Trust in Government
Evidence Synthesis and
International Benchmarking Study

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1. Background and purpose
Trust in government and other state institutions has become a focal point of enquiry internationally. The Covid-19 global pandemic has accelerated efforts to understand this phenomenon in order to strengthen state capacity, state-society relations and meaningful citizen engagement. National governments have been alerted to dwindling figures on trust in government and confidence in state institutions across many contexts. While international comparisons facilitate learning and benchmarking, national programmes of action are needed to build, earn and sustain high levels of trust. The South African Government has taken heed of this call to action, by using a collaborative approach in bringing together different sources of evidence and key agencies in facilitating an evidence-informed dialogue that guides appropriate interventions going forward.

The Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) undertook an international benchmarking and evidence synthesis study after a regular reporting cycle on 26 August 2020 at the Governance, State Capacity and Institutional Development (GSCID) Cluster. The reporting was linked to Priority 1 of the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF 2019-2024) on ‘Capable, Ethical and Developmental State’. One of the resolutions was for DPME to conduct an international benchmarking exercise on the issue of trust and to explore key factors that influence trust. The need was to understand what success factors and drivers of trust exist for countries that are doing well on using trust as an indicator. The focus of this report will be on trust in government as one of the state institutions with cross-country comparisons. The research project was carried out internally with available capacity aimed at informing robust analysis, reporting and discussions.

Initially, a scoping of the evidence base was done to gain a deeper understanding of the conceptual underpinnings of trust. Insights were then drawn from extant literature to provide an international benchmarking based on country level cases. These insights and empirical evidence on actual use of trust data by national governments, were then applied to the South African context. Thinking of pathways through which trust is influenced, provides deeper engagement with the contributory factors that build trust and achieve societal impact. Recommendations on these pathways are made to initiate engagement and dialogue. Throughout this study, methodological issues were taken into consideration, as different variables are used between and within countries. Availability and sustainability of data sources for measuring trends over time was a core challenge. This illustrates the need for conceptual consensus, followed by methodological rigor and integrated analysis when using trust in government for development in South Africa.

2. Study context
The MTSF 2019-2024 was finalized by DPME in 2019/20 for purposes of monitoring the performance of government in the current administration around seven high level priorities. These were operationalized through defined targets and outcomes by which the work of government could be monitored and performance assessed. However, the disruption brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic meant that priorities, intended outcomes and key interventions need to be reviewed in order to mitigate and stabilize the effects of the pandemic. Therefore, in the context of medium-term planning, the MTSF will be re-assessed at midterm as baselines and targets may change due to implications of lockdown regulations on lives and livelihoods. Priorities may need to be sequenced differently as the world and South Africa emerge from the crisis.

Trust as an explicit indicator, is located under Priority 1 in the MTSF under “Capable, Ethical and Developmental State”. Recognising that the state is an enabler for the effective implementation of developmental objectives, it becomes necessary to understand the various pathways of change where trust influences developmental outcomes, and how performance of the state influences trust in a reciprocal manner. Either way, building and maintaining citizens’ trust, ultimately adds public value. What is being witnessed, even prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, is that the legitimacy of the state is challenged by the erosion of trust and confidence in state institutions. The MTSF, Priority 1 notes the following:

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1 The other SA clusters include: Economic Sectors, Investment, Employment and Infrastructure Development; Social Protection, Community and Human Development; Justice, Crime Prevention and Security; International Cooperation, Trade and Security.
A prevalence of violent protests and unfavourable ratings in public opinion surveys and international credit rating agencies. Persistent challenges at an operational level, including: declining public confidence and trust; skills gaps; weak accountability and governance; uneven service delivery; an unsustainable wage bill; persistent corruption; a leadership deficit; and poor governance of ICT resulting in missed opportunities and efficiency gains.

If (as outlined for the trust indicator under Priority 1 of the MTSF) the state aims to achieve public value through higher levels of trust, supported by an active citizenry, partnerships in society and participatory democracy; then there is a need to put attention on how trust in government (and confidence in state institutions overall) can be built as a resource and add public value.

3. Research design and methodology

3.1. Approach

The research design is primarily a desktop review using secondary data in responding to the brief received. A scoping of the existing literature and evidence on trust in government, was carried out to derive the conceptual underpinnings of trust. Several country cases were sourced where trust measures are used to assess government performance. The national context was then analysed for trust in the South African Government, drawing from the lessons and insights of international comparisons.

Objectives:
- Undertake a desktop review to scope literature and international evidence on trust and develop a comprehensive overview of trust as a construct.
- Analyse international country cases where trust in government is used to derive high level findings across the cases.
- Draw insights from the international benchmarking exercise and assess trust as a measure in the South African context.
- Use evidence to inform pathways of change for trust in the South African Government.

Selection of country cases

The initial brief received for the international benchmarking exercise, was to explore how trust as an indicator, is used by other governments. There was an interest in several countries, ranging from a mix of socio-economic status. Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, UAE, China, India, Canada, South Korea, Malaysia and Netherlands were the first cohort of cases. With subsequent discussions, other countries were added to understand contexts where institutionalized racism could be a key factor influencing trust.

3.2. Evidence synthesis

A comprehensive desktop review typically involves the use of available quantitative and qualitative data for further analysis, and depends entirely on effective sourcing of credible and relevant information. The desktop review was supplemented by evidence synthesis methodology, where data is extracted in a systematic and transparent manner to review what is known from existing research. This method is different from a regular literature review, which has limitations due to its subjective use of evidence sources. Relevant evidence was scoped in 2020/21, however, the development of a comprehensive evidence base on trust is continuous due to emerging events globally and nationally. Trust measures fluctuate in response to these events. Thus, it is necessary to track and monitor trust in government using the same variables and methodology over a period of time to facilitate robust analysis.

Extant research outputs were sourced and guided by a comprehensive search strategy, from three databases: Web of Science, Scopus and Political Science Complete. This was further supplemented by website searches and targeted research institutes and think tanks specializing in this work. Quantitative data on trust was

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2 Secondary data on Trust was analysed for South Africa using national surveys. The international benchmarking exercise required searching from a comprehensive evidence base, which was undertaken by an information and methods specialist based at the Africa Center for Evidence, University of Johannesburg.
sourced from various agencies nationally and internationally. Specific measures and variables were investigated and synthesised, and insights were drawn on methodological approaches to measuring trust.

In-house research undertaken on the ‘Capable and Developmental State’ since 2017 generated an evidence base that is available within the DPME Research Repository. This evidence base consists of 18 international country cases and 150 most cited studies on Developmental States. Existing and relevant knowledge resources were thus used to inform this report. Finally, available measures of trust in South Africa by the various agencies within and outside of government were sourced, organized, analysed and used in this report.

4. Trust as a construct for planning
5.1. Dimensions of trust
There is a growing body of evidence on trust, which enables comprehensive exploration of its roots, including its measure, application, use and value. However, various understandings of trust is available in the literature. Broadly, the dimensions revolve around ‘relational’ and ‘situational’, where the former is generalized and non-specific at an interpersonal level, while the latter involves confidence in institutions for specific purposes. Evidence from political science theories and application demonstrate that there was an increased focus on trust since the early 1980s amongst the academic community. The phenomenon of social trust in the social sciences, is reported as path-breaking when the ‘vitality of civil society’ was linked to differences in development outcomes. A study on trust by Robert Putnam, which was published in 1993 is quoted in much of the literature, when causal paths between levels of civic engagement were tracked with development outcomes. The level of participation in voluntary organizations was found to increase social trust by stimulating repeated social interactions leading to the finding that societies inhabited by more trusting citizens have high levels of development and economic growth.

Evidence point to three dimensions of trust (organized in this study), namely cultural, social and institutional trust, with various synonyms to describe them. These dimensions help to build/construct theory on trust, which strengthens conceptual and analytical applications to the South African context. In order for a political system to function, it needs legitimacy through public support of the structures, processes and systems of state institutions, where the public is supportive of the regime and confident in the institutions. Two perspectives arise out of these dimensions. One is that trust is formed as an enduring, psychological trait early in the lifespan of an individual, based on cultural values. Some scholars argue that this type of trust is not easily swayed by events. Another is the experiential and socialization process of gaining trust, that can be influenced especially through horizontal relations between citizens (interpersonal trust), and vertical relations between citizens and the state (institutional trust). There is more scholarly attention (and thus a stronger evidence base) on institutional trust than on social trust. A summary of the evidence on the dimensions of trust is provided in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Descriptor</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural trust</td>
<td>Individual level.</td>
<td>Cultural perspective/ Psychological</td>
<td>An enduring trait learnt early in life from upbringing; Stems from socialization through parents and community.</td>
<td>- Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Individual welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education level</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in voluntary/CSO activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gender</td>
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Table 1 Dimensions and descriptors of trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Descriptor</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>Interpersonal.</td>
<td>Experiential perspective.</td>
<td>Trust is formed by experiences between people throughout life and is thus malleable and can be influenced.</td>
<td>Dispersed to: Experts and professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some scholars report on social (cultural) trust and political trust as two distinct categories, different from the more dominant categories above. However, these do not seem to take into consideration the political relations that define power dynamics between citizens (Kumagai & Iorio, n.d). The main associations made in the literature is between trust in government and citizens’ willingness to comply with laws, regulations and tax demands. What is clearly argued by political scientists, is that trust in institutions is one of the foundations upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political systems are built. It influences individual behaviour in ways that could support desired policy outcomes. This may range from narrowly defined policies and programmes to broader policy reforms.

Trust is important because many public programmes create opportunities which influence behaviour in different ways. Trust in government is reported to be influenced not only by government performance (outcome-based trust), but also in the process of decision making (process-based trust). It has the potential to reduce risky behaviour and create positive expectations of longer-term outcome of public policies, either at a personal level (e.g. pensions) or by contributing to the common good (e.g. redistribution of income through taxation).

While trust takes time to be established, it can be lost quickly. It is not sufficient to discuss the impact of trust in government institutions, specifically on the performance of those institutions, the economy or society alone. Attention is also drawn at interrogating what might happen if there is a trend of increasing distrust in government. This could lead to less willingness on the part of citizens and private sector to respect laws, make sacrifices during crises or to pay taxes, and could ultimately raise costs for government institutions.

### 5.2. Public value derived from trust

The MTSF 2019-2024 makes the link between ‘legitimacy of the state and trust’ and achieving public value, supported by an active citizenry, partnerships in society and participatory democracy (DPME, 2019). Political theory on public trust is growing, with widespread support from political scientists and philosophers on the value of trust by citizens in the political system (Wang, 2016; Sonderskov, & Dinesen, 2016; Thomson & Brandenburg, 2019). Since public space is highly contestable, it is important how we approach judgements of trust; the place of distrust; as well as the relationship of social trust to institutional trust and distrust.

With the focus being on understanding trust in government, attention is directed at what role government plays in influencing social and institutional trust; generating trust as a resource; and pursuing deliberative strategies to ensure that trust by citizens is upheld at all levels and between citizens, through government interventions. The extant literature has been organized into two broad categories on the value of trust, namely **symbolic** and **instrumental** value. These inform how trust measures are used by some countries and can inform other governments. Table 2 provides direct data extracts to illustrate the two categories of symbolic and instrumental value of trust.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Conceptual</th>
<th>Descriptor</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional trust/Systemic trust</td>
<td>Aggregate/Macro level (Including at sub-national level and across nations).</td>
<td>Political.</td>
<td>Interpersonal trust in politics.</td>
<td>- Political parties&lt;br&gt;- Government&lt;br&gt;- Political classes&lt;br&gt;- Officials &amp; bureaucrats&lt;br&gt;- Other citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal/Country level.</td>
<td>State institutions:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Quality at macro level gives rise to experiences with legitimate representation which influences people’s social trust</td>
<td>- Fairness&lt;br&gt;- Effectiveness of the state&lt;br&gt;- Access&lt;br&gt;- Legitimacy&lt;br&gt;- State capacity e.g. to extract revenue&lt;br&gt;- National wealth&lt;br&gt;- Regime performance&lt;br&gt;- Regime type&lt;br&gt;- Ethnic homogeneity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3. Drivers of trust
Evidence on the drivers of trust has increased recently, arising from political theories and tested in practice by some governments. The OECD (2017) synthesised evidence on trust in member countries to understand what the drivers of trust in government are. Trust was deconstructed in the process and linked to two critical drivers: competence as the ability of institutions to do their jobs; intention as the inclination of the institution to do what is right (OECD 2017:142). While the OECD documented this in 2017, the UAE had already been using these drivers in building effective leadership since 2013. These drivers of trust in government, puts focus on the performance of government. Competence revolve around operational efficiency, implementation capacity and responsiveness to actually deliver on a given mandate. Intentions are principles and values that guide action and behaviour. These are illustrated in Figure 1 with descriptions.

The drivers were also validated by other country cases where trust was monitored (Alkon and Urpelainen, 2018; Carino, 2008; Dabros et al, 2015; Festenstein, 2020). Responsiveness and reliability were found to be key attributes for driving competence, while integrity, openness, and fairness are attributed to values (as intentions) of government. Evidence from individual country cases add two further drivers that are linked to the moral obligation of government (commitment) and taking responsibility (accountability) as core intentions of government. Conditions that put citizens in a position of trust, are linked to reliance on government for effective and efficient service delivery, hence has moral implications. This reliance on government can put citizens in a position of vulnerability and dependence.

The drivers of trust in Figure 1, especially those attributes under the values of government, have strong synergy with principles used to guide the governance agenda in development. The Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA), which is a panel serving under the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, has developed a set of principles to build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions which guide countries towards implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Effectiveness include competence; sound policy making; and collaboration. Accountability include integrity; transparency; and independent oversight. Inclusiveness includes ‘leaving no one behind’; non-discrimination; participation; subsidiarity; and intergenerational equity. These principles and its related 62 commonly used strategies3, give effect to institutional aspects of SDG 16. The universal understanding and application of these principles are

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observed and brought into the analysis, as the drivers of trust in government have the potential to build the foundations of good governance.

Figure 1  Drivers of trust

5.4. Factors impacting on trust
An international scan of the way in which trust as an indicator is used across countries, has demonstrated that there are many interacting and influencing factors that impact on trust. While the concept of trust is seen as a resource for legitimacy and stability of public institutions, trust is also measured as an outcome in terms of a judgement of performance, bringing in a subjective component. The dimensions, drivers and factors impacting on trust need to be understood and linked if a causal path is to be determined based on evidence. Relevant and appropriate public interventions strategies need to be adopted to (re)gain and maintain trust by citizens. Key factors emerging from the evidence are summarized in Table 3, with extracts to illustrate how the factors play out.

Two categories are used to understand the various factors derived. Subjective factors are those based on individual lived experiences and have an association with cultural and social trust. Objective factors are mostly systems orientated which national level agencies use to analyse at an aggregate level. However, these categories can be argued against for instance, economic development and measures of wealth are far from being objective for the poorer countries. Hence, these are not conclusive and only used for illustrative purposes.
## Factors that impact on trust with related data extracts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective Factors</th>
<th>Details</th>
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| **Individual experiences** | - People's individual cultural and normative traits and beliefs, or their social backgrounds are assumed to correlate with non-political determinants for political trust.  
- Wealthier individuals are more likely to exhibit higher levels of interpersonal and institutional trust – due to material benefits of the existing system.  
- Physical and mental order – distrust of others is more or less a rational response to the incentives generated by rewards (needs met) – concept of “pot of gold”  
  - Standing in a line analogy – erosion in confidence in the ability of the system to punish transgressors.  
  - Trust can be maintained if there is confidence that some authority will be available to enforce law and order.  
| **Discrimination; social injustice** | - Using data drawn from US localities we find that the strongest factors that reduce trust are: (Alesina, in the well cited paper on “The Determinants of Trust”, 2000)  
  - a recent history of traumatic experiences, even though the passage of time reduces this effect fairly rapidly;  
  - belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated against, such as minorities (black in particular) and, to a lesser extent, women;  
  - being economically unsuccessful in terms of income and education;  
  - living in a racially mixed community and/or in one with a high degree of income disparity.  
  - The UK Government’s highly anticipated race report commissioned in the wake of the Black Lives Matter protests has rejected suggestions that Britain is still an institutionally racist country. This report has however, caused a public pushback as “The Government investigating into its own institutions then finding them not racist doesn’t have much weight to it”. (Jameela, M. (2021).  
| **Human Rights; Corruption; Nepotism** | - “Resource abundance” contribute to a decline in the quality of governance by promoting corruption – evidence from oil-producing countries in sub-Saharan Africa suggest that:  
  - An increase in oil/money – increase temptation for corruption – reduced trust in others and institutions  
  - Corruption undermines institutional performance by diverting resources from the production of public goods into private hands  
  - Resource-rich countries use rents for patronage, leading to political corruption, which in turn leads to decreased social and interpersonal trust (World Values survey)  
  - Africa needs to focus its anti-corruption fight on long-term, high-return institution building activities, coupled with the justice infrastructure and political will to hold those who transgress accountable. This process should start by making key government statistics open and transparent, enabling citizens to keep on top of important information and build trust in their governments. Only with these pragmatic approaches can the continent record wins against corruption.  
- Signs of broken social contract (e.g. Brexit), which affects the middle class the most. The power of the rich and welfare of the poor have squeezed out the middle class.  
- Increasing evidence emerging, which is building on Fukuyama (1995), that trust levels are deeply rooted in inequality.  
| **Crime and violence** | - Decline of trust in government is explained by multiple factors, including exposure to violence.  
- In the ecological model, violence results from complex interactions and factors that emerge from nested systems—at the social, community, family and individual levels.  

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4 Transparency international on corruption perception
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE FACTORS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographics</strong></td>
<td>Older persons tend to be more trusting than younger persons across many countries – age difference affects social- and institutional trust! Participation in civil society organizations and in general organizational life, builds social trust and confidence in political institutions – a socio-cultural approach leads to a sense of interpersonal trust, cooperation and civic-mindedness, which can build strong social and political institutions. Less democratic states have a consistent gap between men and women in social trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic development and national wealth</strong></td>
<td>Economic development and greater national wealth have systematic consequences and are associated with greater social- and institutional trust – but independent of regime type (Ingelhart &amp; Baker, 2000). Different results regarding oil/gas exporters for Africa (Benin, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa) and Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela) where social trust was lower for both regions but institutional trust only reduced in Latin America and not in Africa. The difference may possibly be the higher level of institutional development in Latin America than in Africa (due to patronage opportunities).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information sources/ Transparency</strong></td>
<td>When media sources are responding to a 24 hour news cycle, governments are carefully checking facts before giving information – so when more information is coming from media than government, trust shifts. Positive reports increase trust, but negative reporting has a more serious impact on distrust – and negative reporting garners more viewership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime type</strong></td>
<td>Studies show that social- and institutional trust are lower in authoritarian regimes than in democratic ones (China being an exception). Repressive regimes discouraged social trust (general) and more levels of distrust in authoritarian than democratic ones – expression of dissent like currently seen in Hong Kong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State capacity</strong></td>
<td>More recent literature shows that social- and political trust are related to state capacity – Where capable governments increase the degree of political trust in individuals (2012) Capable institutions that promote peace and stability in a country helps to build social trust (consider 32 Afrobarometer surveys from 16 countries conducted from 2000 to 2005) Relationship between resource wealth and social/political trust is also affected by the level of state capacity. Enhancing public financial management, including efficiency and equity of public spending, will also help. Citizens are more likely to comply with tax collection when they trust that tax revenues are managed well.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. International benchmarking

After scoping the evidence base to understand the drivers of trust, and to identify interactions which influence trust and public value derived from trust, the study set out to undertake international comparisons of countries using trust data. Benchmarking is a tool for assessing and comparing performance, and is only the start. The process of benchmarking should also lead to a strategic plan for continuous assessment and improvement. Socio-economic indicators and other related development outcomes are compared across countries in assessing successful cases. Several country cases, and cross-country comparisons are made using available evidence on how the various factors discussed in Section 4 plays out in different contexts. Despite increasing attention on the understanding of trust, it continues to be defined and used in various ways to meet country specific realities. There is no universal definition of what is trust in government, but there is an understanding (and acceptance) that it is correlated with measures of good performance (Mathews et al, 2021). The starting point is thus identifying key considerations in the measurement of trust.

5.1. Measurement of trust

Differentiated approaches to using trust within and between countries is a direct result of the way in which trust is measured, demonstrating a contested space amongst academia. The evidence consulted, point to trust being measured in three ways (Glaeser et al, 2000) and coincides with the way factors influencing trust have been categorised in Table 3 (Section 4):

I. Subjective: Direct measures through perception surveys.
II. Objective: Indirect measures through objective data used as proxies and observations of citizens.
III. Experimental: Through evaluative designs and behavioural science.

Perception Surveys – These are widely used to measure political/social trust through citizen engagement. Many survey results are used to assess the levels of trust and to conclude on its erosion. Yet these are also sources of controversy in the academic world, as ‘confidence’, ‘legitimacy’, ‘performance’ and ‘trust’ are often used interchangeably in broad or generalized questions. “Confidence” may connote more competence dimensions, while “trust” may relate more to intentions and value dimensions (Kumagai & Iorio, n.d). There may be various reasons for an individual’s behaviour that demonstrates a particular attitude, and hence a direct causal relationship with trust in government presents the challenge. Survey coverage is often uneven both across countries as well as over time. Most survey data come from a small sample. Measures of trust from attitudinal survey questions remain the most common source of data on trust, even though academics have been arguing for more than two decades against its ‘vagueness’ and variability in measurements across contexts, in the sense that questions about trusting attitudes are generally weak predictors of actual trusting behaviour (Glaeser et al, 2000). The Afrobarometer is the regional equivalent for Africa and was established in 2000, after the amalgamation of three independent surveys. The first survey in 2000 covered 12 African countries, namely: Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A gradual increase in coverage across Africa was achieved over the years with seven rounds to date. This is a significant milestone in the last decade, as African countries have lagged behind in the generation of data on trust and values over the years.

Proxies – These are used to observe participants’ behaviour, which is indirect yet objective. Using attitudinal proxies as measurements of trust in government remains outcomes of a behavioural nature by the individual. Examples include voting patterns, participation in civic or political activities, paying taxes, and obeying the law. A good proxy for trust must be carefully chosen as it must ultimately reflect whether citizens believe that the government position is in their best interest or not. Examples include trust in institutions as a determinant of tax compliance; willingness to pay for improvements and other user fees as a proxy for users’ trust in specific government interventions.

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5 The main sources of comparable data on Trust internationally has been the World Values Survey (WVS) since 1981, when it was first released. WVS is the largest non-commercial, cross-national, and time-series survey of public attitudes and values globally, spanning 80 countries and currently in its seventh iteration. Other sources of data emerged, including Gallup World Poll, World Bank, and various international and regional sources.
Experimental – This source of data and evidence comes from evaluations that are experimental in design to test what interventions work, for whom, under what conditions and at what cost. The growing interest in behavioural sciences has emerged out of the confines of social sciences and used more extensively by policy makers and politicians in high income countries. The UK, USA and other high performing countries have established dedicated units (e.g. the ‘Delivery Units’) generating evidence from behavioural science at the centre of policy making. Insights from behavioural economics has been pursued with much expediency in these contexts, and brought into the mainstream of public policy analysis.

5.2. Countries of interest

International comparisons of trust demonstrate great heterogeneity. On the one extreme, in countries such as Norway, Sweden and Finland, more than 60% of respondents in the World Values Survey (WVS) think that people can be trusted, while on the other extreme, in countries such as Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, less than 10% think that this is the case (Esteban & Roser, 2016). Trust in other European countries shows that average trust in the police is higher than trust in the political and legal systems, and that trust in the political system is much lower than interpersonal trust for all countries, except Switzerland (Edelman, 2020).

Many more countries are beginning to use trust measures compared to previous years. Recent and interesting cases on the specific use of trust data by government are provided in Annexure 1 for Canada, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the UAE. The USA has been the longest standing generator and user of trust data, dating back to 1958 generated by the PEW Research Centre, and the General Social Survey since 1972. The steady decline in trust between citizens in the USA is striking and the subject of much analysis by political scientists. Figure 2 shows this graphically.

Using the WVS with more recent data, country comparisons on confidence in governments provide a sense of current trends across contexts and geographies. Figure 3 shows the results of respondents from Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland who expressed relatively high levels of

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6 As reported in “World in Data” by Esteban & Roser, 2016.
confidence in their governments. In contrast, less than half of respondents in Japan, Australia, the US, and the UK expressed confidence in their governments (Mathews et al, 2021). The same study found that when analysing the results further by age, a positive correlation was found between confidence in government and Age where 58-62% of the older population had a higher confidence in government compared to only 28.5% of the younger population.

Figure 3  Confidence in Governments (using WVS 2020 data)

5.3. Trust and economic outcomes

GDP and inequality
Reviews on economic inequality and trust, show that cross-country comparisons, within country studies, and social experiments, all suggest that economic inequality has a negative influence on trust (Jordahl, 2007). Governments are becoming aware of the weight of the evidence which draws conclusions on economic inequality and low levels of trust. The negative relationship between income inequality and trust in the USA makes a strong case to illustrate this point. Data on trust dating back to 1958 (refer to Figure 2), combined with studies by well-known economists on income inequality, found that trust has declined during the same period (Glaeser et al, 2000; Gerukink et al, 2019). Other studies in the Nordic countries, show the coincidence of high trust and low-income inequality, which provide validation in converse. Noting that direct causal relations are still difficult to prove, the increasing evidence on correlations drawn between GDP and trust across country cases becomes convincing.

By far, the most illustrative case is made on an international scale showing the distribution of GDP per capita and trust using the World Values Survey data as in Figure 4, constructed in 2014. It demonstrates that most of the countries are located in the bottom left quadrant with lower GDP and lower trust. The upper outer quadrant confirms the position of the Nordic countries especially. Regime types provide an explanatory factor for the clear outliers like China, Singapore and the USA. Inclusion of performance data of these governments, its association with trust and economic outcomes enables integrated, robust analysis that further validates these findings. The deeper fault lines of inequality across many countries are evident.
The review by Jordhal (2007) explores four mechanisms\(^7\) to explain the negative relationship between trust and inequality. These mechanisms provide deep insights into the origins of trust/distrust and how trust outcomes are time-sensitive as they have a bearing on current affairs. Social ties received the strongest empirical support, but there is also some evidence in favour of inference on social relationships. While the Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of inequality and used increasingly in its association to trust, the availability, comparability and quality of data remains a critical issue for many countries. Figure 5 shows countries (and size of population) plotted between interpersonal trust and income inequality by Gini index, where higher values reflect more inequality.

A case by example, crime and violence have been reported to be costly for Colombia not only in terms of human lives but also in economic terms. There is empirical evidence that crime has cost Colombia nearly two (2) percentage points in economic growth since the 1980s. The efficient provision of public goods and services has the effect of reducing inequality within country cases. Thus, economic indicators for inequality, if combined with the social mechanisms through which trust is derived, becomes the opportunity for governments to effectively measure, influence and use trust in a more comprehensive way.

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\(^7\) The four mechanisms are: (i) Social ties (or networks) (ii) Inference on social relationships (to see inequality as a signal of untrustworthy behaviour) (iii) Conflicts over resources (iv) Opportunity cost of time.
Taxation and revenue generation

Several studies look at the correlation between trust measures and tax compliance, with direct implications on revenue generation capacity by government. This understanding of state capacity as a ‘causal variable’ has not only linked economic outcomes to trust, but also led to the predominance of taxation and tax capacity as a way to measure state capacity. Without revenues, no democratically elected leadership or political system will have the ability to achieve any of their stated outcomes – including ‘territorial expansion’ (Suryanarayan, 2021). Good quality public services generate trust towards institutions and contribute to compliance with rules and paying of taxes by the citizens of a country. Several surveys include tax compliance or evasion questions to calculate trust indicators. Using survey results from the WVS and the European Values Survey (EVS) a statistically significant positive correlation between trust and tax morale was found where researchers concluded that vertical trust (institutional) offers a better understanding of tax morale across different cultures and institutions, and it matters more than horizontal (social) trust.

“Trust breeds trust” is a most descriptive phrase from the literature that encapsulates the way in which trust is derived. It puts focus on the dimension of trustworthiness (linked to the value of openness), and directly impacts on the social contract between citizens and the state. Citizens contribute not only by paying taxes and obeying the law, but also by engaging with public policies and cooperating in their design and implementation. Public services are provided on a large scale and offered to citizens and businesses as a right, in return for their tax payments. It has been argued that improving the quality of public services can lead to more satisfied users, which, in turn, can increase trust in government – a transmission mechanism referred to in the literature as the ‘micro performance hypothesis’ (OECD, 2018).

Voluntary tax compliance has been the focus of revenue collection agencies globally. Most research on tax compliance takes on an instrumental value, focussing on calculations of costs and benefits, and avoidance based on fear of punishment. Yet, from an individual/cultural perspective, compliance is not rational, especially if the risk of being caught is small. The greater the incidence of tax evasions, avoidance and non-compliance, the higher levels of social distrust between citizens. In European countries, higher levels of distrust are connected to a higher tolerance of illegal behaviours such as tax fraud (Dabros et al, 2015). Where cooperates, business and highly influential private sector companies are found to be involved in tax fraud or avoidance, levels of

8 Interpersonal Trust (share of people reporting that “most people can be Trusted” in the World Value Survey) against income inequality by Gini Index (higher values reflect more inequality). Data from 2000 (or closest year available).
trust in the rule of law and confidence in state institutions is affected. Lack of integrity in high-level civil servants demonstrated by misuse of public resources, or inadequate behaviour by government representatives, can negatively shape public opinion on the overall trustworthiness of government institutions.

Public confidence in institutions and policy direction of the leadership were found to be crucial resources for the stability of political systems. These have been demonstrated as the underlying drivers of trust as illustrated in the previous section. Marien and Werner (2016) conclude that the question that remains to be answered is how ‘a democratic system can foster public acceptance of, and voluntary compliance with, political decisions without being authoritarian’. Putting the values of fairness, openness and transparency in practice has been a challenge across country cases.

5.4. Trust and social outcomes
Theoretical constructs explored in Section 4 demonstrates the value of social/interpersonal trust for a stable society. Whereas more evidence was generated in the past on institutional trust, there is emerging evidence on the positive effects of social trust. At the individual level it has been shown that social trust promotes volunteerism, donations to charity and common interest organizations; tax payment; recycling and contributions to the provision of public goods in general. Moreover, studies at the aggregate level across country cases or at the subnational level show that societies inhabited by more trusting citizens have higher levels of GDP.

Social cohesion and citizen engagement
The introduction of social capital theory has enabled deeper enquiry into interpersonal (horizontal) relations between citizens, where strengthened citizen engagement has been reported to offer a way to build trust. Putnam (discussed in the previous section) found that trust, economic prosperity, and institutional competence are also achieved through citizen engagement. Social cohesion as an all-encompassing term, especially applicable in heterogeneous societies, is the subject of interrogation in the process of collective decision making. The capacity of governments to support peaceful collective decision making, and to intervene where necessary, is linked to equality of opportunity, inclusion, law and order and the performance of the police – all used as proxy measures of trust. One of the reasons reported on why citizens do not engage in public processes is due to low levels of trust in public institutions. The lack of citizen participation in government decision making, will in turn negatively affect performance and accountability – which leads to a further decrease in trust. This is the mutually reinforcing and interdependent dynamic between trust in government and citizen engagement.

Figure 6 Share reporting trust in people and index of civic engagement vs index of peaceful collective decision making - 2013

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The World Development Report of 2013 demonstrated the correlation between the index of peaceful collective decision making, and two key measures of social cohesion at the micro level: trust and civic engagement. The index of peaceful collective decision making is a quantitative indicator for each country, using aggregated data on political stability, the absence of violence, and voice and accountability. Figure 6 shows a strong positive relationship: countries where people are more likely to report trusting others, are also countries where there is less violence and more political stability and accountability.

**Education level**

Improved educational outcomes, is reported to generate ‘positive externalities’ which means that investing in education yields both private and social returns, making a strong case for social policy and justification for government intervention in the provision of education services (Esteban Ortiz- & Roser, 2016; Han et al, 2019). Private (individual) returns to education include higher wages and better employment prospects. Social returns include pro-social behaviour (e.g. volunteering, political participation) and interpersonal trust. In many countries, and included in the human development index for cross country comparisons, individuals with tertiary education or post school education are linked to positive outcomes and wellbeing, with the likelihood of increased interpersonal trust.

**Discrimination, social injustice and institutionalized racism**

Factors impacting on trust spans across various contexts and is transferrable across geographical spaces. However, certain factors arise out of systemic practices, embedded in organizations and institutions which become established even when social justice and democratic principles are enshrined in constitutional values. Racism is one such factor, which if demonstrated through systematic failure in the provision of services based on colour, culture or ethnic origin, leads to discrimination. It is also experienced by citizens through the system of social services, employment opportunities, access to housing, health care, education or other rights as a citizen. South Africa and the United States of America (USA) for example, are countries with deeply rooted historical racism, each presenting with unique situations of continued challenges despite democratic rights recognised in their constitutions (Michener, 2015; DPME, 2014, DPME 2019). Ethnic diversity and heterogeneity can exist without racism, and thus need to be differentiated appropriately.

Racism and other forms of institutionalized discrimination has become the subject of widespread concern across the globe in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic and the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement. It has been argued that many investments by governments to ensure a just and equal society as per constitutional imperatives, have resulted in setbacks on progress made. The USA has been in the spotlight on the dual issues of government’s handling of the pandemic and the incidence of police brutality on black citizens for many months in 2020. Both events resulted in widespread social mobilization against state institutions and dwindling confidence by the public at an international scale.

Responses by governments varied, but with the common aim of maintaining stability. The newly elected Biden leadership declared a “Memorandum on restoring trust in government through scientific integrity and Evidence-Based Policymaking” within the first week of office. The UK Government formed a Commission of Enquiry on Race and Ethnic Disparities. While the Commission declared that there is no “institutional racism” within the UK Government, wide criticism was levelled against the findings and the process by citizens and civic movements (Jameela, 2021; SHF, 2021). Data on trust, if gathered during this time, will reveal the sensitivity of trust to events and the mood of citizens.

**5.5. Trust in public institutions and performance of government**

Correlations made in the previous section from country cases on trust and economic/social outcomes, demonstrate how various factors related to trust impact on outcomes expected by government interventions.
Overall, country cases confirm that government performance and service delivery influences institutional trust in a summative assessment; and that conversely, institutional malfunctions lead to distrust. Measures of trust in public institutions, and in government specifically, is undertaken by a range of organizations. Results of surveys vary widely between countries and within countries. Some countries integrate national with international survey data and evidence.

The trend is that trust in most public bodies declined since 2007 with trust in government declining on average 2% points across OECD countries. This includes trust in Political Parties; Parliament; Financial Institutions; Media/Press; and Television. Generally, trust in the Judicial System and Education increased between 4-6% points (OECD, 2017). Furthermore, trust varies by state institutions and levels within those. There were higher levels of trust for the Military, medium levels of trust for Courts, low levels of trust for the Presidency and ‘disastrous’ levels of trust for Congress. Trust is higher the closer governments get to people i.e. local levels. Country cases confirm that government performance and service delivery influence institutional trust. Citizens are reported to trust public services more than government as an institution.

Bureaucratic capacity is linked directly to the performance of government and the implementation of policies. Evidence on the role of an effective bureaucracy/civil service in determining a country’s progress and prosperity is increasing. However, the question of “what constitutes an effective civil service” is difficult to answer precisely, due to historical and political contexts. Civil services across the world vary widely in their shape, size, and responsibilities. Many ideas exist in political science theory, tested in different contexts and collectively address both the performance of government and that of state capacity. The International Civil Service Effectiveness Index of 2019, a composite measure using 46 metrics of 38 central civil services, provides a country comparison on the core functions\(^{10}\) performed by government at the central level (InCiSE, 2019). New Zealand ranked highest in the world during the pandemic for integrity, capabilities, and procurement.

The ‘Open Government Partnership’ includes 75 countries and 15 sub-national governments. At its core lies the intention of building trust through transparency and accountability between citizens and government. A report on trends in rebuilding citizen trust concluded that public officials are reaching out and listening to citizens and meaningfully responding to their needs (Pradhan, n.d). Governments and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are working closely together to overcome corruption and to reform the public service to serve its citizens. These trends (translated to pillars of action) listed in Table 4 represent “a countervailing force to the rising tide of distrust in government”, and are redefining civic engagement beyond voting (Pradhan, n.d):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4</th>
<th>Six pillars of the Open Government movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Arming Citizens with Meaningful Information</td>
<td>Transparency is a critical first step in rebuilding trust. But information made transparent must be genuinely useful to, and usable by, citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Empowering Citizen Voice in Policymaking</td>
<td>Conflict-ridden South Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo allowed citizens to vote on budget allocations using mobile phones. When citizens saw roads and schools being repaired according to what they voted for, tax collection jumped 16-fold, which is a clear measure of the increased trust in government resulting from open, more participatory approaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reaching Out to Marginalized Citizens</td>
<td>With populism on the rise and minorities facing growing oppression, inclusion of the most vulnerable in public dialogue and policy priorities is essential to win their trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Empowering Citizens to Follow the Money</td>
<td>Enabling citizens to monitor government spending and to report the misuse of public funds help build confidence in public institutions by demonstrating that tax money is being spent wisely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Responding to Citizen Needs</td>
<td>Transparency and participation are not silver bullets. Beyond feeling heard, citizens need to feel that government is responsive to their voices. Lack of responsiveness may in fact exacerbate citizens’ scepticism and distrust in government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{10}\) These functions include: (i) **Central executive functions** for ministers, the effects of which are felt by citizens (e.g. policy making, fiscal management, regulation, crisis/risk management). (ii) **Service delivery functions** where central Government civil services interact more directly with citizens (e.g. tax and social security administration, digital services). (iii) **Mission support functions** which enable a civil service to do its job (e.g. finance, human resource management, IT, procurement).
6. Enlisting Citizens in the Fight Against Grand Corruption & Elite Capture

Reformers from government, civil society, private sector and other groups are mobilized to forge coalitions to empower ordinary citizens in the exercise and oversight of governance, to break the cycle of distrust, and to ensure governments truly serve their citizens.

5.6. Trust in the time of a global crisis

The global pandemic has led to the generation of an exponential production of research and other forms of evidence. In a most recent publication by the United Nations on the ‘World Happiness Report’, many studies on the effects of Covid-19 have emphasized the importance of public trust as a support for successful pandemic responses (Helliwell et al, 2021). Similar linkages were studied in previous UN reports dealing with other national and personal crisis situations (e.g. civil wars, tsunami and other natural disasters).

In the most recently published World Happiness Report, 2020, it was found that individuals with high trust levels (both social and institutional) were happier than those living in less trusting and trustworthy environments. The benefits of high trust were especially evident for those in conditions of adversity, including ill-health, unemployment, low income, discrimination and unsafe streets. In addition, the World Happiness Report, 2013, came to the same finding during another crisis, which is that happiness consequences of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 were smaller in those countries with greater levels of mutual trust. These findings were consistent with a broad range of studies showing that communities with high levels of trust are generally much more resilient in the face of a wide range of crises, including tsunamis, earthquakes, accidents, storms and floods. Trust and cooperative social norms not only facilitate rapid and cooperative responses, which themselves improve the happiness of citizens, but also demonstrate to people the extent to which others are prepared to do ‘benevolent acts’ for them and the community in general (Helliwell et al, 2021).

5.7. Lessons learnt from international benchmarking on trust

Given the many drivers, factors and varying contexts within which trust is theorised, measured and applied, it is evident that many different and complex relationships exist. Linkages depend on how the conceptual foundations of trust influence each other, as reflected in the results of trust outcomes. Causal pathways depend on long term historical realities and contextual dynamics with the combination of subjective, objective and experimental measures. These relationships are underscored by the social compacts within states to reach consensus, implement programmes of action and collectively influence outcomes of trust by citizens on government (and state institutions on the whole). Lessons derived from the international benchmarking on trust are therefore categorised and summarised according to the evidence trail generated in this section, as an attempt to distil them for application to the South African context.

❖ Social ties and sense of community are prerequisites for social and institutional trust

- Values that link citizens to daily public life, strengthen social ties and their loyalty to community; reduce transaction costs and contributes to economic growth; help solve collective action problems; facilitate civic engagements and lead to better functioning governments.
- Social trust promotes volunteering, donations to charity and common interest organizations; tax payment; recycling and contributions to the provision of public goods in general. Moreover, studies at the aggregate level across country cases or at the subnational level, show that societies inhabited by more trusting citizens have higher levels of GDP.
- A positive correlation was found between confidence in government and age where 58-62% of the older population had a higher confidence in government compared to only 28.5% of the younger population.

“Seeing Trust in action, has been found to lead to post-disaster increases in Trust, especially where Government responses are considered to be sufficiently timely and effective”.

World Happiness Report, 2020
❖ **Social trust is a resource for participatory democracy and can be built by actions of government**
- Social trust is seen as necessary for the emergence of civil society and essential for the development of political democracy.
- Individuals with high trust levels (both social and institutional) were happier than those living in less trusting and trustworthy environments. The benefits of high trust were especially evident for those in conditions of adversity, including ill-health, unemployment, low income, discrimination and unsafe streets.
- Social trust is likely to change over time and is greatly influenced by experiences in state institutions.
- Trust-distrust is not static.

❖ **Transparency, fairness and accountability reduce political tensions and distrust**
- The factors that correlate strongly with erosion of political trust include: corruption, performance, and quality of government; exposure to violence; increases in citizen expectations; and the state of the economy.
- Lack of citizen engagement is due to low levels of trust in public institutions, leading to poor participation in government decision making and negatively affects performance and accountability – leading to distrust.
- The greater the incidence of tax evasions, avoidance and non-compliance, the higher levels of social distrust between citizens.
- Countries where people are more likely to report trusting others, are also countries where there is less violence and more political stability and accountability.
- Individuals with high trust levels (both social and institutional) were happier than those living in less trusting and trustworthy environments.
- Countries with high levels of trust show: lower levels of corruption; a higher quality of government; lower crime levels; higher levels of political participation; higher levels of compliance with the law; and higher levels of economic growth.
- Where cooperates, business and highly influential private sector companies are found to be involved in tax fraud or avoidance, levels of trust in the rule of law and confidence in state institutions are affected.
- Lack of integrity in high-level civil servants demonstrated by misuse of public resources, or inadequate behaviour by government representatives, negatively shape public opinion on the overall trustworthiness of government institutions.

❖ **Competence and values of government in implementing policies and the provision of quality public services influence institutional trust**
- High quality public institutions influence the achievement of economic growth and the management of inequality.
- State capacity and quality of government have positive effects on all standard measures of human well-being.
- Citizens trust public services more than they trust government as an institution.
- Average trust in the police is higher than trust in the political- and legal systems, and trust in the political system is much lower than interpersonal trust for all countries of the OECD, except Switzerland.
- Reviews on economic inequality and trust, show that cross-country comparisons, within country studies, and social experiments, all suggest that economic inequality has a negative influence on trust.
- Quality of public services lead to more satisfied users, which, in turn, increase trust in government.
- Institutional trust has a causal relationship with social trust.
- Tax system outcomes and tax governance outcomes affect citizens’ tax compliance, which are influenced by norms, values, and ethics.
- Enhancing public financial management, including efficiency and equity of public spending helps citizens to be more likely to comply with tax collection when they trust that tax revenues are managed well.
Effective analysis of trust depends on a combination of subjective, objective and experimental data
- Survey coverage is often uneven across countries and over time. Most survey data come from a small sample. Measures of trust from attitudinal survey questions remain the most common source of data on trust.
- Economic indicators for inequality, if combined with the social mechanisms through which trust is derived, becomes the opportunity for governments to effectively measure, influence and use trust in a more comprehensive way.

6. Contextualizing trust in South Africa
National reviews to date, state that despite much progress in addressing the triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment, South Africa’s developmental trajectory is not achieving the desired impact (DPME, 2014; DPME 2018; NPC, 2020). The NDP review in particular states that “the prevalence of poor service delivery, coupled with a slow-growing economy with limited inclusivity, is negatively affecting the social wage and undermining social cohesion” (NPC, 2020 pg 5). This is an important statement as it makes the critical links to the drivers and factors impacting on trust. The constructs of trust and lessons from the international benchmarking exercise provides an opportunity to contribute to broader discussion and debate on South Africa’s developmental path. While trust is located in the MTSF as a specific indicator under the first priority of “Capable, ethical and developmental state” (refer to Study Context), it becomes clear from the evidence synthesis approach, that building and maintaining trust is a cross-cutting intervention. Contributions from the other sectors (priority areas) is necessary if change and societal impact is to be achieved. By using available national data\(^{\text{11}}\) on trust and combining these with proxy data, a compelling case is made on how certain factors have direct associations with levels of trust in South Africa and more so, a trend towards deeper levels of distrust. Factors are teased out separately to identify core drivers of trust and distrust in SA.

6.1. Trust in government vs other public institutions

The international benchmarking exercise has demonstrated that institutional trust has a causal impact on social trust. There are three further observations drawn from the evidence:

\(^{\text{11}}\) Available data sets used in this section and for contextualizing further, are outlined in the section on data landscape. The research team would like to draw attention on supplementing of data using different sources, noting with full awareness that variables differ and are measured in different ways. The graphs all have an explanation of which data sets were used.
Institutional trust is measured via confidence in existing state institutions. Quality of institutional trust gives rise to experiences (positive or negative) with legitimate representation (voting and political system) which influences social trust. Citizens’ perception of trustworthiness of others are informed by rules that govern citizens’ behaviour.

The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB), measures confidence in various state institutions. These are compared with National, Provincial and Local Government with changes tracked from 2017-2019 in Figure 7. It reveals that trust at national, provincial and local spheres of government differs. Although confidence has increased overall since 2017, most institutions remain below 50% in levels of trust. Trust in all three spheres of government increased slightly, with Local Government being lowest. A longer-term trend for trust in government from 2003-2018 is provided by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) through the South African Social Attitudes Survey, which show levels of trust reducing across all three spheres of government, although trust in national government is higher than provincial and local government in South Africa. This trend differs from the international experience.

6.2. Trust and inequality
Economic development and national wealth were found to be strongly associated with levels of trust from the international country cases, where more advanced economies with higher GDP have higher levels of trust in government. Tracking GDP rates against levels of trust in South Africa presents a picture that is steeped in historical, political and socio-economic challenges influencing trust. In the period 2006-2008 (just prior to the economic meltdown), there were high levels of trust when GDP was above 5%. The period from 2011 to 2018 presents a tumultuous picture with trust fluctuating between 10-70% ranges. Figure 8 shows how levels of trust fluctuates when GDP remains constantly below 3%.

Figure 8 Trust and GDP in South Africa


12 Bohler-Muller et al, HSRC, 2020, Presentation to the Presidency.
13 Measurement bias may be present where both studies are separately done by separate institutions, with indicators differing
In a recent economic analysis by Michael Sachs, a comparison between the USA and SA’s GDP per capita is made, making the case that “a single time trend does not adequately characterise the evolution of GDP per capita in most developing countries” (Sachs, 2021). This difference can be seen when the patterns of growth in South Africa and the USA are compared (Figure 9).

Figure 9  GDP per capita: USA and South Africa (1950–2019)

Sachs, 2021 explains that until the mid-2000s, the USA’s growth rate showed a relatively linear trend, whereas the picture for South Africa was very different, with periodic accelerations and decelerations lasting over a decade or more. The 1950s and 1960s showed consistent growth, but then displaced by falling GDP per capita, which reflected the structural crisis of the apartheid economy. In the 1990s, growth was restored and even accelerated due to the commodity boom. The growth downturn just prior to the Covid-19 lockdown crisis, will reveal further crisis points. How this is associated to trust is explored through the subsequent sections, in understanding other factors influencing trust.

Figure 10  GDP per capita and trust in SA using Edelman and IJR data sources.

GDP per capita and the Gini index is a closer measure of inequality, as discussed in Section 5.2. GDP per capita for South Africa as per the Edelman Trust Barometer, is compared with locally generated data on trust by the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in Figure 10. Edelman data for South Africa only started in 2014, whereas the IJR data dates back to 2006, with a break in 2016-2017, when the variables were being revised. The trend lines provide an interesting observation. While the global trend for trust in government is reported to be reducing, this is better supported by the IJR data in South Africa, than Edelman (which appears to be on a slight upward trend – though this trend-line might look different if data from earlier years were collected). Moreover, there is a stronger relationship between trust and GDP per capita based on the IJR data. Reliability and continuity of data sources is therefore a critical enabler for robust trust analysis.

6.3. Trust and corruption
Corruption at all levels, has been found to influence trust directly across many countries, with a mixed outcome within some countries in the African region when balancing between social and economic outcomes. Figure 11 confirms how rising levels of corruption, has a reverse association with levels of trust in South Africa.

Figure 11  Trust and corruption in South Africa


The South African Institute of Race Relations and Corruption Watch reported on corruption by institution over the 2018/2019 period (see Table 5). While National Government and Local Government remain the highest incidence of reported cases and increased by 2-3% points, it may not be alarming to note that the private sector’s involvement in corruption has increased by 15% over the period.

Table 5  Corruption reported by institution, 2018 & 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional location</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Government</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Owned Entity</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.4. **Trust and social cohesion**

Race relations and social capital are closely tied together which influence social trust in South Africa. Despite efforts in building social cohesion as reflected in the ‘rainbow nation’, national emblems, history curriculum and language policy, South Africa’s racial tensions remain high. These are reflected in the long-term trends of attitudinal surveys from the ‘South African Social Attitudes Survey’ conducted by the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) where evidence point to little trust between racial groups (Struwig et al, 2011; 2013). Inequality is also manifested along racial lines, with challenges remaining in overcoming distrust between race groups. The National 2021 Indlulamithi Barometer, which measures key driving forces towards three scenarios in understanding what a socially cohesive South Africa will look like, reports that South Africa was already trending towards the ‘Gwara Gwara’ scenario (demoralized land of disorder and decay) since 2017. Between 2020-2021 during Covid pandemic, this trend is deepening.

The Institute of Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) reports that 32% of South Africans in the 2019 round of the SA Reconciliation Barometer, indicated that they have little or no trust in people from other racial groups other than their own. This is a nationally representative survey on social cohesion, nation-building and reconciliation. In addition, 52% have noted that inequality is the most divisive feature of society since 2006. Confidence in government to address social disparities has consequently been on a downward trend. These findings are reported to demonstrate weak vertical (state-society) and horizontal (intra-society) relations, with direct implications on solidarity and trust (IJR, 2019)

**Figure 11**  
**Trust and social cohesion in South Africa**

![Graph showing trends in trust, pride in being South African, confidence in happy future of all races, and race relations improving - opinion from 2004 to 2024.](image)


Trust indicators used by GCIS/IPSOS are aligned to international surveys when citizens report on confidence in the future and whether they are happy with the direction the country is taking. Data on trust demonstrate a clear association between trust and social cohesion as shown in Figure 11 and confirms the finding reported
by IJR. While pride in being South African remains high, including confidence in a happy future for all races, race relations is more closely linked to trust. National pride was at its highest between 2004 and 2006, with above 80% of the population taking pride to be identified as a South African. However, in 2007, there was a steep decline in the percentage of citizens who report to being proud of ‘being South African’, reaching the lowest figure of 65% in 2008 (coinciding with the global financial crisis). This trend has however been improving in South Africa with a figure of 81% recorded in the 2019/20 financial year, according to GCIS/IPSOS data.

Social trust has been understood as necessary for the emergence of civil society and essential for the development of participatory democracy. When citizens observe how fellow citizens are treated, what opportunities are made available and what rights are enjoyed, social trust is either facilitated/inhibited and becomes instrumental for those who depend on public goods and services. Low levels of participation in community activities (beyond voting in the election), provide further evidence to explore citizen engagement, its influence on social trust, and its impact on active citizenry (Figure 12).

Figure 12 Percentage participation in community activities/actions (Ethics SA, 2015)

The NDP has active citizenship as a key tenet in achieving Vision 2030. High levels of active citizenry mean that there must be a considerable measure of civic organization and participation at community level. Brand SA has measured this level of activity through the Domestic Perceptions research project, which tracks three indices to understand the drivers of perceptions around Pride, Active Citizenship and Social Cohesion. It is reported that, compared to the intention of participating in community activities, in reality there is a very low percentage of citizens engaged in civic duty with the 20-29 year-old age group even less engaged (see Figure 11).

6.5. Trust and violence
International cases demonstrate that violence impacts negatively on social trust and has a direct association with rule of law and confidence in police services. Research on violence in South Africa by the Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) found that socioeconomic inequality, frustrated masculinity, and lack of social cohesion “connect and overlap to drive violence, especially in combination with alcohol and firearms” (Brankovic, 2019). At the individual and social levels, the experience of injustice, spatial inequalities,
unfair treatment, lack of opportunities and competition for scarce resources, are conditions that lead to violence. The report outlines that when combined, these increase the risk of homicide, gender-based violence, youth violence, violence against children, and collective violence. Young people are both victims of the system as well as perpetrators of violent acts.

Protests by citizens at Local Government level has been the dominant form of expression for dissatisfaction in government service delivery. Furthermore, violence is a key feature of these protests, where 90% of protests from 2013 is reported to have involved some element of violence or intimidation (Nzei et al, 2019). The research findings also make explicit links with the lack of trust communities have on the decision-making processes followed by their local municipalities. Using conceptual and empirical evidence on trust and procedural justice, as well as South African community protest cases, the research finds that citizens may accept unfavourable outcomes if they perceive the processes as fair and their treatment as respectful and dignifying. While international trends point to high levels of trust at the point of service delivery, the South African situation is different where trust is higher at national government.

Violence against foreign nationals has further eroded interpersonal trust and cohesiveness within societies in South Africa. It is reported to be an ongoing threat to economic and political stability. IPSOS conducted an opinion survey poll on adult attitudes towards cross-border migrants and refugees in provinces where most non-nationals live and work in South Africa (HSRC, 2020). The report found that negative stereotypes about cross-border migrants and refugees are common in many towns and villages with people describing these groups as 'violent' and 'dishonest'. Anti-immigrant sentiment is fuelled by the direct and indirect links made in public discourse, between migration and social problems or jobs.

6.6. Trust and crime
Gould states that reflection on history is needed to understand the context within which crime and violence remains high in South Africa, and in particular citizens attitudes to law, policing and the criminal justice system (Gould, 2014). Crime statistics are reported annually by Stats SA, with various analysis and interpretation provided. Crime has been reported to influence interpersonal trust negatively with further lack of confidence in services if citizens find that they are not protected by the law and lack confidence in the police. The general level of crime, as estimated by the Victims of Crime Survey, is reported to be declining during the past five years, however, with periodic increased in 2016/17 and 2017/18. The percentage of households who were satisfied with the police services in their area decreased from 57,3% in 2016/17 to 54,2% in 2017/18. The percentage of households who were satisfied with the way courts deal with perpetrators was already low (44,9%) yet decreased further to 41,1% in 2017/18. Satisfaction with the police declined in every province except the Western Cape and Free State, while satisfaction with the courts declined in every province except the North West. Behaviour towards the law (e.g. traffic offences, wearing seatbelts and currently masks) and attitudes of respect between citizens are reflected in daily interactions that have the potential to influence trust positively or negatively. Thus, unequal experiences of the law (related to any other public service too) has been reported to erode trust in the justice system.

6.7. Relationship between trust, inequality, corruption and race relations
When combining trust levels with key factors of corruption and GDP, the relationships become more apparent, where rising levels of corruption is associated with lower GDP and lower levels of trust (refer to Figure 13). While a causal path is difficult to determine without measuring the same trends over time and controlling for other variables, this finding is aligned with international experiences, despite different contextual realities. Dialogue and debates are needed amongst key stakeholders in order to build consensus on the linkages, relationships and causal paths influencing trust, and where trust levels influence other factors. Assumptions need to be interrogated and evidence generated to test these assumptions if trust in government is to be pursued in a more deliberative manner.
6.8. Trust and the media during the Covid-19 pandemic

Government responses to overcome effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on lives and livelihoods comprise the current concerns in the erosion of trust. During 2020, trust in government dropped significantly according to the Edelman Trust Barometer. While the Edelman results were published prior to the Covid-19 pandemic entering South Africa, we are reminded that the South African economy was already downgraded just prior to the lockdown announcement in March 2020. Observations made from the international benchmarking exercise are brought into the analysis at this point. One is that there was already a trend of reduced trust in government. Secondly that trust differs at the 3 levels of government. The sensitivity of trust to events and responses by government is demonstrated by the findings from GCIS, which reveal how important it is for government to communicate openly, timeously and in an accountable manner. Figure 14 points to higher levels of trust in sources of information from health experts, government and the World Health Organisation, with less from journalists and business.

Specific drivers of trust outlined in the first section, were also used as an analytical frame to demonstrate media headlines and narratives that influence trust, confidence and attitudes towards government interventions during this crisis. Media reporting had a faster turnaround time to keep citizens informed, and therefore exert influence on trust outcomes to different sectors of society. Biases can also be noted when mostly negative reporting is carried out, leading to distrust. Annexure B provides a mapping of media coverage during Covid-19 according to the drivers of trust discussed in the earlier section.
7. Towards a comprehensive Theory of Change

Social and institutional trust are the dimensions derived from evidence that assist in developing a conceptual understanding of trust. These dimensions are useful as the basis for further analysis and application. This section of the report begins to apply the lessons and concepts on trust for the SA Government. Within a strategic and ‘results-based’ approach, a Theory of Change (ToC) takes into consideration multiple pathways to change. It must state the desired outcome and is based on an accurate diagnosis (problem analysis) and design/implementation strategy of effective interventions to address these problems. The current MTSF puts focus on trust and ‘participatory mechanisms’ for strengthening the social compact. Considering the lessons learnt from the international benchmarking exercise, trust is understood more comprehensively, where institutional trust has a causal relationship on social trust.

Section 6 provided a diagnostic of this broader understanding of trust and its influencing factors for South Africa. Social trust (and factors contributing to distrust between SA citizens) may have a direct association with institutional trust. This implies a deeper analysis is needed for the South African context, which raises questions and guide further interrogation. If trust is to be built as a strategic resource, what should government do to ensure that it is sustained at high levels? If trust is both a process (relational) and an outcome (judgement on the performance of government), then it encompasses the ‘whole of government’ and all seven developmental priorities of the MTSF 2019-2024. This requires the Center of Government15 to effectively measure, track and timeously evaluate trust across all seven priorities to disrupt negative trends and path dependencies, which lead to distrust over time.

7.1. Key considerations on trust in the South African Government

A simplistic representation of a ToC for trust is illustrated in Figure 15, which takes into account the results chain for purposes of effective measurement of trust. There are key considerations that arise from the evidence synthesis in constructing a ToC for trust in the South African Government, namely:

- Consensus on an operational definition of trust for South Africa.
- Social trust (social cohesion) influences institutional trust (state capacity) and vice versa, hence both need to be considered in the pathway(s) to change.
- Trust is both a process and an outcome variable in the results chain, and there is no linear path to build or earn trust.
- There is a reciprocal relationship between trust, developmental outcomes and performance of government, which cuts across socio, economic and environmental policies of government.

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15 “Centre of Government” refers to the institution or group of institutions that provide direct support to the country’s chief executive, and can also be found at the subnational level (Alessandro et al, 2013)
7.1. Complexity of the trust variable

Social and institutional trust are inextricably linked, yet for it to be used in government for increasing public value (symbolic and instrumental), it will need to be measured along the pathways of change in more deliberate ways. The lessons from the international benchmarking outlined in Section 6 provide the following points for discussion/questions as a starting point (more focussed questions are needed to test the ToC):

**Prerequisites for social and institutional trust**
- How does social distrust lead to institutional distrust in the South African context, and vice versa?
- What strategies must government design to deliberately build trust amongst citizens?

**Social cohesion as a strategic resource**
- What are the drivers of weak race relations?
- How can the programme of action for social cohesion be strengthened?

**Drivers of distrust**
- GDP rates (growth and per capita) as an indicator of economic standing is strongly associated with trust. Where income disparities is the key driver of inequality in South Africa, can trust be gained by ensuring good governance alone?
- Higher levels of corruption have a negative association with trust. Is corruption the key driver of distrust that has a direct effect on institutional trust as well as horizontal social relations between citizens?

**Competence of government**
- Principles that inform and guide the work of government, as per the values and intentions, mean that these must be pursued, defended and upheld at all levels of government – can these drivers of trust be included as a variable across the results chain as reflected in the ToC?
- These collectively, has the potential to lead to high levels of trust as a composite measure, with contributions made from all seven priorities.

**Subjective, objective and experimental measurement of trust**
- Vulnerability creates a reliance on government and hence citizens enter into a dependent relationship with government for services. Trust by citizens will differ between those who depend on government (poor and vulnerable) from those who are not (affluent) – hence requiring disaggregation based on class and income.
- Government engages with organized labour, business, and private sector to strengthen the social compact, yet trust is measured using subjective surveys at an individual/citizen level. How can more appropriate measures be designed and adopted?
If the ability of the South African Government to deliver services at the quality expected by citizens (competence) leads to higher levels of trust, then each sector providing services must have an indicator of trust to measure citizen levels of satisfaction.

Will data sources be able to provide adequate baselines and sustain data availability to measure trust over the medium and long term?

7.2. Key assumptions
An important component of developing a ToC is identifying risks, processes or activities that undermine the impact of the theory. The understanding in the current MTSF 2019-2024 where the trust indicator has been included, has some inherent assumptions that need to be interrogated. Specific interventions in participatory local governance and citizens engagement is expected to yield increased levels of trust as measured by the Edelman Trust Barometer. This is an assumption where focussing on a stronger social compact as a governance measure, will result in increased levels of trust and ultimately impact on public value and active citizenry. Clearer linkages need to be made between specific interventions across the seven national priorities and how they are expected to influence trust positively, including how trust can be built and maintained at higher levels. In addition, participatory governance and citizen’s engagement does not have a linear path to social compact. Key factors leading to distrust, i.e. inequality, social (race) relations, crime, violence and corruption, must be included for tracking and regular monitoring.

8. Pathways to influence trust
Section 8 of the report provides for an expanded form of recommendations in taking forward the broader construct of trust according to the insights drawn from this study. It outlines preliminary pathways of change for government, where trust is earned (invested in), built (sustained) and influenced (driven) positively. The MTSF 2019-2024 provides the high-level narrative for seven priorities of whole of government. The first priority is the primary enabler with three characteristics of the state: Capable; Ethical and Developmental. Bearing in mind the considerations and assumptions discussed in the previous section, an evidence-based approach is used in this section to initiate dialogue on proposed pathways for change using trust as the core unit of analysis. Each of the three characteristics of the state are discussed to guide the understanding of these pathways, thereby illustrating this complex terrain with the need for wider collaboration. Figure 15 provides a broad schematic representation of the three pathways to change, incorporating the results-based measures to social- and institutional trust.

Figure 15 Schematic representation of the pathways to change
8.1. Capable state

**Definition (MTSF 2019-2024):** “A capable state has the required human capabilities, institutional capacity, service processes and technological platforms to deliver on the NDP through a social contract with the people.”

**Evidence trail:** Depending on which lens is used to investigate and analyse a capable state, there are many dimensions of state capacity evident in the literature. A review of 176 studies are used to understand different types of capacity from different contexts in Table 6. State capacity is broadly understood as the “ability to implement policy; enforce legislation; and deliver services” (Bukenya & Yanguas, 2013).

Of these definitions, ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘fiscal’ or ‘revenue generation’ capacity are the two transversal inputs into a capable state system to give effect to public policy making and implementation. These are aligned to the evidence derived from the international benchmarking study for state capacity as a key factor influencing institutional trust. Social cohesion and nation building remain critical in its programmatic interventions by government to ensure fairness, equalizing opportunity and outcomes and ensures redress. Building trust through the capacity of government to ensure sharing of common space, facilitating public interactions and citizen participation, and reducing disparities through policy interventions (e.g. language, access to education and health, EEA, BBBEE and land reform) serve to improve social relations and build a cohesive society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Sample References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Capacity to manage resources and implement policy.</td>
<td>Organizational capacity</td>
<td>(Tilly, 1990; Evans, 1995; Evans and Rauch, 1999; Hendrix, 2010; Fukuyama, 2011, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>to implement policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal capacity</td>
<td>Capacity to enforce contracts and property rights.</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>(Levi, 1988; Besley and Persson, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>Capacity to project power within territorial boundaries.</td>
<td>Where the state does its work</td>
<td>(Herbst, 2000; Mann, 2008; Soifer, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal capacity</td>
<td>Capacity to extract tax revenue from society.</td>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>(Ardant, 1975; Levi, 1988; Bräutigam et al., 2008; Hendrix, 2010; Fukuyama, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructural</td>
<td>Capacity to shape societal behaviour.</td>
<td>Social domination</td>
<td>(Migdal, 1988; Jessop, 2008; Mann, 2008; Soifer, 2008; vom Hau, 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coercive capacity</td>
<td>Capacity to deter or repel challenges to internal or external security.</td>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>(Finer, 1975; Tilly, 1990; Centeno, 2002; Bates, 2008; Hendrix, 2010)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Bureaucratic capacity of the state has thus been extensively studied for different countries. It is clear that administrations across country cases differ in their institutional contexts, macro arrangements, location, roles and functions. The Center of Government and related sub-national structures have come under review and has been the focus of the current administration in ensuring that the ‘machinery of government’ is made more effective to achieve developmental objectives. The NDP notes that tensions between the political and administrative interphase and instability of the administrative leadership are persistent challenges faced by the SA Government (NPC, 2011: Chapter 13). A review by DPME demonstrated that this is not unique to

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16 Professionalization of the public service, merit-based recruitment and building a skilled workforce have been targeted interventions in public sector reforms across high performing countries. Pay reforms and public expenditure tracking are key programmatic interventions to ensure efficiency and accountability.
Evidence shows that the absence of centralized oversight functions and meritocratic recruitment in the bureaucracy is generally seen as producing public administrations that are inflated, inefficient, ineffective and lacking in autonomy from political leaders (DPME, 2018). These considerations in the design of public administrations and its strategic purpose have direct influence on state capacity.

Unpacking further, revenue generation capacity has unique requirements that demonstrate its own complexity. Research on innovations in tax compliance by the World Bank identifies four key drivers of trust in tax systems to shape tax reforms (Figure 16) – conceptualized as an enabler of trust in government (Kumagai & Lorio, n.d). Intentions of government in terms of fairness and equity are outcomes of tax systems, while reciprocity and accountability are outcomes of tax governance. Together, these two categories of outcomes affect citizens’ tax compliance, which may also be influenced by norms, values, and ethics.

**Figure 16**  
*Four key drivers of trust in tax systems*

- **Fairness**: tax systems are fairly and competently designed and administered
- **Equity**: burdens are equitably distributed and everyone pays their share
- **Reciprocity**: tax revenues are translated into reciprocal publicly provided goods and services
- **Accountability**: Governments administering those tax systems are accountable to taxpayers

**Proposed pathway of change through a capable state**

Bureaucratic and revenue generation capacity to implement policy successfully is directly linked to effectiveness in service delivery and efficiency in the use and equitable distribution of public resources. Institutional trust is strengthened with positive outcomes for administrative justice and equalization of opportunity for all citizens across spatial patterns. Social trust, has a direct influence on citizens’ experience of government and public policy, especially if delivered with fairness, openness/transparency and in a reliable manner. Engaged citizens are needed at all levels to ensure accountability. Race relations is expected to improve, if all races are perceived to be treated fairly by government officials in service delivery. In a heterogeneous society like South Africa, attention is needed on collective decision making and citizen engagement for improved participation in matters that affect the lives of all citizens, thereby influencing social cohesion. These collectively impact on equality and prosperity.
8.2. Ethical state

**Definition (MTSF 2019-2024):** “driven by the constitutional values and principles of public administration and the rule of law, focused on the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights and social justice as outlined in the Bill of Rights”

**Evidence trail:** Sound principles and values of public administration guide the work of government, as demonstrated in the drivers of trust. In a democratic state, various institutions hold the Executive Authority accountable on its actions. Overcoming widespread corruption by public officials, as
well as the respective private collaborators, has been a central focus of the current administration. The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), Department of Cooperative Governance (DCoG), and South African Local Government Association (SALGA) partnered with the Ethics Institute of South Africa (EthicsSA) to conduct a ‘Public Sector Ethics Survey’ in South Africa. This was undertaken for the first time in 2015 to assess organisational ethics at National-, Provincial- and Local Government levels. Four out of the top 5 risks identified, indicate a low level of openness and trust within public sector organisations, and more specifically between managers and employees (refer to Figure 18). The lack of consistent application of discipline (primarily an HR function) is reflected via inconsistency in the application of rules/discipline. This inconsistency is likely to contribute to uncertainty in National, Provincial and Local level public institutions, which negatively impacts on trust (Ethics SA, 2015).

Figure 18   Ethical culture in the public service, 2015

The study highlights a critical finding where 'stronger consequences for unethical conduct' is rated as the most effective potential intervention. Officials feel that there is a culture of impunity where people get away with unethical conduct, resulting in others further engaging in wrong behaviours and even that certain behaviours can become the norm. The survey also highlights various other factors namely political interference, inappropriate appointments and lack of accountability, which contribute to an environment which is more prone to corruption. The ethical state puts focus on citizens as well as government. Citizenship, as the social and legal link between individuals and their democratic political community have fundamental rights and responsibilities as per the Constitution and Bill of Rights and responsibilities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fundamental rights</th>
<th>Fundamental responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality before the law</td>
<td>● Paying taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>● Obeying laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to education; health; decent work etc.</td>
<td>● Respect rights of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in civil society</td>
<td>● Exercise own rights through active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Batho Pele (“people first”) principles and campaign by the South African Government signals its commitment to creating a people-centred public service that is impartial, professional and committed to the public good. These principles sought to encourage public participation and promote citizens’ ability to know and claim their rights. The monitoring of front-line service delivery is therefore important to continuously track challenges by DPME which to date ranged from complaints on management systems, cleanliness, maintenance of facilities, waiting times and queue management for various sectors. These are largely attributable to weaknesses in operational management. From an institutional perspective on economic participation, the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was formed to enable consultation between social partners on key legislation, including the labour laws. Despite challenges, NEDLAC has helped to develop a culture of participatory democracy on economic issues, and build trust and constructive working relationships between the main constituencies.

The previous section highlighted drivers of distrust for South Africa, with corruption and racial tensions being widespread across society, despite interventions by Government. The South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), is also a generator of evidence on a range of issues affecting society (refer to section 9), and has developed deeper conceptual frameworks to understand the phenomenon of social cohesion in the South African context. The “Social Cohesion Barometer” involves three inter-related components: economic cohesion (employment, income, education, housing are considered pre-conditions), civic cohesion (national pride, patriotism, national identity, citizenship), and socio-cultural cohesion (family cohesion, domestic violence and abuse, neighbourliness, interpersonal relations, participation in voluntary organizations (Struwig et al, 2011; 2013. This barometer was developed on the foundations of survey data that links social cohesion at the individual, household and community level to national interventions by government, and therefore to national socio-economic indicators. The complexity behind social cohesion in South Africa is elevated by the High-level panel report on Social cohesion and nation building where this barometer was used, and it supports the findings in this report on the causal relation between social and institutional trust. Measures for each of the indicators described within the three sub-components of social cohesion are needed for effective tracking of trust.

Nation building is a composite outcome of efforts to build a socially cohesive society, and it is defined as “the amalgam of actions undertaken by various actors in society, including the state, to promote nation formation (the emergence of a united nation)” (MISTRA, 2014). It is argued that in addition to economic and political interventions, nation formation generally takes place in cultural spaces. A further contribution is made to locate social cohesion and nation building at the specific levels in their practical application, and therefore appropriate interventions can be implemented for improving public life. This is an important starting point for understanding the role of different actors, and for the purpose of this report, the role of government specifically. The following is a direct extract from MISTRA, who also draw attention on the “interconnection, mutually reinforcing and potentially disrupting” effects of social cohesion (MISTRA, 2014):

- **Social cohesion** – is generally community based and located at a micro-social and sub-national level
- **Inter-community cohesion** – is at the district/provincial level or meso level of inter-community life
- **Nation building** – is nationally orientated and thus located at the macro-social level

**Proposed pathway of change through an ethical state**
Social transformation is about the transition from exclusion to inclusion in social, political and economic opportunities, structures and power. The rule of law and social justice is ensured through constitutional rights and enforced by government (institutional trust). These in turn influence nation building and civic engagement (measured through increase in social trust).
8.3. Developmental state

**Definition (MTSF 2019-2024):** “A developmental state aims to meet people’s needs through interventionist, developmental, participatory public administration. Building an autonomous developmental state driven by the public interest and not individual or sectional interests; embedded in South African society leading an active citizenry through partnerships with all sectors of society”

**Evidence trail:** Chalmers Johnson (1982) first used the concept of a ‘developmental state’ to describe Japan’s economic growth. This concept and analysis has since been expanded to other countries in East Asia (China, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan). The Japanese model has been widely studied and debated, and key attributes derived from the first documented version of a developmental state. Various terms have been used in the literature to describe the role of the state in development, ranging from the Industrial State; Administrative State; Regulatory State; Network State and more recently, the Entrepreneurial State. With an increasing number of countries recognising the centrality of the state to achieve developmental objectives, thereby moving away from neo-liberal ideology, many more country cases are recognised and documented as developmental states (ESID, 2012). We draw on the broad attributes (Table 7) of a developmental state.
Table 7  
Attributes of a developmental state: past and current

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre – 2000</th>
<th>Post - 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Singular focus on economic growth as the prime directive of the economy;</td>
<td>▪ A capable, autonomous (but embedded) bureaucracy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ State-led industrial policy;</td>
<td>▪ A political leadership oriented towards development: i.e. legitimacy based on developmental outcomes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Professional and capable bureaucracy that is connected to industry;</td>
<td>▪ A close, often mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship between some state agencies and key industrial capitalists;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Labour/education systems that are focused on growth;</td>
<td>▪ Successful policy interventions, which promote growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Authoritarian regime intent on maintaining stability;</td>
<td>▪ Successful policy interventions, which promote growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ High savings rate to be used for investment; and</td>
<td>▪ An export-led growth model.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ An export-led growth model.</td>
<td>▪ A capable, autonomous (but embedded) bureaucracy;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These attributes of a developmental state align with the evidence generated on the dimensions of trust and its contribution to public value. ‘Legitimacy’ of the state and that of government of the day is based on commitment by the political leadership to developmental outcomes. Successful policy interventions are in turn needed by government which not only promotes growth, but also strengthens the social compact. The mix of policy interventions differ from state to state, due to differing contexts. Content analysis from the body of knowledge on Developmental States, has generated the most documented policy interventions in the countries identified as developmental states (Table 8).

Table 8  
Most widely documented mechanisms / policy interventions in the sample of Developmental States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area/intervention</th>
<th>Countries that pursued the intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Export-orientated Industrialisation</td>
<td>South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, India, Botswana, Chile, Ghana, Malaysia, Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 State-led Interventions to Build Industrialisation Capacity</td>
<td>South Korea, Taiwan, India, Finland, Brazil, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Support for Strategic Industries</td>
<td>South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Finland, Botswana, Malaysia, Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Use of SOEs to Achieve Developmental Objectives</td>
<td>South Korea, Taiwan, Botswana, Brazil, China, Singapore,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Macroeconomic Stabilisation Policy</td>
<td>South Korea, Taiwan, Botswana, Malaysia, Singapore, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Presence of a Central Planning Agency</td>
<td>South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, India, Botswana, Singapore, China, Ghana, Malaysia, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Land Reform</td>
<td>Taiwan, India, Botswana, Rwanda, Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 State-led Investment in Agricultural Sector</td>
<td>South Korea, India, Chile, Rwanda, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Merit-based and Transparent Recruitment</td>
<td>South Korea, Taiwan, India, Finland, Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Authoritarian Political Regime</td>
<td>Ghana, Philippines, Rwanda, Malaysia, Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proposed pathway for change through a developmental state
Development planning within the South African Government has put forth key policy interventions (compare with country cases) which direct social-, economic- and environmental policy in a coherent manner. Effective, efficient, and equitable implementation of these public policies, as outlined in the seven developmental priorities impact on institutional trust that lead to improved quality of life. Where citizens are directly involved in development planning, monitoring and tracking of progress and informing priority setting, active citizenry is ensured which influence social cohesion, and leads to increase social trust.
9. Data landscape for monitoring and evaluating trust in South Africa

9.1. Sources of trust data

The international benchmarking exercise demonstrates that there is a growing body of evidence on trust, including its several conceptual synonyms like ‘confidence’ and ‘attitudes’. Some sources date back more than 50 years, although more rigorous methods in the measurement of trust and its use to inform government policies and strategies across countries appear to be pursued in the last 25-30 years. Considerations in how trust is measured is critical for South Africa, because of disparate measures, processes and systems of data collection on trust. A consistent investment by public or private institutions in generating data on trust is not evident in South Africa even though some agencies have the capacity for primary data collection on trust. Internationally, several databases are available, many which include South Africa as a country case. As a start,
there is a need to understand who is collecting the data, how the surveys are conducted, how trust is conceptualized, the level of response rates and the demographic profile of respondents, to mention just a few.

Within South Africa, there are several sources of data on trust, with DPME collating related variables that draw conclusions on its implications for social cohesion. There are several agencies noted in Table 9 that generate data on trust. The Government Communication and Information Services (GCIS) uses the international agency IPSOS to generate contextually relevant data on trust for public analysis. The national statistical authority, Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), largely produces sector-based data with inclusion of a specific variable in selected sectors, e.g. trust in the police in the “ Victims of Crime survey”. Annexure B provides the landscape of data sources on trust nationally and internationally. Each have different variables and methods in data collection.

Apart from government sources, there are key generators of data on trust from the wider research system. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) produces the South African Social Attitude Survey (SASAS) which derives data on social attitudes and public values through a nationally representative sample since 2003 (as discussed earlier). There are different modules of data generated through consecutive years, thus building up a considerable data bank that has the potential to monitor social, economic and political values of South African citizens and the council has the capability to predict changes, based on interacting variables, thus contributing to the planning landscape from the social sciences lens.

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) was formed in response to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a civil society think tank. The direct link between justice and reconciliation are core to the approach to research and analysis. The institute developed the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) survey as a post-conflict national survey. It has also partnered with the Afrobarometer Survey network, that was discussed in earlier sections.

9.2. Current trust variables
An interrogation of the variables that are developed to measure trust in South Africa by these different agencies is necessary. Decision makers need to know what variables exist and how these can be used effectively to inform the narrative as well as analysis along the pathways of change. Defining and mapping the various variables provides the initial steps in complementing, integrating and identifying gaps. Table 9 shows the main sources of trust data available for the South African Government. The challenges of incoordination, paywalls and lack of institutional arrangements between different organizations present a disabler in producing consistent data sources, uptake and use of relevant trust data. A dependence on the private sector to generate data on trust, is a further challenge.

Table 9
Trust variables measured in South Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Construct variables for which data is collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Development indicators</td>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
<td>- Confident in happy future (Primary source?) &lt;br&gt; - Race relations opinion &lt;br&gt; - Country direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. GCIS / IPSOS</td>
<td>Direction of the country</td>
<td>- Political trust in government officials (national; provincial; local) &lt;br&gt; - Government handling of &lt;br&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>- Reducing the crime rate &lt;br&gt; - Uniting all South Africans &lt;br&gt; - Improving basic health services &lt;br&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Implementing affirmative action in the civil service &lt;br&gt; - Promoting equality between men and women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Human Sciences Research</td>
<td>South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS)</td>
<td>- Trust in institutions &lt;br&gt; - Citizen engagement &lt;br&gt; - Socio-political orientations &lt;br&gt; - Race relations and identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. Conclusion

A focus on trust in government through an international benchmarking exercise and evidence synthesis approach has demonstrated that trust is a multifaceted and dynamic construct. Many governments are seeking to influence trust positively, due to recognition of the centrality of the state in development. Evidence from various data sources demonstrate that trust in government is falling, and is further negatively affected by the current global pandemic for reasons that vary contextually. Evidence on trust in government draws attention to how social trust is built through active citizen participation in decision making and contributes to social cohesion and nation building. Institutional trust is dependent on competence and intentions of government, and in turn influences developmental outcomes and political stability. The competence of government to deliver quality services at the level and timely expectation of citizens is the foundation of a capable state. The intention of government to be accountable, fair/transparent and implement public policy with integrity and commitment to achieve developmental outcomes – have the combined influence of strengthening social and institutional trust. Trust is thus relational i.e. a resource to be invested in as well as an outcome (evaluative judgement) of government performance.

In South Africa, key factors have a direct correlation on levels of trust. Evidence point to a strong relationship between low levels of trust (distrust), inequality, racial tensions, and high levels of corruption. Despite the increased attention on trust in government and the valuable insights gained, measurements of trust remain a challenge. Consensus is needed on a working definition of trust for South Africa. Insights gained from the international benchmarking exercise show that social and institutional trust have a causal relationship. These inform proposed pathways to change using the three characteristics of the state – capable, ethical, and developmental –, as outlined in the MTSF Priority 1. Trust, being both a process (relational) and an outcome (situational) variable, is difficult to measure as a single indicator, pointing to a comprehensive measure of trust which requires contributions from all MTSF Priorities. Finally, trust is sensitive to time and circumstances, and therefore investment in consistent and continuous measures over time will yield more accurate information for government to assess its own performance and change course where necessary. It is hoped that the scoping exercise, international benchmarking and application of lessons on trust, will inform debates, discussions and constructive dialogue within government and beyond, towards achieving the desired developmental outcomes and impact over the medium and long term.
References


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Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA) (2014) Nation formation and social cohesion: An enquiry into the hopes and aspirations of South Africans, Executive Summary, A research report, Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection, Midrand.


Annexure A  Selected country cases

CANADA (2019/2020)

The Environics Institute for Survey Research found in 2019 that public support in Canada generally has either remained stable or is improving. Large majorities are satisfied with how democracy works in Canada and maintain that democracy is better than any other form of government. Most trust elections, and in recent years the level of trust in elections has been growing. Canadians are becoming more interested in politics, and fewer doubt whether governments are really that interested in what people like them think. Finally, most Canadians have trust in one another. These trends do not undo longer-term ones, several decades in the making, which have seen citizens become less willing to defer to elites. But they do suggest that, as the 2019 federal election campaign gets underway, Canadians can have considerable confidence in themselves as a civic society (Environics Institute for survey research).

Under the Covid-19 pandemic, trust in the Canadian Government increased according to the Edelman Trust Barometer, 2020, and found that the Canadian Government is expected to lead in all areas of the pandemic response.
CHINA

China has demonstrated historically higher levels of trust compared to other countries, associated with the authoritarian regime type. Data from the Edelman Trust Barometer 2017-2018 validates this, with specific reference to trust in government.

However, a recent study found that although officials showed higher degrees of trust in government, they demonstrated no significant difference from the general villagers on their perceived quality of national governance. Also, the effects of perceived quality of governance on trust in most levels of government have no significant differences between local officials and villagers (Han et al. 2019). This shows the differences in trust between levels of government and between urban and rural, associated with differences in class and income levels.

INDONESIA

2010 - Social and political changes in Indonesia have had profound impacts on Indonesian society and culture. To adapt to the situation, the Indonesian Government reorganized its bureaucracy, an exercise that involved changes in structure and systems that would result in modern and efficient bureaucracy. Democratic processes brought about two important results: (a) freedom of the press and (b) freedom of expression, and opportunity for increased “transparency” and “accountability” of government practices and decision making, while also opening room for “participatory government”. Therefore, these changes became an important source for building trust in government.

2017 – A study conducted in 33 provinces in Indonesia using the Asian Barometer Survey, revealed that public performance in education, health, population and security has an influence on public confidence in government in Indonesia.

2019 - Numerous studies in recent years have shown that public trust in the police force has only increased, and in some cases even doubled from 40 percent in 2015 to 80 percent in 2019. Moreover, the election saw an 82 percent voter turnout rate, one of the highest in the world. Contrary to democracy proponent’s fears of a police crackdown, law enforcement has resulted in widespread public trust in institutions and their ability to create a reliable election system. The Edelman Trust Barometer, 2019 rated Indonesia as the highest in the world when it comes to trust in the government and its institutions.

2020 - An analysis of a mixed-method survey of 500 participants found that the public’s perception of transparency in the government’s release of COVID-19 information is still at a low level. This perceived low level of transparency generates minimum trust in the information. Only 8% of participants trust the government’s information regarding the virus.
MALAYSIA
The latest IPSOS survey revealed that teachers, doctors and scientists in Malaysia are ranked highest in trustworthiness (Jan 2020).

Whereby in terms of professions, teachers, doctors and scientists are ranked highest in trustworthiness. The top 3 trusted professions are in line with the global survey results and again, personnel associated with media and government are ranked the lowest.

The IPSOS Malaysia study further revealed that public services, such as Education, Healthcare/Medicine, and the Armed Forces tend to receive more positive trust ratings from the public. Institutions such as banks (69%) and business leaders (68%), journalists (66%) and government ministers (53%) all receive low scores, but the lowest levels of trust seem to be reserved for politicians (44%).

The IPSOS Malaysia study further revealed that government (59%) and Media (58%) have the lowest trust levels among the citizens of Malaysia.

SINGAPORE
2017 - An OECD study showed citizen satisfaction with the Health Care (93%) and Judicial System and Courts (89%) in Singapore were the highest among all SEA countries. With 86% of people satisfied with the Education system and schools, Singapore ranked amongst the top - higher than the SEA average of 82.9% and the OECD average of 68.4% in 2017. In this area, Singapore displayed an excellent performance, emerging top in the 2016 OECD Programme of International Assessment (PISA) study. Moreover, in terms of access to services, Singapore fares the best on the index on the availability of educational materials.

2018 - Citizens continue to display high satisfaction with the Health Care-, Education- and Judicial systems in Singapore.

2020 - A survey conducted by IPSOS over the days when DORSCON (Disease Outbreak Response System Condition) alert level in Singapore was raised to Orange, revealed that Singaporeans remain confident in the government and the country's ability to contain and manage the COVID-19 outbreak.

While 74% of Singaporeans agreed that their income would be affected if the Covid-19 situation does not improve in the next 6 months, Singaporeans said they are confident that the Singapore Government would implement suitable measures to successfully guide the country through an economic downturn brought about by the virus. This confidence increased from 79% before DORSCON Orange to 84% after the announcement.
At a UAE Government Summit Thought Leadership Series in 2013, the focus was on “Building Citizen Trust in Government entities” aimed at strengthening public confidence and driving efficiency. Here 6 building blocks of trust was shared and widely engaged with. The OECD documented these in 2017.
Annexure B

Media coverage during COVID-19 mapped according to drivers of trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transparency</th>
<th>Integrity</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- It is important that governments keep the nation informed on the reasons for its decisions. This will breathe confidence into the ability of the State.</td>
<td>- A tug-of-war is playing out in the ANC over the release of the provincial integrity commission’s (PIC) Covid-19 corruption investigation.</td>
<td>- Government launched a R200 million Tourism Relief Fund. The aim is to provide assistance to small, micro and medium-sized enterprises (SMMEs) by way of a once-off capped grant of R50 000 per entity that qualifies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Unfortunately, that initial openness and transparency didn’t last.</td>
<td>- In South Africa, where corruption has always been rife, the spread of COVID-19 has turned into a looting spree. According to media reports, almost R450 billion of money earmarked for the country’s COVID-19 response has been stolen.</td>
<td>- On 12 July, despite the exponential increase in active cases and Covid-19 infections, President Ramaphosa announced that minibus taxis may carry 100% of the licenced capacity on any trip not longer than 200km. And can only load 70% in long distance or interprovincial trips.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To reduce the stresses of this delicate balancing act, the government needed to have remained as transparent as possible in its decision-making processes, with the president standing before the nation and explaining the rationale.</td>
<td>- “I am sure that you are aware that across the nation there is a sense of anger and disillusionment at reports of corruption in our response to the coronavirus pandemic,” Ramaphosa said in the letter.</td>
<td>Source: Allafrica</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transparency; News24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>Responsiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- A scathing report into the use of South Africa’s Covid-19 relief fund has revealed overpricing and potential fraud, the Auditor General says.</td>
<td>- Government and interfaith leaders share commitment to fight Coronavirus Covid-19 and corruption. President Ramaphosa held a virtual meeting today with interfaith leaders as part of ongoing consultation and collaboration between government and various sectors of society on South Africa’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.</td>
<td>- The South African Government’s initial health response was praised by the international community, given the early lockdown and extensive testing regime. The lockdown devastated an already precarious economy, which led to negative social consequences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- In some cases Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) was bought for five times more than the price the National Treasury had advised.</td>
<td>- Greater effort has been directed at localisation of the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to boost the Retail Clothing, Textile, Footwear and Leather (R-CTFL) industries, in light of the devastating effects of the Covid-19 in the sector.</td>
<td>- South Africa’s early interventions have delayed the Covid-19 peak. Its response is being implemented in the face of constrained resources and other challenges. The national commitment to responding to the epidemic provides hope that the country won’t experience the devastation seen elsewhere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The report also has flagged up 30,000 relief grants which &quot;require further investigation&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Source: Emerald; NEJM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mr Makwetu has been tracking the spending of 500 billion rand ($26bn; £19bn) which is equivalent to 10% of the country’s gross domestic product.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Source: Government communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BBC

Source: IOL; Global Citizen
## Annexure C  
Data sources on trust in government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Online access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center for American Progress</td>
<td>Trust in Government during the Trump era</td>
<td><a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/05/24/451262/Trust-Government-trump-era/">https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/05/24/451262/Trust-Government-trump-era/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalbarometer</td>
<td>Globalbarometer Surveys</td>
<td><a href="https://www.globalbarometer.net/">https://www.globalbarometer.net/</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Regional

| Africobarometer | The Africobarometer is a pan-African, independent, non-partisan research network that measures public attitudes on economic, political, and social matters in Africa. | [https://www.africobarometer.org/countries/south-africa](https://www.africobarometer.org/countries/south-africa) |
| Latinobarometer | Annual public opinion survey that involves some 20,000 interviews in 18 Latin American countries, representing more than 600 million people | [http://www.latinobarometro.org](http://www.latinobarometro.org) |
| Asian barometer | 1st wave covered 8 countries 2-4th waves covered 13 countries | [www.asianbarometer.org](www.asianbarometer.org) |

### National

| GCIS | GCIS tracker works in partnership with IPSOS to generate data on Trust for South Africa | [www.gcis.gov.za](www.gcis.gov.za) |
| SAIRR | Various social and economic indicators | Domestic Perceptions research |
| Brand SA | Pride; Active Citizenship; Social Cohesion | |