as part of emerging countries and five African regional powers grew dramatically between 1999 and 2009. This led to concessions on a number of issues of interest for the south and Africa, including debt relief, market access, trade and partnerships. As the *Fifteen-year Review* report showed, this enhanced South Africa’s global status and bridge-building acumen and had started to produce reportable outcomes in the areas of security, development and governance. The African Partnership Forum, established in 2003 after engagements at the G8’s Evian Summit on the G8 African Plan, elevated the G8-Africa partnership, with South Africa among its leaders. But, as the *Fifteen-year Review* also shows, by 2008, there was slow progress in the implementation of the African Plan and other commitments. The G8 Summit in Tokyo, Japan, and in La Quila, Italy, in 2009 also noted this problem.

By the time the conservative party-governed Canada hosted it in 2010, the G8 commitment to the south and African interests had diminished significantly and South Africa and its partners had not figured out how to defend the advances of the first decade. The global economic crisis had deepened and a swing to the right and insularity in the G8 countries’ economic and political outlook had gained momentum, while the alliance of key African states had also weakened. Thus, the African Plan dissipated to the point that, when they met in the USA in 2012, the G8 countries had decided to exclude the traditional African representatives, including South Africa, marking the lowest point in the engagement with the G8 Forum.

The *Fifteen-year Review* also underlined the important progress registered in South Africa’s relations with the EU, from the mid-1990s’ negotiations that led to the signing in 1999 of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement to the South Africa-EU Strategic Partnership of 2007, which allowed for high-level political and policy dialogue (the so-called Mogobagoba Dialogue). Thus, the parties have worked successfully to elevate their engagement on common interests, including the boosting of trade and investment relations, notwithstanding the Eurozone debt crisis. As a result, by 2009, South Africa was the EU’s 14th largest trade partner and the second largest from Africa, closely following Algeria. The partnership reflects the mutual recognition of the strategic value of one to the other, and the need for jointly defined objectives and activities. Notwithstanding differences over the EPA negotiations, the annual ministerial and regular leaders’ summits have grown in stature, leading to the resolution of thorny issues like the differences over South Africa’s citrus fruits. However, some in Africa still suspect that South Africa is looking after its own national interests, to the detriment of those of its neighbours.
Likewise, the political relations between the USA and South Africa had almost collapsed at the time when the *Fifteen-year Review* was published. The reason was the tensions over Zimbabwe and over the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. However, they have since improved with a change of government in the USA and a change of president in South Africa. Economic relations and cooperation in the areas of education, health and technology have grown consistently throughout the two decades. In a touch of irony, it was during the lull in political relations that the USA invested substantially in South Africa and Africa’s human development. The Obama administration has improved political dialogue between the two countries, leading to the establishment of the high-level US-SA dialogue at ministerial level. This has enabled the two to manage their relations despite differences over matters of global reform, the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Cuban Five. As a result, the two-way trade under the bilateral arrangement and through the USA’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was valued at R155 billion in 2011 alone, an increase of 15 percent on the previous year. South African business has shown growing appetite in the US market. President Obama’s state visit to South Africa in August 2013 capped the revitalisation of relations over a period of about five years.

Bilateral relations with key European states like Germany, France and the UK have remained strong and growing. In the early 2000s, South Africa designated these states as pivotal, and thus negotiated an elevated relationship, managed through binational commissions, which are often chaired by senior politicians. This has resulted in deeper mutual understanding and growth in trade and investment. For instance, this emboldened the UK to decide, in April 2013, that it was time to redefine its relations with South Africa, including the move from aid to trade as the engine of partnership, which South Africa alleges is a unilateral move. This will complicate political relations without harming economic relations, as was the case with the USA earlier.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>South Africa’s key trade relations in the north</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>France Germany UK US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R23 billion</td>
<td>R15 billion  R60 billion  R155 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following challenges can be identified with regard to South African’s north-south cooperation:

- The impact of the global imbalance of power partly leads to asymmetry in economic relations.
- Inadequate work on harnessing the heterogeneity of the global north offers different opportunities. This includes the diversification of trade relations to non-traditional partners in the north, including Australia.
- The relationship between trade and aid is a matter that needs further work in order to prepare South Africa to cope with the impact of its emerging power status on its inflows.
The ability of South Africa to implement agreements to the optimal benefit of its people is work in progress.

South Africa’s capability to influence the development and economic paradigms of its northern partners needs further work, so that the relationship becomes one of co-agenda setters rather than agenda-setter to agenda-taker.

The dependence on economic relations with the Eurozone and the potential impact of the Eurozone crisis on the long-term economic development goals require urgent rethinking.

South Africa’s ability to leverage sound bilateral relations with key northern partners for greater progress on matters of global reform and reform of their relations with African countries is limited.

The UK’s decision to stop aid to the value of R250 million is the unintended consequence of sound performance of trade and investment relations, but the consequences for South Africa’s national development will be significant. South Africa has to think about its strategy as other northern partners are likely to follow suit.

3.6 Multilateralism and reform of institutions of global governance

The goal of South Africa’s participation in institutions for global governance and the pursuit of multilateralism, in general, is to contribute to reform to develop a rules-based global and multilateral order; to promote respect for international justice and law, as well as commitment to equitable and sustainable global economic development, and a world free of conflict. The Fifteen-year Review surmised that the country’s agenda in this regard had been pursued consistently for 15 years.

There are indications of success in South Africa’s push for a stronger role in the UN’s system of protecting and promoting global public goods, as opposed to views that see a greater role for the Bretton Woods institutions. The recognition of the fact that the UN is the most inclusive and, therefore, the most legitimate of international organisations to help manage the transitions currently happening at the global level is widely held. South Africa has actively participated in debates and negotiations at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and its subsidiary bodies to forge consensus that save and strengthen the UN through management and political reforms. This includes its active participation in the Fourth Committee of the UNGA in support of human rights and self-determination entitlements of the people of Palestine, Western Sahara and other marginalised communities. It has also remained seized with the UNSC Reform debate that shifted from the mainstream to subsidiary working groups, balancing the defence of the AU’s common position and the need for it to be a good negotiator by exploring pragmatic options that unite the world around reform. This invariably creates ambiguities, as the AU’s common position asserting Africa’s entitlement to permanent representation on the Council is not negotiable until an AU Summit says so. Believing strongly in the sanctity of the
UN, South Africa has also made regular, full and timely assessed contributions to the UN budget.

The agenda for reforms of the international finance institutions has never been more urgent after the USA and EU completely ignored the developing world in the recent appointment of heads of the World Bank and the IMF, sticking to old rights for them to pick heads. South Africa joined other emerging powers in lobbying for a change, but this came to nought. They then focused on reaffirming their commitment to push for reforms. They have harmonised their positions on giving developing countries a greater voice and a larger share of participation in the decision-making of these institutions during discussions at the IMF and World Bank governance forums, as well as the UNGA and the G20.

South Africa was fortunate to be elected twice to serve on the UNSC for the 2007–2009 and 2010–2012 terms. As the Fifteen-year Review recorded, South Africa used the first stint to cement its status as a vociferous campaigner for reforms in the manner in which the Council responds to international security, challenging the tendency of a few permanent members to use the Council to further their national security goals. To this end, it voted against a number of draft resolutions on the basis that they were manipulated by the USA, the UK or France to further their own ends or that they did not enjoy the support of regions in which the conflicts under discussion were found. It also noted, however, that government’s poor communication led to perceptions that its actions were in support of human rights violators. The review underscored the fact that the second focus was to deepen cooperation between the UNSC and regional organisations like the AU in dealing with conflicts in their respective regions.

In its second tenure, South Africa has maintained its principled stance on the role, function and mandate of the UNSC to some extent, but has avoided controversies by deciding not to enter into confrontation with bullish members of the Permanent Five. It has thus been willing to abstain from voting for or against some resolutions, and voted with the UK-France-USA trio on Libya. This latter position caused a lot of discomfort on the African continent, where South Africa’s position was viewed as abandoning its old stance of defending Africa from external machinations. While South Africa distanced itself from the use of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to conduct a regime change in Libya, it remained on record that it had voted in favour of a resolution that allowed “all means necessary” to be used to “protect civilians” from Gadaffi’s repression. South Africa also championed the landmark Council Resolution 2033 in January 2012 on the strategic collaboration between the UNSC and regional organisations, with special reference to the AUPSC, thus paving the way for Africa-driven collaboration to end African conflicts.

In January 2013, South Africa was elected into the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for a three-year period, thus paving the way for it to
contribute significantly to the articulation of the post-2015 UN development agenda. This includes the Sustainable Development Goals, and ensuring that these are compatible with South Africa’s development agenda, African Union aspirations and the development agenda of the south. It is too early to tell if South Africa has used this opportunity optimally, or to evaluate the extent to which South Africa has used its participation in ECOSOC to expand African civil society engagement with the UN development agenda and to develop consensus after 2015.

South Africa’s participation in the UN’s Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development in June 2012 underscored the need to link the Rio agenda with the Johannesburg outcomes, thus strengthening the south’s interests in the debate. It sought to link the idea of a Green Economy to sustainable human development and poverty eradication.

From 28 November to 5 December 2011, South Africa hosted the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 17) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 7th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP 7) to the Kyoto Protocol climate change negotiations. The successful hosting of the Durban Climate Change Conference, which resulted in a landmark decision committing states to work towards the adoption of a universal legal instrument on climate change not later than 2015, demonstrated, in practical terms, the central role that South Africa has come to occupy in the global system of governance.

Besides its active role in the United Nations Third Committee on human rights and social, humanitarian and cultural issues, the country has increased its voice in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), contributing to resolutions that protect the rights of vulnerable groups and promote new international human rights norms and standards in United Nations forums. In June 2011, it initiated the landmark resolution at the 17th session of the UNHRC to hold the first ever United Nations panel discussion during the 19th session of March 2012, to have produced a resolution on the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transsexuals and the intersex community.

Consistent with its exemplary relinquishing of nuclear weapons in the 1990s, South Africa made notable contributions at the 2010 Review Conference of State Parties of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. It pushed strongly and successfully for the three pillars of the treaty: nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. South Africa’s leadership on non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear technology was further highlighted in the country’s endorsement as host of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy in 2010, following the successful convening of the First Conference of State Parties of the Pelindaba Treaty that created an African Nuclear Weapons-free Zone.
South Africa remained an active participant in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), playing an instrumental role in facilitating the decision to bring Zimbabwe back to full compliance with the minimum requirements of the KPCS. South Africa assumed the Chair of the KPCS in 2013 with a commitment to ensure that the scheme does not derail from its founding mandate.

The following challenges can be identified with regard to the multilateralism and reform of institutions of global governance:

- There is inadequate cohesion within the south and Africa on the agenda for change in institutions of global governance, allowing themselves to be divided when it comes to the appointment of heads of institutions.
- South Africa has to ask itself whether the successes it achieves while in pole position in these institutions can be sustained when its term comes to an end. The question then is how to sustain progress in and outside positions of influence in these institutions, and how to hand over the championing to other southern states on expiry of its term of office.
- South Africa’s participation in ECOSOC is a great opportunity to champion a strong common agenda on global development.

3.7 Economic diplomacy

3.7.1 Policy and national interest

South Africa’s international engagements have a strong economic diplomacy element, with a view to increase trade and investment, as well as science and technological cooperation. Yet, as the Fifteen-Year Review pointed out, there was insufficient correlation between the country’s overall stature and the investments it was attracting. It was stated that this was most evident on the African continent where the country had invested considerable sums on providing assistance for the stabilisation of conflict-stricken countries. Since the Ten-Year Review pointed to the same challenge in 2004, the South African government began giving economic and commercial diplomacy extra focus in 2005 by re-examining the deployment of trade diplomatic missions, the use of conference diplomacy to better attract investment, and the training of mainstream diplomats to attract trade and investment.

The publicly raised concerns about the need for a more coherent and deeper use of economic diplomacy to grow the country’s share of the African and southern hemisphere market contributed to efforts that led to an increase in efforts to give economic and commercial diplomacy special attention. More pertinent questions about return on investment in peace diplomacy and stabilisation in Africa were asked in government, including at Cabinet level. The result of these questions was the stronger involvement of business in government delegations to countries in transition and more effort at the political level to leverage relations for economic and commercial benefits. The size of business delegations in presidential visits to the UK
In recent years, government has worked closely with various platforms of organised business in its facilitation of international relations for the same purpose. The result is evidently a better understanding of the concept of economic diplomacy as including policies and activities aimed at promoting trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), technology transfer and tourism, and positively positioning Brand South Africa in the global arena. In light of this, the country has, in the past five years, developed strategies on economic diplomacy, ranging from the Trade Policy and Strategy Framework of 2010 to the Economic Diplomacy Strategic Framework and the BRICS Strategy in 2012. These seek to deepen the link between international engagements and domestic imperatives, drawing out commercial and economic aspects of foreign policy.

There has also been a drive to enhance DIRCO’s capacity in economic diplomacy through the training of department officials. From November 2009 to July 2011, 302 departmental officials were trained in economic diplomacy, with a further 170 South African diplomats having undertaken training. It is not clear if there has been a qualitative impact on their capacity to attract investments to South Africa.

The implication of both the New Growth Path (NGP) and the National Development Plan (NDP) is that international relations project the country’s national interests to a greater extent. The NDP requires South Africa to link, in more obvious ways, its stature internationally with economic gains, as well as the cost of capacity in deployments for international engagements with a return on investment. The marketing of Brand South Africa is an important part of this. There is an expectation of an aggressive expansion of trade and investment, and financial integration. This is, however, not uncontested by those in government who want to avoid reducing all international relations in favour of economic imperatives and thus dilute the country’s contribution to norm osmosis in an unequal world going through tectonic shifts.

The impact on the economy of the hosting of major sporting and cultural events, especially the FIFA 2010 World Cup and the International Premier League cricket matches, is a matter for further research. However, analyses suggest that the contribution of these events to Brand South Africa or prestige is huge and can only be translated into hard currency by what the country does to harness it over the long term.

A South African Tourism (SAT) study in late 2010 suggested a huge cash injection into the South African economy as a result of a surge in incoming tourist figures. Of the 309 000 visitors recorded during the World Cup, about 90 percent reported that

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10 See various media statements on state visits at [www.info.gov.za](http://www.info.gov.za).
they would return to visit South Africa at a later stage. The following year, Cape Town was voted the number one tourist city in the world, no doubt as a result of the exposure it received from the World Cup and international conferences.\(^{11}\) Conference diplomacy, in general, and positive stories about South Africa have contributed to a hike in tourism figures from just under four million in 1994 to almost 14 million in 2012.\(^{12}\)

The figure below shows a correlation between sudden surges in the numbers of incoming tourists and the hosting of major events. Studies also show that it is the increasingly competitive private sector, rather than coordinated efforts between government, business and marketing organisations, that have had a decisive effect on the boom in the tourism industry. This means that better coordination would lead to even greater success. This is true of other sectors of the economy, including manufacturing, retail and wholesale business expanding into the African continent almost on their own, without much coordination with government.

![Figure 1: Foreign arrivals to South Africa, 1996-2012](image)

**Source:** South African Tourism, 2013

### 3.7.2 Economic relations and trade agreements

A key avenue for South Africa’s economic diplomacy has been the country’s active role in the negotiations that created an enabling environment for multilateral trade agreements since the launch of the Doha Development Round of the WTO in 2001, which remains in progress. In this regard, it has aligned itself closely with coalitions like the Non-agricultural Market Access (NAMA) group of 11 countries, pushing for a trade regime that supports industrial development in developing countries. Engagement with strategic trade partners like the EU, the USA and the emerging powers assessed above is another platform used with a degree of success.


\(^{12}\) Written submission from the Department of Tourism, August 2013.
The SACU agreement was renegotiated and concluded between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland in 2002, and came into effect in 2004. South Africa assumed the position of Chair of SACU in 2010, focusing the organisation on strengthening regional industrial development, trade, revenue-sharing and the establishment of institutions such as the SACU Tariff Board and the SACU Tribunal. It also wanted to improve relations with smaller SACU member states. Furthermore, SACU has now expanded its work programme from the initial five priorities to include the promotion of trade in services and strengthening the capacity of its Secretariat. South Africa, as the dominant economy in SACU, stands to benefit from all these developments to even out levels of development within the union. The SACU Summit took decisions informed by the need to wean SACU from its dependence on common-external tariffs and the South African economy towards a more equal arrangement. This will obviously take time and effort.

The SACU-MERCUSOR and SACU-India preferential agreements are yet to demonstrate the expected economic benefits. The suspended negotiations for a SACU-US FTA in 2006 due to “incompatible mandates” are yet to resume, but the US-SACU economic relations are already significant in terms of volume and capital inflow.

The processes towards a SADC Customs Union and a Common Market have stalled and there is no indication that South Africa has given any new impetus to these goals. The country continues to advocate for a stronger focus on infrastructure development, linking SADC with COMESA and the EAC in a trilateral integration process that has the potential to create a free trade area of 26 countries stretching from the Cape to Cairo.

South Africa’s Trade Policy and Strategy Framework gives emphasis to developing deeper economic relations with South America, Asia and Africa in order to harness opportunities from robust growth in these regions of the south. It wants to find opportunities in Asia, a major reservoir of financial liquidity, and to leverage China’s strong trade relations with South Africa for better penetration in the Asian region.

3.7.3 Foreign direct investment
South Africa’s investment inflows have been uneven over the period under review. In 2008, the FDI, as a percentage of GDP into the country, was 3.5 percent. By 2009, it had dropped to 1.9 percent. In 2010, it dropped again to 0.3 percent. This performance, however, improved in 2011 to 1.4 percent. There have been periods of massive jumps in FDI inflows due to large investment deals, such as the Barclays Bank purchase of a 60 percent stake in Absa Bank, as well as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) purchase of a 20 percent stake in Standard Bank. There have also been a number of significant transactions in other sectors, including
mining, automotive, financial and information technology (IT). For example, Japan’s Nippon Steel and, more recently, US-based Walmart’s takeover of Massmart. Tourism has been key in attracting investment and job creation over the past five years, having also diversified into ecolotourism, and cultural and leisure tourism. It has supported regional integration and the African agenda through the leveraging of transfrontier parks such as the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (South Africa and Botswana), the Great Limpopo National Park (South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique) and the !Ai-!Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier Park (South Africa and Namibia) for an increase in tourist arrivals.

Table 3  Foreign tourism indicators, 2009-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All markets</th>
<th>Leisure</th>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>All tourist arrivals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total (2009)</td>
<td>4.2 million</td>
<td>1.7 million</td>
<td>0.8 million</td>
<td>7 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (2010)</td>
<td>4.7 million</td>
<td>2.1 million</td>
<td>0.9 million</td>
<td>8.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume growth (2009–2010)</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average length of stay (2009)</td>
<td>8.6 nights</td>
<td>5.5 nights</td>
<td>14.7 nights</td>
<td>8.3 nights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average length of stay (2010)</td>
<td>8.4 nights</td>
<td>5.7 nights</td>
<td>16.4 nights</td>
<td>8.5 nights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: South African Tourism, 2012

3.7.4 Export of value-added products
Beneficiation is critical in promoting job creation and industrial development through the export of value-added products. This is an area that remains underdeveloped in South Africa. This imbalance has been the focus of the National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) from 2005, which has been reviewed at three-year intervals since then. It aims to increase the production of value-added and labour-intensive products and diversify the economy away from an over-reliance on commodities and non-tradable services. This is expected to alleviate the current trade deficit, which hit a new low of R34.11 billion at the start of 2013 from R23.71 billion in 2012.

The following challenges can be identified with regard to economic diplomacy:

- The development of a single comprehensive economic strategy on international relations with components on trade, investment, diplomacy, etc. is yet to come about.
- A better coordinated deployment of essential skills in economic diplomacy, both to institutionalise this diplomacy and to ensure that decisions on specialist attachés in diplomatic missions abroad, is taken purely out of a single department’s internal consensus.
• A better articulation is needed of the South African agenda in SACU, so that it is widely understood by key stakeholders, including business, academia and broader civil society.

• Coordination between government and business to grow the country’s market share in a market that is increasingly marked by competition from industrialised and newly industrialised countries remains inadequate.

• A stronger focus on building industrial capability is of utmost importance.

3.8 International marketing and branding

The International Investment Council, the International Advisory Council on Information and Communication Technology, the International Marketing Council, Trade and Industry South Africa, a reformed South African Tourism and the Proudly South Africa campaign combined in 2007/08 to work on branding South Africa as a vibrant economy and society, attractive for major investment. Brand South Africa, established in 2002 to create a positive image of South Africa as a form of soft power, has grown and become more effective globally. The abovementioned institutions successfully leveraged the hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2010, the UNFCCC’s COP 17 climate change negotiations in 2011, the IBSA Summit in 2011 and the BRICS Summit in 2013, projecting opportunities for investment and tourism.

The challenge that can be identified with regard to international marketing and branding is the development and refinement of strategic thinking across government about how to ensure a positive projection of the country, both of its past achievements and its future potential, using conventional and non-conventional methods, focused on engaging with publics inside and outside South Africa, rather than merely “telling them the news”.

3.9 Parliamentary oversight on international relations

The parliamentary role in oversight and legislation in support of growing international relations and cooperation, as required by the Constitution, remains decent, but its quality has varied from time to time. Parliamentary committees on foreign affairs (and later international relations and cooperation), trade and industry, and defence and intelligence (now state security) have been particularly active, processing a number of key policies and pieces of legislation. However, there is limited evidence of coordination between these related committees in overseeing how different departments pursue related policy agendas in a coherent manner. International relations matters are yet to be elevated sufficiently in Parliament’s day-to-day business. Committees remain weakened by the manner in which they are structured, staffed and operationalised. This includes changes in leadership at elections. Parliamentary debates on international relations tend to be limited to controversies and major events internationally, and the quality of these debates is improving due to better utilisation of research by members of Parliament in some cases. South Africa’s involvement in international parliamentary diplomacy, mainly through the
Inter-parliamentary Union, has not grown much. However, there is evidence of more and better used research produced in-house and through interaction with research institutions.

The following challenges can be identified with regard to parliamentary oversight on international relations:

- An activity- and legislation-focused committee agenda means that there is insufficient focus on the matters of strategic coherence across the international agenda.
- There is evidence of inadequate research activity to strengthen the substance of oversight on the part of parliamentary committees.

3.10 Foreigners in South Africa
South Africa is an attractive destination for middle-class tourists, economic migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees because of its relatively wealthier economic status. While the country traditionally attracted immigrants from Europe and its most immediate neighbours like Swaziland and Lesotho, in the past decade, the number of immigrants from Asia has dramatically increased. The numbers are increasing every year. This contributes to the expansion of the skills base and entrepreneurship, also in the peri-urban areas. Most bring huge economic benefits in the form of rare skills, entrepreneurship and hard cash into the South African economy. Many integrate well into South African society, adding to its cosmopolitan character. The world over, migrants are considered communities of economic value, and high-immigrant societies like the USA and the EU tend to thrive economically.

For refugees, South Africa offers unequalled economic possibilities and an enabling legal environment in its Refugees Act of 1998, which has been in effect since 2000 and is one of the most progressive in the world. It prohibits refusal of entry, expulsion or extradition of refugees, and includes in its definition of refugees individuals who have been forced to leave their home countries because of events that disturb public order in these countries.

In addition to the benefits of a monitoring system for planning purposes, knowledge about the volume of immigrants is critical because both government and the public tend to have their own perceptions of the volume and the characteristics of immigrants. As indicated in reference to African migrants, attitudes towards immigration in South Africa tend to be negative, assuming that immigrants are without skills and energy to work for their host country. Government has a responsibility to promote an increased awareness of immigrants and dispel negative stereotypes. This will benefit both national discourse in South Africa and the rights of immigrants in the long term.
### Table 4 Percentage distribution of residence permits by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Central Africa</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australasia</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics South Africa, 2012:36

The following challenges can be identified with regard to immigration to South Africa:

- Poor statistics and data about the number and kinds of migrants are needed to enable proper policy planning.
- The tendency to single out African immigrants is a negative factor.
- There is no clear strategy on how South Africa should harness its huge migrant population for stronger political and economic relations with their countries of origin.
- There is a persistence of xenophobic attitudes, especially against black migrants (African, Asian and Latin American).

### 3.11 South Africans abroad

Outward migration increased after democracy in 1994 as South Africa fully joined a globalising world in which the migration of people, goods and services is a major trend. Between 1995 and 2010, an estimated one million white South Africans emigrated to the UK, Australia and New Zealand, where better socio-economic opportunities were available. This can be linked to the astronomical increase in global migration trends in the past two decades, with emerging countries like South Africa, Turkey and Slovakia being among the main sources of migrants, and developed countries like the USA and the UK being the main destinations. The pull factors have included better employment opportunities, cultural affinity and family bonds. These factors have weakened due to the global financial crisis that hit the global north the hardest. Among push factors among white emigrants, in particular, is a sense of disadvantage arising from the correction of past racial injustices through affirmative action and black empowerment, crime and a dislike of government.

South Africa benefits immensely from remittances in foreign currency as a result of this large diaspora. Some 27 percent of South African households receive remittances, and the overwhelming number of them are in Gauteng. It is the households in the countryside that have benefited the most, and the benefit area spreads across the black/white divide. South Africans abroad are also increasingly involved in promoting the country’s image, as well as economic opportunities in
South Africa through over 100 South African diaspora organisations that have been formed.

The government provision of consular assistance has expanded. The interface between diplomatic missions and citizens abroad has also increased. The extension of the right to vote to these citizens was formalised through the recent Cabinet approval of the Electoral Amendment Bill, thus protecting the democratic rights of South African citizens overseas. The return of many of these emigrants through what has been dubbed a “homecoming revolution” is one of the poorly under-reported developments in post-1994 South Africa. This helps to translate the brain drain into brain circulation, thus helping infuse South Africa with even sharper skills and a variety of world views emanating from its citizens settling in other parts of the world.

Table 5  Top hosts of South African citizens abroad, 2010

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>227 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>155 690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>78 616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>41 676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>38 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12 886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010

The following challenges can be identified with regard to emigration from South Africa:

- The tendency to over-emphasise the brain drain as a result of emigration and thus ignore the benefits in the form of remittances and brain circulation.
- Insufficient strategic thinking about how to harness the opportunities presented by a huge and organised South African diaspora all over the world.

4. Conclusion

As the democratic South Africa reaches 20 years, there are clear indications of major strides that the country has made across the political, economic and social dimensions of its international relations. It has been able to achieve more than its residual capacity justifies, hence the idea that it has punched above its weight. In the process, it has enhanced its stature as a member of the international community, boosting its political clout and increasing its economic standing to the point of being regarded as a globally significant emerging economy. It has been successful in taking Africa’s interests along with it, while also advancing a broader global south agenda. However, it has also been a victim of its success, with critical capacity deficits in the state, even as it strengthens relations and increases participation in international platforms. Skills needs are most urgent with regard to economic and commercial diplomacy, public diplomacy and international marketing. South Africa’s
position and role in the world remains contested at home and abroad, while its stature as a mouthpiece of Africa is embraced by some and challenged by others. Its relations with key countries in Africa and the rest of the world have been subject to a mix of success and failure.

**The future: recommendations**

- South Africa will not be able to maintain its “punch above the weight” anymore without a formal strategy on how it will maintain its soft power (prestige, acceptability and legitimacy) as an independent, but engaging voice for southern and African interests in international diplomacy. Such a strategy should define how the political, security, economic/trade and social dimensions of its diplomacy will coalesce to meet the imperatives outlined in the NDP.

- The infusion of stronger pragmatism into its progressive internationalism will enable South Africa to have an innovative, engaging, yet still critically independent stance in international relations. This is the major reason why it is taken seriously. This begins to harm the country when it leads to rigid diplomatic positions and loud diplomacy.

- The country’s championing of developmental regional integration, with a strong focus on industrialisation and economic production through SACU and SADC, will be an important part of its own economic survival in a post-crisis global economy.

- The strengthening of the African integration agenda will benefit from the upgrading of the institutional framework (norms, rules and institutions) towards shared or ceded sovereignty, which enables Africa to pool its sovereignty to turn its huge resources and market potential into real economic development.

- Stronger bilateral relations with pivotal states in the global south will be the basis on which functional south-south cooperation will lead to shared prosperity and endogenous development.

- North-south relations will again depend on the extent to which key bilaterals, such as with Nordic countries, Germany, the UK, France and the USA, are strengthened.
References


